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TO Chief of Station, Germany

DATE

FROM Chief, EE

INFO: Bonn

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational, CACDET
SPECIFIC - Report on Nehru's Recent Travels

ACTION REQUIRED: None

For your background information, we are forwarding under separate cover a C-3 report on Prime Minister Nehru's recent trip to Yugoslavia, West Germany, England, and France. The source of this report is an Indian official with established access to members of Nehru's advisory staff during the trip. The information is regarded as highly sensitive and is to be tightly held.

Attachment: A/S USPROV (TDCS-14750)

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- 3 - COS, W/2 cy. att. U/C
- 2 - Bonn.
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JUL 1957

Results of Discussions Held by Prime Minister Nehru During Recent Trip to Yugoslavia, West Germany, Denmark, and France

1. Prime Minister Nehru was extremely pleased with himself at the Commonwealth talks. Next to Prime Minister Anthony Eden, he considered himself the most important figure at the meeting. Nehru was somewhat disappointed with the Canadians; he thought their attitude toward the USSR was too similar to the American approach.

2. Madame Fautit, Italian Ambassador to Great Britain, is due to return to London until 1958. Nehru regards her as a friend.

3. Nehru treated the British Socialists somewhat shabbily; he spent far more time with Conservative party leaders.

4. There is a strong possibility that the Duke of Edinburgh will visit New Delhi during the coming winter or his return from the Olympics in Australia.

5. Nehru approached the visit to West Germany with a supercilious attitude. However, this attitude changed dramatically within 24 hours after the visit began. Nehru, who liked the Germans and the preparations made for the visit, was touched by the German announcement of Indian scholarships and the offer to build a science institute.

6. Nehru was impressed particularly by the extent and scope of German economic development. He was almost visibly overcome by the detailed statistics on German industrial production shown him by the Indian embassy in Bonn. Nehru was also shocked by the documentation shown him on the numbers of East German flees to the West.

7. The most important headline result of the visit was Nehru's decision not to recognize the East German regime. (Source comment: it is not believed that Nehru informed Adenauer of this decision.) (Headquarters comment: according to press reports, Nehru refused to say he would not recognize the East German government.) Before his visit there was a 50-50 chance that Nehru would recognize East Germany soon. There is now no possibility of Indian recognition, at least in the foreseeable future. Nehru stated that recognition of East Germany would be emotionally unjust to the West Germans.

8. During his visit to Bonn, Nehru received an invitation to visit East Germany but declined. (Source comment: G. H. Neuhoff, Indian Ambassador to West Germany, and the Indian embassy staff in Bonn are strongly pro-German in outlook.) Neuhoff has requested retirement next year; he is considering returning to journalism and residing in Europe.

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9. Nehru was greatly impressed by the Krupp works. Alfred K. Krupp on Hohen and Halsbach, head of the Krupp works, is now entertaining Lord Dootlingham, secretary of the Indian Ministry of Iron and Steel, and has given the latter the use of his private plane.

10. In a speech before a private group at Bonn, Nehru failed to reemphasize all of the five principles of French style. He reemphasized the first three but had a distinct lapse of memory regarding the last two.

11. Nehru's visit to France resulted in nothing more than a reiteration of Nehru and French leaders of views previously stated. Nehru is fond of the French but though he had done them a favor at Brioni by persuading Jassid Abd-el-Nazir to accept a moderate position on the French settler problem in Algeria. Nehru was hurt and puzzled by the French criticism of the Brioni communiqué.

12. At the Brioni conference Nehru had four main objectives: He wanted to hear Tito's views on the USSR; he wished to emphasize to Tito his reactions on Nehru's terms; he wanted to give Tito and Nazir a summary of the commonwealth talks; and, finally, he wanted to moderate Nazir's stand on Israel and the Algerian issue.

13. According to Rajeshwar Prasad, Indian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Tito at a closed session on the first day of the conference, made the following points regarding the USSR:

The new look in the USSR is genuine. The anti-Stalinism of N. Khrushchev, N. Dulganin, and V. Mikoyan represents a sincere expression of opinion.

B. Stalinist minority remains. Tito cited V. M. Molotov, L.M. Aganovich, and P. Malenkov as members of this minority.


C. Khrushchev is the single most important individual, but Stalinists like Molotov still have a residue of power. Differences however, are kept well beneath the surface and are not apparent.

D. B. P. Kopylov is not important.

Other countries should resist Khrushchev's responding political to his policies. The more the West, that is, the U.S., opposed and frustrated Khrushchev, the more strength would accrue to the Stalinists.

E. Do not let leaders have not let given up the concept of two distinct world blocs. The Soviets have faith in the belief that two blocs can co-exist. Tito told Nazir and Nehru the edges of the two blocs are and

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will continue to crumble slowly. The dissolution of the Cominform was a significant event.

G. The Poznan riots were a clear example of the liberalization in the satellites that has taken place. The riots could not have happened under Stalin. Asked by Nehru if the Poznan riots were American-inspired, Tito said they were not. The Poznan riots, according to Tito, were merely a sign of the times.

H. Tito said the liberalization trend among the satellites was widespread and could be reversed only with great difficulty. The West must do everything possible to assist this trend.

I. Tito said that he had told Soviet leaders that while he and they had many common interests, they would continue to have differences based on different national needs.

