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TO: Mr. Taylor.  
FROM: Mario K. Giordano.  
DATE: 26 Jan. 1961.  
SUBJECT: FORWARDING OF AN EXCLUSIVE MEMORANDUM.

1. Hereby I am forwarding two copies (the original and one carbon-copy) of a Memorandum the subject of which deals with a concrete proposal in ACQUISITION OF HIGH LEVEL CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE AGENTS.
2. According to my finding it is of vital importance that the subject of this Memorandum in its present stage of development would be handled as an URGENT and TOP SECRET matter, of which only as few officers as possible or necessary would learn about before an authoritative decision concerning the use or rejection of the idea will be taken by the Authority in the Agency who is qualified for this.
3. Therefore, will you, please, forward the copies of this Memorandum together with this letter to the Deputy Director of the Agency in charge of Operations.
4. All writing, editing and typing of this Memorandum has been done by me personally, without any help by other persons. I have carried these papers on myself or with me in a locked briefcase.
5. ONLY TWO COPIES (see point 1) were prepared of this Memorandum.
6. To give the deciding Authority the full picture of the circle of officers who have or will ~~xxxx~~ come into contact with this Memorandum, I suggest that all these officers write their identification sign on this sheet, indicating also to which extend they had taken insight into the Memorandum.

*Mario K. Giordano*  
Mario K. Giordano.

LIST OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE DEALT WITH THIS MEMORANDUM:

Officer's name.	Date.	Forwarded to.	Degree of familiarization.
1. M.K. Giordano	Dec. 60	-6--	Spoken about the idea and one promising recruit with Mr. EASON.
2. M.K. Giordano	26 Jan. 61.	Mr. Taylor.	<i>Taylor</i>

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

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*26 Jan 1961*

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MEMORANDUM

by

Mario K. Giordano

January 1961.

SUBJECT: USE OF RESIDENTS OF SOVIET OR SATELITE COUNTRIES  
IN ANTI-COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE WORK

1. Many difficult and time-consuming steps must be successfully accomplished before a newly won agent, often but of medium standard, would be able to start his clandestine work at the target.
2. Penetration into the Target Area, and acclimatization and legalization there, are the most critical of those steps, often the fatal ones.
3. Recruitment of agents amongst the people who already live and work there would help to bypass these critical steps.
4. There are thousands of able and high standard people living behind the Iron Curtain who:
  - a) are satisfactorily prepared for some clandestine intelligence work through their high general intelligence, and the training and practice in their normal fields of work;
  - b) could do the clandestine work under the cover of their normal work;
  - c) have good motivation and daring wish to work against the communist regime, be only given a reasonably secure and promising way to do this, or -
  - d) could be coaxed or blackmailed into this work.
5. Secure spotting and assessment of such people should not be too difficult, because:
  - a) our different representations abroad should be able

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to furnish personal-data and other necessary information on people with whom they get in contact, or whom they get to know in process of the normal work;

- b) some qualified escapees or defectors from behind the Iron Curtain are carriers, sometimes unwitting ones, of valuable information concerning such people which we need;
- c) it should not be too difficult to elicit such information, if the carriers can not be asked pertinent questions openly.

6. By this way of recruitment we can have better qualified and more securely installed agents who have better access to the targets, who are more secure in their clandestine work, and who, thus, can supply us with more reliable and more important information during longer periods of time than could do the best and the luckiest of our sent-in-agents.

7. The main difficulties on this way of recruitment are, and the right solutions must be found for:

- a) proper CONTACTING of the selected recruits, and
- b) proper means of clandestine COMMUNICATIONS with the agents.

8. The recruits would be persons on advanced or technically important positions on the governmental, military, or industrial ladders. It is normal that these people are under some kind of automatic observation by the Soviet security organs. Therefore, the techniques of contacting and of communications must be the safest possible. They shall not include anything what could attire the attention of a casual informant and could be used by the KGB against the agent as "evidence" of his clandestine work.

