

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
	S-E-C-R-E-T	PROPOSED	ACTION
TO			ACCOMPLISHED
INFO		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
FROM	Chief, SR via Chief, WE	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
SUBJECT	RENKON/LCISPROFI/AEDOMA - Project Renewal		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			ABSTRACT
			MICROFILM

Action Requested: It is requested that you forward your views on renewal of this project as soon as possible.

- During the last few days of [] stay at Headquarters, we discussed Project AEDOMA and its future. In these discussions, it was noted that AEDOMA/1, as the only CE asset of the Soviet section, has provided us with the major portion of information available to [] on Soviet intelligence activity in France. For the most part, however, this production has been on emigre operations, which did not affect the security of PEFRINE nor enlighten us on new Soviet intelligence techniques and/or intentions. Soviet State Security (KGB) has been conducting emigre operations since the beginning of the Soviet State and we cannot foresee any change in the KGB coverage of emigres.
- From the latter thought we went on to speculate that, unrecognized, AEDOMA/1 has probably been serving KIBARK as a harassment operation against the KGB. It is unlikely that we will ever be able to measure the effect AEDOMA/1's presence in Paris has on the KGB Paris EM section, but we surmise it is threefold: a. the EM Section has to entertain the premise that AEDOMA/1 in Paris is an indication that PEFRINE is involved in EM operations in Paris; b. if this be so, then the EM section has to mount operations to collect information on such PEFRINE operations; finally, AEDOMA/1 circulating among the emigres probably contaminates by contact many prospective Soviet agents.
- Marking back to AEDOMA/1 production and its relative value to KIBARK, we believe this emigre information should be used as priming material to stimulate a closer relationship with liaison on RIB matters in France. It is our opinion that by passing such leads as GWIP and NYKYPORUK, which affect the internal security of France, we will engender a similar response from liaison.

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 []

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	6 Feb 61	
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	OWPV-20745	
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
	29-6-106/1	

CLASSIFICATION	ORIGINATING	
S E C R E T	OFFICE	EXT.
	SR/2/CR	8757
	OFFICER	TYPIST
	[]	hhh
	COORDINATING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	OFFICER'S NAME
	CSR/2	[]
	SR/ST	
	WE/3	
	RELEASING	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
	CWE/3	

2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CR
1 - RI

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
	S-E-C-R-E-T	OFFW-29745
<p>4. [] remarked he was interested in having the project renewal include as a secondary objective the use of AEDOGMA/1 for REDEKIN support activities. It is [] opinion that, because of AEDOGMA/1's position in the Ukrainian community plus his natural ability to ferret out information, it would seem logical to have AEDOGMA/1 call this community for REDEKIN leads in conjunction with his search for indications of Soviet intelligence activity. [] noted that AEDOGMA/1's office in the Ukrainian charitable organization (exact name unknown, but identified as one that offers stipends to students - presumably those of Ukrainian extraction - who will include the study of Ukrainian in their curriculum), and his membership in the Ukrainian Academic Society provided AEDOGMA/1 with access to an indeterminate number of REDEKIN leads. In comparison to other REDEKIN informants, the use of AEDOGMA/1 in such a role is his ability to check the security status in the Ukrainian community of any such leads. Another facet of AEDOGMA/1's REDEKIN potential, which [] desires to explore in the next year, would be AEDOGMA/1's ability to prepare propaganda briefs for use in REDEKIN operations.</p> <p>5. Headquarters reaction to the REDEKIN use of AEDOGMA/1 is lukewarm. Our view is jaundiced from the three abortive leads that have been forthcoming to date, i.e., ROMANCHEK, HENNER and DAVIDCHEK. Further, we fear that AEDOGMA/1's development of any REDEKIN lead would result in that lead being turned to the SIS because of that service's interest in AEDOGMA/1. There is also the possibility of compromise of these leads to UPHILL and other services such as the French, who might be aware of his affiliation with the AIS.</p> <p>6. We leave to [] discretion the decision of requesting renewal of Project AEDOGMA; however, should this request be made, and approved, it should be mutually understood that production from it will be under the closest scrutiny. We are aware of AEDOGMA/1's potential value to [] and are certainly anxious for him to prove his worth, but by the same token we are also aware of his shortcomings, both personal and professional. Unless he can be directed during the next project year to sway the balance of opinion unquestionably in his favor, producing above the marginal level, recommendation for his termination will have to be made.</p>		
FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION, REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO.