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FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

ON

Stubaf Horst KOPKOW

Ref: Brief CIB/B5/PF 253 dated 27 Nov 45.  
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ACTIVITIES AGAINST RUSSIAN IS

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I. RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC ESPIONAGE IN GERMANY

1. Introduction

Prisoner states that the only forms of scientific espionage attempted by the Russians and known to him were in the realm of industry. This espionage was carried out by the following means:-

- a) by the interrogation of German engineers and technicians who emigrated to RUSSIA in 1933;
- b) by industrial espionage missions given to Germans returning from RUSSIA between the years 1935 and 38;
- ✓ c) by the "Be-be" work done in GERMANY;
- d) by the activities of visiting Soviet Commissions during the period of the Non-Aggression Pact 1939-41

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- c) by specific missions given to agents during the war, many of which were disclosed to the Gestapo by means of WT "play-backs".

Prisoner's knowledge of this subject is limited, since this work of the Russian IS was dealt with in Amt IV by the Russian CI dept IV B 2 and the Communist CI dept IV A 1, and not by Prisoner's IV A 2.

2. Interrogation of German Engineers and Technicians

The Stapo ascertained from these persons, upon their return to GERMANY, that they had been questioned by the Russian IS when they emigrated in 1933. The following subjects had been of special interest to the Russians:-

- a) the light steel industry in SAXONY and THURINGIA;
- b) the optical glass industry;
- c) shipbuilding;
- d) short-wave-WT transmission.

Practically all tech trade secrets had been given away, without very much pressure being used on the Russian side; a refusal to divulge the info asked for would have meant either deportation for the German concerned, or that at least he would not have obtained a job commensurate with his skill.

3. Germans returning from RUSSIA

Germans wishing to return to GERMANY, from 1935 onwards, were asked if they would be willing to work for the Russian IS; if not, they were not allowed to leave the country. However, almost without exception, these men were not given any special individual missions. This was not practicable, as it was not known where in GERMANY the repatriates would obtain employment, and in any case the Russian IS reckoned only on a more or less temporary allegiance so far as these persons were concerned.

The instructions were to get in touch with a middleman in GERMANY itself, who would hand out specific tasks according to circumstances prevailing at the time and in the locality concerned. In the majority of cases, however, these meetings never actually took place.

4. "Be-be" Work

This is dealt with, in such detail as Prisoner can provide, in Section XI of the present report.

5. Activities of Russian Visiting Commissions

These commissions, which came into being as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, inspected a large number of German factories, in spite of the official objections to this procedure raised by many of the authorities concerned. In many places, however, these Russians were welcomed with open arms, and were accorded a totally unwarranted and often excessive measure of confidence, in spite of the astonishment caused when these Russian officials asked to inspect specialised secret productions. The Gestapo supervisory bodies set up to watch and control the movements of these commissions were actually only established months after the commissions had been touring GERMANY, and were, Prisoner believes, controlled by IV A 1 (formerly IV D 3).

Prisoner states that his only first-hand knowledge of Russian activities in this connection came to him much later when, during the war, an engineer who had obtained employment at the GAP research station at ADLERSHOF, near BERLIN, was arrested through a "play-back" with the Russian IS, and it was revealed that this engineer had long before been recruited as an agent by a visiting commission.

Another case of this kind was that of LORENZ, a German national, of whom it was discovered during a WT "play-back" that he had formerly had connections with the Russian Trade Commission in BERLIN, where his wife had been employed too. During the "play-back" it was revealed that LORENZ was to be approached and asked to supply infm relating to the firm of BORSING, BERLIN, where he had formerly been employed.

6. Missions given to Agents during the War

From infm obtained by WT "play-backs" it was soon apparent that the subject of most constant interest to the Russian IS was that of poison gas. This question was constantly cropping up and it was clear that the Russians always expected GERMANY to launch some form, possibly a new development, of gas attacks.

There came, too, a series of enquiries on the V-weapons programme; Russian interest in this was centred not so much on their production as on the location of the experimental firing bases near BROMBERG in POLAND.

The following industrial undertakings in GERMANY, AUSTRIA and the Protectorate were also subject to espionage activities by the Russian IS during the war:-

SCHICHAU Werft - ELBING  
 BRÜNNER Waffenwerk - BRÜNN (BRNO)  
 KOLBEN-DANNECK(?) Armaments factory - OLMÜTZ  
 SKODA - PILSEN  
 RHODE-SCHWARZ - MUNICH  
 Aircraft works - WILNER-NEUSTADT.