9. The principle of NEED TO KNOW must be applied strictly. The candidate must be given effective proof that the contact is not a provocation made on order of the KGB. The candidate must be assured that:

- a) the contact comes from an organization abroad;
- b) no other Soviet knows, or will know of it, if he himself would not abandon the secret;
- c) the person who made the contact will leave the country as soon as this his assignment will be accomplished;
- d) the Sponsor has no other agents or officers behind the Iron Curtain who know about this contact.

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Besides of this, the recruit must be assured that if he accepts the offer then he will be given clear signals for recognition of those persons who would be sent to him in case that he would need help.

10. The solution of these problems depends upon the character of each individual case and, thus, must be considered accordingly.

On the following pages one case, spotted by the writer of this Memorandum, will be elaborated.

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CASE: RICHARD TOMBERG. (Later referred to by: RT.)

A. GENERAL INFORMATION.

1. Nationality: Estonian
2. Citizenship: Soviet, since 1940.
3. Age and Health: 63 or 64 years of age. Robust built, apparently in good health.
4. Whereabouts: Normally in Tallinn, Sov. Estonia.
5. Qualifications:
  - a) Before July 1940: Major-General, G.S., Estonian Armed Forces; Commanding General, Air Defense; military flyer; expert in military-technical and -political matters.
  - b) Now: Retired Major-General of Soviet Army or Airforce; Civil Engineer; member of the Soviet repatriation institution "Committee for Development of Cultural Contacts with the Estonians Abroad", with the office in Tallinn.

B. HISTORY OF LIFE.

1. Raised in North-East part of Estonia.
2. Education:
  - a) Teachers' Seminary in Estonia, before WW I.
  - b) Reserve Officers' Courses of Russian Tsarist Army, during WW I.
  - c) Career Officers' Complementary Courses of Estonian Army, after 1920.
  - d) Courses of General Staff of Estonian Army, before 1924;
  - e) French "Ecole Superieure de Guerre";
  - f) A British Royal Military Aviation School (flying).
  - g) Possibly, during and after WW II: some Soviet military and engineering schools.
3. Employment (incomplete record):
  - a) Before 1918: Officer in the Russian Tsarist Army during WW I.
  - b) During the Estonian War of Independence, (1918-20): C.O., Company, 8th Inf. Regiment, Estonian Army.
  - c) About 1924: Captain G.S., Professor of History of Military Arts, Military Academy, in Tallinn.

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- d) Chief of Department: Operations, Gen. H. Q., Estonian Armed Forces.
- e) Commanding Officer, Air Force Regiment, about 1929/30.
- f) Simultaneously: Consultant, Estonian Delegation to the League of Nations, Geneva.
- g) Commanding Officer, Air Defense (Divisional command), since 1932 (approx), up to 1940.
- h) Simultaneously, due to this position, Member of the Council of the Ministry of Defense.
- i) In winter 1939/40: Chairman of the Commission of Estonian officers in Moscow, to negotiate the delivery of A.A. weapons promised to the Estonian Air Defense by the USSR.
- j) Social activity: President of the British-Estonian Club in Tallinn for many years, up to 1940.
- k) In Summer 1940, after the Soviet take-over in Estonia Commanding Officer of an Infantry Division (of mixed, Estonian and Russian, components).
- l) Soon thereafter: Sent to the "Frunze" War Academy, Moscow, together with many other Estonian general and field-grade officers.
- m) During WW II: Major-General in Soviet Armed Forces, assignment unknown.
- n) After WW II: in Siberia, circumstances unknown.
- o) Since approx. 1958: Back in Estonia (see p.5, b).
- p) Since Spring 1960: member of the repatriation committee, in Tallinn (see p.5b).

4. Family Status:

- a) Wife, an Estonian, married some 40 years ago. The wife and one son, born approx. 1938, remained in Estonia when RT was sent to Moscow in Summer 1940. They remained there also in 1944 when the Germans retreated from Estonia, and she was there in 1958.
- b) Daughter Claudia /prob./, about 40, married during WW II in Estonia, now in Australia. (See c, below.)
- c) Son-in-Law, Mr. LAANEKORB, Estonian, between 40-50, son of a well known Estonian judge. Sports flyer and probably an official of the Aero-Club in Tallinn before 1940. During WW II he commanded a German-controlled Estonian flying unit. The couple emigrated after WW II to Australia.

