

SECRET

File LC 1000

given to  
AS  
Guide FOR

10 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

SUBJECT: Future of BDJ

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review

OKed by FAL

1. Messrs. [ ], [ ], [ ], and [ ] formed themselves into a working party to consider the recommendations submitted by [ ] regarding the future of the BDJ. In essence [ ]'s recommendations were to the effect that the BDJ should be withdrawn from the area of day-to-day political controversy in Germany. After this discussion the working party felt that the complete implementation of this recommendation would deprive OPC of a valuable tactical asset, which OPC must be in a position to utilize during the coming months.

2. The working party recommends, therefore, that the OPC Station in Germany be instructed to take the following line:

a. Dr. Schumacher should be approached, and it should be stated that there exists the mutual interest of fighting communism in Germany and especially in the East Zone of that area; that it would be of interest to learn from Dr. Schumacher and the SPD what could be done to make this fight more effective; that ~~of course, the United States Government has no funds available for that kind of operation but that~~ probably private organizations

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

and individuals could be interested in helping this cause.

b. Should the question of the BDJ be raised during this discussion the OPC representative could make the point that the matter could be investigated if Dr. Schumacher would be interested in it.

c. During another meeting with Dr. Schumacher it could be stated that the investigation of the BBJ has shown that it was organized primarily to:

(1) Combat communism;

(2) That a secondary but still extremely important mission is to further the concept of a united Germany in a unified Europe;

(3) That it was not organized to attack the SPD or meddle in German affairs.

3. In general it is believed that:

a. The BDJ should be utilized as a tactical instrument by the OPC field station in Germany, and it should continue to adopt a defensive line in any future controversies which may arise with any political parties.

b. It should not affiliate itself with any political organization. It should remain in the German sense non-political in type and structure.

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

SECRET

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

1. Background

The BDJ (KMPRUDE) is important to OPC from two standpoints:

a. To combat Communism and its instrumentalities throughout all of Germany. Its effectiveness in this regard at the present time is not high but on a long-range basis, KMPRUDE, we hope, will develop into quite an effective anti-Communist organization particularly in the East Zone.

b. To mold or influence public opinion in West Germany along the lines of U. S. foreign policy. In this connection, KMPRUDE has been utilized on occasion to counter certain policies and attitudes of the SPD which are contrary to U. S. interests. KMPRUDE is quite effective in this type of operation in West Germany, constituting, in fact, about the only efficient organization at OPC's command to organize ostensibly spontaneous mass meetings, to prepare and distribute posters on short notice and otherwise to be brought into prompt action as the occasion required.

<sup>b</sup>  
What follows in this paper deals only with point/above.

2. Problem

To determine whether to continue the use of KMPRUDE as a tactical instrument for OPC activities in West Germany in the light of strong SPD opposition, or to reorganize the movement into a non-controversial organization whose activities will be directed primarily to combatting Communism.

3. Assumptions

For the purposes of this paper we have assumed that the SPD's objections to KMPRUDE are based on the party's desire to avoid U. S.

meddling in internal West German affairs. The party has not expressed its objections openly in such terms, but has objected to the EDJ as an American creation which is non-democratic and whose principal leaders are definitely right of center if not neo-fascist.

We have further assumed that reorganization or other action taken by the EDJ itself will fail to satisfy the objections of the SPD. For this reason we have concluded that, if the atmosphere is to be cleared, high level discussions between an OPC representative and the SPD leadership are necessary. Alternatives to this position i.e. the complete removal of the organization from controversial fields of activity or its continuation in its present form without contacting SPD leadership have been ruled out for reasons of expediency.

#### 4. Discussion

KMPRUDE has its greatest present effectiveness as a tactical instrument, short-range in nature, for OPC's operations in Western Germany. OPC has employed the organization in furthering U. S. objectives during the East German elections, in counteracting opposition to the rearmament question, and other special one-time operations. Since the SPD generally was not in accord with the U. S. objectives for which the KMPRUDE group had been employed, it began to apply considerable agitation not only through the Kaiser Ministry and the Bundestag Committee on All German Affairs, but also through NIGGO against the EDJ. It is conceivable that these pressures could culminate in the SPD taking action on the Laender level to have the EDJ declared an illegal organization. Such action would be an extreme step on the part of the SPD, but cannot be discounted.

Recognizing at this time that it is not an objective of U. S. policy to undermine the SPD, it may be desirable to remove the EDJ from the controversial field of its activities. On the other hand, it is important to have available a covert mechanism through which pressures and barbs could be leveled against the Socialist party whenever needed.

