Foreign Downerds Division

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## Pifteen Years Over the Norm

Author

The events which began in Estonia in 1939 indicated that the Communist general staff in Moscow had decided upon the destruction of the Estonian armed forces prior even to the beginning of the overt Communist measures against the Estonian government and people. But they did not begin the execution of these plans at once with the immediate seizure of everything by force. They were sufficiently well concealed and conceived, and began with the elimination of individuals from among the many, so that it would not be apparent to those who were to be liquidated when the great seizure was to begin.

On 2 July 1955 it will be exactly 15 years from the day that the writer of these lines himself heard about the measures the Communists had taken. That he heard of them is probably owing to the foresight of the new officials. The Communists had already placed, or had forced the President of the Republic [of Estonia] to appoint, Major General G. Jonson as Commander of the Armed Forces in place of Supreme Armed Forces Commander General J. Laidoner, who had similarly been discharged through their pressure. When General Jonson received an order from the Red leaders, the first phase of which involved the liquidation of two Estonian officers, the originators of the order once again apparently made the mistake of forgetting to specifically forbid him from reporting, thinking that he would not dare to inform the authorities as to the source of the order. General Jonson, as an honorable Estonian officer, though considered a proper tool by the Reds, informed the authorities of the true situation.

The preliminaries prior to the order were so clear to both of the officers concerned that they were able to draw the proper

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conclusions. Thanks to that, and thanks to their assistants, they are still alive -- 15 years above the "norm" which the Communists had decreed for their existence. (1)

(1) Colonel V. Saarsen, a War College [of Estonia] graduate, and Captain (Author), a War College graduate.

How did it come about that the Red leaders gave their attention to mere captain among the generals and colonels in their plans?

What did that man, as a captain and as a civilian, experience and do during those fateful days and during the ensuing 15 years?

The present document attempts to answer those questions as accurately as recollection permits. The writer will rely upon written notations made during the occurrance of the events, or shortly thereafter while the impressions were still fresh, to the extent that they are available, so that gross errors of memory will be eliminated.

The writer will not recount or tell of any personal "heroic feats," for there were none; he begs merely to tell his own account, as an Estonian soldier, as he sees it and is able to, of a situation quite unusual for a soldier.

In order to avoid the first person singular recounting, the writer begs reference to himself in the third person as the author, and when this is inconvenient, simply as "the captain," without mention of the name.

Since some small details of this article may in variance with the premature or belated writings of other authors, it is urged that it be taken as a free interpretation with the assurance that it makes no pretense at infallibility. The retentive capacity of the human mind is limited. Various incidents can with the passage of time assume significance, in the minds of those who have experienced them, that is not in keeping with the true situation, and individual wishful thinking may preclude an objective picture, and there are few authoritative opinions written on the subject. Butwriters can control the accuracy of their minds by a comparison of the divergent writings, as well as the influence of memory, and researchers can come closer to the truth by the use of such documents than would be possible by the study of only one document.

Where the writer may use material from the works of earlier writers or researchers, that fact is indicated by the use of appropriate notes.

## Peacetime Service in Division II of the General Staff

Division II of the [Estonian] General Staff was called variously the foreign and the information division, but most frequently the expionage division. In the eyes of those who were not familiar with the operations of the Division, it was given some kind of a secret, clandestine mission. So it happened that the captain, then still a lieutenant, rejected the offer of an assignment in Division II when it was made to him in 1931, (2)

(2) By Col K. Laurits, a War College graduate, then chief of the division.

as he had just completed the course at the War College. When the same offer was repeated two years later, he excepted it and went on duty in Section A of the Division in January 1934.

At the time Lt (Author) entered on duty, Col K. Laurits was chief of the Division. But Col Laurits was a military attache but College graduate, who had been a former chief of Section A, and more recently a military attache in Riga, then became chief of the Division.

The author was originally assigned to Section A and Capt A. Kristian, a War College graduate, was transferred from Section A to Section C. The departure of the author, who had been promoted to captain, to attend a code ciphering course in Poland was soon ordered. But the unexpected illness of Major Tornist, and the approaching departure of Major Sinka as military attache to Moscow disrupted these plans. Captain Kristian was brought back to Section A so that he could take over the section upon Major Sinka's departure to Moscow. The former had to return, therefore, as military attache to Finland. The captain (author) had to remain temporarily in Section C, where he worked under directions given him from time to time by Major Tonurist, who was expected to go to sick leave. But Major Tonurist became seriously ill before Major Sinka's departure for Moscow. One of Major Tonurist's legs was amputated, which would necessarily keep him away from the Division for an extended period. After that Captain Kristian was ordered permanently into Section C, and when Major Tonurist's other leg was amputated, which necessitated his separation from the army, Captain Kristian was appointed chief of Section C. In order to effect Major Sinka's appointment to Moscow, Captain Kristian, already earmarked for this duty, was ordered as military attache to Finland (concurrently as senior officer of Section C), and the captian (author) was appointed temporary director of Section A.

This appointment placed a great responsibility and workload upon the still inexperienced captian (author), especially since at first he was not able to have an assistant and had to do alone the work of two. But he believed that he coald assume the responsibility for a short time, until a new section chief would be appointed, since there were suitable candidates who claimed the proper experience; that point was already assured by the planned appointment of a lieutenant colonel, since an officer of the rank of captain could not be appointed acting chief until he had had two

years of experience as a "temporary appointee." But -- time passed and no new section chief was appointed, but in time the captain Changed his name t was assigned a Junior Lieutenant Didwig (subsequently Raia) as assistant, and later a Capt A. Reinlo (former name Freimann), a War College graduate. After two years the captain was made acting chief, and later chief of the section.

The work in Section A was diversified, involving the authorization of all actions delegated to the section. The standard staff duty day of seven hours was not long enough. It was necessary to work in the evenings and at night, so that the family complaints that "we do not see you for days on end; you frequently appear just long enough to change your clothes and disappear again; you seldon get home before midnight, only to disappear early next morning, constantly day after day," were all entirely justified.

The captain's work involved all of the foreign military attaches accreditied to the Estonian army and also the Estonian military attaches abroad. There were 16 countries (3) which had military attaches in Estonia. Many countries did not limit themselves

For the record, let it be noted here that Estonia had military attaches at the following localities: Latvia and Lithuania, Riga; Soviet Union, Moscow; Poland and Rumania, Warsaw; France and Belgium, Paris; Germany and Hungary, Berlin; Finland, at Talinn until 1939, subsequently in Helsinki. Estonia had no military attaches in England or the Scandinavian countries. There was a naval attache for a short time in England following establishment of the [Estonian]

<sup>(3)</sup> The custom then was to list the names of the countries in their French-language alphabetical order. But since the French language has practically lost its value as a diplomatic language, the countries will here be listed in their Estonian-language alphabetical order, as follows: England, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Horway, Soviet Union, Poland, France, United States of North America, Sweden, Rumania, Germany, Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Republic. Estonia had no military representatives outside of Europe.

to a single attache, but had special ground, naval, and air forces representatives, frequently with assistants.

The Soviet Union, Latvia, and Poland had their resident attaches in Talian, while the other attaches came as needed from their residences in Riga, Warsaw, Berlin, Helsinki, or Stockholm, just as the Estonian attaches did in representing their forces in the various countries.

It was a beautiful sight to beheld and sweet music to the ears when the attaches and their assistants gathered in Talinn for the observation of Estonian Independence Day. They presented a beautiful picture in their parade uniforms, flanked by the flagbedecked streets, but even more festive and colorful was the ensuing official reception, with everyone in dress uniform and bedecked with all their medals. The languages of discourse would then be mostly French, Russian, German, and English, depending on the fluency and wishes of each representative. Since the representatives of the countries neighboring Estonia were frequently their native tongues, the Estonian officer corps included linguists in those languages. The Finnish representatives were so accomplished, in fact, that they conversed with the Estonian officers in faultless Estonian. Though perhaps it was a bit of a burden for the Estonian officers to orientate themselves smong all these languages and to, shift frequently from one to another, there was no real difficulty; small wonder then that the memory of such receptions frequently returns to mind.

The foreign representatives from both the nearby and furthest countries traveled extensively in Estonia in the course of each year,

and they were regularly reassigned every two or three years. We will mention by name several of them who remained longest in Estonia or otherwise made themselves more noteworthy.

It is the popular custom that the military attache who has been longest at a post, or who was first appointed to that asuntry, should be considered the senior attache in that country. In 1934 there was one such, the Lithuanian military attashs, a Col B. Jakutis, a solid senior gentleman, talkative, and equipped with an inexhaustible stock of anecdotes. After he left, the Finnish attache, Maj. R. Ingelius, became the senior attache until 1939. Later, when the Communists were driven out of Tallinn in autumn 1941, Ingelius returned to Tallinn as a lieutenant colonel, this time as the Finnish liaison officer with the German forces in Estonia. He was known as a cordial and serious person, respected and beloved by many Estonians, especially after the dreary events of 1940-41, when his presense brought back the joyous times when he represented his army in the free Estonian Republic.

