

AEB

21 February 1957

Chief, EE
 THRU : Chief of Station, Germany
 Chief of Base, Berlin

CAGONY/Operational

Identity 1

REFERENCES: A. HRCW 31230 E. ERMW 5687
 B. HQQA 65155 F. DER 45816
 C. DER 45814 G. EGBA 37114
 D. ERMW 5656

1. Summary. This dispatch was begun as a commentary on that portion of the EE Evaluation Staff's paper on Identity 1 which was forwarded under Reference A (hereinafter referred to as "Ref. A"). While our comments were in preparation, References B, C, and E arrived. It has become apparent that basic questions on the approach to Identity 2 objectives in Germany are at issue and that Identity 1 - applying techniques different from others more commonly used - is the subject of an exchange of views on these objectives. Although it is particularly illustrative of the differences in views, we would like to make from the start a differentiation between the internal resolution of Identity 3 views on the one hand and the control and development of Identity 1 on the other. What follows is an attempt to single out the problems and to summarize BOB's views on each of them. We hope this will serve as the basis for mutually satisfactory consolidation of the several viewpoints now evident. This dispatch's contents can be outlined as follows:

SubjectParagraph(s)

Explanation of Distribution Practice
 Summary of BOB Comments Thereon
 Comment on Other Points of Fact

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Distribution:

3 - EE w/att. UNSEPCOV
 2 - COS w/att. UNSEPCOV

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 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2007

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2. Distribution. The first comment concerns a point of fact, and relates to the sentence on page 27 (of Ref. A), "It then appears that Identity 1 is producing beyond its capabilities to distribute." This conclusion is reached after it is pointed out that a substantial quantity of material remains on hand at the end of every month and that distribution of certain items was not completed until four or five months after printing. There is one point to be made in connection with the practice of carrying over from one month to the next a certain inventory of material: that this has been a question of judgment, not capability. In fact, where mail distribution is concerned, capacity is a function of available funds mainly. The other factors in capacity determination can be varied at will: Part-time workers to stuff and address envelopes can be hired and fired in accordance with need, and the 22 West German mailers have not yet approached the limits of their capacity. This capability is best illustrated by November 1956 operations when special emphasis was placed on quantity in order to take advantage of the Christmas mailing rush: 71,026 items were distributed (as against a recent monthly average of 30-35,000), and 44,150 were produced, dropping the inventory over that particular reporting period from 54,772 items to 28,603.

3. We feel that the EE Evaluation Staff was quite correct in citing the principle that informational material should be distributed promptly after its production and we agree with its general validity. Outlined below are some of the considerations which - in application to specific operations - have led to modifications of this principle and the current Identity 1 modus operandi:

1) We do not feel that a delay of 1-4 months in distribution significantly detracts from the effectiveness of certain Identity 1 products. (Please note that most of the copies of a particular

production are distributed within a month.) While reserving specific analysis for the item by item discussion below, it can be mentioned here that most Identity 1 products deal with trends and developments of significance which continue to be of interest over this time period at least. Feature items have still a longer life span. We have not felt it possible or worthwhile to compete with daily RIAS, SFB and other newscasts nor with western daily newspapers which are read in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

ii) A detailed study of production and distribution figures will show considerable flexibility in the amounts of Identity 1 staff effort each month put into various activities such as a) collecting addresses and information and recording it in usable form in card and addressograph files, b) keeping up-to-date on the correspondents' files (now about 850) and sending appropriate personal letters, and c) distributing mostly by West German mail from 20 to 70,000 items in the Soviet Bloc. Because the employees' efforts can be shifted arbitrarily among various activities they can be more efficiently utilized while, at the same time, the project is always in a position to exert a concentrated effort (neglecting other activities temporarily) on one operation if and when time is an important factor.

iii) Within this distribution framework, the publications which do lose value with age are given prompt distribution. Nachrichten aus Deutschland and Von Herz zu Herz (carrying ads taken from daily publications) are examples. Another is the rapid production and prompt distribution of the first Tunnel GMBH item (NSA 32320). More recent is the operation inspired by the worker unrest in Magdeburg last October: While reports were still in the press, Identity 1 selected 1,632 addresses located in the factory district concerned (from a Magdeburg address book) and mailed an Aquator Verlag item to each.

iv) In Berlin sector border sales, experience has shown that a greater volume of items can be moved if the salesman can display and offer a complete selection of Aquator Verlag publications. Under the present pattern of repeating a publication only once in four months, this means that a certain quantity (i.e. the best estimate of what will be sold) of each item is not distributed for four months. The pattern of purchases by East Germans (items are sold for DM.) does not support the Evaluation Staff's opinion that they decline with age in interest value.

v) Identity 1 hand distribution groups could probably handle larger quantities of material than they are, in practice, getting. This situation has developed from the project's hand distribution group history and is, at present, calculated to afford reasonable effectiveness. While we have established with reasonable certainty the hand distribution capabilities of these groups which survived the review and assessment of Summer 1954, we have always recognized the possibility that a group leader - if he thought he could get away with it - would just as soon privately destroy the material and collect his fee from Identity 1 for its distribution. It is only since the development of the mail distribution channel and the effective controls that Identity 1 has gained independence from, and the ability to realistically evaluate, the courier outlet. Mail gizmos, reader reactions, and questionnaires marked to identify their distributors indicate fairly conclusively whether or not the publication gets to the NSR reader and how it got there. The open possibility of abandoning hand distribution in favor of mail (or perhaps balloons) affords certain independence and objectivity in judging its effectiveness. These advantages have been exploited by Identity 4 and his assistant in dealing with the hand distribution group leaders. The impression is given that material is parceled out to them on a fairly sparing basis, that there are means of testing the distributor's effectiveness, and that if the distributor does not perform properly, Identity 1 would not find it difficult or damaging to break off the relationship. The result is that the distributor comes to Identity 1 for material (particularly if he needs to earn money) more often than Identity 1 to the distributor. Thus we feel reasonably certain - and tests tend to confirm it - that Identity 1 material is being distributed as reported by hand distributors. This situation is outlined to give more meaning to the term "hand distribution capacity." The distributors could, doubtless, handle more. We feel however, that the present balance is about right.

vi) A technical matter might also be noted here which has, perhaps, contributed to the impression that distribution is being unduly delayed. While an Aequator Verlag item may be in production over an entire month (fernsehreiber, Die Kurve, and Die Frau take longer.), it usually does not come off the press until near the end of a given reporting period. The monthly production/distribution report may thus give the impression that an item produced in one month is not distributed until the next. Strictly speaking, this is correct, but it should not be interpreted to mean that the delay between printing and commencing of distribution amounts to more than a few days.

