

January 1952.

My Visit to Stockholm.

Reason: To see the 5 or 6 recruits and to gain a personal idea of them.

Cover: To see my sisters and old friends in Sweden.

Preparations.

Visa was requested in the Consulate General of Sweden in Frankfurt on 14 November, 1951 and received on 21 December, 1951.

Danish transit visa was requested in the Consulate General of Denmark in Hamburg on 31 Dec 1951 and received on 4 Jan 1952.

My attempts to change some DM to Swedish kronor failed, - reasons:  
a) no business but visiting trip;  
b) German general shortage of foreign currency;  
c) request made too late (change had to be requested a few weeks before the scheduled start, not on the eve of it as I did).

I left Hamburg on 5 January with declared 30 DM in my pocket, which I had to bring back to Germany when returning. I had to cable my sister in Stockholm to collect me at the station in Stockholm on 6 Jan.

First meeting with Min.Rei.

I contacted Min.Rei by phone on 6 Jan at noon. Meeting was fixed by him for Monday, 7 Jan. afternoon, in his lodging.

Mr.Rei phoned in my presence to Mr.Imant Rebane who had to arrange my meeting with ~~with~~ the recruits. My first meeting with Mr.Rebane and 2 recruits was scheduled for Tuesday night at an address in Stockholm which, as I learned later, was that of the recruit Mr.Heinsoo.

My conversation with Min.Rei was rather dry. He ~~over~~gave me some copies of forms for biographical questionnaire in English which were given to him for the "visitor". Min.Rei told that he personally does not know much of the men under question, even not the names of all of them, Mr.Imant Rebane being in charge of contact with them. He knew that one of them had resigned and another had not yet filed the requested doctor's certificate.

On my question who knows of the undertaking Min.Rei answered:

- 1) Mr.Imant Rebane as actual manager of recruiting,
- 2) Capt.Karl Talpek, whom the "Finnish boys" take for their "old man", had to be informed, and
- 3) Mr. Uustalu. No particulars were given about why and how much he knows (I did not ask supplementarily).

The names of Mr.Sikkar and of Mr.Valdin, told to me before I left Munich, were not mentioned by Min.Rei. ①

I asked Minister Rei whether he could supply the undertaking with

-2-

130A-55 (21)

one copy of the daily records of the Estonian radio news (original records in Estonian) and one copy of the Estonian newspaper RAHVA HÄÄL during the period of teaching the recruits. The answer was:

- 1) one copy of the original radio news can be supplied, as he hopes to receive a new electric typewriter enabling his people to take up to 14 copies instead of 8 copies taken till now;
- 2) the possibilities to receive RAHVA HÄÄL are very short now. Sometimes the copies he receives, have to make a very long way even over Asia. He can not promise a copy of every issue, as there are gaps in his own supply, too. He likes to preserve the original copies for the Estonian archives in Sweden but could supply us with photocopies or in some cases with original copies too, if he will more than one copy himself.

I told Min. Rei that these my questions were of informal character and the official request for these supplies will be made in usual way of his contact.

As I had no Swedish money so I asked and received from Min. Rei 300 kronor, giving him a receipt.

#### First meeting with Col. Saarsen.

During the night of 8 January I met Col. Saarsen in his lodging. I informed him of my activities after our last meeting in Germany before he left for Sweden, and in very general lines of my present work, as was agreed upon in Munich. I asked him for information about the 3 persons, Saarne, Saar and Kalea, but he told not to know them. He was concerned about my contact with Min. Rei and his political lieutenants, whom he can not trust fully, especially in such confident matters I was out for. I told him the 6 names of our recruits and asked whether he has some information about them. He told to know quite well Mr. Heinsoo as one of the leaders of the Estonian Boy-Scouts whom he finds very intelligent and trustworthy. A common visit of Col. Saarsen and me to Col. Maasing was scheduled for Thursday, 10 January.

#### First meeting with Mr. Imant Rebane.

Although I came 15 minutes later than was agreed upon, Mr. Rebane was not yet at the given address and I was left in by a young man who introduced himself as Mr. Heinsoo and told that Mr. Rebane has not yet arrived. I did not tell him my name. Mr. Rebane came a few minutes after me and I had my first talk with him in Mr. Heinsoo's room, which he let to our disposition. The co-inhabitants of Mr. Heinsoo were not in.

Mr. Rebane told to know me from earlier times. (We really met in Tallinn on 20 Sep 1944, but I would not have recognized him). He informed me of the time-table of the scheduled meetings, of resignation of Mr.

Mr. Riis and of probable resignation of Mr. Rätsepp, who, as to his information, would be ready to be used as an instructor teaching the agents, but not as an agent himself. He told that my name has been told to none of the recruits and that from the recruits Heinsoo and Palusaar only know each other, being good friends, whereas the others are unknown reciprocally.

On my question who knows of the undertaking besides of Min. Rei and Capt. Talpak, Mr. Rebane answered:

- 1) Mr. Talmet, his liaison man in Göteborg to Rätsepp and Riis;
- 2) Mr. Luide, his liaison man in Norrköping to Toomla.