Prisoner gives the following personal estimate of the success achieved by the Russians through the afore-given activities:-

- a) Infm obtained from German technicians who had migrated to the Soviet was considerable. It dated, however, from before the time of the German armament drive.
- b) Extensive infm was obtained prior to 1933 through Communist Bo-be work; thereafter, owing to Stapo counter-measures, this was severely curtailed until, after the outbreak of war, owing to weakness in the channels of comm, it ceased entirely.
- c) The very numerous attempts to use WT agents in the Reich and German-occupied territories can be considered to have failed in the general sense, although such networks as the Rote Drei and the Rote Kapelle, until they were broken up, admittedly provided accurate and useful infm to the Russian IS.

Prisoner concludes by stating that a complete estimate can be obtained only by taking into consideration the views of the competent persons in Referatc. IV A 1 and IV B 2.

✓ II. COMMUNIST SABOTAGE ACTIVITY

✓ 1. Introduction

Prisoner states that he can give only a brief report concerning the plans of and work done by Communist sabotage groups during the closing stages of the war, as this whole subject was dealt with mainly by Referat IV A 1a and not by his Referat IV A 2.

8. Organisation in GERMANY

In 1944 the illegal KPD endeavoured to enlist the help of Russian civilian workers and P. in GERMANY for the formation of sabotage groups. These preparations, which never got beyond the stage of initial planning, were completely frustrated by Stapo counter-action in BERLIN, Central GERMANY and LEIPZIG.

9. Organisation in AUSTRIA

In AUSTRIA the preparation for sabotage action by Communist groups was much further advanced and reached the stage of action; willing helpers had been found among Austrian railway workers. Altogether there was a series of attacks on railways, against which fairly large-scale Stapo counter-measures were initiated. However, from the Stapo point of view the danger was never disposed of, and the transfer of SS Stubaf STRAUB from BRUSSELS where he had been Leiter IV, to VIENNA, where he took up the post of KdS, in autumn 44, was an indication of the seriousness of the situation.

III. PENETRATION OF NAZI PARTY AND ORGANISATIONSBY COMMUNISTS OR RUSSIAN-TRAINED AGENTS

10. Prisoner states that this question comes more properly within the scope of Dept IV A 1 of the Stapo than within that of IV A 2.

After the seizure of power by the NSDAP, the KPD made a series of attempts during the years 1933 to 1936/37, to penetrate the NSDAP with the object of disrupting the organisation; this work was directed from MOSCOW and was based on decisions reached at a Communist World Conference held there in 1933.

Prisoner adds that by the time he went to Stapo HQ in BERLIN in 1938, this action had been successfully dealt with by Depts IV A 1a and IV A 2a. Thereafter, almost the only attempts at penetration were those connected with persons returning from RUSSIA, among whom there were some who endeavoured to use allegiance to the NSDAP as a cloak to cover their real missions.

Prisoner asserts that the Comintern did not succeed at any time in achieving any systematic penetration of the NSDAP. Although, when Communists were arrested, it was found that they had in many cases become members of the NSDAP, it was clear that these persons had not become members with the purpose of undermining the Party, but had joined merely for the sake of appearances and to enjoy the advantages accruing from membership. They did not, however, constitute anything approaching a serious problem for the NSDAP.

Prisoner concludes by saying that none of the Russian-trained agents he had to deal with during the war ever appeared to have an assignment involving penetration of the NSDAP. When the NKVD used its agents in GERMANY for Party ends, their aim was not to split up the NSDAP, but to investigate the possibilities of placing Communist political work in GERMANY on some kind of organised footing.

IV. VASSOV AND THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY11. Introduction

Prisoner states that he was not the Sachbearbeiter for VASSOV and the questions relating to the Russian Liberation Army. These questions were dealt with by a special section of Referat IV B 2a. Prisoner did,

however, come into contact with VLASSOV matters on three separate occasions.

12. First Contact with VLASSOV Matters

When the GAF Lt <sup>87</sup>AUGUSTIN, who was arrested for his rôle in the von GOTTLBERG case (see Field Interrogation Report ref 030/8/64/2 dated 7 Jun 45, Part 1, para 16) was interrogated, it was revealed that he had been interested in VLASSOV.

AUGUSTIN stated that he had been earmarked by the Russian IS to assassinate VLASSOV. For this purpose he had been to BERLIN to study how this could be carried out. He had then returned to MOSCOW and reported that he considered the task feasible, as VLASSOV had permanent headquarters in BERLIN which were not guarded in any special manner. However, his plans had not met with Russian approval and instead of being sent back to BERLIN to carry them out, he had been entrusted with the killing of von GOTTLBERG in MINSK.

13. Second Contact with VLASSOV Matters

The second contact came a few months after the AUGUSTIN incident. A German patrol shot a Russian skier on the central sector of the Eastern front. On the dead man were found papers which showed that he intended making his way into the Reich, where he was to approach VLASSOV staff circles. Prisoner cannot recall whether he was to do this himself or whether the approach was to be made through intermediaries. In the papers a number of generals were named who belonged to VLASSOV's Russian Liberation Army, and who were to be contacted and made to realize the error of their ways. They were then to be persuaded to desert VLASSOV. It was made clear in the dead man's instructions that these measures were to be carried out very carefully and that he was not to fail in his mission through any too hasty approach or action.