4. To summarize our comments on distribution, then, the following are the pertinent points:

a. Identity 1 has the capability of distributing much larger quantities of material than it has averaged over the past year. Large volume distribution can be accomplished by an easily made redirection of effort. The principal limitation on mail distribution is available funds.

b. The current Identity 1 distribution pattern is a matter of judgment of relative distribution priorities, and a balance between the optimum number of employees and various other activities. Being arbitrary, it is subject to change and improvement. We consider it reasonably satisfactory.

5. Another point of fact for commentary is a "discrepancy" which was noted in the June 1956 Activities Report (Page 28, Paragraph F of Ref. A). There are a number of ways in which incorrect reading of the report could give rise to what appear to be discrepancies. Reference is made, however, to a portion of the review which was not forwarded to BOB so that we are, unfortunately, not able to provide the explanation.

6. With regard to Paragraph X. A., p 30, the Identity 1 Progress Report for April 1956 was not intended to suggest that the BV and Oberstaatsanwaltschaft investigations of the national editor of Die Kurve would lead to what Ref. A calls "an official investigation by the FEDERAL Government Commission which is now investigating other Identity 3 sponsored anti-Communist organizations in West Berlin." No connection between the national editor investigation and Identity 5 has existed, since developed, or is expected to develop. The investigation of the national editor was apparently dropped after Identity 4 clarified the matter with the Berlin Oberstaatsanwaltschaft. There have since been no developments in this connection but, in any case, we believe a Commission review would result in favorable findings.

7. Personnel. With regard to the sentence in Paragraph D on page 32 ("More details on staff members should be obtained from Identity 1 to complete Headquarters' records and to permit operational clearances for those individuals who have not cleared."), the following should be mentioned: All staff members (i.e. persons

of operational interest to Identity 1, and those permanently employed whose duties are other than envelope stuffing, address writing, and support work) have received Operational Approval or have applications pending therefor. Those still pending are listed below:

- a. HRBA 26945, 27 October 1955
- b. HRBA 28169, 7 December 1955
- c. HRBA 28171, 7 December 1955
- d. HRBA 28245, 12 December 1955
- e. HRBA 30068, 21 February 1956
- f. HRBA 30111, 29 February 1956
- g. HRBA 30697, 16 March 1956
- h. HRBA 32738, 6 June 1956
- i. HRBA 32741, 7 June 1956
- j. HRBA 34398, 3 August 1956
- k. HRBA 34399, 3 August 1956
- l. HRBA 35206, 10 September 1956 (Proprietary Approval)
- m. HRBA 36012, 12 October 1956
- n. HRBA 36285, 19 October 1956

One person (identified in Paragraph "g" of HRBA 33061) is slated for addition to this list. It is otherwise complete as of 31 December 1956.

8. Objectives. More important than the points touched on above are those which deal with the objectives and the effectiveness of the project. While we appreciate the importance of the security, support, and administrative aspects, we consider them secondary to the questions of what is being done and why. Unfortunately - and perhaps significantly - these are the questions on which the Field and Headquarters opinions are (with respect to Identity 1) farthest apart.

9. Before launching into a discussion of objectives, techniques, and effectiveness, we must note at the outset that much of our reasoning is inductive. Particular observations, incidents, and ideas are often expanded for general application. In the case of Identity 1, the acceptance and use of a particular thesis rests upon the experience of professional German journalists and publicists, plus specialized training and experience in psychological warfare, plus extensive contacts in and cooperation with commercial press circles, plus the advantage of a daily survey of a substantial portion of the GER press, and finally, the advantages of Identity 3 financial and other support. On this basis, we feel that the generalizations made below are valid. At the same time, however, we recognize that each has its exceptions and is subject to challenge and discussion.

10. The EE Evaluation Staff suggests that certain Identity 1 operations are not in line with Identity 3 objectives. Presumably the reference on this point is the EE Related Mission Directive, and the Evaluation Staff/BOB difference of opinion arises from different interpretations thereof. We shall outline our interpretation below with specific reference to Identity 1 operations.

11. Identity 1's approach to Identity 2 objectives in East Germany has two basic aspects:

i) To support the concepts of individualism, human dignity, freedom, solidarity with the West, and all other bases of the "spirit of resistance," (i.e. the so-called "simmering pot policy")

ii) To disable the apparatus of Communist control, i.e. the government, the party, the security services, mass organizations, etc.

The determination of appropriate techniques for attainment of these objectives is inseparably associated with the target audience. We have adopted a principle which is basic to the professional advertiser: Effectiveness is in direct proportion to the precision with which the characteristics of the target individual are determined and the advertisement adapted to them. In every operation, a genuine and reasonably successful effort is made to seek out a target group with known characteristics and to adapt the publication or letter to it. The precision ranges from an individual approach to each of the ca. 850 Soviet Bloc mail correspondents, to a group which is identified only by its sex - women.

12. There are, of course, countless "classes" within a population which can be identified by common characteristics. Many such classes in the EER have psychological characteristics which make them susceptible to approaches which Identity 6 groups can or do make to them. We feel that any valid evaluation of an Identity 2 operation should include among its "yardsticks" consideration of the target audience reached and the precision with which the medium is adapted to it.

13. For purposes of this discussion, we advance only one basic thesis: that the majority of the EER population is oriented against Communism and the Communist regime. Though the proportion probably varies, our guess is that it lies somewhere between 85 and 98%. This thesis suggests at least two deductions:

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perhaps
there is
no need
for our
activities

a. That, after 11 years of experience with it, the East German does not need to be told that the Communist regime is despotic, that his material position is worse than that of his countrymen in the West, that the Communist press represents a combination of half truths and lies, or that the Communist philosophy and propaganda is a hoax. In fact, we think that any attempts by the well-fed West to demonstrate or "prove" this to him would meet with disappointment at the lack of Western understanding, and perhaps bitter resentment.

b. We conclude, therefore, that there are about three kinds of things NSB can do through information media to support the "spirit of resistance:"

- (1) Provide objective news reporting.
- (2) Convey a sincere Western feeling of sympathy with, understanding of, and dissatisfaction with, the plight of the Moscow subjugated peoples, and
- (3) Place in the hands of the subjugated peoples usable and practical tools - largely information and ideas - of resistance.

