


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
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1		The US	SR also	suppo	rts Arc	gentina	a in it	s disr	ute	Å.
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1 2	The	relati	onship	with t	he Sov	ets al	llows A	rgenti	na	, <b>\-</b> 7 \$∫
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9 May 1980

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opportunity to vent its irritation over US human-rights	
and nuclear-proliferation policies and the termination	3.5(c)
of Washington's military assistance programs.	(-/
Hadding on D mill odly doblb canob programs.	
Moscow's interest in Argentina has guickened in the	
wake of the US grain embargo. In addition to securing	11
access to Argentine grain and developing trade ties, the	
USSR is trying to exploit Argentine differences with the	٠.
United States. Moscow is willing to overlook Argentina's	
right-wing orientation, because a better relationship	
with Buenos Aires would give the Soviets a foothold in	
an important country in a traditional US sphere of influ-	
ence. 3.5(c)	
Institutionally, Argentina's military government is	
strongly anti-Communist and, despite the fact that it is	
a dictatorship, it closely identifies with Western democ-	-
racies. Buenos Aires appears eager to expand and improve	
its relations with the USSR, but, in our judgment, it has	
no intention of aligning ideologically or militarily with the Soviet Bloc.	
the Soviet Bloc3.5(c)	
Expanded relations probably will be limited largely	
to trade, and, despite imbalances, this trade can be ex-	
pected to grow. The two countries reportedly are nego-	
tiating a long-term grain agreement for a minimum of	
5 million tons of grain annually for the 1981-85 period,	
thus further tipping the trade balancealready \$350 mil-	
lion in Argentina's favor. 3.5(c)	•
The Soviets, seeking to redress this balance, will	
try to sell more "big ticket" items in the Argentine	eg over
market, but probably without much success. They might	
supply additional equipment for hydroelectric power in-	
stallations. The fishing protocol also could benefit	
them economically by providing the opening for a major fishing program in Argentine waters. The USSR, however,	
probably is willing to endure an adverse trade balance	
in order to preserve access to sizable grain and meat	
supplies over the next few years. 3.5(c)	
It is unlikely that the Soviets will become a key	• •
supplier of military hardware, however, because the	
Argentines are wary of political strings that might be	
attached. Neither are the Argentines likely to accept	
the Soviet training necessary for the use of advanced	
weapons systems. 3.5(c)	

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