This document is part of an integrative file. If separated from the main file, it should be subjected to individual systematic review.

The BDJ's controversial activities could be removed by rebuilding the organization into a group concerned solely with fighting Communism in Eastern Germany and taking only such anti-Communist steps in Western Germany which would have at least the tacit approval of the SPD and would be of such watered-down nature as to suit other political parties as well. This new concept of the BDJ would provide OPC with a long-range, strategic instrument, of use solely in combatting Communism but of no use in shaping the West German political climate in favor of U. S. objectives. It would also deny OPC the tactical propaganda weapon which could be employed at short notice, as it has been in the past, against a variety of targets. During the discussions in Washington on 7 March 1951, Messrs. [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted] agreed that to strip the BDJ of its present hitting power would be equal to complete surrender to SPD pressures. On the other hand it was felt that to ignore the SPD objections would be unwise.

5. Conclusions

It is believed that the main controversial issues confronting the SPD and OPC's operations in Eastern Germany, i.e. the rearmament question and the Schuman plan, may come to a climax within the next six months. Also the relations between the West German Government and the allied powers may have changed to such an extent as to make negotiations between OPC and the Government desirable. It is therefore important to play for time during that period by neither giving in to the SPD demands nor rejecting them in toto. It is further felt that this time gap could be bridged by entering into negotiations with the SPD—to be drawn out as long as possible—on the following basis:

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

can't this  
enough?

a. The framework of the discussions must be the problem of OPG/SPD relationship in general.

b. In order to retain the EDJ as an OPG tactical instrument the SPD should be informed that the EDJ was organized:

(1) Primarily to combat Communism

(2) To further the concept of a united Germany in a unified Europe.

It was not organized to attack the SPD or "meddle in German affairs."

c. It should be indicated that only our strategic control of the EDJ could assure the SPD of the EDJ's adherence to this agreement, since, without our control, the EDJ would turn for support to other interested parties such as the Ruhr industrialists who are probably eager to acquire just such an instrument for the purposes of anti-labor activities.

d. To satisfy the SPD's objective<sup>ms</sup>, if raised, that the EDJ is rightist and non-democratic, the point should be made that democratic elections within the EDJ were always foreseen and will take place as soon as the organization has crystallized.

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

Contingent upon the reaction to the foregoing  
matter of the BDI be discussed along the lines set forth in

DRAFT

6. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. Without affirming or denying United States direct  
interest in clandestine activities in West Germany, that

approach Mr. Rudi Shumacher to ascertain the  
exact nature and real motivation for recent complaints of  
U.S. meddling in internal German affairs. The Wehner con-  
versations in Washington might well serve as the point of  
departure for this initial approach;

b. At the outset of this discussion, it be made clear  
that Western interest in combating communism transcend the  
national interests of Germany alone, and must be viewed in  
the light of a united Europe of which Germany will be an  
integral part;

c. Recognizing the parallel interests of the SPD and the  
United States, an offer of assistance to the SPD in its fight  
against communism should be made requesting the SPD to stipu-  
late its needs in this regard;

d. Contingent upon the reaction to the foregoing, the  
matter of the BDI be discussed along the lines set forth in  
Paragraph 5 above, to which should be added the proposed high-  
sounding, vague program set forth in Attachment A;

e. Throughout these discussions the OPC representative  
bear constantly in mind our desire to retain control of the  
BDI to yield the absolute minimum to acquire the tacit

This document is part  
file. If separated from  
subjected to direct  
document series.

acquiescence of the SPD to its continued existence and expansion;

f. Mr. McFley be fully informed of this approach.

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.



## KMPRUDE Purposes

1. KMPRUDE stands for the freedom of the individual, and opposes political and economic enslavement in all its forms.
2. KMPRUDE opposes fascism of both right and left. It stands for free expression of the will of the people, for the rule of law, and the preservation of the constitutional rights of the individual.
3. KMPRUDE stands for national pride without nationalism. PRUDE is ready for the curtailment of national sovereignty for the benefit of a federation of free nations in Europe and the world.
4. KMPRUDE supports world security through a world police. Armed national security is supported only as a provisional necessity.
5. KMPRUDE will unmask the forces of Bolshevism and tyranny wherever they attempt to hide. Those who support such forces out of cowardice or temporary personal interest will be exposed. To enforce political honesty, PRUDE demands a law to make public all political contributions and force the publication of financial accounts by all political parties and public groups.
6. KMPRUDE believes that democratic rights (Burgerrechte) should be accorded to all who believe in such rights. All who join in the fight against tyranny are PRUDE's allies, and PRUDE will treat them as such.

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.