Since each country strives to use its most capable officers as its representatives, it is no wonder that many of the military attaches who were stationed in Estonia have subsequently risen to high rank and to high office. They cannot all be listed here, but we will mention several: Major Ganeval, the French military attache later became a general and assistant to the chief of the French General Staff, and more recently, chief of the President's cabinet of the French Republic; Major Onodera, the Japanese attache, as a general during World War II represented his forces in Sweden; Capt Tangen Hansteer, the Norwegian attache, was a general in charge of Borwegian occupation forces in Germany, and later became commander of the entire Borwegian army; Maj G.B. Guenther, the USA attache, came out of World War II as a general, and Maj W.E. Shipp, as a

colonel, has represented his armed forces in a number of countries, most recently in Spain, going into the reserves in autumn 1954 after that assignment since he is approaching retirement age; Lieutenant Colonel Veiss, the last Latvian attache in Estonia, was decorated with the German Iron Cross for exceptional bravery and service in the war against the Communists. He was later killed in that same war.

than they did to the attaches of any of the other countries. That was natural since it involved their largest and most mysterious neighbor against whom they had fought for their independence and whose political objectives differed so much from their own and from that of their neighbors. They were the select from tens of thousands of Red Army commanders, intelligent and capable in all fields. There were three of them regularly in Estonia during the period 1934-1940 and they presented quite an interesting picture of the Red commanders. We will deal with them at greater length.

The Red Army forces were represented in Estonia during 1934 by a commander Mazalov (Estonian transliteration from the Russian). Rank was therefore not then yet employed in the Red Army. Mazalov carried service appointment credentials from which it could be assumed that his attache rank corresponded to that of a brigade commander, which would correspond to a major general eff a senior colonel in the Estonian army.

Mazalov did not reveal to others the extent of his knowledge.

He was not adept socially. He concealed his knowledge of the

Estonian language, apparently en orders, which is natural since an
individual who is appointed as a "representative" to a neighbor
country should properly know the language of that country. The

Estonians, however, did not believe in this inability of his to know

their language and the Estonian ladies constantly created situations aimed at bringing about a "confession" from him. It so happened one warm summer day in the Officer Association casino in Tallinn that the "comrade military attache" was seated at a table between two Estonian ladies and across from one Estonian man. He appeared to feel uneasy in such civilian company. He bacame hot and the sweat began to roll down his face. One of his Estonian table companians, whose appetite no doubt was affected by this sight, remarked in Estonian during an appropriate moment to another Estonian words to the effect "he could at least wipe his nose so that it wouldn't add to the sweat." The representative in uniform heard and understood, and was so influenced that he forgot his pretense of not knowing the language that he reached for his handkerchief and began wiping himself, all the while reddening and sweating all the more.

The following Soviet Union military attache wasTupikov. He was plain, but freer and more accomplished in his department than his predecessor. Tupikov was well read; he dared and liked to converse and play chess, even with civilians. The use of military ranks for Red Army commanders was adopted during his stay in Estonia. Tupikov received the rank of "polkovnik," which corresponded to that of a colonel in Estoria. Epaulets were not yet then authorized, only the insignia corresponding to rank were issued for the collar and the coat. During a reception given by the Polish military attache in the extraterritorial area, two of the guests, M. Reek, the Estonian Chief of Staff (who was then a major general), and Soviet Polkovník Tupikov, played a game of chess, the latter already having won against many opponents. We have forgotten how the game turned out, but we remember the conversation that went on during the game. The conversation touched on the new ranks adopted by the Red Army. General Reek predicted that the Red Army officers would soon begin to wear bright epaulets, as they had during czarist times. Tupikov maintianed that this would never happen. General Reek offered to make a wager that they would not only adopt gold eqaulets, but would

begin to attend church and to kneel to icons. A part of General Reek's prediction has come true, and the realization of the second part has come nearer rather than farther, for the control by the Communist Party of all high and low church officials is officially and publicly admitted, though the attitude of the Communists toward religion has not changed.

Polkovnik Tupikov knew how to handle situations. When any of the other attaches became "over-fatigued" at the frequent receptions, he did not make this known to the guests. He felt completely at home in the Soviet embassy. Once, upon the departure from Estonia of Captain Radomsky, the assistant to the Polish military attache, he gave a small farewell reception. When Captain Radomsky had already departed, for he was in a hurry, and the guests were drinking their coffee, Polkovnik Tupikov, as the host, said that he had been in the company of Captains at numerous receptions where there was no lack of good liquor, but that he had never yet seen a captain intoxicated. Now he wished to see how much an Estonian captian could take. The captain was unable to talk himself out of this "examination," especially when the Polish attache was pushing the host on, as well as the chief of Division II, who was the captain's chief. (4) The umpires

<sup>(4)</sup> The two officers involved were Lieutenant Colonel Szczekowski, the Polish attache, and Colonel Massing.

were selected and they duly determined the conditions for the honorable combat. The liquor was to be Kremlin cognac, the typical Soviet drink, of which the host seemed to have an inexhaustible supply.

The Red Army lost that encounter. Tupikov became so "fatigued" that the guests ended as the victors. Both of the umpires and the captain remained relatively sober, but it was not easy for them to be sociable the following evening, nor were they able to do much work during the day, for the Kremlin cognac was much more potent even than Estonian bootleg liquor.

Polkovnik Tupikov's knowledge of Estonia, and especially the extent of his information resources, are illustrated by the following incident. The foreign attache corps had been invited by the Estonian General Staff to an excursion somewhere between Tapa and Rakvere. An attache of a western country inquired as to how far from Tallinn they were. Before the Estonian escort could give an answer Polkovnik Tupikov gave the accurate distance from the nearest crossroads to Tallinn. It was not an important crossroads whose distance from Tallinn might be readily known, but one among many small ones. The distance he quoted has been forgotten, but this first-class instance of map control showed that Tupikov's information was accurate.

Tupikov was apparently considered such an efficient attache that he was later, probably in early 1940, sent as the Red Army attache to Berlin in the rank of major general. There he again became involved in Estonian affairs for, with the Soviet occupation of Estonia in 1940, the Estonian embassy in Berlin was liquidated? upon the demand of the German Foreign Office and the embassy building and its equipment were given over to the use of the Soviet officials. The Red Army attache office was then located in it, with Major General Tupikov as chief.

The last Soviet military attache in Estonia was Polkovnik
Türkanov [Estonian transliteration from Russian]. Although he
came to Estonia prior to the beginning of the bad events of 1939,
he was not able to create that human atmosphere around himself that
Tupikov had been able to create. Polkovnik Tsukanov also had
social contacts with the officials, but he did not create a humane
impression, remaining a coldly calculating aloof official, as if
he were afraid of someone or something. The Estonians had nothing

against that, however, for it was clear to the officers who had observed the Soviet military attaches that the backward Mazalov, the adroit and precise Tupikov, and the timid Tsukanov all represented the one great menacing power which they had seen attempting the invasion of their country on 1 December 1924 and again in 1939, and finally in the dreary days of 1940.

Polkovnik Tsukanov's timidity may be ascribed to the watchful glances of his "wife," regarding whom it was rumored that she was not his real wife but a high Communist surveillance official. As respects Mazalov, there is no impression that he had any members of his family with him in Estonia. Tupikov's wife was in Estonia only a short time with her child, explaining that she was studying chemistry in a university and could visit her husband only during the university vacation period. Whether that was actually so, or whether it was a cover for the barsh Soviet regulation which demands that the members of the families of representatives going abroad must remain as hostages in the Soviet Union, is not essential here. Tupikov's wife had the appearance of an ordinary domestic Russian woman, who seemed quite suitable to Tupikov, who was also plain. In the case of the Tsukanovs it was impossible to say whether they had merely been sent out together; both were quite well educated; the man fearfully reticent, gray, and level-tempered; the woman small, superbly dressed, and with manners befitting a high-ranking woman during the entire stay in Tallinn. Perhaps they had an agreement as to who should be considered the surveillance officer.

A Captain Markov appeared as Tsukanov's assistant in 1939.

He was not appointed as an assistant military attache and was not entered in the diplomatic register. He did not visit the Estonian General Staff in connection with his duties, but there was frequent telephone contact with him since he would answer the attache's telephone, especially after the beginning of the irregular events of 1939.

The management of official affairs with all of the foreign military attaches proceded smoothely and projurly. Only the excessive love of alcohol of several attaches produced some difficulty socially. The cognac contest given by Polkovinik Tsukanov was not merely a small and gay affair, but brought with it affairs known as "alcohol poisoning," which were to be avoided whenever one had the ability to talk himself out of them. Besides, Tupikov could control himself even when "fatigued." The unexpected inebriation of Maj T. Shimanuko, the friendly assistant Japanese military attache at a small afair he gave in the green room of the Estonia building created at first an uneasy feeling among the guests, especially since his superior was present, but the latter caused no disturbance of it; in fact, a self-appointed expert asserted that this was quite proper, since under Japanese custom the host must be in a "gay" mood so that the guests would feel free to enjoy themselves. Whether that is so we cannot question, but it is known that Japanese customs vary greatly from those of the Estonians. But in addition to those who were of natural high spirits, or to those whose "fatigue" was merely feigned, there were also individuals whose fatigue was authentic, and whose presence at such functions became a burden to the entire social corps, especially to hosts. On one occasion the matter went so far that the report of the inebriation of one representative came back from abroad through official channels to Estonia.

Owing to his great workload, the chief of Division II was not able to attend personally to everything. The section chiefs therefore had to handle independently many subjects of a general nature. Thus it fell upon the chief of Section A to prepare and execute an excursion for the foreign attache corps to visit the troop units at Rakvere, Tapa, and Tartu, of which mention has already been made in connection with Polkovnik Tsukanov's knowledge of Estonia.

The trip began quite normally. Since the trip was during a cold and snowy winter, part of the trip by automobile between Tapa and Rakvere was quite cold, since the Estonian automobiles then were not yet equipped with heaters. The high-quality Estonian wine used to ward off colds, and later the French cognac at the supper table, tasted so good to many of the guests that they were not able to endure them. The escorts had some difficulty with one representative, (5) who did not participate in the pleasant sessions

(5) Lieutenant Colonel Veckalnins, the Latvian military attache.

As it became clear later, during World War II, that officer who had appeared so decrepid and weak by nature in 1940, changed overnight into a Red and into one that sealed the fate of many of his Latvian fellow-officers.

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of the company, while the majority of the participants remained quite sober.

Many weeks after that excursion there came a report from the Estonian wilitary attache in Riga to the General Staff concerning a rumor smong the attache corps in Riga to the effect that the excursion had been one big drinking bout. The Chief of Staff ademanded an explanation from the chief of Division II. The Division chief, who was not familiar with that phase of the excursion, though he had been breifed on the excursion prior to the arrival of the ill report, then gave, with an amused appearance, a mischievous order to the captain that the situation must be rectified. It was then necessary to write a report stating that the liquor and the claimed debauchery were not forced on anyone; that nono of the Estonians were inebriated; that the majority of the quests had been completely sober; that most had only taken a single drink, while there wan only one who was actually inebriated; and that when the Estonian army invites guests it must also provide them with food and drink; that the Estonians, as the hosts could

not say to any guest that he could have no more, since each person is the best judge of the quantity sufficient for himself; that the hosts could not end a function until all of the sober guests had departed; that a re-examination of the events of the excursion indicated that there had not been an over-abudance of liquor, but that the fault lay with the one who became "over-fatugaed". The event was closed for the captain with the submission of this report, but the over-fatigued person of that event became fatigued again later.

The reader of such a report might infer that there was much drinking going on in Division II. Such a picture would be erroneous. It is true that during peacetime there was considerable drinking, for the custom in Estonia and her neighboring countries was still such that the taking of one of three appetizers before dinner was considered normal; those who could not adhere to that, or who spoke against it in principle, found it somewhat difficult to get along with those guests who liked to drink. Maturally the Estonians as hosts did not dare, least of all in the course of social functions, to make comparisons between individual representatives which of them did or did not slumber from the effect of drinks. There was an unwritten rule in the Division that no drink would be forced on " either the guests or our own people, and also the fact that the Estonian officers did not dare to lose their alertness and remain drinking with those who wished to do so. Frequently it was necessary to guard discretely against the attempts of foreigners to examine one under influence of liquor, and to assist one's companions in avoiding such involvements. It was frequently necessary to return to one's work at headquarters after such "wet" functions in order to finish work needed the next morning. It was not a light or gay responsibility, but an inevitable aspect of a diverse job. It was not for the light-minded or irresponsible, but for one who could practice self-control under pressure. The small Estonian army staff was not large enough to permit the use

of different personnel for attending unavoidable social functions and others to do the work, as in common in the headquarters of large armies. The same personnel had to perform both functions without thought of over-fatugue. Fortunately there were some, though not many, experienced military attache officers in Estonia, who, with few exceptions, were socially accomplished in the western cultural sense, to whom the social diversion was frequently a good change from the tension of staff work.

Thus far in this document the presentation of the captain's work has been involved with the foreign representation because -- as will later become clarified -- it wasone of the prerequisites which later permitted him to escape the Red tentacles in 1940.

The captian's duties required that he have contact with the highest foreign military leaders visiting Estonia, since he had been charged with the technical preparations necessary for their reception. There were so many of these visits during the period under consideration that it is no longer possible to arrange them in the proper chronological order. The daily notes regarding them were burned as a precaution in autumn 1939 when the Soviet Union pressed an assistance pact upon Estonia and brought her forces into Estonia. Thus a great quantity of secret documents were destroyed, not only in the War Ministry, but in many other ministries and offices. The furnaces were not able to burn this great quantity of paper fast enough for complete destruction and a heavy swat hung over many parts of Tallinn with charred and undestroyed parts of book pages floating in the air. It was a necessary measure, but we now lack accurate data for the writing of history. And the undestroyed data are not now available to us, but to our enemies.

It can be generally observed that the chiefs of staff of all near and far countries neighboring Estonia visited in Estonia; these included Marshall regorov [Estonian transliteration from Russian], the Soviet Union chief of staff, and General Halder, chief of the German ground forces staff. Even higher officials visited from several other countries -- ministers of war and armed forces chiefs. The visits to Estonia of the highest military leaders resulted in the visits of corresponding foreign division staff chiefs, or of special representatives, such as that of Admiral Canris, chief of the German general staff foreign division, and that of General Kanave, the senior Japanese military attache in Europe. The official visits of foreign naval units in Tallinn and other Estonian ports, are also worth noting.

The wanter is reminded of one of the earliest of such visits, that of the special attache from Hungary on the eve of the Estonian independence day in 1934. Hungary did not yet then have a regular military attache in Estonia. They despatched one officer (6) of the

writer

(6) Only an oral impression remains of the visitor's name, which might be approximated as Uishiashi.

rank of major as a special representative to the celebration wondering at the patience of Major Sinka, then chief of Section A. The visitor's first greeting was polite and so complimentary and flowery that it lasted several minutes. All the while thelatisitor held the section chief's hand, cordially aqueezing and shaking it, and Major Sinka somehow managing to smile energetically and to squeeze in return the visitor's hand during what appeared to be an interminable time. It was not a common situation among us Mordics. But, customs vary and it is natural that each representative behaves according to his own customs, and we have no right to criticize that which appears strange to us. The visitor fulfilledhis function well, erring only on one point when he mentioned the 15-year existence of the Estonian Republic, when actually the sixteenth anniversary was being observed.

A. Oksala, the Finnish minister of war, visited in about 1935 and toured through Estonia. That visit has remained in the

captain's memory because he was ordered to be at the visitor's service during his stay in Tallinn, and no doubt it was in this connection that the Order of the White Rose of Finland was subsequently conferred upon the captain. It was the first foreign decoration on the captain's uniform, which led the section chief to remark that this decoration had only begun the series of crosses that would be conferred on him until after a while he would not know which ones to wear. The chief was right, for during the course of years such a large number of them accumulated that he had to be careful what decorations to wear at the receptions and anniversaries, for the attache concerned would consider the wrong decoration an offense to his country. Fortunately, this occurred only one time to the captain and he believes that the foreign representative with whom he was dealing took it quite sensibly.

As regards the visit of Marshall Jegorov, the impression remaining is that of the exaggerated wariness of the visitors. On such visits the insuring of the safety of the visitors is naturally the responsibility and duty of the host country. Rooms had been prepared for the Marshall and his party in the Palace Hotel (the former Peterburg) just then completed. There were no other guests in the hotel as yet. The Estonian army and police took all the necessary and possible measures to ensure the security of the Communist visitors. But one member of the Marshall's party thoroughly searched under the bed and dressers of the rooms assigned to the Marshall, in the Marshall, in the presense of the Estonian escorts , as if he expected to find many infernal machines there and much more. It was unthinkable to the Estonians who accompanied their own commander or chief of staff, even when in Moscow, to throw themselves on the floor in the presense of their hosts to inspect under the bed in the room assigned to their general. But the officials of any country or department act as if their own procedures were being applied against them, thus betraying their own fear and distrust.

The Marshall's party included 5 or 6 officers, which was twice the number usually accompanying the army commanders of other countries on their visits to Estonia. We later again encountered Major Kalmokov [the Estonian transliteration from Russian is Kalmokov], a member of this party, in the rank of brigadier general, as a member of the commission for establishing military bases. We recall one bearded polkovn'l [of that party] who explained that he has worn a full beard since the time when, in the war betweenPoland and the Soviet Union following World War I, he had to retreat from Warsaw because of Marshall Pilsudski's advance. He swore that he would not shave off the beard until Red Army units again march into Warsaw. The members of Marshall Jegorov's party were generally similar in conduct to the later Red commanders of bases in Estonia, who in every instance, no matter what the topic of conversation. would say "we have the saem, but much bigger, much better, and much more developed." That type of answer put one of the polkovniks in an awkward position when the conversation turned to the natural increase of population. It is well known that the rate is small in Estonia, and we made no effort to concealeit, so the polkovnik found a suitable topic for proving the unusual virility of his people. He quoted, apparently automatically and without thinking, such a large amual birth rate for Moscov that the absurdity of it occurred even to him and he quidkly changed the subject of conversation.

Col J. Remmel, a War College graduate, then chief of the Training Division of the Estonian general staff, once put all of the Marshall's party into something of a delemma. He asked the visitors a question concerning the grammar of their own language. The visitors pondered and deliberated for some time for the correct answer when colonel Remmel, an old schoolmaster from the times of

Russian rule, stated that all of the answers were incorrect. He did this with such assurance that the visitors were dumbfounded. (7)

(7) Years later, when Colonel Remmel was in Petseri, deceitfully entrapped and doomed with many other Estonian officers as a result of the compatriates of these visitors, the captain discovered while doing research on the Soviet language that both sides had been right on that linguistic question. Many expressions which were prohibited as incorrect in the Russian literary language in czarist times have now been accepted with the growth of officialdom into the Soviet Russian language. The question put forth by Colonel Remmel chanced to involve just such an expression: "ya shimlyu." Apparently he had not yet chanced to obtain any special Soviet glossaries, of which there were very few generally available at the time, but which would have show the adoption of the term into the official Soviet terminology from the spoken language.

During General Halder's visit, when the president of Estonia entertained the general at Oru castle, it was necessary for the president to retain Colonel Grabb, the senior command officer, to see that the general in his hastewould not step into the vater.

There was a natural pit in the rack on the grounds of Oru castle, which contained a body of water so clear and smoothe on the surface that the guest did not perceive it -- only the clean chalk bottom of the pit was visible.

During the same visit Maj Gen H. Kauler, inspector of the Estonian heavy artillery, invited the guest, who was also a heavy artillery man, to test the accuracy of the Estonian artillery while at the Jagala heavy artillery firing range. The commander of the battery that was to deliver the fire chanced to be one Capt E. Anari (former name was Amberg), one of the best Estonian heavy artillery officers and battery commanders. The guest selected a target on the terrain and designated it himself to the battery

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commander. The latter prepared his range calculations with amazing speed, delivered them to the battery, gave the order to fire, and the shots resounded, accurately on the target which was completely destroyed. The Estonian havey artillery inspector, who had also heard the guest's target designation, was overjoyed at Captain Anari's achievement, since it was necessary to leave a good impression with the guest, but -- the looks of the latter indicated that something had gone awry. It then became clear that target designation and its comprehension are not dependent merely on language ability. The guest had selected and designated quite another target, but both General Kauler and Captain Amari had interpreted incorrectly, yet both exactly the same way. The guest could not understand why the Estonian officers were so pleased with the result. It was later explained that neigher side was at fault: the guest had designated the target according to the method used in the Gorman artillery, while the Estonian artillerymen had interpreted ity by the method used in the Estonian heavy artillery, and the fault lay in the fact that the German and Estonian methods differed. The bonor of the Estonian heavy artillery salvaged; the guest had seen that the Estonians could fire quickly and accurately.

The captain had less occasion for contact with the foreign diplomatic representation in Estonia than he did with the military representatives, who were daily visitors at the Division. Visits to the embassies were mainly in connection with the visits of the highest military men, with the celebrations of the various countries, or with the receptions given in the embassies by the military attaches with whom one had dealings. There was also frequent contact through the exchange of courtesy calls.

In these times of the cold or political war the leaders of many countries frequently give special attention to the tone

of the courtesy letters or telegrams received from other countries, attempting to discover from them whether international political relations are impriving or becoming worse, or to discover a change of direction in policy. Only in very few cases can this beassumed possible, but we dare not minimize this possibility. The captain speaks only on the basis of his own experience. For many years he had the responsibility of composing the greetings, telegrams, and numerous types of expressions of appreciation sent by the highest Estonian military officials to the corresponding foreign officials, himself dictating the text. Only in very few instances when exceptional matters were involved did the undersigning high officials give instruction as to he special content of the document, but the work of actual composition was always delegated to the technician. The captian was naturally responsible to the extent that the latters would be appropriate to the occasion and properly phrased, without receiving special instructions. There is no season to suppose that the methods developed in other countries in this respect differ much from the course developed in Estonia. There must cartianly be captains, polkovniks, and first secretaries in the foreign offices and security offices of the countries involved in the cold war who write these courtesy notes sent through official channels to the very top, without even a complete reading by the purported originator. It is a normal occurrence in the modern bureaucratic flood of paperwork, for high officials would not get much of their work done if they had to read every document bearing their signatures; they must have donfidence in their subordinates and trust their safety to their own choice of expert advisors. It may therefore be entirely inappropriate to attempt to seek special indicators of political direction from such documents. They may merely give an indication of whether the "little wheel" who composed the letter was tired or

clear min that day, or whether he was in a good or bad frome of mind. If many highly placed individuals now detect signs of changing political direction in such documents, it can therefore at best give reason only for the independent smirks of the "little wheels," or at the worst, what the cold war adversary may observe from such maiveties may therefore give him another weapon, namely, that he may purposely undertake the development of "lenient" or of "stringent" relations at the next round, in order to lead the opposition more astray or into greater confusion.

The captain had contact also with high Estonian military leaders in the performance of his duties. He was still a lieutement and a newcomer to Division II when he was sent as a representative of the General Staff to General Laidoner to hear his wishes in respect to the observation of his fiftieth birthday, then approaching. Years later, when General Reek observed his fiftieth birthday, he also called on the captain to assist in the arrangements for the reception. The captain found such tasks more demanding than the discharge of those in the headquarters of the foreign military attaches or at the social functions, because at the former type of function the captain was either alone, or one of very few others, of junior rank among the ministers, generals, and colonels.

Though the captain, or more properly the lieutenant, had received an excellent background in dealing with colonels when he took the course at the War College, he found that the work in Division II gave him an even higher education in this respect. For two years he worked in the War College side-by-side with experienced majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. There the lieutenant saw on many occasions that a lieutenant could be as intelligent, or even more intelligent, than any of a number of colonels. During his six years in Division II the captain had frequent and close contact with so many high foreign and domestic officials, office holders, and military personalities that he soon lost his fear of them, which was not

quite natural for many a line captain who in ordinary conditions seldom come eye-to-eye with many generals. The captain learned to see not only the official person in the colonels, generals, and ministers, but also the inner man and to gauge their strengths and values, as well as their weakness. It was a useful experience in the school of life for him.

## The Autumn of 1939

The captain had then been five years in Division II. That was an excessive length of time under the regulations in one type of duty. There was mentioned on many occasions of sending him into some troop unit, but it never materilaized. Lieutenant Raia, who had been his assistant, had long since been reassigned to a unit. Capt F. Brede, a War College graduate, had alos been reassigned after a tour of duty of about a year in Section A, having been promoted to the rank of major he was sent as military attache to Latvia; the section chief then was left with but one officer assistant. Then came a turn of affairs for the section chief, for it was decided in summer 1939 that he would be sent to Germany for three years to attend the War Academy.

The captain had already put his affairs into order in preparation for his departure, which had been ordered for 3 September, when the war between Germany and Poland broke out on 1 September, which cut these plans short since the War Academy does not train foreign officers during wartime; even those who were studying there at the time were sent home.

The captain therefore had to remain in Section A of Division II, although a Captain-major B. Linneberg had already been ordered there, as the new section chief replacing the captain, to familiarize him with the duties Before taking over the office.

But because of the rapidly changing situation, Captain-major
Linneberg never did officially take over the function. For a short time
the new and old section chiefs worked side-by-side, until Captain-major
Linneberg was appointed chief of staff of the [Estonia] naval forces
following the escape of the Polish submarine Orzel from the Estonian
naval forces.

Thus the captain had to remain as chief of Section A, but because of the pressure of events this was not confirmed by official order.

The outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and the demands made of Estonia by the Soviet Union, resulted in a considerable change in the nature of work in Section A of Division II. The workload became even greater. The social functions at the foreign legations and attache offices decreased, but the operational liaison with the representatives increased, since they were naturally interested in the special events developing in Estonia. The situation became extremely involved in that now the attaches of two important nations, Germany and Poland, who were at war with one another, both made visits to Division II, in addition to the attaches of many other countries which were in war readiness but not yet actually at war with one another. Precautions therefore had to be taken so that none of these attaches would ever be put together into the same room since they were not supposed to @see" one another or engage in any kind of conversation. During the Estonian independence day parade in 1940 there was a serious problem of how to avoid placing the attaches of warring nations into ranks so as not to be abreast of one another. Ordinarily at those parades the chief of Division II would take the position at the right flank of the rank of attaches and the attaches would take positions at his left in the sequence of their accredition, beginning with the one having greatest seniority, followed by the assistant attaches in similar sequences, with the chief of Section A as the last man in the rank. This time it happened that one of the attaches most recently accredited in Estonia had to be placed abreast of Capt Koerner, the assistant German attache, who had seniority of accredition in Estonia. The problem was resolved by placing the chief of Section A into the middle of the rank between the attaches and the assistant attaches; he therefore separated the two "warring factions."

There was a phenomenal increase in the dealings with the Soviet military attaches. During peacetime the Soviet attaches did not molest Division II with excessive visits to the Estonian staff. They visited only occasionally, as if out of courtesy or custom, and asked few

questions. This may have been owing to the fact that they usually made their wishes known at the Estonian staff after they had expressed similar wishes to the Estonian attache in Moscow. Since they did not wish to reveal anything special to the Estonian attaches, the expression of their desires in Tallinn were apparently limited -- until the situation changed in September 1939 with the presentation of Moscow's criminal demands. Then the telephones between Division II and the Soviet attache began to ring frequently and Polkovnik Tsukanov was frequently seen in Division II. The conversations at first concerned the appearance of Red Army aircraft over Estonian territory and of Red naval vessels in Estonian territorial waters. After that the discussions concerned the ordering of Red Army bases in Estonia, and after the arrival of the commission on bases, the details of their production. Later they concerned the technical execution of marching Red Army units to the bases, inquiries concerning tanks that ran into holes or got stuck along the way, flights of aircraft over Estonian territory between the bases and the Soviet Union, forced landings, and inquiries concersing other mishaps. That work increased to such proportions that the personnel of Section A could no longer cope with it. It become necessary to establish a continuous watch service on duty 24 hours a day. The entire staff of Division II was used for it, together with many other general staff officers who had sufficient proficiency in the Russian language. The workload at the Soviet. embassy also grew to such proportions that the attache and Markov, his assistant were not able to handle it. New voices and names appeared there until these exchanges were finally performed without the use of the military attache exchange service directly from the Red Army base at Paldiski and the staff of the Red Army corps stationed in Tallinn. The workload increased wven more when the Soviet invasion of Finland began, since the Red aircraft frequently dropped bombs on Estonian territory. Also, many more Soviet aircraft then made forced landings in Estonian territory than they did during their flights

between the Soviet Union and the bases. The grounded fliers were often panic-stricken, thinking that they were in hostile Finland. It was sad and even repugnant to have to assist the invaders of a kindred nation -- but everyone had to do their part.

Dating from the time that Major Sinka was chief of Section A, the section had been charged with the responsibility of producing press releases concerning the Estonian armed forces. They were confined for the most part to events which in one way or another had some connection with the foreign military attache corps. Later, when the emphasis of the releases shifted to domestic affairs, that responsibility was transferred to Section B, especailly in view of the fact that Maj P. Villemi, a War College graduate, then chief of Section B, had had previous experience with newspaper work. (9) (9) Following the entry of Section B chief Maj Ermits into the reserves, Maj J. Toonser, a War College graduate, became chief of that section and after he had completed his tour of duty, Maj Villemi took over command. Capt K. Tamm, a War College graduate, was the last chief of Section B. That weorganization considerably alleviated the workload of Section A. although the reporters, following the accustomed procedure, continued to make telephone calls to Section A. After having been released from the responsibility of furnishing information to the press, the captain had to rush back with all haste from lunch one September day, when the Leningrad radio began to broadcast a report that the Soviet ship Metallist had torpedord and sunk the Polish submarine Orzel, near Marva, after it had escaped from Estónia. It did not take long to establish the falseness of that report, for the Estonians were still the masters in their country. The Estonian naval observation posts were still operating without interference and their reports indicated that nothing of the kind reported by the Leningrad radio had occurred at Marva or thereabouts. The other factors were also so evident that the summary of data

refuting the report was soon prepared and submitted to the division chief for the consideration of higher officials and for release to the public. The peacetime operations of the intelligence divisions of the general staffs of all countries. are very similar to their wartime operations. Beginning in early September the Estonian Division II operated under extreme pressure. A number of radio receivers had been installed in the section and in the officers' quarters because the officers were required to remain on watch even during their off-duty hours, since the staff was still undermanned to peacetime strength, and because many wished to keep abreast of so that they could properly advise the top level command. But Estonia was not yet engaged in actual war preparations and was therefore not abreast of the surrounding countries that were. The release of that accusing radio report marked the beginning of her eastern neighbor's open activities against her. It was a war in which the weapons still remained silent. Under such conditions it was the self-assumed responsibility of Division II to deliver accurate information with the greatest possible speed to chief of staff so that the president and the commander of the armed forces could make the correct decisions on important matters. There was a sign of relief in the division when the information, so quickly obtained, showed that the Leningrad accusation was entirely without basis and so poorly based that it could be refuted with ease. If all of her neighbor's measures could have been dealt with such despatch, Estania's position would not have been at all hopeless. But in the meantime a report arrived from Moscow to the effect that demands, very onerous and degrading to Estonia, had been made there to the Estonian minister of economy [or state finance]. During such a critical situation no one would dare to take a chance on creating an even worse situation by attempting a public refutation as in Leningrad accusation. The press therefore remained temporarily uninformed.

In addition to the other work it was necessary to work also in the social sphere, but under conditions quite different than those of peacetime. The performance of such operations is now known as the waging of cold war. A commission for the determination of the details of the bases, which the Soviet Union forced on Estonia under the assistance pack, soon arrived in Tallinn from Leningrad; the commission was composed of high-ranking Red generals and commissars. The members of the commission were extremely reticent. The Estonians tried to relieve the dejection of the commission sessions by establishing more human relations with their counterparts by intermingling with them at the dinner table. But their neighbors were so reserved that they could not enjoy either the food or the drink the Estonians offered them. The captain naturally was not a member of the corresponding Estonian commission, but he had official contact with the latter and he had to participate in the attempts to create human relations. But he knew: that the official discussions were so trying that Ghmerelli Reck, the Batonian chief of staff, had to be discharged as chairman of the corresponding Estonian commission and that this heavy responsibility was then placed on K. Selter, the Estonian foreign minister. The captain chanced to be a vitness on one occasion to the diplomatic tranquility with which Minister Reek reacted to an extremely sharp demand. He did not respond with a quick retort, but slowly rese from the table, walked calmly to a table in a corner of the room, poured beverage into a glass, drank some, returned just as calmly, and took his place at the table. The opposition remained under tension during this time, but the tension on the Estonian side was reduced by. that brief and peaceful delay. After that it was easy for Minister Selter to give the Reds a quick answer, which showed that their "bomb" had missed its mark. The captain was also aware that the quiet avernight departure from Estonia of Colonel Massing, first assistant to the chief or staff, came about as a result of the bitter remarks he made to the opposition when he was a member of the commission on several occasions and had put the opposition to silence with the logic of his arguments.

The captain knew that the commander in chief inwardly condoned Colonel Massing's procedure, but knew that he could not at that time reveal his true opinions or feelings. It was clear that Estonia must attempt a peaceful reconciliation with her neighbor. But Estonia could not agree to all of the demands. Colonel Massing's courageous and forthright presentation aided in the alleviation of the demands made by the Red generals, as well as the situation for Estonia. But it was also clear that Colonel Massing could not personally live any longer under the power of those Red officials, and that it would have been extremely difficult for the Estonian government to protect him from them if he had remained there.

The Red generals and commissars made a miserable impression socially. But the Red commanders who came "to visit" in Estonia in uninvited naval units appeared even more pitiful. The Estonians had to remain polite; when a new arrival says that he is coming to visit, then the host must treat him appropriately, since the situation did not permit slamming the door in the face of even an uninvited guest. The Estonians found themselves in just such a situation; they had to give at least one official reception, no matter how simple.

The preparations for such a reception would not have caused the Estonians any difficulty if the "visitors" could only have provided information on the number of guests, their names, and ranks that they would sent to the reception. Polkovnik Tsukanov was asked to provide the needed information as soon as possible, which he agreed to do. The importance of the seemingly trifling matter that the highest ranking and most important individuals had to be seated at the table wiscent in proper sequence from the host, was nevertheless well known, for the guests were known to be quite sensitive in that respect. But this time Polkovnik Tsukanov had even more trouble in providing the required information than his predecessor had on the occasion of the reception given to the commander of the Red battleship "Marat" upon the visit of the latter in Tallinn during its return from the coronation of the king of England. The information was received barely an hour before the reception. When the guests began to arrive it immediately became apparent that the proper seating plan that had been hastily prepared could not be used because a great number of individuals had been substituted on the list of guests previously submitted to the Estonians. The only thing that could then be done was to estimate the importance of each Red commander and to seat him accordingly. Polkovnik Tsukanov himself was uneasy since he knew from previous experience at Estonian receptions that the hosts were not accustomed to that kind of situations.

The memory of one Red commander at that table who apparently went to great lengths to exhibit cultural refinement still lingers. His hands were not especially clean, but perhaps it was not his fault that he had had no time to wash his hands since his name did not appear on the list of guests submitted to the hosts. But apparently he had receive been coached in some kind of manners. He would take a slice of bread from the tray with one hand and shove it on the end of a fork held upright in the other, and would then eat the bread from the end of the fork. No doubt his eating manners were those he had become accustomed to at home.

There were two aspects to the situation; on the one hand there were the utterly haughty and blunt demands of the high-ranking Red generals in the sessions of the commission, as well as the social inaffability of their

officials, all of which contributed to an uneasy premonition, and on the other, there was the feeling that everything had ended and that the monster would swallow Estonia, yet, when one observed their unrefined and uneducated manners and the superiority of the Estonians in this respect, there was a rekindling of hope, though there was no real possibility of physical or political opposition. It was indeed a strange feeling; the captain experienced it himself and struggled against it. The fact that many Estonian officers remained in Estonia until suitable avenues of escape had been closed, no doubt resulted from this feeling.

But the problem of escaping from a perishing country cannot be dealt with as simply as that. There were many other factors in addition to the two-fold feeling described above, which influenced the people to remain, such as the desire to continue ones work, to remain retain ones position, and the hope that time would resolve the situation, and that kind destiny would bring its just desserts to the Estonian people.

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Afhe work of the commission dealing with the establishing of the bases had been completed and the Red members had departed from the dinner given after the signing of the papers, the Estonian members present, notably General Laidoner, the chief, of staff, and Foreign Minister Selter remained in the Officer Association casino to exchange thoughts. Everyone supported the idea of sending certain leading government officials abroad as a precautionary measure. The discussion then turned to the question of how great an advantage it would be for Estonia if President Pats and General Laidoner were to go to the free world and work from there for the good of the country. General Laidoner remarked that the decision regarding the president is a foregone conclusion: He must remain with the people to share their destiny, for he who has worn the purple cannot flee. As respects himself, the general said that though he has not worn the purple, his position as commander of the armed forces was such a high office that he could not flee either and would therefore remain. The general seemed to support the idea that many officials ought to be sent abroad. The commander in chief considered the situation

purely from the military, the realistic, point of view. Captain-major J.

Santpank, the recently-appointed commander of Estonian naval forces, brought up the question of what the Estonians should do in the event war should break out between Germany and the Soviet Union and German naval units should come into the Gulf of Finland and into the range of Estonian shore batteries. The Estonians would be required to open fire on them under the terms of the assistance pact, but they would not want to do so. The general answered in the affirmative, that certainly fire would be opened, for the Estonians always observe the terms of their treaties. He added further that when the Estonian shore batteries would encounter German ships under such conditions the German unit commanders would certainly become aware of the situation and would remark, "Clever fellows, those Estonians."

The remarks and opinions of an experienced government official and military leader cannot be lightly set aside. These aged men knew the realities and did not permit themselves be influenced by their individual considerations nor by wishful thinking. They foresaw the difficult times in store for the Estonian people and knew that the entire population could not floe, and that therefore they would also have to remain. The question is, what were those powers that mismigraphica upset the correct plan designating the positions from which individuals where father would be sent abroad under official order; these individuals were those whose fates would have been sealed by remaining there during the coming developments, because of their former maximum official actions in opposing the Soviet Union, either during the War of Et Independence or during later times. The plan to send such officials abroad who could speak for the rights of the Republic of Estonia until such times as the principles of justice would be restored in the world also failed. The preparatory measures were under way, even the lists of names were being compiled, though the papers of only a few officials had been put into readiness for action by the foreign minister. From the military side, Col H. Kurg was sent as military attache to France, replacing Col J. Soodla, a War College graduate, who had been recalled when the situation began to become critical in 1939.

