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## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

144

FROM : American Consulate General,  
Bremen

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 30, 1953

DATE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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SUBJECT: Former activities of local Technischer Dienst

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The following account of the extent and nature of the Technischer Dienst organization in the Bremen area was given to us by a former employee of the Consulate General, Paul Schmalenbach, who was engaged in the naval section of the Dienst. Schmalenbach was formerly a career officer in the German Navy, serving as Kapitänleutnant on the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" during the war. He came to work at the Consulate General in 1946, and served here in various capacities until his resignation in October 1952. He now represents a German machine-tool firm, and expects to go to the United States shortly to develop business contacts there.

According to Schmalenbach, the Technischer Dienst in the Bremen area consisted of some 10,000 men organized in a typical underground system. Each member knew only three others, one above and two below him. The whole movement in this area was under the control of former Waffen-SS Obersturmbannführer (Lt. Col.) Walter SCHMIDT (see Bremen's despatch No. 27, July 17, 1951), who is said to have good contacts in the higher echelons of still-active Waffen-SS leaders, such as Gille. He was one of those arrested in Bremen by the Verfassungsschutz for questioning about the Technischer Dienst following the arrest of Zinn.

Particular emphasis was given in Bremen to organizing crews which would, in the event of an attack by the Russians, seize and man ships which might be in the local ports at the time. Each crew consisted of master, helmsman, and engineering personnel, and was to be ready for action at any time. Teams were organized to seize and hold the locks so that ships could be navigated through inland waterways and out to sea. The chief purpose of these crews was to be the evacuation of selected Germans, who fell generally into two classes:

1. These persons in official positions who were expected to collaborate actively with a communist occupier;
2. These persons of sufficient ability, standing, and dependability to be useful to the Allied cause both during the war and after it.

The lists of such people were these infamous lists which received so much publicity at the time the whole affair was aired by the Hessian Government. Schmalenbach insisted that no one on the list was to be

Arthur R Day:dm

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
Members of the regular Dienst, as distinguished from the naval element were to remain behind in Germany solely for the purpose of gathering and transmitting information to the Allies. There was to be no sabotage or other overt activity.

Schmalenbach observed that all of the men who were active in the organization are still de facto members of an underground resistance group, and still maintain the contacts which they once had. He did not believe that they would come into action in the event of an attack, however, since the Army had taken their weapons from them last spring. Without small arms of some sort, he stated, they could not expect to seize vessels or protect locks which would both be the objects of considerable effort on the part of communist saboteurs and people who simply wanted to get away.

According to Schmalenbach, there was little relation between the Dienst and the BDJ. The most recent leadership of the latter, in particular, had little or no idea of the existence of such an underground organization. He seemed to have little but contempt for the BDJ, and could not conceive of it having much to do with an important and well-organized movement such as the Dienst, of which he was obviously quite proud.

Comment: Schmalenbach's account is probably reliable. He was prompted to give it when he learned, with some surprise, that the Consulate General had <sup>not</sup> been thoroughly apprised of the organization's activities. His estimate of the number of men involved may be high, and doubt is cast upon its reliability by his own statement that each member knew only a limited number of others. It is known that he had, and probably still has, good relations with Schmidt, since it was he who invited an officer of this staff to meet the Waffen-SS man at his house some time ago. Schmalenbach's own participation in the Dienst was, he claimed, simply another expression of his conviction that Germany and the United States must work closely together in the post-war world for their mutual benefit. (He added that his efforts, and those of many other Germans, in this direction, had, he felt, been set back considerably by the recent publication of the HICOG public opinion poll.)

FOR THE CONSUL GENERAL:

  
Philip F. Dur  
American Consul

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