Mr. Heinsoo .

For getting in close contact with Mr. Heinsoo, as Mr. Rebane who had to contact us was not there, I told Mr. Heinsoo that I had heard much good about him from Col. Saarsen. Mr. Heinsoo made a very good impression of an intelligent, calm, and concentrated young man. He does not smoke, pretends not to drink liquor and not to have any other special vices. His brother in Sweden knows that he has the intention to leave for Germany for joining the American Army. He has spoken about the undertaking to Mr. Ivar Kullter, whom he trusts fully, with the intention to recruit him, but M. refused because of familiar reasons: his father is very seriously sick and he does not dare to leave him. That fact is known to Mr. Rebane too. Mr. Heinsoo corresponds with his brother and nephew in Canada. He has been elected Member of the Presidium of the ERF (Estonian National Fund) in Sweden. His English and Russian need perfecting. His German was good but he has much forgotten. He understands Finnish pretty well but does not speak himself. He has been recruited by Mr. Palusaar. He, together, with Mr. Palusaar, were given a special course of English by Miss Mai Talts in the rooms of ERN in Stockholm during the period of February till May 1951, twice the week. They two only attended that course. He does not know who paid for these lessons.

Mr. Palusaar

Mr. Palusaar could not hide his excitement and some nervousness during our conversation. He was recruited by Mr. Rebane in autumn 1950. He is an intelligent and solid young man, has some experiences in leading Boy-Scouts and Senior-Scouts. It seems to me that he would like more to be taught and used later as an instructor or some kind of officer for the future Estonian forces, but he is ready and willing to work as an agent, too. He worries because of his mother, 54, of whom he is the

only supporter. He likes to have her emigrated from Sweden to the States or to Canada before he will leave Sweden.

He visited a German aviation school during the war in Estonia, but he is not an aviator - the course could not be finished.

Mr. Palusaar wears glasses, but pretends to be able to read and to work without glasses too, and to have received his driver's licence without wearing glasses. When under short test he really could read without glasses, but of course, it would be a burden for him to do so for long time. He has joined no political party although Mr. Rebane is trying to get him into the Radical-Democratic Party. He, as well as Heinsoo, as boy-scouts, have participated on a course of radiotechnics where they received some practice @ building simple wireless receivers.

As to my understanding Mr. Palusaar, duly taught, could really make a good instructor for our use, and a good agent too, if only his shortsightedness will not progress and his worries about his mother could be settled.

As Mr. Heinsoo and Mr. Palusaar are good friends, so I had a common talk with both, too. I told to them, as I did later to all other recruits, that I have no political relations to Mr. Rebane or to any other Estonian exile-politicians, my task being purely military - to try to help free our homeland. It turned out that they both do not trust Mr. Rebane fully, especially because of his good relations to Min. Rei and to the ERN, where, as to their understanding, many unreliable men are in leading position. Min. Rei has greeted them by shaking hands as to old good relatives before many other functionaries of the ERN in connection with their English lessons, although they had not met Min. Rei and were not acquainted earlier. From that fact they both suspect that Mr. Rei and many other leading persons of the ERN know of that undertaking, especially Mr. Uustalu who was mixed into a similar failed enterprise in 1949, the secretary General of the ERN Mr. Horn whom they find to be the most mystical men of the ERN, and Miss Mai Talts who taught them and translated their life histories into English. They told me of one case where Mr. Rebane did not agree with one candidate proposed to him, because of the candidate's father being a strongly anti-ERN. That candidate, <sup>LAAS</sup> although a very good man, was therefore not contacted at all. (Now he is married.) Both men assured that they like help their country, they trust me and like to work together with me, but they dislike my contact with Mr. Rebane and the possible contact with ERN through Rebane.

Mr. TOOMLA.

Then next evening I met Mr. Toomla and Mr. Palk, successively, in the same room of Mr. Heinsoo. I thought that Mr. Rebane had arranged that Mr. Heinsoo will not be at home at that time, as were not his co-inhabitants, but it was not so. Mr. Rebane described to me the appearance of Mr. Palk, who had to come later, and introduced Mr. Toomla whom he had brought together with him and who was waiting in the room of Mr. Heinsoo. Thus it could not be avoided that Mr. Heinsoo saw Mr. Toomla and Mr. Palk when opening the entrance door for them. (Mr. Palk came earlier <sup>in fact</sup> as foreseen, when I still was talking to Toomla and therefore Heinsoo opened the door for him.) Mr. Rebane seems not to have much understanding of the necessity of security precautions.

Mr. Toomla makes the impression of a good fighter. He is intelligent but not of the same high level as are Heinsoo and Pahaäär. He smokes much, but does not make the impression of being nervous. He drinks, as was told by Mr. Rebane, but understands to control himself.