5. Voyages Abroad:

- a) During the period from 1920-1940, when in Estonian Armed Forces: Many trips and longer stays in

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France and Gr. Britain in connection with the attendance of schools and procurement of aircrafts. Additional trips to other European countries in connection with procurement of aircraft and AA artillery. Trips to Geneva, to attend the sessions of the League of Nations.

- b) During WW II: probably different trips in USSR, including Siberia.
- c) After WW II, in Aug. 1960, from Estonia to Sweden, in a "tourist group", probably on orders, as member of the committee mentioned in p.5, b. In Sweden RT tried and partially succeeded to take up contact with some Estonian officers who are living there.
- d) RT has written of his attention to visit his daughter and son-in-law in Australia, during 1960. No information available that he had carried it out. Nor is there any information about his daughter or son-in-law having been in Sweden when RT was there. Thus, a trip to Australia could be forthcoming.
- 6. Foreign correspondence: There are rumors that RT has sent letters to some former Estonian officers abroad, to Sweden. He also shall have written to his daughter and the son-in-law in Australia.
- 7. Knowledge of Languages: Estonian, Russian, French, English and German, all fluent.
- 8. Hobbies: Unknown. He was normally so busy with his manifold jobs that there was not much time for hobbies.
- 9. Use of Narcotics: None known up to 1940. RT drank very moderately and probably did not smoke at all.

C. CHARACTERIZATION.

- 1. By this reporter, who knows RT since 1924. Due to the reporter's official position he had rather often official and social contacts with RT during the years from 1934 up to July 1940. According to the reporter's personal impression RT is:
  - a) very intelligent, and well informed in military, political, and technical fields,
  - c) industrious and aggressiv, coolly calculating, and ruthless if necessary,
  - d) polite, serious, humanly co-operative.
  - e) RT has good self-control.

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2. By General J. Laidoner, the long time Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces, as heard by this reporter, and as was generally known in Estonian military circles:

General Laidoner was of very high opinion of RT. When Estonian Delegate to the League of Nations, General Laidoner chose then Colonel RT to be his adviser in this Delegation.

In later years Gen. Laidoner mentioned on many occasions that RT would be the best future choice to the post of the Chief of Gen. H. Q. of the Armed Forces, and then to the post of the Commander-in-Chief.

D. MOTIVATION of RT, as estimated by the reporter.

1. Analysis and Synthesis of RT's probable thoughts.

a) The period from WW I to 1940:

- (1) RT knew the life in Estonia and in Russia before and during WW I and during the Russian revolution. He felt Estonian and anti-communist. He left Russian army, joined the Estonian national army and fought against the communists.
- (2) RT had very good record and advancement in the Estonian Armed Forces of peace time. He traveled in official capacities all over in Europe, and lived for long periods in France and in Gr. Britain. Thus, he saw the really free and good life of a well situated field officer during the years between the two WW.
- (3) RT saw the low standard of the carefully selected Soviet generals and field-grade officers who visited Estonia during the years of Estonian independence.
- (4) RT saw also the drab life of the Soviet officers in their bases in Estonia (1939/40), and the poor life in Moscow, with no freedom at all.

- Having such a background and so good possibilities for comparison, the intelligent and aggressive RT could NOT have turned to be a dedicated communist.

b) The Change in 1940:

- (1) RT was promoted to the grade of Major-General by the President of Estonia in February 1940.
- (2) However, RT looked changed when he returned from Moscow after having stayed there longer than did the

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Commission of which he was the Chairman.

(3) It looks that the communists had made an offer to RT in Moscow and that he had accepted it.

