

*file Giordano*

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

VIA: AIR  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MEMA 08378

**SECRET**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division "M"  
Chief, Foreign Division "S"  
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *1/2*  
SUBJECT: GENERAL: REDSOX/LCHOMELY  
SPECIFIC: Mario K. GIORDANO

DATE: 2 February 1952

Reference: MEKW-12082

Attached herewith is a report regarding Mario K. GIORDANO.

Copies have been sent through ZACACTUS channels.

[ *RSP* ]

Distribution:  
~~3~~ 5 EDM w/2 Att's  
1 COS w/1 Att.  
2 MCB w/1 Att.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

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[ ✓ ]

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Attachment to ~~MGMA~~  
2 February 1952

08378

CSOB MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: REDSOX/LCHOMELY - Mario K. GIORDANO

Reference: MGKN-12082

1. MGKN 12082 has been received with interest. In reviewing correspondence and contacts with Giordano in the light of reference memorandum, we have concluded that the information contained in reference, while undoubtedly true, neither reflects Giordano's personality or capabilities nor necessitates any action vis-a-vis his use as chief trainer for LCHOMELY. Throughout our year of association with Giordano, he has shown himself to be stable and reasonable as regards his operational activities and his emigration problems. The latter have been complicated to an almost unprecedented degree and have ended in failure after three years of continuous effort. We conclude from the calm and reasonable attitude Giordano has shown towards this problem during the past year that his extreme nervous reactions during 1949 to 1950 are not indications of a basically unstable personality.

2. It is entirely possible that Giordano's reactions to IRO interrogations were an attempt or the result of an attempt on his part to withhold information concerning his wartime activities. This information was given confidentially by him to the DP Commission, the U.S. Consulate and INS, but was consistently withheld by him from IRO on the grounds that disclosure of such information to an international body (such as IRO) might expose to the Communists persons still behind the Iron Curtain who had either aided him in his escape from Latvia in 1940 or worked with him against the Soviets. Giordano's sincerity in his belief that he would endanger his former co-workers by giving his true story to IRO is substantiated by the fact that he consistently refused to disclose this information over a period of three years in spite of pressure from the DP Commission, the U.S. Consulate and INS.

3. We have no reason to believe that Giordano wished to join ZACABAL as such. His desire to continue working for an independent Estonia through his profession of intelligence was and is well-known to the British, the Germans, his professional Estonian associates, and to us through the letter written by Colonel Shipp, U.S. Military attache in Spain, on Giordano's behalf to ZACABAL's cover organization in Germany. Giordano has never indicated any knowledge of ZACABAL as such and has, in fact, raised doubts concerning the bona fides of ZACABAL personnel now in contact with him on the grounds that he has no assurance they represent an official branch of the U.S. government. As regards knowledge of ZACABAL interest among members of the DP Commission, we must point out that such knowledge is unfortunately inevitable in cases in which we try to apply pressure on American officials in order to expedite the emigration of persons of interest to us.

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