The loss of one eye seems not to trouble him much and is not too striking. He tells the same of the wound in his head, but it seems to me that his memory has suffered from this wound: he does not remember exactly of things which occurred some years ago. He pretends to be an enthusiastic sportsman. His Russian is very poor, he does not understand the simplest questions, not to speak of answering. He gave his new address: Maysbo Berga, Norrköpping, and the phone: Norrköping 19072 (under the name of Peterson). It was he who was looking for possibility to do something for Estonia, and so he contacted Mr. Emil Odraks and Mr. Uno Luide, of whom now the last is his liaison man to Mr. Rebane, whom he knows a little only. He does not care for politics, but Odraks and Luide tried to convince him <sup>to vote</sup> for ERN and "he thinks that he did so", as he told me. Not knowing Mr. Rebane and having seen me for the first time, he does not know whether he can trust us, and asked whether I could bring him a sign from his old commander Col. Rebane whom he trusts. I told this to be rather difficult because of Col. Rebane living in England. He tried to remember the name of an old Estonian colonel, white-haired, whom he had liste heard making a speech; him he trusts too. I told him names of many Estonian colonels in Sweden and he recognized the name of Col. Saarsen. I told that I, too, trust Col. Saarsen, and so we agreed that a sign from him would do. We agreed upon "TOOMAS" as my name for an eventually needed message. Mr. Toomla pretends not having told of that undertaking to anybody but the s/m Luide and Odraks; I suspected him having told to a girl-friend.

Virve Ott and to his sister-in-law, but he denies that. Nor does he correspond with anybody abroad. Mr. Toomla seems to like adventures and excitement. He has been in contact with many Estonians who escaped to Sweden during the post-war years: Vladimir Popov from Pärnu, came 1946 with Estonian ship "Merituul" (although having lived in Pärnu, too, Toomla did not know Popov earlier); he ~~will have~~ helped, together with many other fellows, to one Estonian to escape from a Russian ship in the last year (he has forgotten the name of the man), and he takes his meals in the family of an Estonian Seitun (?) who escaped from Poland some 3 years ago and married later in Sweden (Virve Ott is a sister of Mrs. Seitun). But he does not know much to tell of these persons. It seems that not the persons, but the adventures interested him.

Mr. Palk.

Mr. Palk made good impression of a calm, intelligent and determined man, who is not looking for excitements, but likes to solve and to fulfil the promise given to himself when in prison in Estonia during <sup>the</sup> first communist occupation (1940-1941). He told that he can not forget the dramatic words scratched into the walls of the cells by many Estonians before they were executed by the communists. He has read these ~~asks~~ to help the Estonian people, he has promised to help, and he likes to do so. He told how he escaped, he named witnesses, and I believe his story. He does not smoke, nor does he drink liquor. He stands in good contact with Capt. Talpak and Mr. Rebane whom he knows from the time when they all were in Finland. He thinks that these men are both good Estonians.

His brother in Sweden knows that he intends to leave for Germany, but not more. Ltn. Koolmeister and Mr. Põrk know of that undertaking. Koolmeister ~~resigned~~ to participate. He warns ~~before~~ Mr. Põrk, who is not reliable and drinks too much. He mentioned as a good man Mr. Matti. (I understood that Mr. Matti knows a little of the undertaking. The same Mr. Matti is known to Mr. Toomla too, as can be seen from his life history)

Second meeting with Mr. Rebane.

The meeting with Mr. Rätsepp was scheduled for Sunday, 13 January. Not liking to make Mr. Heinsoo disappointed with all recruits, I asked Mr. Rebane for an other place for meeting. He agreed at the lodging of Mr. Rebane. But Mr. Rätsepp did not arrive. Awaiting him I talked to Mr. Rebane. I told of the necessity of greatest caution in all the matters bound with that undertaking and asked who ~~more~~ could know of it. He

told that Minister Varma seems to suspect or know something, having once mentioned to him that Min. Rei has besides the recording of the Estonian radio news probably some other contacts more with the Americans. Mr. Rebane warned me, too, especially <sup>of course</sup> before the old Estonian officers in Sweden "whom one can not trust". It seemed to me that he knew already of my contacting Col. Saarsen and Col. Maasing, which facts I did not intend to hide at all. As Col. Saarsen is living in a family (Mr. & Mrs. Liidmann /?/), the head of which is an active member of the ERN, so it was quite normal that he spoke of my visit <sup>ing</sup> to Col. Saarsen. Mr. Rebane asked whether the Organization is interested in Russian original documents. He has a passport issued for an Estonian male person, aged 40 - 50, from the area of Haapsalu or Läänemaa (district round Haapsalu). I answered that the Organization surely is interested in such documents and that I shall report on that.

I asked Mr. Rebane to contact Mr. Rätsepp once more and <sup>to</sup> ask him to come for an interview even in the case that he likes to be used as an instructor only.

Third meeting with Mr. Rebane.

Mr. Rätsepp came to Stockholm on Friday, 18 January and we met in the buffet of the Central Station. Mr. Rebane, who introduced him, asked for one more talk and we had it right before talking to Mr. Rätsepp. Mr. Rebane asked whether I can help him in obtaining the Estonian newspaper RAHVA HÄÄL, and whether I can supply him with some Estonian maps. I told him that I just asked myself Min. Rei ~~for~~ RAHVA HÄÄL, and that Capt. Talpak offered me one year ago Estonian maps; he could ask him. Mr. Rebane answered that Capt. Talpak really has a complete Estonian map, he thinks in scale 1:200.000, but he personally has some single sheets only. I could not promise any. to him.

Mr. Rätsepp.

Mr. Rätsepp made a good impression of an experienced and reliable officer. Asked, whether he knows me, he told that he thinks so and told where I was serving during the peace time. As his information was right so I told my name, which he probably knew already. Asked about the reason why he has changed his mind and does not like to participate actively, he denied such change, claiming to be still ready for active work too, but only in case that he could be convinced in the good character and solidity of the undertaking. He, too, did not trust the political line of Mr. Rebane and of his friends.

As to his understanding the following persons, besides Rebane and his chiefs, know of that undertaking:

- Mr. Talmet and Mr. Oland by whom he got in touch with Mr. Rebane;
- Mr. Vahur, brother of Mrs. Rebane. Mr. Vahuri, whom Rätsepp qualifies as a negative type, knows supposedly all that Rebane knows. Rätsepp thinks that Rebane is something like a tool in Vahuri's hands.
- Mr. Mihkelson from the SRN, also a negative type, and probably
- Mr. Mikiver, too.

As good and reliable persons who could be used in future, he mentioned

- Lt. Armin Vene, and
- Mr. Boris Ritsberg.

Mr. Rätsepp has once spoken about similar undertakings to Minister Varma but the last "did not catch fire"

Mr. Rätsepp has learned wireless and pretends to be able to receive up to 80 signs in one minute and to be able to teach wireless.

I did not check his knowledge of Russian, presuming that to be good, but that was an error; as shown in his life history — where stands: Russian — slight.

I asked every recruit of his opinion concerning the possibilities of going to Estonia and working there. None but Mr. Rätsepp could make a suggestion about the way of going there. They all thought that legalisation would be impossible, but some old contacts, especially to the elder people, could be refreshed and used. Mr. Rätsepp thought that the best way for going to Estonia would be going by land, starting from Germany.

I further asked every recruit not to speak of me visiting them, and not to stay on alert awaiting a <sup>quick</sup> call, <sup>up</sup>, but to go on doing their daily work as if nothing has happened, because it may take very long time before, if at all, they will be asked to come over; if all the undertaking will not be called off because of different security reasons.

It seemed to me that the recruits agreed with that calm waiting; most of them were themselves <sup>noticed</sup> bored by their own doubts about the reliability of some contact <sup>man</sup>.

#### Summary.

Heinsoo and Palusaar are very good and reliable young intellectuals. Palusaar is a little handicapped by his shortsightedness and by his mother of whom he is the only caretaker. He could be taught to a good instructor.

Rätsepp is very good and reliable and experienced officer, may act as instructor, too.



Palk is very good, reliable, and determined worker, intelligent, too.

Toomla is a good, reliable and gallant fighter, a little handicapped by loss of one eye and by a small defect of memory. He could render good services as a member of the team who would carry out different tasks requesting special audacity and skill.

Politically all are reliable. Four out of five do not trust the political line of Mr. Rebane and of the ERN, and like to do the job under a clear military leading, which they could trust fully.

Summarizing the names of the many people told to me, who surely or probably know of the enterprise, and knowing that far not all names of persons informed of it were told to me, remembering the way how I myself and other persons were contacted by Capt. Talpak in December 1950, and how Mr. Rebane organized my meetings with the recruits, and what the recruits told to me, I must state that the four a/m men are right when worrying because of the security of the enterprise.

#### Recruiting of Instructors.

I met Mr. Simmo on 13 January in his living room. He is still a good and very reliable man, has meanwhile worked as wireless operator on board, and finished special courses in wireless and electricity at a Technical Institute in Stockholm, but he stands just before marriage with a Swedish girl. It must be a very good offer which he would accept in such conditions. I should rather not employ persons having wives of a third nationality (not Estonian and not American).

Mr. Rosenfeldt is sailing as wireless operator. The news I got about him from very reliable sources do not allow me to recommend him for such a trustful job: he drinks too much, <sup>loses</sup> ~~does not~~ control over himself.

Some names which may be of use later:

Sternbeck, Olav, 28, wireless operator and mechanic, politically reliable, has a very good job with Fa ELM Ericson in Stockholm.

Sternbeck, Hannes, 25, brother of Olav, sailor, very gifted in different languages, especially in Russian. Both sons of an Estonian general murdered by the ~~communists~~ communists. Hannes has worked during the war together with the Finnish, ~~misguiding~~ guiding Russian pilots by radio.