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(By the latter point, we mean such things as areas in which individualistic and imaginative activity cannot be stamped out by the IER regime, questions embarrassing to the regime which a student could ask at a forum without endangering himself; guidance on how to act if pressed into service by the MFB; tactical suggestions to "Workers' Councils" in the current struggle with the regime for authority to participate in determination of wages and norms; and texts of speeches embarrassing to the regime such as those recently made by Gomulka and Tito (Turnel GmbH).)

14. Operations conceived to support the "spirit of resistance" among pro-Westerners do not, of course, serve that objective exclusively. Material which acts to strengthen an individual's personal feeling of solidarity with the West can also tend to disaffect a supporter of the regime. In general, the type of material most likely to have this double-edged effect is objective news reporting and other examples of the practice of Western democracy which can be described in the Soviet Bloc and which has minimal propagandistic connotations.

15. The foregoing outlines the general framework of objectives and approaches in which Identity 1 operations are conducted. In a discussion of individual items, we shall try to show where each fits into this framework and how each is intended

to achieve its objective. It will be noted that the project does not attempt to cover the entire range of Identity 2 objectives.

16. We have five general comments on the Evaluation Staff's review of the Identity 1 publications:

a. An attempt was made, apparently, to evaluate each publication on the basis of its appearance and content alone. This approach overlooks several factors which - in our view - are essential. These are the costs, the target audience and the publication's adaptation to it, the kind of distribution channel used, the degree of effectiveness in reaching the target audience, the attribution assigned to the publication (specific, e.g. Aquator Verlag, and in general, the West), and the integrity or logic (Identity 7 uses the term "Stilreinheit") of the operation as a composite of all these factors.

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b. There is an apparent difference between the Evaluation Staff's general thinking on objectives, appropriate techniques, and audience and that outlined above. We have this impression from such phrases in Ref. A as "articles which show the hardships and disadvantages of life in the East as compared to that in the West," "make them dissatisfied with life under the Communist regime," and "It is believed that this publication would be more effective if it included some material directly attacking the East German regime." We are interested in how the Evaluation Staff would rate these statements to current Identity 2 objectives in Germany.

c. Without exception, Ref. A attributes to each of the publications objectives and an approach which were not necessarily intended by its publishers as noted explicitly in routine reporting. (This will be evident from the item by item outline below.)

each must stand on its own

d. Three Identity 1 items were not considered by Ref. A - two from the Targeted Letter Series, apparently, because they did not appear until after the review. The other is the Satellite mailing operation.

e. It should also, perhaps be pointed out that the items in the Targeted Letter Series (with the possible exception of Tunnel GmbH) do not involve the financial and other outlay which the word "publication" implies. Each is edited and produced in the Identity 1 printing shop, with the result that paper, inks, and postage are about the only operating costs. (For example, Von Herz zu Herz costs about \$50.00 per month.)

17. Below is an attempt to outline briefly the conception behind each of the Identity 1 products, the essence of the technique, and the objectives. It should first be noted, however, that the audiences for each of the publications have been sought out with considerable precision. Identity 1 has, in its mailing offices, telephone books, classified (yellow-page) telephone books, and address books which - taken as a whole - cover the entire BER. The address books list each resident of a particular town or district. Using these books along with the substantial quantity of classified advertising in the East Berlin and provincial press, distribution personnel have been able to seek out doctors, professors, midwives, taverns, and other groupings which play a significant part in the conception of individual operations. The publications will be treated below in the following sequences (the first four being the Acquator Verlag publications):

Die Kurve:

A newspaper in the style of a "weekly," primarily for middle and upper class tradespeople.

Die Frau:

A magazine designed for female audiences.

Lehrschreiber:

A collection of sophisticated Western editorial opinion on timely issues, designed for the intelligentsia.

Extra:

A newspaper in boulevard style for persons of middle and lower intellectual level.

Nachrichten aus Deutschland:

A type of Identity 8 operation and a model item in the Targeted Letter Series.

SED Lagebericht:

A black circular letter designed for BER functionaries and attributed to an SED opposition group.

Klatsch:

A collection of trivia designed for Security Services, the Peoples' Army, and other regime supporters.

Horizont:

An attack on Communist functionaries through the vehicle of astrological analysis and prophecy, designed primarily for functionaries and secondarily for persons interested in or susceptible to this medium.

Von Herz zu Herz:

A collection of Western marriage advertisements compiled for East Germans seeking wives and calculated to stimulate East/West mail correspondence.

Die Gesundheits:

A four-page item devoted to practical problems of health maintenance for "healing practitioners" calculated to alienate functionaries and encourage absenteeism.

Das Schlagszug:

A four-page item calculated to spread the popularity of jazz in the Soviet Bloc.

Satellite Mailing:

Through encouraging exchange of publications among the Soviet Satellites, designed to sow confusion, exert a Westernizing influence on the press, and establish mail contacts.

Tunsel Gsch:

Documentary publication of speeches, etc. calculated to embarrass or otherwise hamper the Communist control machinery.