In contrast to the foregoing plan, official action was taken to itmit place a limit on indiscriminate transfers abroad by establishing a strict control for the issuance and application of official foreign passports. As formerly, the responsibility for the passports of military officers rested with chief of Division II, who sent them to the director of the administrative division of the foreign ministry, but now such papers had to be prepared by the chief of staff. Even more stringent measures were taken. The hardent Police (Välispolitsei) and the birtheat Guardposts (Piirivalve) were issued an order harring with a list of names of individuals who were not to be given afficial passports unless they could also present apparial papers assued specially for that purpose. The captain's name was also on such a list, as he discovered in 1941 upon his return to Estonia, though he had been able to leave despite the order in 1940. But that account milk would precede the events.

The changed situation brought additional tasks in the maintaining of liaison with Estonian military attaches abroad. Formerly the military attache for Finland ordinarily resided in Tallinn, traveling from there to Helsinki only as the need arose. In the new conditions he resided permanently in Helsinki and utilised the submarine cable across the Gulf of Finland with the friendly permission of Division II of the Finnish general staff. using telegraph as the mode of communication, with Tallian. The situation was similar with Lt Col K. Mollini, a War College graduate, who was the Estonian attache for Latvia. The Estonian general staff had direct telegraph communication with Riga during certain hours, and the chiefs of Division II and Section A frequently received long reports through that channel. The same telegraph line was utilized also by the Latvian general staff for maintaining communication with their attache in Tallinn; for that reason the Latvian military attache was frequently seen in Division II, waiting for a time when the line would be free. The captain chanced to be on tour of duty attending that line when the Latvian commander of armed forces reported

to the Estonian commander of armed forces that he would not go to the prearranged meeting place in Valga because there were too many watchful eyes
in Riga — that being the approximate reason he gave — which report arrived
barely two hours before the Estonian chief of armed forces was to depart
from Tallinn to discuss exchange opinions regarding the situation, with the
neighbor country seems commander of armed forces.

There were fundamental changes also in the staffs of the foreign military attache offices in Tallinn. Lieutemant Colonel Szczekowski, the Polish attache, protested vociferously when the Estonian naval forces interned the submarine "Orsel," which had come into Estonian territorial waters. The Estonians could not hold that against him, for that was thus his duty as well as it would have been the duty of the Estonian attache in a similar situation, but the Estonians could not grant his wishes, for that would have been in the interests of the Estonian government and would have violated the national law. The escape of the Orzel may have been some consolation to him, but he certainly did not display any joy, for the fateful ending of the Polish Republic was rapidly approaching. He quietly disappeared from Estonia witheven a farewell. The Estonian chief of staff had presented a two-volume the Estonian copy of the Vabadussoia Ajaloo (History of the War of it Independence), each individually dedicated, to each of the foreign military attaches accredited in Estonia. The volumes dedicated to Colonel Szczekowski were later found in the Tallinn fleamarket. That was not a pleasant piece of news for the Estonians, but when one considers the number of precious books and other valuables that we ourself had to abandon in order to escape with our life, we can find it to forgive him, since he no longer even had a homeland to which he could return; the concern for the future causes an effacement of the rules of courtesy and decency.

With the development of war conditions in Warsaw, the French naval attache, Commandant Gruillot, established himself in Tallinn. He used to remark that he likes Estonia very much and wants to settle down in Tallinn in private life. He, however, was able later to return to his homeland.

Captain-lieutenant Cellarius, the German assistant naval attache, and Captain Koerner, the German assistant ground forces attache, were frequently seen in Tallinn during those times. They were both superb officers, very cordial and sincere. Fate brought them back to Estonia in 1941, both in higher rank. They each had their parts to play in the liberation of Estonia.

Captain Hallakorpi, who was appointed Finnish military attache in Estonia after the departure of Major Ingelius, did not remain long in Estonia because the Winter War, which had just begun, took him back to his homeland.

But life and work continued onward although all joy and radiance had behind departed, leaving, only the dismal worksday life, and the sight of the prosaic Red Army men, and the constant threat of even worse to come, for there was a strange premonition prevailing throughout, following the recalling of German personalities from the Baltic countries. And so the worse times soon followed.

The operations of Division II did not permit the American chief to be much in his office? even during peacetime. The responsibility of the sections chiefs to perform their operations independently thereafter increased, for the work had to go on, whether the division was there or not to give orders. Colonel Massing, who was division chief when the captain took over the leadership of Section A from Major Sinka, gave the captain orders to that effect, remarking in his own joking manner that it does not pay to wait for praise, and that when the work is well done everything is quiet, but when something goes wrong, then "hell lets loose." The praise was not forthcoming even when Colonel Massing became first assistant to the chief of staff and Colonel Saarsen, a War College graduate, who until then was the military attache in Latvia and Lithuania, became chief of Division II. But "hell" never did "break loose" and the work inside the division progressed quietly and smoothely, with masserum progressed quietly and smoothely.

The workload increased to such a point during the period that the bases were maintained in Estonia that it was possible to be with ones family only very few hours of during any 24-hour period. And the recognition for the independent work still remained forthcoming. The captain had to substitute for the division chief during the latter's absence for, during the course of time, the captain had become the senior section chief. The mandicheration independent action which had become ingrained during the course of the years became far more necessary! under the new conditions. An example of that follows. One Sunday in June 1940, the captain was in the division, as usual. The division chief was out of Tallinn. The telephone central reports that there is a long-distance call from one of the border posts on the Estonian-Latvian boundary. The caller is Captain-lieutenant Cellarius, the German assistant naval attache. He is having difficulty crossing the border with his automobile because he does not have a permit for it which he would have obtained from the ministry of economy in Tallinn. The attache states further that his trip is urgent and more he cannot return to Tallinn, and that he is asking for assistance from the Estonian general staff. The border post

chief, a noncommissioned officer, states that he cannot permit the vehicle to pass without the required papers (the automobile had been purchased in Estonia) or without a direct order from his chief, the border guard section chief in Valga. The captain assures the attache that he will do what he can, and the attache remains waiting. The captain is certain that it is proper for the vehicle to pass, but Division II has no right to give orders to the border guardpost service. Neither the border service chief nor his assistant can be reached by telephone. But small wonder, for it was a beautiful Sunday morning and those who could still do so, after becoming accustomed to the situation, were out enjoying the peace of nature. Nor did anyons answer the telephones at the homes of the chief of staff or of the commander of armed forces. The captain put through an emergency call to the Valga border service division, hoping that he could straighten the matter out with the chief there. Fortunately, the latter knew of the captain, at least in respect to his name and place of duty, (1) but stated

that he could not give such an order to the border post chief without an authorisation from the harder chief of the border guardpost service, or someone higher. The captain had to make a quick decision. It occurred to him that the Estonians dare not, under the conditions prevailing, put any obstacles in the way of attaches friendly to Estonia purely on the basis of minor peacetime economic regulations. The captain knew that personally that the attache waiting at the guardpost was an efficient officer who had not concealed his anti-Communist views even after the friendship pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. But he did not dwell long on these thoughts; they went through his mind as he was talking with the chief of the border service division. The result was that the captain gave an order in the name of the commander of armed forces to the chief of the border service division to permit the automobile to pass. No minor official in the ministry

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<sup>(1)</sup> Possibly because the captain's name was on the list of those who were to be detained at the borders! And man't certainly the Valga border post had one of those lists.

of war or in the armed forces would not have been authorized to issue such an order, but the commander of armed forces was authorized to issue orders to the ministry of interior and the border service subordinate to it. The order was honored. The following day a report on the incident was submitted to the officials concerned. That incident was should not be justified by the fact that the alternates of the highest military leaders were not available. They could certainly have been reached, but in the captain's opinion there was no need to refer to them in regard to such a specialized and urgent matter, for there was no reason to suppose that they, unfamiliar with the details, could have made a better decision for the commander of the armed forces than was possible for the responsible section chief in Division II.

During the events of June 1940 the captain had his residence on Paldiski Highway, just across from the police precint station. When the Estonian supporters and Communists, presented their demands, the internal enemies were expected to become more active, the captain rented a cottage in Norme, where it would be more peaceful for his family than in Tallinn.

On the morning of 2 June, the passage from Paldiski Highway to Pagari Street was quite difficult, for the usual route along Pikk Street at the Rackojaplats had been closed by Red Army sentries. There was an atmosphere of tension at staff headquarters owing to the reports of an impending rebellion or sedition, which had begun to arrive during the previous day and were still coming. The telephones in Division II were ringing frequently with the arrival of new reports and with news of the situation. The division chief wax frequently skike in the chief of staff, the minister of war, or the commander of the armed forces. The captain had also had to hasten frequently implies there to deliver new reports to the division chief. While there, the commander of armed forces ordered the captain to put through a telephone call on a special line to Kadrioru Castle so that the commander could talk with the president of Estonia. It was necessary for the captain to remain in the room, so he overheard the conversation between the commander and the president. They spoke of the appointment of the Vares-Barbarus cabinet, which Zhdanov had urged upon Estonia, and to which the president

had not yet agreed. The commander recommended yielding to that demand because, he said, that Estonia had no other alternative and must avoid any encounters with Red Army units for that would give them cause to start a battle which would be catastrophic for the Estonian nation — but that the authority should not be handed over to the mob; that would be delivering them the weapons of the army.