#### Visits to Col. Maasing.

I met Col. Maasing twice, on 10th and on 13th January, both times in his lodging, in presence of Col. Searsen.

I informed Col. Maasing of my past war activity and of my present contact, telling no names, as I was instructed. I told of the doubts which I had in the beginning of that contact because it was reached by the

intermediation of Captain Telpak and Minister Rei, whom I can not trust fully because they are politicians. I told that I should prefer to work on a clear military line only, backing myself, if necessary and if allowed, and leaning to the authority of my old highly respected Chiefs, Col. Maasing and Col. Saarsen.

Col. Maasing told to be glad knowing me in contact with the competent American Authorities, because the U.S.A. is the real powerful motor of the anti-communist fight and therefore the main help for delimitation of Estonia, too, can come from America, the States, only. He agreed and underlined my doubts concerning the participation of the politicians in intelligence work: a clear military line only, without any politics and politicians is acceptable, or one never knows what will happen. He and Col. Saarsen, living in Sweden, can not do anything actively, but would help in every possible way. But then, of course, they must be contacted by some American officer whom they know, so they would know with whom they really would be collaborating. That was a hint on the matter of fact that I could not tell whether names or the authority with whom I am working - a very silly position indeed!

Referring to the good results which the Estonian military Intelligence Service obtained during peace time by systematic and minute study and evaluation of the information contained in different newspapers and specific literature, he told that despite the troubles in obtaining these materials now, there is still possible to gain reliable and valuable information by such research work now too, and on much lower costs than obtaining the same information by sending out agents.

As to the possibilities to send agents from Sweden to Estonia Col. Maasing told that one can boast with it and speak of it, but as far as he knows, the attempts made some years ago have failed, not a single boat having reached the Estonian coast, all being detected by the Russians. As to his understanding the Swedish authorities would never participate on such an enterprise, and to do such things in Sweden without knowledge and approval of the Swedish authorities is quite impossible. But there still remain some possibilities to receive from time to time some interesting book, or other information collected by different people still visiting the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The conditions of life in Estonia, according to his informations, are not at all to the favor of a secret agent. Legalisation of such people in the Baltic States is extremely difficult because of the special vigilance of the many Russian and local (Estonian) communist watch organisations, as these countries are still under special observation.

I asked whether the Colonels know how the recording and the evaluation of the radio news from Estonia is organized and whether that is done duly. The answer was that Mr. Tõnurist, a former officer of the Estonian milit. intelligence has worked on that, but he has been discharged by Minister Rei, reason being unknown, possibly politically unacceptable for the ERN.

Last visit to Minister Rei.

I met Min. Rei for the second time on 13 January. I gave him back the questionnaires which I did not use. I asked him the same question which I put to Col. Maasing concerning recording of radio news from Estonia. Min. Rei told that Capt. Purre, the husband of Mrs. Purre (News Letters) is doing that work, but as a part-time-job only, after his usual daily occupation, shortness of money being the reason why that work can not be done with due efficiency. The results could be better. As to Min. Rei an other person does the same work on his own initiative or privately, but he does not think that the results of that work are better than these of Mr. Purre. He did not tell me the name of the other person and I did not ask specially. Min. Rei asked me whether the Organization has enough original Russian or Estonian documents and clothings for supplying the agents, and whether there is enough Estonian and Russian newspapers so the agents could get acquainted with the many new special expressions in use in Estonia, the unknowledge of which being fatal to the agents. I told that all these questions are under due consideration, but that I am not entitled to give any special hints as to what Min. Rei's Organization has to do; the corresponding instructions will be given in the usual way, also concerning the Estonian copy of the radio news and the photocopies of RAHVA HÄEL of which we spoke during the first meeting.

-----  
Having received a cable according to which my family had to leave from Grohn - Bremen early in the morning on 21 January, I left Stockholm on 13 January late in the night, arrived at Grohn on 20 Jan. in the morning and saw my family off on 21 January. On 22 January I cleared my last relations in Wentorf Camp and in Hamburg and I was back in Munich on 23 January at 13 h.50.

My Swedish visa would have allowed me to stay in Stockholm up to the morning of 19 January, thus for one night longer as I actually stood.

The Next Steps to be Made.

Analysis of situation.

1. We have 5 generally good and reliable recruits.
2. Four of these recruits <sup>lose</sup> ~~lose~~ the absolutely needed trust into the solidity and security of the enterprise. That is due to the relations the enterprise has till now with the political organization of ERN. I have had the same distrust all the time and that was not dissolved, but was <sup>confirmed</sup> ~~fastened~~ by what I saw and heard in Sweden. Mr. Rebane, who in the eyes of the recruits is officially the main Estonian bound closely with that enterprise in Sweden, left on me a bad impression as if having to hide something. I can not blame the recruits who do not trust him and the ERN behind him.
3. Over one year was needed to reach the today's situation in the development of the enterprise. Should we let fall these 5 recruits because the unreliable ERN knowing of them, and try to find new ones without the help and knowledge of the ERN, then, in Sweden, we probably should fail, because the ERN has contacted not only these 5 men but many others more, and we inevitably should stumble over these men, or the ERN would hear of our attempts. Besides, every new recruiting would take much time.
4. The information over the situation and the life conditions in Estonia at our disposal, as far as known to me, is still very fragile for instructing agents before going to Estonia.
5. The results of recording and of study of the Estonian radio news and of RAHVA HÄÄL, if there are no better materials as I have seen, are unsatisfactory and do not promise much amelioration in future.