14. According to Dayal, Nehru asked Tito at a closed meeting, how can you explain the exodus of the East Germans. Tito was taken aback by this question and tried to explain the exodus on the basis of superficial capitalistic classes in West Germany. Nehru refused to accept this explanation and stated that the exodus obviously involved deeply-held beliefs. (Headquarters comment: A report to another government agency dated 23 July 1958 discussed Dayal's views on Nehru's role at the Berlin conference.)

15. Nehru told Dayal confidentially that it was obvious that Tito was much closer to the Soviets than last year but that Tito was still a Yugoslav nationalist above all.

16. During the discussions on German reunification, Nehru was not willing to support Tito on a statement favoring direct East-West German negotiations. Dayal said the use of the vague term negotiations was a Nehru strategy. Not only did Nehru avoid specific support on the Soviet position on the German question, but he also persuaded Tito to modify his stand from that announced during the Moscow visit.

17. According to Dayal, Nehru and Tito jointly pressed Nasser to take a moderate stand in the communique on Israel and Algeria. Nehru was responsible for persuading Nasser to consent to a communique statement on legitimate economic interests. (Source comment: Subsequent Nasser action on the Suez canal must have shocked Nehru.) In the opinion of Egyptian correspondents at Beirut, Tito and Nehru committed Nasser for the first time to a peaceful settlement of Israel and Algeria. (Source comment: News of the U.S. and U.K. cancellation of financial support for the Suez Dam project was not revealed to Nasser until after the conference had broken up.)

18. According to Dayal, there was limited discussion about the U.S. at the conference. There was general admission that U.S. relations were difficult, with the U.S. was possible until after the reconsideration of the situation. It is clear

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leaders took the stand that the U.S. was more to blame than the USSR in not supporting cold war relaxation measures. None of the criticisms of the U.S. was strongly hostile.

19. Nehru stated in closed session he was pleased with the moderation of Communist Chinese policy. (Source comment: It is not believed there was any discussion regarding plans to get Communist China into the United Nations. It is not known if there were any discussions on USSR-China relations.)

20. Dayal stated that a Yugoslav source seven days earlier had told him that the Soviets were backtracking on offers of economic aid to the middle east because Communist China was putting pressure on the Soviet Government not to adopt aid programs in the middle east which would limit the extent of aid for China.

21. Nehru was asked briefly a question about the status of the Communist Party of India (CPI). Nehru answered that the CPI is in a state of confusion and weakness. (Source comment: It is not believed that the subject of Soviet subversion was discussed, nor was there any discussion of Iraq, the Baghdad Pact, and the Balkan Pact.) Cyprus was discussed. (Source comment: No specific details were known; it is quite certain that Ceylon, Kashmir, and Pakistan were not discussed.)

22. According to Dayal, Tito made up a list of advisors who would attend the closed session. Indian advisors were H. D. Pillai, Minister of External Affairs, and Dayal. M. C. Mittal, special assistant to Nehru, was not included, which made him extremely angry. The Yugoslav advisors were Alexander Rankovic and Edmund Kardelj, two Yugoslavian Vice-Presidents, and Koca Popovic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Egyptians were Mahmud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Sabri, Chief of the Cabinet to the President, and a third person. (Field comment: Source could not remember the identity of the third person.) Huzefa Habib, Egyptian ambassador to Yugoslavia, was not included. Dayal stated that Habib appeared to be out of favor and was to be recalled soon. The Egyptians used a Yugoslav interpreter.

23. Both Tito and Khrushchev, according to Dayal, made frequent use of advisors. Whenever a new subject came up for discussion, Tito, and particularly Khrushchev, would confer with their respective staffs for briefing purposes. (Field comment: Source was unable to learn whether any particular advisors had unusual importance.)

24. According to Dayal, Nehru and Tito did the bulk of the talking at the conference. Tito spoke mainly on Soviet and satellite de-atomization; Nehru on Burma, the Commonwealth, and the Middle East. Khrushchev without question was treated as a junior partner. Dayal listened to Nehru and Tito with interest but did not regard his subordinate role. Nehru still regards Khrushchev as a genuine good-intentioned man, but who is still growing up. (Headquarters comment: It was reported in 11-30-52 that Nehru regarded Khrushchev as a rather naive man.)

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26. Security restrictions on Brioni were minimal. Nehru did not bring a bodyguard from India on the trip.

27. The first communique was drafted by the Yugoslavs. Nehru objected to it. He said too many of the same expressions were used in the earlier Egyptian-Yugoslav communique. Nehru also felt privately that the English of the Yugoslav draft was poor. Nehru's offer to do the new draft was accepted. He dictated the bulk of it while Tito and Naor were watching the Naval Review.

28. Nehru stated at the close of the conference that U.S. policy toward the Yugoslavs was stupid. In Nehru's view, Tito would be a useful tool of the Americans if handled properly. Nehru remarked that the USSR realized the value of Tito and was acting accordingly. Nehru pointed to the forthcoming Mikoyan trip to Belgrade, he considered it a good example of how the USSR was cultivating Tito. (Field comment: source was unable to acquire any substantive information on the Mikoyan visit. The general impression he received was that Mikoyan was briefed on the Brioni conference and he in turn briefed Tito on the satellite.)

FIELD DISSEM: NONE