The commander of the armed forces was quite calm during the entire discussion, but his expression showed that he was under great internal tension. One time when the milling about of the generals and colonels around his office became too distracting, he raised his voice somewhat, apparently unintentionally, and said that those who cannot control themselves and those who have nothing to do should go into their offices and sit there so that they will not be in the way of those who are still able to work.

What the captain overheard the commander of the armed forces saying to the president was of use later to the captain when he had to answer requests for information, which were directed to Division II. Colonel Soodla, chief former of the War College, soon telephoned from the Saksa Gummasium (German Gymmasium) quarters on Luise Street. The War College had been transferred there from the Tond, and now two kinds of persons were gathering in front of the building to demand arms. There were among them also two persons in Red Army uniforms. Colonel Soodla wished to know what operational orders there were for the event the mob should become violent. It was not the function of Division II, and much less that of the chief of Section A, to transmit orders to troop units. They should be issued by operations, possibly through Division I. The captain did not know whether Colonel Soodla, himself a former chief of Division I, had tried to contact that division. The Captain informed Colonel Soodla regarding the commander's standpoint on that question and as to the source of the information.

The captain gave the same information to Captain Meripuu, the duty officer at the Communications Battalion, who also telephoned with the same inquiry; he was calling from the Rauatänav school building into which the battalian from its own barracks, had been moved, also in accordance with the order to disperse. It may be

that because of theat information and exchange of fire, which would have brought forth Red Army armored vehicles, was avoided when later that day private persons attempted to enter the quarters of the Communications battalion.

The captain had occasion to make use of that information for the third time. It was on the manus day when the building located on Pagari Street jointly occupied by the ministry of war and the general staff was to he have been "taken over." A group of civilians gathered at the building and demanded admittance. The captain does not remember how it happened that Major General A. Kasekamp, first assistant to the chief of staff, Colonel Saarsen, chief of Division II, Lieutenant Colonel Luts, chief of Division I, Major Valme, staff commandant, and many other officers with Captain Reinlo, manufacturing the assistant to the section chief were all together at one time in his office. (2)

(2) No doubt the commandant had turned to the general staff to inquire about the orders in respect to the entry attempted entry of mobs, and then probably that it had been decided to turn to Tsukanov, which contact had to be made by Division II.

contact time Polkovnik Tsukanov or whether Tsukanov himself chanced to be calling the division chief at that moment, but before long the captain was saying to Tsukanov words to the effect that the Soviet influence had "called forth the ghosts" and that now they were threatening to take over staff headquarters, but that the Estonians could nothand over the authority "to the street", and that he, as the representative of the Red Army which had caused them to come forth, should also see to it that the ghosts are called off. Tsukanov said that he would come personally to the Estonian staff headquarters. In the meantime the captain the manufaction that if it was understood that Tsukanov was not to be endangered by the fire that might be opened on the "revolutionists" that might try to force their way in with himl

The staff commandant was greatly relieved, as he had later remarked, upon hearing that talk, and hurried from the fourth floor, where the talk

had taken place, down to the men and gave the order to open fire if the throng should attempt enter with the polkovnik. He was relieved because no one had told him earlier whether to fire or what to do, but what he had now heard made it clear to him what he should do.

The situation MEE so critical that the officers who had been assembled in the captain's office carried their personal weapons, for the invasion of the building could have taken place at any moment. But some of them did not own pistols, so the captain distributed the pistols kept in reserve in a steel cabinet in Section A. No one expected any assistance from the Red forces since the entire "popular uprising" had been staged and premeditated by their officials.

The saptain It occurred to the captain that he should contact his family. He telephoned to Nomme and asked for his wife. He spoke a few works regarding the state of affairs, stating that there was probably no escape from the situation, and said goodbye to his forever. She later told him that the conversation was so brief and in such an ordinary tone and coming so unexpectedly in the peaceful sunshine at Nomme that the full import of it had not occurred to her until she had said "farewell" and hung up the receiver. Then it occurred to her that this was the end! But that, however, was not yet the case. Polkovnik Tsukanov did not come personally to staff headquarters and he had no real intention of doing so since he had plenty of high subordinates at his disposal; but after three o'clock a major was sent from the Red corps staff headquarters who then remained as a "protector." with in the same room with the Estonian duty officer. The danger of forced entry abated some time later when Maj Gen T. Rotberg, the former assistant to the retiring minister of war and now newly appointed minister of war in the Vares cabinet, announced from the building that they should go to the Soviet embassy on Pikk Street. The throng immediately accepted him when they heard that they were dealing with a "people's cabinet" x minister of war who deals with Soviet embassy and their special urge to enter the building soon disappeared and they quietly dispersed.

On the following day, which was 22 June, Major General Jonson called a

meeting of all the people working in the general staff to be held in the Council of War conference room. The old esteemed cavalryman was a stricken man. Having been coerced by Soviet authorities into accepting the post of commander of armed forces he urged that everyone honorably fulfill Estonia's military obligations. It was quite apparent to everyone present that the "red inclinations" of this old and tired warrior were limited to the red coloring in his cavalry trousers.

On St. John's Day 24 June there was a gathering of people, resembling some kind of a meeting, at the Piiritakanats. Though many people were outdoors in the beautiful weather, that meeting did not seem to interest many of them.

" In the forenoon of that day Polkovnik Tsukamov had called by telephone to inquire for Captain Tamm and that they wished to discuss something important. When Captain Tamm could not be reached, they asked for the chief of Section A. As soon as the latter heard of this he called the polkovnik's offics. Polkovnik Tsukanov wanted im maskamithrine captain to meet with him at ten o'clock that evening; the meeting was not to be in the embassy, but at the consulate, whose entrance was on Laialt Street. Neither the time nor the place were quite usual, but then, neither were the conditions any longer what they had been, so the captain agreed to go to the place at the time requested. The captain informed the division superious of the invitation. It was agreed that the captain would stop at Division II before going to the consulate. The deliberation there concerned the kind of questions Polkovnik Tsukanov might bring forth. It was apparent that the it did not concern any ordinary discussion which could have been conducted by telephone or miker manuar at another time. Because of the unknown factors in the case, the captain was instructed to act according to his own best judgement and within the framework of the "Mutual Assistance Pact." After leaving the consulate, he was to report directly at Division II, regardless of the hour. In order to avoid the possibility of any kind of misunderstandings or provocation the captain went unarmed to the consulate, leaving his pistol in the division. The captain was allowed to wait for 15 minutes after reaching the consulate. Then Polkovnák Tsukanov made his appearance, apologizing

for his tardiness, saying that he had been called away on an urgent matter; then he asked that the captain speak with his two companions, to whom he then presented the captain. Both were in the uniforms of brigade commissars; one of them was tall and blond and spoke fluent Estonian, the other was short and dark, typically Russian. The captain does not remember whether Polkovnik Tsukanov mentioned their names or not during the introduction. The captain recognised the blond as the individual who had attracted his attention at the Ulemiste airport on 5 June when Colonel Saarsen and the captain were waiting there for the arrival of Loktionov, assistant to the Soviet commissar of war. That man in uniform remained in the captain's memory because he was wearing inappropriate, checkered socks with his uniform.

The captain was offered a chair at a small table and the commissars took places across the table from him. There were writing materials on the table, and no doubt a pistol which the blond commissar may later have placed before him on the table, though the captain cannot recall the precise details. The captain was asked to choose which language he wished to converse in, Russian or Estonian; if in Estonian, the blond one would have acted as interpreter. The captain chose Russian, knowing that language well enough. He was asked to recount his personal history, what he really does, in the conviction that it was quite important to know precisely concerning both. This observation led to his purely proletarian origin, and they asked whether he wished to work with them, that it would be quite profitable for him; as an Estonian officer he would forever remain a captain, though he had long been outstanding; summy that if he worked with them he would soon attain the rank of polkovnik. The captain answered that he was already working with them, as was the entire Estonian army, under the framework of the Mutual Assistance Pack that existed between the two countries. Then the blond interrupted, saying that the captain should not talk in such a naive manner, that he knews very well what they mean and that there is no need to engage in empty words. The captain continued to maintain that the entire Estonian army is prepared to fulfill the terms of the pact honorably.

The captain was next asked to furnish ix data concerning the Estonian espionage network in the Soviet Union. The captain answered that he knows nothing about it, that his relations with the military attache to the Soviet Union have had nothing to do with the Soviet Union. Then he was asked what Major Kristian did in the division and where he now was. The answer was that the major was chief of Section C, studied Soviet military literature, Red Army regulations and instructions, and was now the military attache in Finland. The blond still remained dissatisfied, asking why the captain the captain tries evade the question, namely, what kind of an espionage network Major Kristian had in the Soviet Union. The captain reiterated that he does not know, whereupon the blond attempted to intimidate him by asking what kind of a general staff officer he was be anyway when he, despite his long service in Division II, knows nothing about the espionage network. The captain parried with a thrust of his own, alluding the to the fact that the generals, especially since they were in the political field and therefore among the elite of the Red Army, should know that excessive talk is forbidden in espionage work, and because of the fact that he wanter the captain works in Section A, he naturally does not know the details of the work in Section C. To this the generals replied that of course they knew that and then turned the conversation to the person of Capt A. Norm , the new chief of

Section C, inquiring about his personal history, his family, and his family difficulties. The answer was brief, that the captain does not know details of the personal histories of his companions, though in regard to the family difficulties the captain said that their information must be incorrect, since to his knowledge there were none. Again they asked about the espionage network, especially in regard to a new network which was also in Estonia in the military bases. The captain replied with conviction that he did not know

<sup>(3)</sup> Capt Arnold Nomm, a War College graduate, was appointed chief of Section C following the permanent residence in Helsinki of Major Kristian as military attache. Capt Nomm had been prior to that in the island defense staff in Kuressaare.

what there had been previously, but that he was certain that now, where the assistance pact, there was no network either in the Soviet Union or in the bases, that the appointment of Captain Nomm as chief of Section C was a natural result of circumstances, and that he previously had not been in any way connected with anti-Soviet activities, having served in the western part of Estonia.