Therefore:

- a) The selected 5 men have to be used.
- b) That has to be done without further help and knowledge of the ERN, but without hurting the ERN or causing special suspicion in its circles. Two ways could be gone:
  - bringing the men to Germany as has been foreseen till now and breaking then every contact between them and the ERN and even with the relatives because of the security needs, or -
  - inform the ERN and let the men be informed through the ERN that the enterprise has been called off, whereas in reality the men will be instructed under fullest secrecy to show disappointment and to emigrate from Sweden on own hand to Canada or to Germany, from where they will be collected anew quite secretly for the teaching.

Besides of that, and notwithstanding which way will be chosen,

the following has to be done as soon as ever possible:

- c) to request from Min.Rei full original Estonian copies of every record of radio news made till now, and of every new record;
- d) to request from Min.Rei a spare copy or a photocopy of every issue of RAHVA HÄÄL (starting with papers from 1. Jan 1950) which is not yet available, and of each new issue;
- e) to organize a new second center of recording of Estonian radio news somewhere in British Zone of Germany on the Baltic Sea, so the possibly and probably incomplete records of Min.Rei (made in part-time-job) could be checked and completed;
- f) to organize collecting of information by interviewing the Germans who will come from Estonia or who came from there recently;
- g) to organize somewhere near or in Munich a center for study and evaluation and systematization of materials and informations gathered according to points c to f above;
- h) to contact Col.Maasing for obtaining the information from and about Estonia which he can receive through his special channels.

( Follows ).

Explanations  
to  
New Steps to be Made.

Our first, and urgent, and most important task is to collect information about the actual situation in Estonia, and about the persons whom our agents will find or may find there. Any premature sabotage or violence acts would come to the benefit of the communists only, giving them good ground to accelerate the annihilation of the Estonian people by mass deportations and arrests because of their unreliability manifested by those single acts. The Estonians still in Estonia do not need such special acts to uphold their inner resistance against the communists. It is not good to show that resistance and to use it by drops. That resistance must be spared up for a well-organized and well-timed violent saving outburst, which may not be started as a local Estonian action only but as a part of a world-wide decisive coup.

Sending out agents is one way to come to the wanted information. But our own experience shows how long that way is. We have spent over a full year already, and probably another will go before we will be able to say that our work has given some results. And that possibility we shall have only if our enterprise has not been and will not be signaled to the enemy, and if we will succeed to smuggle the agents in and to camouflage them so well that they really can do some working. We may hope to come to such positive results only if we shall act with due precaution.

Our enemy is very suspicious and on the alert. Therefore we may not hope on our luck too much and let us guide by the temptation to send the first men out as soon as possibly, hoping that they could help with their first-class information to smooth the way of the following ones. If the first men would go in haste, unduly prepared, then they will be lost soon and for nothing, and it would be much more difficult to send in new men.

Therefore we have to use at first all the means promising us some usable information in a shorter time, so we could use that information for instructing our agents before their start, so they could really overlisten the enemy and supply us with first-hand information.

Therefore the steps mentioned under letters c to h (page 13), have to be taken in first order.

To "c" and "d".

The summaries of events received till now from Stockholm may give a good idea of the life in Soviet-Estonia in general lines. But these summaries do not contain the details which are much more interesting for us, so we could build up a really complete and minute picture of the situation in Estonia. That is not a work for part-time-occupation, and ~~it needs~~ much original material is needed before some really usable minute picture of the situation could be assembled.

To "e".

Intelligence work has to be done apart of politics, if possible. It is not because of one or an other person participating in such a political body, but because of the regime of work of such bodies which do not guarant the necessary security. Therefore it is not good to bind our work too closely to any political organization, especially if that organization has in its lists persons whose political views and past life are not quite clear or not quite acceptable to our work. Therefore - don't bind us more closely to the ERN and the affiliated organizations.

From the other side I would not show our distrust to these organizations by withdrawing from them the work they have done. I should let them, at least for time-being, go on recording the radionews and writing the summaries. That contact is needed especially because of the Estonian newspapers which we need, as these are at present the most useful sources of information, and as we have no other ways to receive them.

