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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation of Messrs, Reber and Joyce with Messrs.  
Dulles, Wisner and [ ]

1. Mr. Reber and Mr. Joyce called on Mr. Wisner in his office to talk about the PROWL affair. At a preliminary meeting at which Messrs. Wisner and [ ] were present there was a general discussion of events leading up to Zinn's speech in the Hessian Landestag.
2. Mr. Reber stated at the outset that he felt that much too much had been made of the affair in the U.S. and stated that he did not think that it, in fact, was of any real political significance in Germany. He quoted both Adenauer and Ollenhauer to the effect that they believed that the importance of the incident had been exaggerated, predicting that it would soon blow over.
3. Mr. Wisner explained that the agency as a whole had been deeply concerned by the incident and was fully prepared to accept responsibility for it and that failures on the part of agency personnel were fully recognized. He pointed out however that pressures from outside agencies were at least partially responsible for the fact that the agency was over committed. For example, the crisis at the time of the North Korean invasion had caused the Department of Defense and Joints Chiefs of Staff to exert pressures on CIA to establish assets faster than was desirable or even possible from the point of view of operational control. He stressed the Director's insistence that when flaps of the nature of the PROWL affair arose all agencies of the government must close ranks and work together.
4. Mr. Reber expressed himself as very sympathetic to this point of view and stated that both Ambassador Donnelly and himself recognized these obligations in the matter fully and were prepared to assume full responsibility. In this connection however Mr. Reber indicated some concern that he and Ambassador Donnelly had not been kept fully informed and indicated that there was at least an impression in his mind of a tendency on the part of the agency in Germany not to come completely clean until it was too late. As an example of this attitude he said he had not been made aware of [ ]'s unreliability as a witness until after he had been given some indication of HICOG's willingness to have him appear at the Joint German American Commission. He also felt that too long a time had elapsed between the time that CIA had received information concerning the alleged

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SPD lists in Zinn's possession and the time when Donnelly and himself had been fully briefed. He felt that if he had been able to approach Zinn personally sooner, he might have been able to persuade Zinn not to make the speech. He also felt that it was a mistake on General Truscott's part to send [ ] to see Zinn when a higher level person would have been preferable for the job. He was disposed to ascribe this reluctance on the part of CIA to keep him fully informed to General Truscott's lack of appreciation of the significance of certain developments and later, at lunch, repeated the statement stating specifically that there was no difficulty on the working level and no disposition on the part of operational people to "cover up". He affirmatively commended both [ ] and [ ] for their work and behavior during all negotiations. When asked about Mr. DeBevoise's admission to Ollenauer that the BDJ would be closed out and as to why this statement was made without prior coordination with [ ], Reber stated that General Truscott had several weeks ago authorized him to make such a statement if it was thought desirable.

5. At a lunch at which Mr. Dulles was present the foregoing points were reaffirmed. Mr. Reber indicated some apprehension concerning the security of the Lawyers organization and a cable has been sent to Bonn indicating his views. His views concerning the arms dumps have also been cabled to Bonn.

[ ]  
Chief, Eastern European Division

3 November 1952

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