- This decision of RT to co-operate with the communists was a coolly calculated risk and a step for survival. He knew the political situation in the world. As an Estonian general he could do nothing, neither for Estonia nor for himself, he would have been doomed soon (as, indeed, were others a little later). As a Soviet general he, at least, had some aspects to survive the foreseeable purges.

c) The period from 1940 up to date:

(1) RT survived the purges which followed the incorporation of Estonia into USSR, and also the WW II. Later, according to his own utterings, he had been banned to Siberia for about ten years. Although we do not know under which conditions he was there, those could not have been pleasant and cheering.

(2) Now back in Soviet Estonia, RT sees the misery of the life there if compared with that before 1939 and with that in Sweden now.

(3) Although the life in Sov. Estonia is still better than this in other parts of USSR, of which RT had seen a plenty, he sees and feels the strict limitations of liberties in general and this of his own liberty: he could not take his wife and his son with himself to Sweden although this would have been a good propaganda move for the Soviets to let them go and return all together. The Soviets did not trust him, and the family had to stay behind as hostages.

(4) The Estonians who had seen RT in Sweden, to whom he could not confide his real feelings, found that he had remained an aggressive personality.

- A man with such a firm character and self-control, who after all the sufferings and disappointments manages to show and act aggressive, RT can not be satisfied with his present drab situation although this is a little better than that of the other Estonians in Soviet Estonia. His situation is still much worse than this of the Estonian officers-refugees in Sweden who, many of them his former subordinates, live freely and well on money being earned by work freely chosen by themselves, whereas he has no

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freedom whatsoever and nothing what he could really call being his own.

d) RT's Estimate of the Present Military-Political Situation.

- (1) RT, generally intelligent, militarily highly trained, with over 20 years of life and service in the Soviet Union, has a good picture of the strength and also of the weaknesses of the Soviet war potential.
- (2) Although having been separated from the free world for over 20 years, RT knows and understands the general wishes, the strength and the weaknesses of the free nations.
- (3) He surely understands the great danger which threatens and would crash the free world if the latter will not take decisive steps against the communists.

- RT, himself naturally yearning for real liberty, is hoping, if even wishfully, that the West has recognized the gravity of the communist threat, that the West is preparing itself against it, will take necessary steps in due time, using the claimed principle of nonaggression as a good cover for its preparations.

e) Restoration of RT's Honor:

- (1) RT certainly likes to be back in his old position of an estimated and honorable Estonian general when Estonia will be freed in the general process of western struggle against the communists.
- (2) To reach this, he must "wash off" the bad stain left on him from his co-operation with the communists. This must be done before the liberation of the country, so that the liberators could protect him against his fellow-countrymen who know him for a privileged communist.
- (3) This help of the liberators he could earn by one-and-the-only way, by early and efficiently contribution to this liberation.
- (4) This contribution he could give the best by supplying valuable and competent military information to the West so that the latter could prepare and conduct a successful action.

- RT really likes all these thoughts.

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f) Calculations:

- (1) RT is not a coward. However, he is a coolly calculating, realistic man. Would this his eventual participation not endanger his security? Is it worthwhile to gamble his present limited freedom and security under the communists for the expected vindication of his honor in case of the liberation of the country? Should he risk this in view of a possible failure or cancelation of the enterprise, or even in view of a possible security leak?
- (2) RT is sure of his own abilities and cautiousness. But, he knows that he can not trust anybody in his entourage, spying and denouncing being a general rule in Soviet Union. What if somebody would notice him doing something suspicious, or another notices in his living or working place something what an other Soviet of RT's stand would normally not have?
- (3) RT knows that the Soviets never trust him fully and do spy after him. He must be prepared that the KGB would send some provokers to him under the masque of Western agents.
- (4) RT can not be sure that the free countries would start against the communists something serious during the remaining years of his life. However, nor can he ~~not~~ be sure that the Soviets themselves would not start an open war or some other action which would trigger the decisive counteractions of the West.

