

SECRET CONTROL

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Officer: AB 57

Operations No: BSC/Ops/023

Source: Gull

Report Date: 3 February 1947

Evaluation: B

Date of Information: Nov 46-Jan 47

Information Received: January 1947

SUBJECT: SPHINK PROJECT; EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE POSSIBILITIES AMONG RUSSIAN EMIGRE CIRCLES IN BERLIN.

I. INTRODUCTION.

1. It is the purpose of this report to summarize the results of the project of our source to make a comprehensive survey of all dissident Slav elements in Berlin. The material for this survey was gathered by source in Berlin from 21 November 1946 to 8 January 1947. (NOTE: The scope of the project and original instructions given source are found in report BSC/Ops/003 of 2 December 1946.)

II. BACKGROUND.

1. It must be remarked that the Russian emigrants who by one circumstance or another were in Berlin in April and May 1945 often greeted the Soviet armies entering Berlin with open arms. In particular, those emigrants who had maintained an inimical attitude to the Nazis did not hide their patriotic feelings toward the new arrivals: "They may be Reds, but at least they are our own people--Russians!" Soon, however, the conduct of the Red Army in Berlin had a sobering influence on the old emigrants, and as with the passage of the months they became acquainted with the working methods of the MVD, they found little had changed since 1920. This sobering influence resulted in a pronounced repugnance for the long awaited representatives of the fatherland. Many emigrants tried to flee from Berlin to the west by every conceivable means. In Berlin only the weakest remained, while almost everyone with strong anti-soviet views either left Berlin or was arrested and taken away to the USSR. To be sure, among those who remained, by no means everybody works with the Soviets. Among the fortunate ones to be left relatively unmolested are those who have acquired German citizenship.

2. The first thing that is obvious in Russian emigre circles in Berlin (source includes Russian Balts and Russian Germans as well) is terror of the 'omnipotence' of the MVD. The Slavs remaining in Berlin were literally hypnotized by this terror. At the time of their complete occupation of Berlin, the Reds succeeded in impressing on everyone that they alone were the masters of the situation and the true victors in Berlin, while the western allies were only their temporary guests. According to source, this "hypnosis" was and is supported by real facts; by the actions of the "operatives" of the MVD in all four sectors of Berlin. Everyone knows of a number of cases where Russians and Germans were taken at night from their dwellings in one of the Western Sectors and taken to the Soviet Sector of Berlin. For instance, the old emigre, Baron KAULBARS, was taken from the British Sector by people dressed in British uniforms. Recently, on Jagowstrasse in Berlin/Moabit (British Sector), a young German girl was taken away. She had been working as an interpreter in a Soviet office, and for some reason had quit her job (not long before she had made the acquaintance of a British officer).

3. Non-naturalized Russians have to get their permission to live in Berlin at the Magistrate in the Soviet Sector. Officials try to bring each one of them before a Soviet MVD major who sits in one of the back rooms and gives each non-subject Russian or Balt to understand that he is "under the guardianship" of the USSR. This circumstance deprives them of all confidence in their future, and in general:

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they feel themselves in the Soviet net, although they may live in the non-Russian sectors of Berlin. Somewhat better is the situation of Russians who are German citizens; they feel more sure of their legal position.

4. Because of the completely unsettled situation and the terror-hypnosis, many people with an anti-Soviet attitude refrain from any political cooperation with the Allies. Every one of them is convinced that the "all-powerful" Soviet intelligence will soon unmask him as a foreign agent, and that he will be seized by SMERSH, wherever he might be. For this reason, among the emigrants in Berlin, as well as among Russian Germans, it is difficult to find a person who will agree to work as a double agent; and if such a one turns up, it can be said beforehand that he will accept material benefits from the Allies, but through fear will really work in the interest of the MVD.

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5. But even these agents do not last long. The MVD is morbidly suspicious, and it takes only the slightest suspicion of an agent's good faith for him to be "liquidated" by a decree of a board of SMERSH without benefit of a trial. This is well known to all Russians, Russian Germans, and Balts; and, for this reason, the mere hint of the possibility of working against the MVD causes these people in Berlin to pale. The majority of Russians, Russian Germans, Balts, and other Slavs in Berlin are either terrorized inhabitants, small or big-time black marketeers, or one-way Soviet informers or agents.

6. The investigation carried on by source for over a month in these circles established the fact that in Berlin there is not a single Russian emigrant organization, not even a scientific, professional, or simple sporting association. The church cannot gather people around itself, because those who attend fear there the searching of the Soviet police organ. (NOTE: The activities and personalities of the Russian Orthodox Churches in Berlin have been reported in Berlin RIR No. 656, dated 14 January 1947.) Russian emigrant military organizations have disappeared without a trace. There are, at the moment, no organized Russian youth in Berlin. (NOTE: Russian emigrant military organizations and Russian youth are covered in Berlin RIR No. 635, dated 17 December 1946.)

7. Such is the general background and the general (unfavorable) political situation in Berlin, which makes it extremely difficult to formulate a plan to combat systematically the organs of the MVD, which are attached and working with not only police institutions, but with military, propaganda, and economic organizations as well.

