SECURITY Security Information

12 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/DOB

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SUBJECT

: Evaluation of Personal File, Case of Mario K. GIORDANO (pseudo)

1. The following are extracts from the subject file which may be considered derogatory. Your attention is respectfully invited to the fact these extracts become isolated and out of context, since they are selected to list derogatory items only. This presents a lopsided view which is more than counterbalanced in the full file. Since this is so unsatisfactory and does not achieve what we truly wish, future evaluations will be based on a ledger which will reflect "credit" as well as "debit" entries.

Following are the selected extracts: and summaries:

In 1939, Alex was Chief of Section "A" and Deputy Chief of the III Bureau of the Estomian General Staff in Tallinn with rank of Captain. (See document #E - Alex' undated ltr to Mr. Shipp). Was with this staff 7 years as well as 5 years with the German and Finnish Secret Services. (Ibid).

Document F, Paragraph 7 of page 1 - The Garmans (the Abweir of the Wehrmacht) helped Alex and his family out of Estonia into Germany. Alex was given a good position in the I. G. Farbenindustrie. In 1941 began work in "Abwehr I" together with the Finnish in Helsinki (Ibid, Paragraph 1 of page 2). Alex quit the Finnish Army in 1944. The Abwehr evacuated Alex' family to Germany although Alex claims he was not in the Abwehr at this time. Alex was then appointed an Estonian Liaison Officer with C-in-C of German Army Group NARVA operating in Northern Estonia. After the Germans retreated from Estonia in September 1944, Alex was again assigned to "Abwehr I", where he remained until 4 May 1945. (Ibid Paragraph 2, p. 2)

Document G, dtd 2h Aug h9: "Alecsei Kurgual is known to our station in Karlsruhe and was once considered for intelligence operations into the USSR, but the matter was not pursued because of doubt about the security of Kurguel's wartime associate, one Korv. Capitain Peter Emist Georg NEUMAIN, with whom Kurguel operated in Riga and other Baltic points, dispatching agents into Soviet-controlled territory by boat and plane. DAD is being informed of these latest Kurguel approaches and asked to explore the matter further."

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DATE 2006

130A-124(5)

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Document M, Paragraph la: "He (Alex) worked as a w/t specialist for MEUMANN and trained agents to be dropped in Estonia and Latvia. He (Alex) has not been enlisted for operational work because of doubts about the security of his war-time associate, NEUMANN, who is probably known to Soviet authorities."...... "He (Alex) worked for the Abwehr in Finland from 1911 to 1913 and with NEUMANN in 1914 and 1915, mounting plane and boat expeditions to Estonia and Latvia."

Paragraph 1 states: "There is no information in our files on the other individuals mentioned in reference (58-CFCKG)."

Paragraph 5 states: "Check was made with IDEUCON with negative results."

Document N, Paragraph Lc, page 2, quotes from WFPA-7019, dtd 12 Feb 51.

Because of special treatment received in Bonn, it "confirms source's opinion that CELLARIUS (Alexander) has been chosen by ADENAUER and General Hans SPEIDEL (who is a good friend of CELLARIUS) as one of the chiefs if he had known subject (Aleksei Kurguel) during subject's visits to Finland during the war. Source stated that though he had never mat him personally, he has heard of him at great length and holds the highest opinion of his intelligence potentialities, considering him one of the fifteen or twenty top intelligence men in Europe. Based on information received, subject appears to be an old hand in the intelligence field and quite closely connected with influential intelligence operators such as Cellarius and Sagreen. From all indications, Cellarius appears to have been chosen by Adenauer and Speidel for an important post in the West German intelligence service now being formed."

Document P. Aleksei Kurguel granted OC on 30 Jun 51 as "an agent acting as Operational Staff Chief on operations out of Germany into Estonia under project ICHCMEIN. This clearance is granted on the CONDITION that the results of any contemplated field checks will be sent to this office for transmittal to Eks. The files reflect in a report from Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, that in June 1950 subject was not enlisted for operational work because of doubts about the security of his wartime associate, Neumann, who is probably known to Soviet authorities. Another friend and associate of subject was a Colonel W. Saarsen, who was connected with the Japanese Intelligence and Estonian Intelligence from 1938-19hh."

Document S, Paragraphs 2 and 3: "On three occasions when Giordano (Alex Kurguel) was interrogated re his war-time experience, he showed complete lack of emotional control and began profound weeping. Fact that Giordano considered for employment ZACABAL known to at least four persons in Hamburg. This information known because DREXEL GIBSON, D.P. Commission, brought case GIORDANO to ZACABAL Frankfurt."

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Document V: "Proceeding cantiously re GIORDANO until details arrive. However, on basis of results of carriage and personal contact, feel GIORDANO trustworthy and emotionally stable."