5. Die Kurve is conceived along the editorial lines of a weekly newspaper, the sort which stands above daily events, picking out trends and turning points. Content emphasis is on political developments with a tendency to view them from an economic standpoint. (Advantageous, among other reasons, because of the acknowledged economic superiority of the West, the economic plight of the DDR, and economic basis of Marxian philosophy.) This is balanced by a series of features - short story fiction, a picture section, theatre, a women's page, research and technology, etc. The point of heaviest emphasis is the front page editorial, usually an incisively aggressive and well-phrased summing-up by Identity 7. The overall impression sought is a contemplative review of world developments, informatively outlined, and principally for middle and upper class business and tradesmen in the DDR. It is distributed by mail, courier, and sector border sales. As of 25 January, 66 Soviet Bloc Die Kurve readers are corresponding with its notional editor. We believe Die Kurve serves the objectives described in Paragraph 13b, (1) and (2) above.

b. Die Frau is discussed in EEBA 35052, dated 30 August 1956. At the risk of oversimplification it can be described as an attempt to give - in a publication - to the Soviet Bloc women certain things which the Communist system cannot provide, both in terms of content and in technical quality (paper and printing techniques). While straightforward political polemics have no place in a women's magazine (although the issue following the Hungarian Revolt has a strong political aspect), the publication encourages imaginative and individualistic thought patterns and activities which are feasible for most women in the Soviet Bloc. These can be manifested in choice of wardrobe and makeup, decoration of the home, and upbringing of children, to name only a few. Also, Die Frau is probably the best example of a characteristic which, we hope, applies to all Identity 1 publications to greater or lesser degree: It is entertaining and interesting whether the reader is looking for a lecture on politics or not. In its quality - technical and editorial - it represents a level commonplace in the West but which, their recent efforts notwithstanding, the DDR has not been able to attain. Thus, the publication is a continuing source of embarrassment to them, and for the reader, its propaganda effect lies in the concrete attractive evidence of the Western desire to provide the oppressed population with moral support, and to do so in a manner evidencing understanding for their circumstances.¹⁾

1) Our contention that Die Frau has a strong political impact is challenged in References A and E. Coincidentally, a neutral but authoritative arbiter recently provided us with an opinion on this question: A West Berlin administrative court denied the 1:1 currency exchange privilege to an employee of Die Frau von Heute (the DDR's magazine for women) living in West Berlin on the ground that it is a political pro-Communist publication. The incident is described in West Berlin's Der Tagesspiegel (15 January 1957) as follows: "The periodical of the Communist Women's League, 'Die Frau von Heute' is a propaganda organ of the totalitarian system; whoever works there represents the opinions of the SED and combats the basic free democratic order. With this justification, the administrative court confirmed the revocation of the right of salary exchange of a female editor of this publication living in West Berlin. The 40 year old plaintiff, who lives in Neukoelln, has been working there since 1949 as editor and reporter for cultural questions and has been receiving the favorable exchange rate. The privilege has now been withdrawn. The plaintiff had maintained that only a non-political housewives' magazine was involved and that she wrote only non-political articles. (Aktenzeichen VG II A 345.56)"

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DDR publication
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(Objectives: Paragraph 11 (1) and Paragraph 13b (2) and (3)) Its primary target is, of course, women in the Soviet Bloc, and the subscribers' addressograph file consists of a selected group of appropriate candidates in this category. As of 25 January, Die Frau's notional editor is conducting active mail correspondence with 185 readers in the Soviet Bloc.

c. farnschreiber is, in its conception, an original idea of Identity 1, a publication designed specifically to fill a need which arises from the current political conflict. Each issue is intended to provide a complete and well-rounded summary of world editorial opinion on 3-5 developments of major significance. farnschreiber's approach is probably best summarized by the introduction appearing in Issue No. 1, Vol. 2:

"The commentaries printed here resemble a colorful fireworks display of opinions. Whoever reads them realizes: Here there is no party line; here, journalists have submerged themselves searchingly and objectively in political problems. They have made basic use of the right of free press to say loudly and clearly even those things which may be unpleasant or unwelcome. Even though the opinions and judgments may be widely varied, they are not an expression of disunion. Freedom of opinion rests on principles which have validity for all."

The audience for this publication - one which we consider a particularly significant target - is composed of people who read regularly the editorial pages of more than one newspaper: editors, journalists, politicians, and the intelligentsia. farnschreiber is the best example of an approach which is more or less common to all the Identity 1 products: It seizes upon some characteristic of Western Civilization (in this case freedom of the press) and, using it as a basis, builds an idea/publication which may be informative, interesting, entertaining, or all three. The publicist's skill is manifested in what he chooses and how he presents it to his target audience. The desired effect on the reader is the impression that the publication affords him something which is commonplace in the West (in this case a survey of freely expressed editorial opinion) which has been provided to him out of a sense of sympathy and desire to support him in his struggle with the Communist regime. Certainly he does not have to be told that such a thing is not available in the Soviet Bloc or that the Soviet Bloc press does not contain freely expressed opinions. (Of course, the pro-Communist

reader is made uncomfortable by the objectivity of the opinions and information as well as their diversity.) The essential point in the conception of a publication like fernsehreiber is that its acceptance by the reader (ergo its effectiveness upon him) rests on

a. its credibility as a genuine selection from accepted Western press media (as opposed, for example, to leaflets and other media which seldom appear in the Western press), and

b. the remoteness of propagandistic (with all the negative implications which the word implies) motives of the publisher.

We think that publication of fernsehreiber serves all of the objectives, to greater or lesser degree, outlined in Paragraphs 11. i) and ii), and 13b (1), (2), and (3). In addition to all DDR editorial offices, and those of the Western papers whose commentary is printed, the fernsehreiber addressograph files contain names of persons with academic or other titles which mark them as members of the intelligentsia. The notional editor is in regular mail contact with 44 Soviet Bloc readers of fernsehreiber. (In addition to the marked influence of fernsehreiber shown by the DDR press, it has received considerable favorable comment from professional Western journalists, e.g. Saishuenger Nachrichten and the German Federal Press Office.)