8. Another circumstance which makes CE work more difficult, from our point of view, is the difference in the methods used by eastern and western organizations. While the western intelligence services work on a fairly humane basis, the MVD often gets people to work for it by threat of death, by physical torture, or by blackmail of all sorts (for instance, the practice of holding close friends and relatives as hostages). It must be concluded, therefore, that anyone, especially if Russian, who has been detained by the MVD, is suspicious, and is ready to pay any price to escape a repetition of this "detention".

9. However, nearly all the non-naturalized Russians in Berlin have been detained or interrogated by the MVD. From this it follows that the basic condition of working with an emigrant Soviet agent, in order to make him a "double", or to turn him to our side, is to be able somehow to give him a guarantee of protection and safety. He must be made to understand that he will, of course, risk his life in his work and in the struggle, but he must not consider that the struggle against the MVD means that he is "doomed" or "beyond hope".

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the message really hints
10. Source states that a favorable condition for working against the MVD in Berlin is the fact that the officers of the MVD are convinced that the Allies will never employ the active methods of working, or even a part of these methods, which they themselves (the MVD) use. Hence, they are accustomed to feeling that only for them is "everything permitted" and that "democrats are fools". They have in part been lulled to sleep by this consciousness of their own "power". This circumstance can be used to advantage.

III. PROPOSALS.

1. Passing now to the results of his observations, source proposes the following people as sufficiently motivated by idealistic considerations to have possibilities for development as informers in Russian emigrant circles:

why should we go into the business of having informants in Russian emigrant circles? They are not interesting enough.

- a. Dr. WALTER (Fnu)--(Berlin RIR No. 633, dated 17 December 1946.)
- b. Dr. Leonid AXENOV--(Berlin RIR No. 626 dated 3 December 1946.)
- c. Boris LEDKOWSKI, choir director for church circles.
- d. Georg GRJASNOW--(Berlin RIR No. 634, dated 17 December 1946.)
- e. Julius JESSERICH--(Berlin RIR's No. 634 and 635, dated 17 December 1946.)
- f. GUPPERTS (Fnu), student at Berlin University, and can be used in student circles.
- g. Gudrun HOLL or CHOLL--(Berlin RIR No. 635, dated 17 December 1946.)

2. The next category of people listed by source are some major or minor Soviet agents or economic commercial or propaganda co-workers in Soviet institutions. He suggests that they be placed under observation and be worked on. He warns that the list is far from complete. Upon investigation, these suspected agents should be used as doubles (especially those living in the non-Russian sectors of Berlin), or in the case of those who are committed to the MVD because of sympathies toward Communist doctrines, they should be rendered harmless. The following are particularly interesting as having greater means, influence, or possibilities in the sense of ties with the Soviets:

- a. Paul KRIVENKO, Konstanzerstrasse 56, Berlin-Wilmersdorf (British Sector). Has a factory in the Russian Sector.
- b. Dr. HUBE (Fnu). Has a position in the Russian Division of DANA. Whether he had any official connection with the Ost Ministerium and with OMGUS remains to be verified. (Berlin RIR No. 651, dated 7 January 1947.)
- c. Dr. LEIST (Fnu). Radio propagandist with VAG. (Berlin RIR No. 671, dated 29 January 1947.)
- d. WILJAMINOV (Fnu). Speculator having big dealings with the Soviets. Suspected MVD agent. Resides at 22 Friedbergstrasse, Berlin/Charlottenburg (British Sector). Security check being made to determine whether wife works or worked with Information Control.

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e. Nikolai Leonid WASSILJEV, 4 Nollendorferstrasse, Berlin/Schoeneberg (US Sector). Translator at the Magistrat. Source is certain that he is a genuine Soviet agent. (Berlin RIR No. 634, dated 17 December 1946.)

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f. TUGAN-BARANOWSKI (Fnu). Father and son. Address unknown--according to some, Kurfuerstendamm. (Berlin RIR No. 665, dated 21 January 1947.)

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g. LITWINOV (Fnu). Formerly a cavalry captain. MVD agent and is said to be residing in some non-Russian sector of Berlin. (Berlin RIR No. 635, dated 17 December 1946.)

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h. Father ADRIAN. Pastor of the Russian Church in Berlin/Tegel. (Berlin RIR No. 656, dated 14 January 1947.)

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i. Alexander KALIN. Lives at 46 Grollmannstrasse, Berlin/Charlottenburg (British Sector). Source regards him as a minor informant who works more among the German element in Berlin.

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j. ^{GERASSIMOV} GERASSIMOV (Fnu). MVD informant on Russian church activities in Berlin. (Berlin RIR No. 656, dated 14 January 1947.)

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k. Alexander BOGEMSKI. 18 Neu-Ansbacherstrasse, Berlin/Schoeneberg (US Sector). Minor informant. (Report No. 626, dated 3 December 1946.)

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l. ^{Basil Wasilij; Orlov} Basil WASILIJORLOV. Former lawyer, now working as a translator and informant for the Soviets. (Berlin RIR No. 626, dated 3 December 1946.)

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m. Michail SCHAPORENKO. The owner of a Russian book store at 5A Regensburgerstrasse, Berlin/Schoeneberg, and Soviet informant.