Document W, Paragraphs 1-3: "Impossible arrange emigration GIORDANO to U.S. as declared ineligible DP by BSI/INS under sections 10 and 13..... GIORDANO claims he was once promised emigration by our organization and as he has given up chances to emigrate to Australia and Canada on basis of that promise, he feels justifiably wronged. He had previously refused to work for JAYHANK on basis they could not promise emigration to England. Feeling of wrong plus worry over fate of wife and child in Cermany makes work with GIORDANO extremely difficult unless emigration can be arranged immediately for wife and child.....GIORDANO essential to ICHOMENY unless substitute with equal knowledge of languages and experience in clandestine operations can be obtained without delay. Feel GIORDANO highly qualified and motivated. Arrangement of emigration will increase security, control and motivation, whereas failure to arrange will lead to lack of faith, inferior work and probably necessity to break relations."

Document DD, Paragraph 2 (of a 12 Dec 51 report to "When GIORDANO was interrogated (in 1951) he apparently realized that his service with the German Abwehr would certainly be discovered and cause him to be rejected from immigration to the U.S. As the interrogation progressed, his nervousness increased until he reached a point where he could no longer control his emotions and began to weep. To persons who have not dealt with Displaced Persons and have not interrogated them on points which would either permit or prohibit entrance into the U.S., such emotional action would appear quite reasonable, especially when one would consider all the hardships that these displaced persons have suffered in the past ten years. However, the undersigned has interrogated countless Legionnaires and other displaced persons - some, to whom Chordano "fate" under the Germans would have seemed like a Utopia, - but seldem has the undersigned witnessed such emotional reaction as Giordano displayed during the initial as well as subsequent interrogations."

Document MM, Paragraph 5 of Enclosure A: "Captain Kurguel and his family were declared inadmissible to the United States under Sections 10 and 13 of the Displaced Persons Act of 25 June 1948, as amended, by a Board of Special Inquiry of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, convened at Westorf, Germany, 31 July 1951. The case was appealed and at a second Board of Special Inquiry - convened in Munich, 7 September 1951, Captain Kurguel's family was granted p rmission to immigrate to the United States but Kurguel's own status remained unchanged."

Paragraph 6 of Enclosure B: "Although he worked with the German Army Intelligence chring World War II, he was opposed to the policy of the German politicians. He is somewhat prejudiced against the British because of their lack of assistance to the Estonian intelligence officers who had furnished information to the British prior to the war, and because of their lack of activity against the Soviet Union following World War II.

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Document TT: Medical Report, dtd 8 Jul 52: ".....1926 - Hydro-arthanis (water on the knee) left knee - no recurrence -----193k-1938 - high alcohol consumption......"


Document VV, page 1, lines 8-12: "Aside from efforts to get in touch with the AIS through Colonel Shipp and others, GIORDANO was not commetted with any other intelligence service except the British for whom he collected information on Estonia from debriafings of RV's from spring 1950 to the end of summer 1950."

Idnes 21-30: ".....Although Chordano has respect for authority and discipline, he is stubborn and outspoken in pursuing a cause he feels is right regardless of the authorities involved. Because of his strong sense of honor, he would pursue a course contrary to his higher authorities only with their full knowledge unless he considered that course outside the limits of his commitments. For this reason it is particularly important that commitments between Glordano and DYCLAIN he stated firmly and specifically and that adherence on both sides be strictly enforced."

Idnes 32-35: ".....Outside his specialties he has little initiative and would require considerable direction to be productive. He is systematic and sensible except for occasional highly imaginative and equally impracticable ideas." (The next eleven lines of this same paragraph completely refutes this - which makes this particular report rather confusing. Perhaps it was a mistake in typing.)

Document EEE: "Wartime activities of Aleksei Kurguel, an Estorian nationalist who cooperated with a German Naval Intelligence Officer, Peter Erist Georg Neumann (Captain) from 1940-1945) described in Kurguel's file. Kurguel acted as W/T specialist and trained agents to be dropped in Estomia and Latvia.....Both Karlsruhe and FDM feel Neumann, who offered his services late in 1948 and in March 1949, along with those of Kurguel, is insecure and probably known to Soviet authorities because of his wartime activities. It is believed that the Soviets have made inquiries about Neumann." (This information is undated.)

Document IIII, Paragraph h: "It is recommended that in the future, American personnel dealing with Alex should undertake to build his confidence relative to American competence in the field of intelligence. Although no actual criticism of American methods or techniques were voiced, there were references implying rather pointedly that, on the basis of past experience, some doubt does exist especially in the matter of administration and handling by American personnel.



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Assistant Operations Officer, T/C

Specific Information