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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 36994

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): DIRECTOR, CIA

OM: SR. REP. FRANKFURT   ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6   2101Z 12 FEB 53

FORMATION: DCI, D/DCI, DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2, PP/PAD.

FRAN 1552

TO: DIR   INFO: SBONN   CITE: SFRAN

BDJ/CADORY

REF: FRAN 1551 (IN 36911)

THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPD WHITEBOOK: "THE PLAN TO CARRY ON A PARTISAN FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE WILL SEEM SO UTTERLY SENSELESS AND USE= LESS TO ANY RATIONAL THINKER THAT HE MAY WELL HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE BDJ LEADERSHIP AND OF THAT OF THE TECHNICAL SERVICE. TRAFFIC CONDITIONS AND THE DENSE POPULATION OF WESTERN EUROPE DISCOUNT MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF A PARTISAN FIGHT FROM THE OUTSET. IT HAS BEEN RIGHTLY POINTED OUT BY THE PRESS AND BY THE HESSIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THAT THE EXECUTION OF THE BDJ PLAN WOULD BRING TERRIBLE SUFFERING TO THE GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION. IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER 1 IS FOR OR AGAINST A MILITARY CONTRIBUTION, THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE CAN NEVER BE EXECUTED FROM THE WESTERN RIM OF EUROPE OR FROM AFRICA. PARTISANS AT HOME AND THE ATOM BOMBS OF THE WESTERN ALLIES WOULD ELIMINATE THE NECESSITY OF A GERMAN LIBERATION

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BECAUSE NOBODY COULD SURVIVE THE ENSUING CHAOS. THUS THE CONCLUSION IS OBVIOUS TO ANY OBJECTIVE OBSERVER THAT THE T/S WAS NOT INTENDED BY ITS INITIATORS FOR MILITARY TASKS, BUT WAS INTENDED FOR THEIR OWN POLITICAL OBJECTS. HOW ELSE CAN ONE INTERPRET THE ADMONITION OF THE "RETIRED" BUT SECRETLY STILL ACTIVE FIRST CHAIRMAN, PAUL LEUTH, IN HIS ARTICLE IN THE WEEKLY "DIE ZEIT" OF 25 DEC 1952, THAT THE BDJ SHOULD NOT LOWER ITSELF TO BECOME A "KLEBEKOLONNE" OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES IN THE NEXT BUNDESTAG ELECTION. THE PROSKRIPTION LISTS AND THE "MANUAL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNAL UNREST" POINT LIKEWISE LESS TO MILITARY INTENTIONS THAN TO INTERNAL AIMS.

HOW LONG THE INTERIOR MINISTERS OF THE LAENDER OUTSIDE OF HESSE WILL PUT UP WITH THE DOINGS OF THE BDJ WILL HAVE TO BE SEEN. AT ANY RATE IT MUST BE EVERYBODY'S DUTY TO ADMONISH RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES WITH ALL MEANS AT THE DISPOSAL OF EVERY CITIZEN TO FULFILL THEIR DUTY. SOME OF THE MORE "ADROIT" POLITICIANS OF THE BONN GOVERNMENT PARTIES HAVE ADMITTED IN GOOD TIME THAT NO STATE IN THE WORLD CAN TOLERATE WITHIN ITS FRONTIERS THE FORMATION OF ARMED SECRET ORGANIZATIONS BY A FOREIGN POWER. IT IS OF NO CONSEQUENCE WHETHER THIS REALIZATION SPRINGS FROM HONEST CONVICTION OF FROM THE REALIZATION THAT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE LEGAL VIOLATIONS BY THE T/S EXCLUDES ANY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO BELITTLE THEM. AS A FINAL RESULT THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCLUSION WAS NOT DRAWN, TO PROCEED AGAINST THE T/S AND ITS BACKERS WITH ALL SEVERITY PERMITTED BY THE LAW, BUT ALL THAT WAS DONE WAS TO

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RECOMMEND THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT SO THAT IN THE FUTURE SUCH DEVELOPMENTS
WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. WHAT THOSE POLITICIANS HAVE FORGOTTEN IS TO
POINT OUT, WHICH (NON EXISTING) STIPULATION OF THE ALLIED TREATIES
CAN PREVENT A NEW "TECHNICAL SERIVCE". IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT CAN NEVER PREVENT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS.

ONLY PAUL LEUTH AND HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS CAN EXPLAIN WHO WANTED
TO CREATE A PRIVATE ARMY THRU THE BDJ IN VIEW OF THE FARREACHING
CONNECTIONS TO BONN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, TO THE OCCUPATION POWER, TO
FORMER NAZI LEADERS, TO ILLEGAL NEWS AGENCIES AND IN VIEW OF THE
INDICATIONS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET ZONE THAT IS, OF PANKOW.

END OF MESSAGE.