d. Extra is a modification of Das Illustrierte Wochenblatt which was introduced in September 1956 after prolonged discussions of the latter's strengths and weaknesses and general agreement that it was the least effective of the Identity 1 publications. It was conceived after the DDR government leveled criticism of a too liberal editorial policy at the DDR newspaper Die Wochenpost. Identity 1 began producing a falsified version of Wochenpost intended to exploit the situation. Political developments, and the gradual abandonment of the passive "anti-Communist" technique of copying their publications brought an attempt to give the Identity 1 Wochenpost a positive character of its own, and to produce it in a form generally accepted in the press field. In January 1956, the name was changed to Das Illustrierte Wochenblatt and an attempt made to compose it in the style of a daily newspaper. The fact that it appeared about once every four months and that distribution on a daily basis is not feasible are only two of the considerations which made this theory difficult of practical achievement. Dissatisfaction with Wochenblatt was increased by its relative inability (compared

with the other Aequator Verlag publications) to recruit reader correspondents. It was finally decided that we might well try capitalizing on the demonstrated attractiveness (i.e. high circulations) of the boulevard newspaper - that is: many pictures, short texts, features, a touch of sex, and a tendency toward sensationalism. For Identity 1, the idea was feasible insofar as content was not pegged on daily events and journalistic irresponsibility was avoided. The audience intended for Extra is that to which a boulevard newspaper appeals, the lower and relatively uneducated classes. The response to the first issue has been encouraging, reflected by a distinct rise in the rate of reader correspondent recruitment (as against that of Wochblatt), favorable comment and assistance from the chief editor of a successful boulevard newspaper (West Berlin's EX), several signs of influence on the DDR press, and what appears to be a rather unique harassment operation by the MfS (on which we expect to report shortly). A final judgment is not yet possible, but it appears that the editorial changes have created a significantly stronger appeal, and that the observable response is increasing accordingly. Its national editor is in active mail contact with 43 Soviet Bloc readers. The publication is designed to contribute particularly toward the objectives outlined in Paragraphs 11 i), and 13b (1) and (2) above.

e. Nachrichten aus Deutschland (NAD), in our opinion, comes close to being a model operation. Its theory and practice are described in some detail in EGBA 29677 (17 February 1956). The "integrity of style" (Stilreinheit), to which we alluded above, is manifested by a high degree of consistency in consideration of all the following factors:

- 1) Selection of a specific target audience;
- 2) Determination of objective(s) with respect to that audience;
- 3) Selection of a medium appropriate for the objectives and the audience;
- 4) Selection of attribution which is consistent with audience, objectives, and medium;

- 5) Selection of a distribution channel which is consistent with audience, objectives, medium, and attribution;
- 6) Selection of a follow-up method consistent with audience, objectives, medium, attribution, and distribution channel.

The MAD target audience is defined by appearance in the BBR and other Soviet Bloc press of names and addresses of individuals who publicly support the Communist regime. (Identity 1 has carded and addressographed more than 2,000 such names.) Such people regularly appear as authors of pro-Communist "Letters to the Editor," recipients of awards for outstanding party or mass organization work, etc. The objective with respect to that audience is to deny to the regime the assets which such persons represent. (In other words, a kind of Identity B operation). The selection of the technique arises from concurrent consideration of medium, attribution, distribution channel, and follow-up possibilities. The basic conception is that of a West German publisher (notional publisher of MAD) of a Newsletter (somewhat like the Kiplinger Letter in the United States) - a kind of mysterious observer of people and events in East Germany, apparently concerned with supplying accurate information to supporters of the regime and who leaves other possible motivation to the conscience and imagination of the addressee. The reaction sought in the target individual (aside from the news information which debunks the Communist line) is an apprehensive realization that he is being watched by someone in the West who may some day call him to account. The repeated reminder (MAD appears and is mailed about once a month.) to a person faced with the psychological problem of daily rationalizing his support of the regime is intended to dampen his enthusiasm and eventually bring about his withdrawal from pro-Communist political activity. Aside from target personalities who have taken up correspondence with the notional publisher, we have been able to observe several gratifying indications of effectiveness: i) A person cited as an activist in Letschin (Kreis Seelow) has apparently disappeared from public life, at least insofar as could be determined from local publications (Reference: the local "Notizbuch des Agitators"). ii) A person who had fled the BBR and later returned wrote to the notional publisher in an apologetic tone which clearly evidenced a guilty conscience and need for self-justification. iii) A farmer who had never been sent MAD wrote to the notional publisher with an explanation of a news story which falsely made him look like an advocate of the regime - an indication, we hope, that the concept of the notional publisher

has already spread beyond his target audience. iv) Finally, it is interesting to note that - after the MAD operation had been underway for about eight months (i.e. Summer 1956) - the DDR press stopped printing the complete addresses of the MAD target audience. To return to the idea of "integrity of style," please note the specificity of the target audience and the objective, the conception of the systematically well-informed publisher, the newsletter medium (personal and confidential), the fact that all newsletters are distributed by mail, and that it is natural for a publisher to write occasionally to his "subscribers" (follow-up) asking for opinions and suggestions. The national publisher, as of 25 January, is in active mail contact with 57 of his "subscribers." To summarize, the MAD operation is a continuous and, we think, effective attack on a specific audience, designed specifically to contribute to objective 11 ii) above.

f. SED Lagebericht is conceived as a circular letter, periodically published by an opposition group of Communists within the SED. It is written for Identity 1 by a German former Communist, now recognized as an expert in this field (Identity 9). It is mimeographed on low-quality paper and mailed from within the DDR. The basic address material was given to Identity 7 by a fellow journalist in 1948 and allegedly represents information given to Occupation Authorities by Communists attempting to justify their claims for extra rations by describing their anti-Nazi activity. The letters contain analyses of current events from a socialist viewpoint and in Marxist jargon - interpretations of theory which contradict DDR regime practice. The objectives are to alienate from the regime its convinced Marxist supporters (The Wolfgang Leonhard types, for example) and to provide them with valid Marxist arguments against DDR regime policy. This corresponds with the objectives in Paragraphs 11. ii) and 13b (3) above. Although we have no specific and documentary evidence of the effectiveness of this item (It carries no attribution and its readers cannot, therefore, write to the publisher as they do in the cases of other Identity 1 publications.), our judgment is that its editorial quality and the proven method of distribution (mail) guarantee reasonable impact. Also, the DDR press occasionally reveals reactions which might possibly be ascribed to the Lagebericht.