- Although RT would like to do something in those lines, this is too dangerous, not secure enough for being entered easily.

g) Calculations if being contacted:

- (1) If the contact was a KGB provocation and RT did not report it at once to his bosses, then this would have started the short end of his life.
- (2) If it was a genuine one and came from the free world, in a secure way, then the reaction depends of the feelings which RT has about the reliability of the organization behind the approach.
- (3) RT knows that once approached by the West and if he refuses to co-operate, then it would be easy for the proposers to defame him in the eyes of his communist bosses. He also knows how difficult it is to defend himself against such a defamnation, especially now after he has had the "freedom" to talk to

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some people in Sweden without any witnesses of his bosses present. Even if he had during these talks a hidden "witness" always with him, say in form of a small device which recorded or reported all his talks, such a defamation would anyhow be very dangerous for him and could bring the end of his present "security" of his communist standing.

- (4) This refusal could also be used against him in the free world by publicizing it and labeling him a coward and selfish renegade of his nation. This would damage the image of RT in the eyes of his friends and daughter's family. Til now RT has good reason to believe that in the latter's eyes he is still a honest and brave general, a realistically thinking man who only chosed "The least from two evils": the co-operation with the communists without harming thereby anybody, versus a sure death which would have helped nobody.

- Thus, RT should find that if he knows the contactor and has good reason to believe that he is not an agent of the KGB, or if he has other good proof that the offer is a honest one, coming from the free world, then it is less dangerous to accept and to follow it than to refuse it.

2. Sum of Synthesis:

- a) Powerful and lasting, positive, as well as negative motives for acceptation of the offer are present on RT's mind:
- (1) he is a hidden anti-communist,
  - (2) he likes his honor of an Estonian general restored when the country will be liberated,
  - (3) he is affraid of being defamed in the eyes of the communists, his friends, and akin if refusing to accept the offer.
- b) He has plenty of valuable information available in his memory, and collecting new information would not be too difficult or too dangerous for him.
- c) He would accept an offer provided that:
- (1) the contact will be made securely, without endangering his security,
  - (2) good proof will be given that this is not a provocation,

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- (3) full protection and secrecy of his name will be guaranteed by application of strict measures of security on the Sponsor's side,
- (4) he will do the job alone, without any helpers attached to him in Soviet Union by the Sponsor,
- (5) he would not have to use too dangerous methods and means of communications,
- (6) the reward would be vindication of his name and honor after the liberation of the country, and his protection during the action of the liberation of the country.

E. CONTACTING.

1. Two possibilities of approach to RT must be foreseen and prepared for:

- a) contacting RT abroad, and
- b) contacting RT in Soviet Estonia or Russia.

2. Contacting abroad:

- a) It is possible that RT, being a member of the "Committee for Development of Cultural Contacts with the Estonians Abroad", will be ordered to make a new "Tourist trip" abroad, be it:
  - (1) to Australia, to meet his daughter's family,
  - (2) to Finland or to some other country in Europe when the Estonian male choir of New York, N.Y. will be visiting Europe during May/June 1961, where, thus, many Estonian exiles could be easily contacted by the "Committee member",
  - (3) to other continents where there are enough Estonian exiles, e.g., the United States, Canada, Latin America.
- b) Such a visit could come soon. Therefore, we must make our different technical preparations quickly, if it will be decided to use such an opportunity.
- c) In such a case RT could be contacted by an Estonian whom he knows from old times and whom he could trust not being a Soviet CE agent abroad.
- d) Our recruiter must have a good cover to appear in the country and the place of RT's visit during his presence there.

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- e) If necessary for convincing RT, he could be told that the recruiter represents the leader of a secret military organization of Estonian exiles, created mainly for the purpose of protection of the security of the Estonians abroad and in Sov. Estonia who are involved in the preparations for the liberation of Estonia. This organization would guarant that his name would not be disclosed before the disclosure would be necessary for his imminent protection.