14. Third Contact with VLASSOV Matters

In Feb or Mar 45 a Russian Maj landed in SILESIA behind the German lines in an old-fashioned aircraft. He was wounded on landing and arrested.

Under interrogation in BERLIN he stated that he was trying to reach VLASSOV's staff so as to join the fight against Bolshovism, but the circumstances were so peculiar and the Major contradicted himself so often that the German CI suspected any one of three possibilities:-

- a) That the Maj was a courier link between MOSCOW and VLASSOV;
- b) That the Maj had a mission to approach VLASSOV with a view to assassinating him, or arranging such action with the help of other persons;
- c) That the Maj was a courier bringing definite instructions to VLASSOV from MOSCOW to change sides at the last minute and take up arms against GERMANY.

It was pretended to the Maj that he would be given a post in one of the Liberation Army's Kdostellon; this, however, he refused to accept, insisting that in order to carry out his mission to free the Russian people, he must be allowed to contact VLASSOV's staff. When this was refused, he asked repeatedly to be sent to ENGLAND.

V. USE OF NKFD AGENTS

15. Introduction

The NKFD produced three types of agents:-

- a) Propaganda agents, recruited by the NKFD from German PW captured on the Eastern front;

- b) NKFD agitators, similarly recruited, but who operated directly behind the German front line;
- c) NKFD agents who had been handed over to the Russian IS, with espionage assignments in GERMANY and German-occupied territories.

The NKFD was composed mainly of the German PW captured at STALINGRAD. Prisoner was told by a German immigrant who had held a leading position in the Communist Party in MOSCOW, that he and several other German Communists had travelled from MOSCOW to STALINGRAD in Jan/Feb 43 to recruit prisoners as members of the NKFD. These prisoners were at that stage so apathetic, having been decimated by disease, that the task was relatively easy and most of them clutched at the chance of co-operation as a way out of their difficulties.

Prisoner states that training was at first given by German Communist emigrants, who were, however, apparently quite incompetent. Later they were replaced by Russian college professors, among whom were many women instructors. The prisoners who had expressed their willingness to co-operate were sent to and trained in a special camp.

The first task received was usually the signing of drafts of leaflets which were to be dropped from aircraft and, in the case of officers, the making of gramophone records which were subsequently relayed over the front line by loudspeakers. Within the camp itself, there was the so-called "Innere Aktiv" which performed the real political work, ie drafted the leaflets, wall-newspapers, etc; at the same time this selected personnel of the "Innere Aktiv" was given training along with the remainder of the camp's inmates. This body, besides holding all the responsible positions in the camp, formed the nucleus of a widespread informer system among the PW.

16. Personalities in NKFD Organisations

Prisoner considers that the three most important personalities in connection with the organisation of the NKFD were:-

- a) Gen Lt Graf EINSTEDL

A nephew of RISMUECK and a strong advocate of his uncle's policy of Russo-German solidarity.

- b) Hptm HAEDERMANN

An Oberstudienrat from KASSEL.

- c) Fw or Lt RIES

Formerly deputy Gaupropagandaleiter of the NSDAP in STUTTGART; played a leading part in front-line propaganda and in the interrogation of German PW captured at the front.

17. Front-Line Propaganda

The principal medium for this was the loudspeaker in the front lines, by means of which German troops were given short talks on the political and military situation and were called upon to desert.

Another means to achieve this same end was the use of NKFD personnel as agitators behind the German lines; among these men there were also spies with minor espionage assignments in the fighting line proper. Prisoner states that he had no contact with persons in this category as such matters were dealt with by IV A 1a or IV B 2a.

18. Agents with Espionage Assignments in GERMANY and German-occupied Territories

Prisoner states that NKFD agents or groups of agents dropped by parachute were not employed until comparatively late in the war, i.e. after mid 44. Prisoner adds that he does not think that the org of the NKFD in RUSSIA was actually responsible for the briefing and dispatch of these agents. He believes that these Germans, having been fully trained politically by the NKFD, were handed over to the Russian IS, and that they thereafter came under the exclusive control of the latter service.

These agents formed part of the long-range recon units which were dropped by parachute from Russian planes in the EAST of GERMANY. The personnel of these groups varied considerably; often they had a Russian officer in charge, several Red Army agents, a Russian female WT operator and a German NKFD PW as guide and interpreter. Some groups had more German PW and not all the German PW working in such groups were NKFD personnel.

Results obtained by these recon units were very varied; in some cases the German members deserted at once and reported to the German police, giving info which led to the arrest of the group; in other cases, having become convinced Communists, they carried out their espionage duties loyally, and when caught, offered armed resistance.

