

27. FEB. 1953

Chief, EE

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Operational/CADORY

BDJ White Book

REF: FRAN 1551

1. Herewith is forwarded one copy of the book "Der Bund Deutscher Jugend und sein Technischer Dienst" (The League of German Youth and its "Technical Service").

2. The book was published by the Executive (Vorstand) Committee of the SPD.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

3 - Addressee - 1 Enc. h/w as above.

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15 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ] Chief, EE/PP/Germany

SUBJECT : Analysis of SPD Whitebook on the Bund Deutscher Jugend (BDJ)

- S U M M A R Y -

The SPD Whitebook is a biased account of the BDJ and the Apparat. In an effort to raise a facade of objectivity some favorable material is brought to light, but on the whole the effort is half hearted, and does not succeed. There is a great deal of information in the whitebook which is confirmed by LCPROWL reports and home office debriefings, but there are also many distortions and half truths contained therein. The whitebook does not prove the existence of the so-called murder or "Proskriptionsliste", but does make an effort to slant the information so that the reader would normally infer that such a list containing the names of leading SPD figures was compiled by the "Technischer Dienst" (Technical Service)(TD). The book is extremely critical of the United States role in the BDJ, but does make a concession in not attacking the U.S. outrightly. The intense enmity felt by the SPD towards the BDJ is evident throughout the book. In closing, the SPD bemoans the utter futility of partisan warfare in Germany.

\* \* \* \*

1. The whitebook opens with a resume of the charges leading to the four Länder ban of the BDJ. The organization is indicted for illegal partisan activity, planning civil war, right, and left wing radicalism. Although the anti-Bolshevist character of the BDJ is admitted, the accusation of neo-Nazism is emphasized throughout the whitebook. The secret services of foreign occupational powers and German industry are named as the financial supporters of the BDJ.

2. Paul Lueth, described as a self torn personality, former communist and black marketeer, is called the founding father and ideological driving force of the BDJ. The whitebook points out that the organization was patterned on Lueth's book, "Citizen and Partisan", a document which was the "Mein Kampf" of the BDJ movement. In accordance with previous plans the security division of the BDJ, section If, began the collection of data on KPD members and sympathizers. The SPD attacks Lueth rigorously for paying out large sums of money to Dr. Wagner of Munich for information on suspicious SPD personalities. The whitebook also contains charges in this section to the effect that the allies requisitioned the Abwehr in toto after the war.

3. Among the supporters of the BDJ the SPD names [ ] and [ ] [ ] and [ ]. In actuality these were the field aliases used by [ ] and [ ]. Four private firms, Dr. Lehr, and the Kaiser Ministry in addition to "American sources" are named as

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financial supporters of the BDJ. The salaries paid to Lueth and the BDJ leaders are branded exorbitant, and attractive primarily to dubious leaders such as Norbert Hammacher and Hans Otto. The latter subsequently betrayed the Apparat to the Frankfurt police.

4. The whitebook then launches a tirade against the internal methods utilized in the BDJ and the TD, in particular criticizing the use of personal history statements. This is followed by a description of the TD and several of its leaders. [ ] is then mentioned by name, although the SPD suspects his real name is [ ]

5. The training site in Waldmichelbach, the curriculum, the cover business <sup>of the TD</sup> and the inferior motivation of Peters are discussed.

5. At this point the whitebook takes up a careful study of the Security Section of the TD. A definite attempt is made to prove that the "Proskriptionsliste" contained the names of persons who were to be assassinated in case of a Soviet invasion. Hans Otto was the only person who agreed with this interpretation. Rietdorf admitted this was a possible interpretation, but he did state that this was not necessarily true. Rademacher claimed the persons named on the "Proskriptionsliste" were to be arrested in case of Soviet invasion. The whitebook, nevertheless, concludes there was no doubt as to the fate in store for these persons.

6. In Chapter XV the SPD charges that the BDJ carried out a blatant propaganda role while the "night workers" in the TD prepared for a Soviet invasion. Herbert Stettner, Frankfurt Falken leader, Martin Niemoller, Gustav Heineman, and Prof. Noack are mentioned as innocent targets of the BDJ. In this attack the SPD condemned the BDJ for pro-EDC activities, in a sense revealing the small area of tolerance permitted by the SPD itself.

7. Perhaps the most revealing facts are established when the SPD charges that the TD was not satisfied with the American support. The whitebook states that [ ] led TD men to Lich where they attempted to locate an American Army cache. Reference was also made to corruption in the TD <sup>when</sup> the whitebook correctly states that [ ] at one time asked Peters to cover deficits of DM 40,000. The whitebook also reveals that Garwood was shortly thereafter succeeded by another American who attempted to cut all ties with the BDJ and reduce the TD to 300 members. When he discovered this could not be done, the American announced on May 19, 1952 all financial support will be ended by September 1952. (This reference obviously refers to [ ] who succeeded [ ]) The SPD also stated ~~in the spring of 1952~~ that the BFV and LFV knew of the existence and mission of the TD long before September 1952.

8. As a part of the attempt to present an objective picture the whitebook includes an annex by a former TD member who points out that the TD originated after the Korean war from the realization that Germans must defend their homeland. The annex points out that the "Proskriptionsliste" were designed to take Russian collaborators into custody and

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thus save untold suffering among thousands of Germans who will surely be their victims. The former TD member also denied that any of the persons named by Zinn were included in the TD "Proskriptionsliste". He was equally outspoken in his denial that the TD intended to follow a policy or engage in activities which might invite retaliation in a Soviet occupied Germany.

9. In conclusion the SPD bemoans the futility of partisan warfare in West Germany, pointing out that "partisans at home and the atom bombs of the Western allies would eliminate the necessity of a German liberation". The whitebook asserts that any objective observer must conclude the TD was intended for domestic political goals.

10. The CDU and U.S. Government are criticized for abetting and supporting the BDJ. Not only is Paul Lueth, former BDJ leader, attacked for creating the BDJ with the assistance of the Bonn Government, the occupation powers, former Nazi leaders, <sup>10th</sup>illegal news agencies, <sup>but</sup> in the closing sentence he is said to have relations the the Soviets. This last conclusion is apparently little more than wistful SPD thinking in an effort to discredit Lueth <sup>in</sup> from all directions.

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A study of this whitebook reveals clearly that the SPD considered the BDJ a paramount enemy, entirely capable of generating a new totalitarian force in Germany. In their fear of Lueth and company the SPD lost objectivity, and did not hesitate to condemn the United States, private German industry, and other democratic German political parties for their real or imagined roles as supporters of the BDJ. Neither was the SPD reluctant to utilize German nationalism, or the forces of neutralism or pacifism in the struggle to eradicate the BDJ. The SPD revealed itself closely bound by its own party dogma, and only nominally tolerant of those who did not share its views. In a position of strength the SPD exhibited little willingness to compromise, a factor which should be borne in mind for future contingencies

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