3. Contacting in Soviet Union:

a) The following technique could be used:

- (1) At a proper place and time when no enemy could see, an agent, unknown to RT, hands him a short message, asking to read it when alone.
  - (a) This message must be so short that RT would dare to read it. It should contain the request of his help, and it should announce a proof of "bona fides" of the contact person, that he is not a provoker but a true friend.
  - (b) The character of the proof must be so impressive, and the proof itself must follow so quickly that RT would not feel endangering himself by delaying the eventual reporting of this contact to his superiors before he has received the proof itself.
  - (c) The proof could be in the form of an announcement of certain minute items and futur changes in the program of an indicated broadcasting station in the free world which is satisfactorily heard in the area of contacting. The fact that the message indicates to RT these minute changes, if he will be able to check them by listening to this program, would be a good proof that the contact is coming from the free world.
  - (d) The note must further instruct RT how to indicate his willingness to receive the next note, in the same manner as was delivered the first one, securedly for both, without announcing the time and the place.
- (2) The second note would give RT the description of a Dead Drop where he will find the full explanation for these contacts and the help wanted from him.

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This note could also bring the announcement of a second proof of "bona fides", similar to the first one, but not mere repetition of it.

- (3) The DD should contain:
- (a) an explanation as to what for and why RT was chosen out and contacted, and what would be his reward for co-operation,
  - (b) instructions about the kind of information RT should procure,
  - (c) instructions and advices concerning the security of RT's clandestine work,
  - (d) instructions concerning the communications,
  - (e) devices to be used in proces of communication,
  - (f) signals for future contacting of RT when
    - he would come abroad, or
    - he needs help or protection in Sov.Union.

b) Necessary Pre-Arrangements:

- (1) Agreement with the chosen broadcasting station as to what to play or say at certain times so that this could be used for our purpose.  
Steps must be taken to assure punctual execution of this agreement. The personnel of the station shall know that this is very important, however, they must not know what for this must be done.
- (2) The Dead Drop or two of them, the second containing such items which would not be necessary at the beginning of the work, must be planned and made in such a way that RT could reach tem without endangering himself or the security of the enterprise.  
The agents who prepare the DDs should have nothing in common with our official representations in the USSR.
- (3) The two contacts with RT must be planned according to the habits of RT and considering the security of the contacts.  
It is not necessary that both contacts should be taken by one and the same person although this would be good for RT's security feelings.
- (4) Secure and quick communications must be arranged with the contactman (or the leader of the team to which he belongs) to secure right start of broadcasts.

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F. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Main Channel.

a) Regular Soviet and Foreign Mail Services will be used to carry the secret messages in both directions.

b) Cover for the secret messages will be provided by giving to these letters the appearance of:

- (1) normal letters from Soviet citizens to their relatives or friends abroad,
- (2) propaganda-type letters of the Committee of which RT is a member to Estonians abroad,
- (3) from Estonians abroad to RT in his quality of the member of the above-mentioned Committee,
- (4) private letters to RT from his relatives and friends abroad.

c) Secrecy of Messages:

(1) A code, unrecognizable by sight, will be used. For each word, letter or number in the secret text there will be multiple substitute words to choose from, depending from their suitability in the text of the coverletter in which the substitutes will appear as genuine parts of the open text. The code will be built on the basis of a normal Soviet dictionary for open possession and use. RT would have good reasons. The substitution of items of the secret text will go over a numbers' system which allows also deciphering if deemed necessary.

(2) Secret writing should be used only in case that RT would feel secure to have the necessary materials (constituting evidence of crime) in his possession.

d) Recognition Signals: The message-carrying letters sent by RT must have double- or triple-sign signals to indicate:

- (1) the presence of a secret message,
- (2) whether the letter may be delivered after the interception, or should it be retained, this depending upon the address used (may be a phony one) and upon the construction of the coverletter.

The letters to RT need but the first type of indicators.

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e) Addresses and Names of the Receivers and Senders of the outgoing letters will be chosen by RT himself, according to his own security needs. The countries in the receivers' addresses will be limited to those where these letters can be intercepted and, if necessary, held back from delivery. The return addresses of letters to be sent to RT will be chosen from among those used by RT, or will be set up specially.