g. Klatsch is conceived as a direct attack on the Nationale Volksermee (National Peoples' Army) and the DDR security services. The technique has several aspects: First, it is entertaining enough to guarantee a certain readership - target audience, postal censor,

or mailmen. Second, it is a distinctly Western product: Trivia of this kind is printed and otherwise circulated so widely in the West that it is commonplace and taken for granted. In the Soviet Bloc, however, trivia and gossip are alien to the basically political and argumentative press. Klatzsch is aimed at this contrast and at East German readers who, we think, particularly appreciate it. Third, it is well suited to put rumors into circulation. While it makes no claim to veracity, it prints items in a context calculated to inspire a chuckle, stick in the memory, and to be repeated. Fourth, through humorous ridicule of politicians Eastern and Western, it demonstrates a privilege peculiar to the free world and provides the reader with an anecdote at the expense of the Communist regime. Finally, much of the trivia is taken from the Western scene - imagination catching items which focus attention on the West, and tacitly note that they have no counter-part in the East. The address list consists of a list of about 1500 KVP members provided by a former member of the UK Political Affairs Staff in Berlin to Identity 7 and the Identity 10 "Informant Warning Lists." Three types of indications of effectiveness have been noted: a marked rise in the amount of space devoted to trivia in the DEA press including use of items first carried by Klatzsch (i.e. a forced modification of the Marxist press); publicity attacks of the type described in MEMA 34301; and the 11 (a relatively low figure) DEA readers with whom the notional publisher is in mail contact. It is designed to serve the objectives described in Paragraphs 11 11) and 13B (2) and (3) above.

b. Horizont is conceived as a direct attack on advocates of Moscow Communism through the vehicle of astrological analysis and prophecy. This vehicle is another example of a commonplace phenomenon on the Western scene which takes on political significance when transplanted to the Soviet Bloc. In the West, it is studied without restriction by its advocates; others find it entertaining; few take it seriously. (It is perhaps worth noting also that astrology is much more popular in Germany than in the USA. All but the intelligentsia-oriented publications regularly carry horoscopes. Handkers on Berlin streets can be heard to describe their paper's astrological contents in preference to the news.) In the East, it is damned by the dogma as superstitious and "unscientific, and "refuted" by the precision of dialectical materialism. Under such attack it becomes a cause celebre which attracts the attention of persons who would - under

Western circumstances - be uninterested, but who recognize in it a vehicle for expression of their animosity toward the dogs and the regime. For the above reason alone, it can be seen that circulation of astrological material and ideas behind the Iron Curtain is in the interest of the Western cause (Paragraph 13b (3) above). Another argument can be made to show that peoples under oppression like that of Moscow Communism strongly tend, psychologically, to seek escape in such things as religion and superstition; that therefore the seeds of astrology find fertile soil in the East. Finally, it can be noted that some people are guided and a larger number are influenced by what appears in their horoscopes. (Identity 4 has an acquaintance who was brought to the verge of suicide by his horoscope. That Adolf Hitler was strongly influenced by his personal astrologer is a matter of historical record.) We think, therefore, that Horizont not only promulgates a general idea antagonistic to Communism, but also that it publicizes specific and suggestive analyses and predictions which are not without effect on Communist authorities and their antagonists. Accordingly, two specific target audiences are sought out: The first is a list of party functionaries and MfS employees, the second, a list of DDR pubs and taverns. (The objectives are in Paragraphs 11 ii) and 13b (3) above. The indications of effectiveness are of two kinds: First, the eight Horizont readers in mail contact with Horizont's notional publisher; second, the fact that DDR propagandists find it necessary to attack astrology continuously as unscientific superstition. This attack is manifested in a superabundance of press articles, hundreds of which have been forwarded to Headquarters in the past year. Indeed, a book dedicated to the same purpose was recently published. (Gerhard Doerenz: Magie, Sternkunde, Spiritismus, Urania Verlag, Leipzig/Jena, 1956). Interesting, too, is a sequence begun when Die Welt recently printed a horoscope which boded well for the SED. Very likely because favorable predictions of this kind are very rare and because the party has come to appreciate their impact, the Welt item was prominently reprinted in Neues Deutschland.

1. Von Herz zu Herz was conceived with a view toward exploiting the rather prosperous "marriage bureau" business in Germany and the substantial surplus of marriageable women over men which is particularly acute in East Germany. Its objectives are:

- (1) To encourage correspondence between East Germans and Westerners (i.e. Westerners who place "get-acquainted ads" in newspapers).

- (2) To encourage East German consideration of the material advantages of marrying a Westerner as opposed to a person whose dowry includes a share of Communist oppression.
- (3) More mail contacts for Identity 1 and the chance to investigate this field for other Identity 2 possibilities.

Of course the fact that the national publisher has evidently founded an East/West German "marriage institute" also falls under objective in Paragraph 13b (2) above. The audience has been easy to reach: The DDR press contains a large number of individual marriage advertisements and DDR marriage institutes also make frequent use of the same medium. As for effectiveness, the national publisher has received a written reply for every 133 items sent into the DDR in 1956. (She has also been told - ~~unverified~~ information - that two marriages have resulted.) We are sending Yon Hark in Hark to one DDR institute in about 12 copies and are reasonably certain that they are further distributed from there. (This institute has advertised "free lists" for its clients.) As a by-product of undetermined value, we have also learned quite a bit about the post-World War II history of DDR marriage institutes (from the 27 MAIL contacts) and their current problems.

J. Die Sprechstunde grew out of the concept "Managerkrankheit" (managerial illness) as applied to SED functionaries suffering physically under the increasingly heavy work-load imposed on them by the party. Its objective is two fold: to identify (in the minds, particularly, of functionaries) the physical repercussions of overwork on behalf of the regime and to suggest, tacitly, to the sufferer the possibility and a justification for absenteeism. The mailing list consists primarily of "healing practitioners" (Heilpraktiker) and midwives. The effectiveness is difficult to assess. The national publisher is in mail contact with 5 DDR readers and we note fairly often in the DDR press articles on the same theme. (Whether the articles are printed for the same reasons and whether there are relationships between their publication and Die Sprechstunde are, of course, open questions. In terms of the objectives outlined above, this item falls under Paragraph 11 ii) and 13b (3).)

k. das schlagzeug is calculated to encourage the playing and popularity of jazz in the DDR. For an excellent outline of the objectives and techniques please see the attachment to MEMA 37696, pp 17-24. Along with astrology, we consider this one of the most potent psychological forces available to the West for an attack on Moscow Communism. The response to the two issues which have appeared thus far (September and December 1956) is unprecedented: For every 88 copies distributed, a written reaction has been received by the notional publisher, including a number from FDJ Chapters. The audience was originally conceived as youth organizations and jazz fans, not as easily identified from telephone and address books as some of the other categories singled out by Identity 1. FDJ meeting places, dance halls, etc. were included in the first mailing list. In practice, we find that schlagzeug apparently moves frequently from hand to hand. Many correspondents say they saw a copy in the possession of a friend or that it was passed along to them. The mailing list, therefore, is growing to include persons who have requested personal copies. In short, we consider this item one of the most effective in the Identity 1 list and most susceptible to further development and expansion.

1. The concept of Satellite mailing operations is based, briefly, on the theory that the Communist character of the press is most marked at the geographical center of the Soviet Bloc, and that - because of the necessity of adaption to the traditions and tastes of individual peoples - it becomes less marked (i.e. more "Western") as one progresses from Moscow, say, to the European periphery, the DDR. While this is a generalization and not without exceptions, it can be noted, for example, that the DDR press is more Western in character (because it must be adapted to German tastes) than that of the Soviet Union and most of the other Satellites. It follows that a relatively Western influence can be exerted on Satellite editors if their readers can be stimulated to agitate for publications like those in the DDR. Since the DDR publications are, in general, much more attractive than their Satellite counterparts, Identity 1 has sought to exert this kind of pressure by creating notional East Berlin Communist agitators who seek "pen-pals" and the exchange of publications in the other Satellites. (A special arrangement permits mailing to and from East Berlin.) Although the approach in this case is on a strictly Communist "Comrade" basis, the letters of a number of the correspondents suggest that they see through this approach and guess that they are in contact with the West. The best example is a Prague newspaper correspondent who visited East Berlin, found the address of

his West Berlin Identity 1 correspondent to be nothing more than a bombed-out ruin, returned to Prague, and continues the correspondence as enthusiastically as ever. The effectiveness of this approach is indicated by the response: For every 13 addresses approached, one has become a mail contact. As of 25 January, the total is 205 and - particularly since November 1956, it has been rising fast.

m. Beginning with the special publication dealing with the West Berlin tunnel incident in April 1956 (HDBA 32320), the Tunnel Gabb series consists of authentic reports of speeches and protocols deemed by Identity 3 to be significant in the cold war. To date, it has published and distributed speeches by Lee Bauer, Chruschev, Gomulka, and Tito. The latest issue contains the minutes of the 19-21 October 1956 meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party - the meeting at which leadership passed to Vladislav Gomulka. Tunnel Gabb is the only item of all the Identity 1 publications which is distributed indiscriminately to all addressees in the card and addressograph files. It serves the objectives outlined in Paragraphs 11 ii) and 13b (1), (2), and (3) above. As far as recruiting reader correspondents is concerned, it has the poorest record. (4,383 items per recruitment) In view of the character of the item, however, we are fairly confident of its effectiveness and do not feel that the "recruitment yardstick" is exclusively applicable.

18. In the following concluding paragraphs, we are summarizing our comments on the issues raised by the references, including some of their general implications for Identity 3 conduct of psychological warfare operations based in Berlin. The first point is to note that the foregoing discussion does not cover all the reasoning behind the individual Identity 1 publications and Targeted Letters, the efficiency of their distribution, and their effectiveness in securing desirable responses from the target audience. We might have quoted much additional favorable commentary, for example, by commercial publishers, public officials, and news editors. And - more to the basic point at issue - we might have quoted from letters of the more than 850 members of the target audiences in regular mail contact with Identity 1. We feel that these points have been discussed with reasonable thoroughness in earlier correspondence and in the monthly Activities Reports. Here, we would only like to note our feeling that the Evaluation Staff appears to us to overlook the fact that each operation is based on a complete review of Identity 2 objectives, a high degree of sophistication in political analysis, familiarity with the local scene, appreciation of the target audiences' "mental set," journalistic professionalism, psychology, area (and language) knowledge, and psychological

warfare and experience. Although personnel equally qualified are entrusted with the evaluation responsibility at Headquarters, we suggest that the physical distance (not to mention elapsed time) between them and the area of operations renders it difficult, if not impossible, to produce an accurate evaluation.

19. Secondly, since Ref. A does not, in our opinion, attach sufficient importance to Identity 1's Reader Correspondents, we are describing them here and outlining our thoughts on this activity. Identity 1 defines the "Reader Correspondent" (Leser) as "a person who has given a specific political reaction which is observable and documented," (thus excluding anonymous letters and all mail control returns). Mail contact with such a person has at least three aspects:

i) As an indication of effectiveness, the reader's letter indicates how a target individual responded to the operation (not merely that the distribution apparatus was successful in one case).

ii) As a persuasive instrument, the mail contact has continuous psychological significance, acting in the sense of the objectives i) and ii), Paragraph 11 above.

iii) It is a potential basis for public opinion research inside the Soviet Bloc.

The latter possibility is a field which, we think, holds considerable promise. The science of poll taking (long supported in the USA by the demand for market research information and popularized by elections) is beginning to attract considerable attention in Germany. Die Welt recently opened a discussion of the influence of 2,000 polled citizens on Bundestag politicians, posing the question of whether or not it is healthy. In the Soviet Bloc attention to this field was marked by the appearance of a reader questionnaire in an August 1956 issue of Das Volk (Moscow). The DEW press has, in recent months, announced the conducting of several polls and introduced discussions of opinion research. (We cannot demonstrate a connection, but it is worth noting that Identity 1 introduced questionnaires into its publications in Fall 1955 and has since been practicing this technique with increasing intensity e.g. the poll results published in the November '56 Das Volk.) When Aquator Verlag has accumulated about 1,500 - 2,000 Reader Correspondents, it will be in a position to poll the DEW on a reasonably representative basis. We think this will represent a particularly potent instrument in the field of German public opinion, both East and West.

20. With regard to Paragraph 3 of Reference F, we wish to note that HOB use of the term "experimental" is intended to mean that Identity 1 is continually seeking to discover and develop new techniques in pursuit of Identity 3 objectives. We feel that this is particularly necessary in Identity 2, a still developing field. Please note also that this approach is not intended to justify a Field desire to increase indiscriminately the list of operations conducted by a given project. It is also manifested in the radical changing of character in some publications and the termination of others.