The questioning then turned to the captain's own activities in Section A. They were not satisfied with generalities concerning it, but wanted details concerning: (1) What did Captain Hallakorpi, the Finnish military attache, speak about on his last trip to Tallinn; (2) what did the British military attache talk about on his recent trip to Tallinn, and especially, what did he talk about with the Estonian commander of armed forces; and (3) why did the former Turkish legation attache, whose name the captain has forgotten, possibly Iksel, make a trip recently to Tallinn, and what did he talk about with his companions on the train while traveling from Riga to Tallinn. The captain answered that he could not answer those questions because he did not know the answers, not having been a party to any of the conversations. Now he was told that he must know all that, or if he did not, he must find out and and let them know. The captain asked them to look up the many public reports in Tallinn concerning those persons, but that was not considered sufficient; they wanted him to get the accurate reports, adding that they already knew the answersbut wished that the captain would show them, by obtaining the max accurate answers, that he was truly prepared to cooperate. This the captain categorically refused to do, saying that it would be spying, and that spying is contrary to his honor as an officer and has nothing to do with working together. The dark one, who appeared to be a good-natured conciliator and pacifier, then took the lead in the interrogation and asked to explain that such work is necessary, and that all these were small, inconsequential matters; that the captain need only to think the matter through and he would come to the same conclusion.

When the captain again refused, the blond one asked, while toying with the pistol on the table, whether the captain understood what that refusal

would signify whether he knew that he was endangering his position. The captain answered that he was fully aware of the situation and that he was ready for anything. He stated cynically that he was unarmed, and asked the threatener whether he wanted the captain to remain sitting in the chair or to stand in a corner (the question was so phrased and directed that the hearer could not fail to understand that the captain was speaking of the position he should assume for his execution). The dark one again hastened to make amends, saying that the matter was bizarre or as pressing as all that; just let the captain think about the matter and he will himself see how inconsequential the matters are that he is asked about. The captain again refused, saying that be has no need for reconsideration. The dark one had then resumed the lead, suggesting to the captain that he go home, think the matter through in peace, and then notify Polkovnik Tsukanov when he is ready to give the answers. He admonished the captain not to tell anyone what they had actually talked about and indicated that has the captain should explain that he had discussed the movement of Red Army units with Polkovnik Tsukanov, as the captain had done previously. It was about one o'clock, as the captain later verified. He does not remember how he came out of the consulate. From Laia Street all the way to Pagari Street he felt that he was being followed, since he had so categorically refused to cooperate. "It was a strange feeling; one did not we want to die, yet one did not want to run away from death." He was under such great tension that he walked as though on parade march until he reached Pagari Street vhile and out of possible line of fire on Lais Street, around a corner where a rifle bullet would no longer reach him. (4) The captain's nerves were

<sup>(4)</sup> The essential parts of the abstract and the account here presented have drawn from the summary which the captain wrote in Germany during April 1950, and which he had wished to present at the time of the incident to Col V. Saarsen, chief of Division II, who is the only witness to the fact that the captain immediately reported the incident. Colonel Saarse's notation on the original draft of the summary states among other things ... "On 24 June

Captain (Author) informed me that Polkovnik Tsukanov, the Soviet Union military attache, had invited him to a conference at 2200 hours at the Russian consulate on Laia Street. I instructed the captain that he should act during the conference in accordance to his position as an Estonian officer and in keeping with his oath of allegiance to the Republic. We agreed that I would wait for the captain's return in my office on Pagari Street. At about midnight I became concerned about Captain (Author)'s extended absence and attempted to make contact with the Soviet Embassy and consulate. There were no answers to telephone calls to Polkovnik Tsukanov's office and the consulate. I then took up the matter by telephone with General Jaakson, the chief of staff, who ordered not to wait for developments. Soon after one o'clock at night Captain Kurgvel reported to me in person . . and . . . and told me all the details as they are recounted in this book . . . "

exhausted, and he wished then for a drink of cognac before he began his account of the developments to the chief of Division II. The captain assured the division chief that he would never execute the mission asked of him and would take no steps toward that end.

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During the week following that talk, either Polkovnik Tsukanov or Captain Markov, his office manager, made telephone calls more frequently than usual to Section A. There was the impression many times that they really had nothing to said inquire about and that they were merely checking whether the captain was there, or perhaps because they wanted to keep the captain under strain. This continued for a week, until 3 July, when General Jonson received orders to make new sasigness appointments to the positions held by the chief of Division II and by the captain, because, as General Jonson had said to Colonel Saarsen, "You and Kurgvel are not suitable for cooperating with the Russians." Whether those orders had any connection with the captain's nocturnal talk and his refusals is not known, but it can be assumed that there is.

Captain Koerner, assistant to the German military attache, chanced to be

in Division II when Colonel Saarsen came from General Jonson's office with the above news. Captain Koerner had just made the proposal for assisting the captain to leave Estonia and the captain had just turned it down, since it would have app seemed like running away from the field of combat. But upon arrival of the news it was clear to him that he could no longer fight on that field of combat and that perhaps it be also done from abroad, so the captain then accepted the friendly offer in the presense of the division chief. He demanded that the matter be kept absolutely secret, except for the necessary instructions he would have to give his wife. The captain officially applied for, and was granted, a leave of absense of one month for the purpose of resting his nerves and in connection with a change of assignment. The leave papers had to be signed by Major General Kasekamp, signature of the the assistant chief of staff, for the chief of Division II was no longer sufficiently firm, since he himself was "unsuitable for cooperation." While appending his signature General Kasekamp asked the captain what assignment he might wish after his leave, since it would also have require an order. The captain remarked that perhaps the position of communications lecturer at the Oppeasutus might be most suitable. He promised to keep that in mind, but the general added that while he was still assistant chief of staff today, no one knows who will knownthunknowniki assistant chief of staff a month from that day.

Maj F. Brede, a War College graduate, who was recalled about that time from Lithuania, and Maj H. Onni, a War College graduate, who was removed from staff Divison I, were both later murdered at the Öppeasutus (Armed Forces Combined Training Institute) merely because they were conscientious Estonian officers. But the captain's time was not yet up.

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He had to perform one other task that evening at Section A, in line with its kim duties with attaches: he must go to Balti station in Tallinn and politically escort two western military attaches from there. (5) A Red Army

<sup>(5)</sup> If the recollection is correct, one of them was the British military attache, Major Firebrace, who previously had been an attache in the Baltic

countries and after an absense of many years was now enroute to his new post in Moscow. The other was probably the British military attache for the Baltic countries, a Lieutenant Colenel Vale. Since the captain had so many personal worries at the time, he is not quite certain whether these were the officers concerned.

armored train was standing in the station and the soldiers were singing one of their army songs "Katyusha." The western attaches noted the captains sad looks and cheered him in a paternal manner, saying that everything will go all right, that after a month's time everything will be fine again. The captain felt sorry for these gentlemen, either they were so naive that they believed it themselves, or considered the captain so stupid that he would believe so. Or perhaps those gentlemen were soothsayers and knew that the captain would be freed from earthly life in a month's time, and that thus everything would be alright.

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It was about midnight when the captain returned to Division II and heard there that he must at once make one more telephone call. He made the call but there was no answer. Soon he learned that either he or the division chief must be ready to leave the country mm that morning, and that who was to leave first was just then being considered; it appeared, however, that the captain should leave first because the too sudden disappearance of a division chief might cause difficulties, but a captain could go on leave anytime. It was finally agreed to leave that decision to the division chief. He then had to reach the division chief at once. The result was that the captain was to leave first.

It was between two and three o'clock at night when the captain arrived at Nomme and reached his family. There were a number of things he had to tell of to his wife, and the packing had to be done so quietly in the night—time that the neighbors on the other side of the thin dividing wall would not be disturbed. The existing wealth had to be left behind, for one did not dare take anything but the most urgently needed, only as much as would be necessary during a leave of one month . . .

When the departure from the protected place was about to begin in the afternoon, one of the assistants noticed that there were still too many possessions and that the amount of them would be apparent. But one of them was more accustomed to family life and observed that a year-old child must always travel with a bottle of milk. . .

How the escape was actually executed cannot yet be set in writing because it is not impossible that many of those assistants may still be living somewhere behind the iron curtain and may suffer danger of new persecution as a result, for under Communist conditions nothing is forgotten or forgiven and nothing becomes time-worn.

The captain still asks himself occasionally why he was given a week of reprieve after he had refused to become a henchman af thus for the Communists. He thinks that they were not yet quite ready to arrest the division chief and the captain because there were still foreign military attaches in Tallinn and reports of the arrests would soon have reached Helsinki and Major Kristian, the Estonian military attache there, whom the Red authorities were anxious to seize, would have heard of them. The Red authorities despatched a regular order to Major Kristian for his recall to Tallinn, and persons who have followed developments in that situation say that every ship arriving from Helsinki is met at the harbor by a black car with its windows blacked out, but has always had to return empty. Those who were expecting his return did not of course know that both those who transmitted the recall order and the one who received it knew at once that that order would not be fulfilled. Apparently the arrest orders af for both of the unsuitable officers would have been issued after they had been removed from Division II and from view of the foreign military attaches there: otherwise they too could have shared in the honor of being sent to the Soviet "academy" along with those many Estonian generals, colonels, and other officers for whom there is no return.