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n. Alexander KORBUNSKI. Former actor of the Diamantid circle. Source suspects that he is a double agent.

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o. Shura GARFELD-PETROV, Grossbaerenstrasse, Berlin/Mitte. Formerly with "NORM" (Russian Youth Organization).

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p. Nikolaus BISCHOW. Formerly with "NORM" (National Organisation der Russischen Jugend). (Berlin RIR No. 635, dated 17 December 1946.)

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q. Dr. MENZEL or MENTSCHEL. Source found contradictory reports on him. (Berlin RIR No. 633, dated 17 December 1946, and RIR No. 634, dated 17 December 1946.)

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r. ZHARAVOV (Fnu). A church elder in the Russian church on Ferbellinerplatz (British Sector). His status as a Soviet informant should be held only tentatively until clarified.

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s. VASILJEV (Fnu). A church elder of the Russian church on 10 Nachodstrasse, Berlin/Wilmersdorf (British Sector). Lives in Potsdam, where he works as translator for the Soviets and gives Red Army officers lessons in German.

3. Source thinks it expedient to interest a small group of Russians from the working class, who, because of idealistic-political considerations are anti-Soviet, may prove willing to oppose the Soviet police or intelligence agencies. They could be useful in gathering information on doubtful and suspicious persons, conducting

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surveillances and observations without arousing too much suspicion. Source thinks it might prove interesting to use such a group in diverting the attention of the MVD, by methods of provocation, such as distributing copies of some western Russian newspaper like "Sowing" or "Free Voice" in a Soviet barrack or at some meeting of MVD officials. This would circumscribe their activity at least to the extent of devoting more time to internal affairs. The unceasing propaganda attack of the Soviets, which tries to sow communist propaganda and corrupt Germans and Slavs, can be met by a counter-attack by carrying on "democratic" propaganda in their very ranks. This will make counter intelligence work easier, as the whole Soviet machine will be put to work to discover the source of the propaganda. Source is of the opinion that a little application of provocation methods will in general raise the level of counter intelligence work.

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4. This Russian group should have no contact with foreigners, with the exception of its leader, who renders accounts, receives instructions and means. In case of a fall or of non-success, it would be easy to disown this group. Such a group in general should consider itself an illegal organization, completely conspiratorial even as regards the Allies. (For example, under the guise of a link of the MTSNP--National Working Union of the New Generation--centered in Kassel) or even of the Vlassov group.

5. A part of such a group must speak German faultlessly and possess German documents. The group should consist of only three or four people, preferably young people of both sexes especially selected for their boldness, conspiratorial tendencies, capabilities, and good preparation for carrying out the tasks given above. Source thinks it would be desirable to make up this group not from Berlin youth, "corrupted" by the conditions of life in Berlin and already under the control of the MVD, but to bring the group in from the American Zone. In this case the advantage is on the side of youth selected on idealistic grounds and not hypnotized by MVD fear. If this is technically difficult and too risky, then the question is limited to strengthening existing intelligence organs with reliable Russian or Russo-German agents.

IV. FIELD COMMENTS.

1. Opinions and suggestions expressed in the above report belong to source.

2. In general, source's picture of the sad and depressing fate of the Russian emigrants in Berlin is true. Their harsh treatment under the Soviets is nothing unusual. The Soviet propaganda line and policy has always been that this class was "counter-revolutionary" and a security threat to the state. Many of them deserved their fate, especially those who aided and abetted the Nazis in the hope of some Czarist restoration or the return of some sort of a pre-Revolutionary status quo. Since the Soviets went about this suppression in a thorough manner, there were undoubtedly many innocents who suffered. Particularly hard must have been the lot of the youth, women, and those emigrants who had conscientiously acquired German citizenship.

3. Source often tends to oversimplification in estimating the character of his own countrymen. In his mind (although he would strenuously deny it) there are two varieties of Russians--either Red or White (anti-bolshevik). The former have only "evil" attributes, and the latter are motivated by "pure" idealistic considerations. Thus, a Russian emigrant (who should be a White according to him),

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and who deigns to work in some minor capacity in some Soviet institution is automatically suspect and a potential spy. And so with Russian emigrants who engage in black market activities. Whenever the proof or evidence was meager, or based on hearsay from untested sources or even on conjecture, the case officer weeded out such persons. Otherwise, source's efforts would have been dissipated over a too wide field and the chances of running down something worthwhile reduced to a mathematical probability. Nonetheless, the list of personalities in this report should constitute the foundation of any proposed projects or operations directed against the MVD, in which the use of Russian emigrants in Berlin is contemplated.

4. Source in his survey was not limited to Russian emigrant activities, but was told to include the activities of other Slav elements in Berlin. Except for the existence of a suspected Polish agent, and that there is a restaurant in Berlin frequented by Bulgarians, nothing was reported other than the activities and personalities of Russian emigrants, Russo-Germans, and Balts.

5. It is the considered opinion of AB 57 that source (considering all the handicaps,--the least being the extremely cold weather in Berlin during his stay), has performed a commendable task which will be of good use to this organization.

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