21. Running through the EE evaluation and in References B, C, D, E, and F is an apparent opinion that the effectiveness of Identity 1 items suffers because it is not "forceful" enough. It will be apparent from the foregoing discussion that we disagree with this view. Constructive discussion of the question would have to include consideration not only of the objective, the target, and techniques but also of the particular circumstances of Germany, principles of persuasion, psychology, etc. etc. etc. We submit that such discussion and agreement on approaches by Identity 3 elements concerned is necessary, but do not feel that it can always be accomplished in written and formal correspondence. This suggests, perhaps, a series of discussions among appropriate Identity 3 staffers and agents along with necessary TDY assignments.

22. One of the most evident variances between Headquarters and HOB views lies in the placing of content of printed matter in proper perspective with respect to the effectiveness of a psychological operation. We think that the Ref. A attempt to read directly and exclusively from the printed matter the operation's objectives, technique, and effectiveness is basically responsible for the conclusions which diverge from those of HOB. The Identity 1 approach begins with formulation of an objective (in support of Identity 3 policy which is not subject to modification by HOB) and ends with the response of the target audience to the operation. Comparison of the response with the objective is the measure of the operation's effectiveness and could, quite conceivably, be undertaken with little or no reference to the content of its printed matter. If this view is adopted, the evaluation of a psychological operation becomes a matter of ascertaining the target's response. Particularly in denied areas, this is a complex problem which goes beyond empiricism to include reasoning, hypothesis, instinct, and - unfortunately - controversy. We submit that there are two approaches to determining the target audience's response to a particular operation: first, observable reactions to the operation and second, the validity of the operation's conception as based upon applied professional skills, experience, area knowledge, and imagination of its sponsor. Neither is conclusive, but in combination they afford certain, if not unqualified, conclusions. It is apparent that such conclusions frequently rest on generalizations and hypothesis subject to discussion and

rebuttal. We feel, however, that the conceptions of the various Identity 1 operations are the results of rather hard-won Identity 3 experience in a new field. And - with respect to a psychological approach to the target area with which Identity 1/Identity 7 has been concerned for about seven years - we think these operations (and the analyses which are their prerequisites) demonstrate a high degree of professional skill. The addressees will understand our reluctance, therefore, to accept an evaluation (or the recommended "reorientation" in Reference B) which not only does not come to grips with the theses outlined above and in previous Identity 1 correspondence, but also fails to suggest alternatives which capitalize on experience of the last five years as applied to current Identity 2 problems in Germany. As already noted above, we think the resolution of these differences cannot be accomplished in written correspondence. Accordingly, consideration of the possibilities of oral discussions is again suggested.

23. Finally, we wish to object to the use of the term "mass propaganda operations" when this implies an indiscriminate approach to an indiscriminate audience - with results which cannot be evaluated. Reference C, paragraph 1 A states, for example, "There is no objective standard by which optimum quantitative level East German mass propaganda operations can be determined. Decision as to level admittedly arbitrary" The need for objective standards is recognized, we think, by all Identity 3 elements concerned and Identity 6 has, for some time, been trying to develop any "yardsticks" which would aid in the assessment of individual operations. Identity 7, for example, expressed this search in terms of setting up a "propaganda formula" which would express fixed relationships, with due consideration to all factors involved, between the costs of a psychological operation on the one hand and its effectiveness on the other. Such a formula is, of course, an unattainable ideal. But we do not feel that the admitted absence of absolutely objective standards justifies the opposite and extreme conclusion that there are no standards against which individual operations can be evaluated. Listed below, for example, are a few which are consistently applied to Identity 1 operations:

- a. The relationship between the operation's immediate objective(s) and the general objectives of Identity 3 policy.
- b. The political significance of the target audience.
- c. The validity of the operational concept with respect to stimulating the desired response in the target audience.

d. The skill of execution of the medium. That is, how well is the medium (magazine, personal letter, leaflet, newsletter, etc.) adapted to the target audience and the operation's concept?

e. The operation's "integrity of style." (Paragraph 17e above)

f. The degree of efficiency with which the medium is delivered to the target audience.

g. Observable responses:

(1) Letters to the editor

(2) Other documentary reactions such as returned letters which the addressee has refused to accept, and anonymous letters.

(3) Reproduction of the medium's content in publications within or reaching the target audience.

(4) "Signals" of recognition given by Soviet Bloc publications to acknowledge receipt of the medium.

(5) Adoption by Soviet Bloc publications of techniques and themes introduced by Identity 3 media.

h. Effort expended by the opposition to thwart the operation(s), and the method in which such efforts are made.

i. Independent "expert" opinion on various phases of the operations, e.g. publicists, publishers, journalists, politicians, and postal authorities.

j. Dialectical arguments by the opposition which they find necessary to counter the Western attacks.

The above list (suggested with Identity 1 in mind) is certainly not all inclusive and the various indices are not equally applicable to all operations. We think that the progress made in developing standards of this kind is significant enough, however, to deserve consideration in any evaluation of individual projects or operations.

24. In conclusion, there appear to us to be three basic problems with respect to Identity 1:

a. Establishment of the funding channel and incorporation of Acquator Verlag. Apparently agreement on this point has been reached (References G, A and B) and we await Headquarters' advice on implementation.

b. Objectives being a matter of specific policy, general agreement must be reached on the techniques suited to their pursuit. Since the major features of Identity 1 are accepted, agreement on techniques can be reached after a step by step substantiation of each phase of activity.

c. A general line for future development must be agreed upon which provides for a broadening base of financial support for Identity 1, and its increasing acceptance by the general public. As a possible goal we suggest that Identity 3 might eventually (through the Identity 11 group of anonymous donors) cover only the Identity 1 overhead expenses and perhaps the Targeted Letter Series while other publications, e.g. the four Acquator Verlag items and perhaps the Tunnel GmbH series, could be bought on a contract basis by Identity 12, USIA and other private and official organizations.

C

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HQBA-39340

Identities:

1. LOCANSOCK
2. KUCAGE
3. KIBAPK
4. CAUFERY
5. DELINER Exports
6. CAERAE
7. CAERER
8. CAERAK
9. []
10. []
11. PEPRINE
12. CANASH

Distribution:

- 3 - HE
- 2 - COS

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