In that connection be remarked that the regular supply of the Estonian (Soviet) newspapers is not more so simple and innocent as it was some few years ago when the Russian liaison officers brought heaps of them to the D.P. camps or to the I.R.O. for distribution. Sometimes the Soviet official representatives still distribute copies of some Estonian issues, but that is not done regularly and and copies of some single issues only have been distributed. Mr. Mr. Heinsoo and Palusaar told me that they, too, have once collected some of such copies distributed in connection with a Soviet movie performance in Stockholm and have overgiven these to Mr. Rei's organization. I do not know anybody outside the Iron Courtain who still receives Estonian newspapers by legal subscription. Col. Maasing told me of an attempt to subscribe the RAHVA HÄAL through a public agency in Stockholm advertising among others different Soviet newspapers,

too. The order was accepted but never carried out. The person, who did order that paper, had to investigate and to remind many times before he, many months later, was informed by that agency, that according to an answer from Moscow such a newspaper is unknown there, the inquiry sent to the editorial office on the address given by the subscriber (the exact address in Tallinn as given in that paper) had been unsuccessful, the subscriber must have had given a wrong address... He never got his copy of Raeva HÄÄL! That shows that RAEVA HÄÄL can not be received by ordinary legal ways. If some of those copies, which I was promised, have to come over Asia - which, the price of them, can that price be paid in some currency or has it to be of some other nature?

Where to organize a second center of recording?

The radio-technical conditions of reception of radio news from Estonia are much better in Sweden than in Germany, where it could be made with some success somewhere on the Baltic Sea only (in Lübeck area). If the new center can be organized and can work in Sweden in full secrecy before the ERN and ERF, known really to the persons only who are working in it, then it would be much better to install that center in Sweden and organize a good quick communication between that center and the new-to-be-established study center. If that is not possible, then efforts have to be made to do the job in Germany.

I should recommend to use automatic recording devices. If besides the news broadcasted by Tallinn there are other broadcastings of local news, e.g. from Tartu, as well as the local news from Estonia in Russian language, have to be recorded, too.

To letter "f".

One has to assume that among the German returnees still coming from Estonia or from the other Baltic states, from where all the Germans were resettled during 1939 - 1941 already, may be many communist agents who were sent out purposely, and whose information therefore are unreliable. But that source, too, can not be neglected; the ex-PoWs can still give some usable information.

Who could do that interviewing? It must be done by Estonians speaking a comprehensible German and whom the good Germans would trust. I think it should be the best to let it be done by the Estonian war-invalids, who fought against the communists together with the Germans, and who, thus, could be trusted by the Germans. That job could be done as an enterprise of the Association of the Estonian Fighters "Eesti Võitlejate Ühing" (EVÜ) where most of Estonian invalids are belonging to.



That undertaking, carried out in a legal manner, could interest the organizations of the Voice of America and the Radio Free Europe, too, which are in need of fresh information about Estonia for their Estonian broadcasting programmes. I think that it would be better not to let such an undertaking hang upon the purse of the young and pauper EVU only, that cover would not be good enough. Would it not be better to let the action being requested and sponsored by the a/m organizations or by the recently nominated Estonian Consul General in Western Germany, Minister Karl Selter, or by the Central Representation of the Estonians in Western Germany, headed at present by the three representatives:

Mr. Karl Grau - American Zone, in Augsburg,

Lt.-Col. Hermann Stockeby - British Zone, in Augustdorf n. Detmold,

Col. Ludvig Jakobsen - French Zone, in Tübingen. Col. Jakobsen, since 1937 Military Attaché of Estonia in Germany, is also the President of the EVU.

It could be of use to discuss that problem with Minister Selter, Col. Jakobsen and Mr. Leonhard Vahter, the President of the Estonian Panel of Radio Free Europe, who, as to my informations, will come to Germany soon or is here already, coming from a meeting of exile politicians, from London.

The same organization of EVU could be used for collecting Soviet-Estonian newspapers in Germany, if such are still distributed between the Estonian refugees.

To letter "g".

The different raw materials, as the recorded radionews, the Soviet-Estonian newspapers and the records of interviews have to be worked through carefully. The information-scrap has to be evaluated, classified and systematized. That work has to be done under leading of somebody who has some experience in such work. The help of that center will be very often needed when the recruits will be instructed of the real situation in Estonia. Therefore that center can not be too far from the area where the tuition of the agents will be done.

To letters "a" and "b".

It is clear that the contact between the recruits and Mr. Rebene, and the organization behind him, has to cease. If we like to obtain real help against the possible danger for the enterprise coming from the present contact of the recruits with

Mr. Rebane and his political collaborators, then, if taking the recruits over to Germany as has been scheduled, we will have to prohibit every correspondence between the recruits and their relatives or friends. It would not help us much when letting them correspond using a special cover address. We could explain such a rigorous step to the recruits as a prescribed and absolutely necessary security precaution. But would it not be too striking when these men, going to Germany ostensibly for quite harmful reasons, will cease corresponding with their relatives and friends? Besides, if our suspicion is grounded and there are enemy eyes watching our movements already, then it will not be too difficult for these eyes to follow our recruits to Germany, or to shadow that person in Germany who, remaining legal himself, will have to move between the recruits and your establishments. If that person will be known to those eyes already, then the job will not be too difficult..