2. Reserve Channels.

a) The traffic on the reserve and emergency channels will proceed under the use of the same code mentioned before and of recognition signals adjusted to the character of the carrier.

b) From RT to us:

- (1) in RT's articles in Sov. Estonian normal newspapers or in that issued by RT's Committee,
- (2) in RT's letters to his daughter's family and/or to his other relatives abroad,
- (3) in RT's propaganda speeches in Estonian radio (to be monitored in Sweden), under the use of special indicators as to his freedom of editing of those speeches,
- (4) use of a special W/T set which will be normally cached and will be used only in cases of special urgency or when other means cease to work. (RT, as flier, had some training and practice in W/T and, probably, still is able to operate a set satisfactorily, on moderate speed, of course.)
- (5) in normal Soviet Estonian radio broadcasts, in case that RT can and dares to secure the cooperation of some members of the station.

c) From us to RT:

- (1) In special articles of some exile-Estonian newspaper which RT, as member of the Committee, has to read,
- (2) in abusing letters addressed to him in the Committee, by the exile Estonians,

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- (3) in forged letters replacing the intercepted letters of his daughter's family;
- (4) in broadcasts of some non-governmental broadcasting station, e.g., "The Voice of Liberation of Estonia" which could also be used for broadcasting of the "bona fides" during the contacting;
- (5) in coded or ciphered messages given by voice or in Morse code over some special radiostation in emergency or other special cases.

G. CONCLUSION.

1. I wrote this Memorandum because I thought that the ideas and the recruit mentioned in it are worth of being given due consideration by competent Authorities.
2. I am aware that much more information about RT, and many more answers to detail technical questions will be necessary than have been given here before a final decision could be taken. However, I am not able to produce such information about RT, not to go on with the further technical elaboration of the project without being specially authorized to do this, and without being helped in it.
3. Additional information about RT could be received from the following persons, all Estonians, whom I shall list here in the sequence of their importance as sources:
  - a) Mr. Richard MAASING, former Colonel K.S. Diplom, long-time Chief of G 2, later, up to 1939, 1-st Deputy Chief of Gen.H.Q, now living in Sweden, Rindögatan 20/IV, Stockholm. Mr. Maasing could give good general information about, and evaluation of character of, RT on the basis of the source's long time high level contacts with General Laidoner and RT himself.
  - b) Mr. Erast TIIVEL, Mech. Eng., former Major, Deputy Chief of Procurements (Technical Branch) of the Ministry of Defense, now in Canada, 1830 Lincoln Ave, Apt. 9, Montreal, Que. Mr. Tiivel was one of the members of the Commission in Moscow of which RT was the Chairman. The source could give genuine information about the behavior of RT in Moscow and also in Tallinn during 1939-1940.
  - c) Mr. LAANEKORB (Laanekörb), former Captain (see page 5, point 4, c). The source could give plenty of intimate information about RT and also about RT's activities after 1940.

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- d) Mr. Theodor KALBERG, former Lt.-Colonel, Chief of Administrative Section, H.Q. of Air Defense, now in Sweden, Apelgatan 16-1, Norrköping. The source was in close contact with RT and could give detail information about the latter's character and service in the Air Defense.
- e) Mr. Eduard REISSAAR, former Lt. Colonel, K.S., Commanding Officer of a Fighter Group in the Air Defense, now in the U.S.A., 2944 N John Marshal Drive, Arlington, Va.. The source should know RT well because the latter was his divisional C.O..
- f) Mr. Willem SAARSEN, former Colonel K.S. Diplom, Chief of G 2 during 1938-1940, now in Sweden, c/o Toppi, Torsviksvängen 35, Lidingö (Stockholm). The source knows about RT'S work and activities during 1938-1940, and what the latter reported when returning from Moscow in 1940.

All those six persons, as well as RT, know me personally and should have no reason not to trust me. Col. Maasing and Col. Saarsen were my immediate superiors, the first from 1934 to 1938, and the latter from 1938 to 1940.

*Mario K. Giordano*  
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