When going that way we probably will lose Mr. Palusaar because of his mother, as it would be rather difficult to help her to the States or to Canada if he will go to Germany. I should not like to lose that good man, we have no great reserve so we could abandon him easily.

Some more security could be reached if we shall ostensibly call off the enterprise and let Mr. Rebane inform the recruits accordingly. That would not look striking after the affair has last so long already and after the "visitor" has found so many things to worry about: too many people informed, one recruit short-sighted, another has one eye only and other defects more... To have the camouflage complete, the "visitor", too, has to be "fired", so Mr. Rebane and the circles behind him could be really convinced that this enterprise is closed. The recruits have in that case to be informed of the real situation by direct safe channels in due time, so they could react on the call-off information with due acrimony. Some of them could earlier already bring to show some hopelessness concerning that enterprise and start some preparations for emigration to Canada. It would then not strike when the disillusioned men will look and find other ways how to come to their dreams, when Mr. Palk and Mr. Heinsoo would emigrate to Germany for entering the special U.S. units composed of East-Europeans, and when Mr. Palusaar with his mother, as well as Mr. Rätsepp and Mr. Toomla would emigrate to Canada where so many Estonians are going from Sweden. It would also not strike so much if these men will cease corresponding with their relatives and friends after

having emigrated to Canada or entered the U.S. units. The experiences have showed that young people going to Canada or to the States have no time or no interest for correspondence, they send one or two letters and that is all, - the life is hard, they change the jobs often, if they can do so, and disappear quite normally. Our friends could then be helped to pass the U.S. frontier, not for a permanent stay there, but only for being collected and brought to the scheduled secret places where the tuition will have to be done.

That way, of course, takes a little more time and money, but the gain in security will balance that loss out. Besides, having seen how long it takes to arrange quite simple things, I am not sure that we, using the simpler and shorter way of bringing the men at once directly to Germany, should get ready with all preparations and could let the men go to Estonia early enough in coming autumn. Therefore, if the general situation allows such a delay, let us do the work as sure as possible, and be ready for a duly prepared start in the spring 1953.

Approximate time schedule.

- A) Organizing of  
1) interviewing of German returnees;  
2) study center;  
3) second recording center (if to be done in Germany) 3 to 4 months.

During the same time:

- 1) smooth flow of the original Estonian radio news and of the Sov.-Estonian newspapers from Stockholm has to be secured;
- 2) the recruits have to be informed of the real situation and instructed what to do;
- 3) Minister Rei has to be informed of the "call off" of the enterprise and instructed to inform the recruits accordingly;
- 4) My immigration to the States has to be settled under Sect. 3 (c) of the DP Act, so the "fired" man could go the less striking way. That could not be difficult any longer now, as there is nothing more preventing me to file my appeal against the erroneous disqualification under Sect. 13. That solution would suit well to my later "firing", as I have told my friends and relatives that I have promised a job with the Americans up to my emigration only, which I hope to settle soon.

- B) The "disappointed" recruits and the "fired" Kurgvel immigrate just where one can go . . . . . 3 to 4 months.

As Kurgvel "fears too long sea trips" so he goes over Sweden and Canada, visiting once more his sisters in Sweden and his old sponsor Mr. Dulder in Canada.

That trip could be of some use in connection with the immigration of the recruits to Canada and their later move from Canada to the States.

- c) presuming that there will be no special formalities and difficulties with taking the few recruits in a military airplane back to Germany, if the tuition will have to be done here, all friends could be together and the tuition could start in October/November, and a geographically sized course could be finished in some . . . . . 6 months, the men being ready for going on work in April/May, 1953.

As to Kurgvel's return to Germany, he could come back clandestinely together with the recruits, or quite legally as a representative of the Estonian Panel of Radio Free Europe, attached to the Estonian Consulate General in Germany, or under some similar cover enabling him some possibilities to move from one place to other, so it would not strike if he will be often not "at home".

Supplement to the Tuition Plan.

I find that the provisional tuition plan of our recruits has to be supplemented by two essential subjects:

- 1) photography, and
- 2) wireless picture transmission (video).

It is not much what our 5 recruits could collect on information and transmit to us by usual wireless messages. Would it not be better to build up a team of those men, to equip that team beside the usual wireless sets with a photo radio and a photo laboratory, so they could send us much more materials than could do hundred men working with usual wireless sets only. They could, e.g. send us photos of different local newspapers which often give more information than the bigger general newspapers do, and which are inobtainable here. Their own messages, too, could be sent in photographed form, which procedure is taking much less time (shorter transmission periods) as needed when giving these messages by Morse. Use of such devices would highly augment the safety of our agents before the enemy radio-goniometers, especially when our devices will be fitted out with special directive areals and the men will not be forced to send long messages by Morse.

+

To bring the men and the whole equipment safely to Estonia - my proposals of 29 Oct, 1951 could be taken into consideration.

31 January, 1952.

A. Ku.