VI. IV A 2 AND ORGANISATION OF NKVD AND NKGB

19. Prisoner states that he is unable to give any info regarding the org of the NKVD and the NKGB or on the use made by these bodies of Communist Party orgs. He claims that all matters relating to the NKVD and the NKGB were dealt with in the Stapo by Depts IV A 1 and IV B 2 and that his dept (IV A 2) only passed on to these depts any relevant info it might obtain without appraising this in any way. Prisoner is of the opinion that only the leading officials in the depts concerned would be in a position to give the required info, which would not have been available to junior or even medium-grade officials.

VII. ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN CONSULATE IN KÖNIGSBERG

20. General

Prisoner states that, to the best of his knowledge, the Russian Consulate in KÖNIGSBERG had nothing to do with Communist Party work. There was no link between MOSCOW and the KPD running through that Consulate. The Consulate's interest was confined to a supervision of Russian IS work in EAST PRUSSIA proper. These activities were dealt with by the Stapo Regional station in KÖNIGSBERG.

Prisoner adds that, as he never served in KÖNIGSBERG, he cannot give info as to how this Consulate organized its espionage activities, who was in charge, the type of agents employed or their actual missions. Prisoner worked until 1937 at the Regional Stapo station in ALLENSTEIN and claims that while he was there, he was concerned mainly with CI activities directed against POLAND. Prisoner states that the amount of Soviet IS activity which came to the notice of the Stapo at ALLENSTEIN was certainly very small and was definitely not sufficient to give him any insight into the methods employed by the Russians at that time.

21. KPD Links with RUSSIA

Prisoner concludes by saying that, while the activities of the KPD in GERMANY and the links with RUSSIA have never been the subject of any study either on his part or on the part of his dept (they were dealt with by depts IV A 1 and IV B 2), he believes that the control was effected on the following lines:

Controlled through STOCKHOLM

KPD in HOLSTEIN, MCKLENBURG, POMERANIA, HANOVER, BRANDENBURG and EAST PRUSSIA.

Controlled through PRAGUE

KPD in WÜRTEMBERG, BADEN, BAVARIA, THURINGIA, SAXONY and SILESIA.

Controlled from a centre either in HOLLAND or BELGIUM

KPD in OLDENBURG, WESTPHALIA, RHINELAND and probably PFALZ, HESSEN, HESSEN-NASSAU.

VIII. GERMANS RETURNING FROM RUSSIA

22. Introduction

Prisoner states that about 40% of the Germans who returned from RUSSIA had been recruited for IS work by the NKVD. He reaffirms, however, that he knows of only two cases of returning German technicians who became active as agents and attempted to carry out their assignments.

The greater proportion of these returning Germans admitted freely to the German frontier control authorities that they had been recruited by the NKVD. A further section of these people would not make any such admission, even when prompted to do so, because they feared either punishment from the German side, or reprisals by the NKVD after they arrived home in GERMANY. They had, however, no intention of ever actually undertaking any IS work for the Soviet and were usually only given away by statements made by persons who arrived in later parties. They would then be cautioned by the Stapo, but legal proceedings would not normally be instituted against them.

23. Assignments given to Returning Germans

These persons were not given any specific assignments. They merely signed an agreement with the NKVD which bound them "to do everything to further the just cause of Socialism" on their return to GERMANY. This agreement usually contained a strict warning to these persons that the NKVD had means of calling them to account if they failed to fulfil this duty. Finally, they were told that when they reached their homes they would be contacted by some messenger, from whom they would receive specific instructions.

24. Methods of Sending Back Information

All arrangements for sending back info were to be made by the messenger who issued the instructions. The identities of a number of these messengers became known to the Stapo, who arranged that meetings between them and the returning Germans should be under their control. It was found that these messengers were either members of the staff of the Russian Embassy, or, more frequently, members of Russian Trade delegations in GERMANY. Prisoner cannot recall any special methods which may have been used for identification. Prisoner states that at the time the question was not viewed by the Stapo as being one of any exceptional importance; it was considered that the measures taken as regards the returning Germans were an adequate safeguard. In any case, in spite of the large number of persons who had signed the agreement with the NKVD, it was found that Russian activity in GERMANY itself through their messengers was extremely restricted, and very few returning German nationals were ever actually approached by a messenger at all. However, Prisoner admits that in later years, after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, it became evident that the Stapo had really failed initially to cope with the potential danger of these returning German nationals and much of the Russian



espionage activity in GERMANY during the war did in effect receive noteworthy assistance from Germans who had returned to the Reich several years earlier. Prisoner states, however, that the persons who were eventually useful to RUSSIA came mostly from the ranks of the 100,000 odd who returned to the Reich after the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and not from the 6,000 technicians who started to return to GERMANY in 1936.

Prisoner admits that in the report he prepared at NEUMÜNSTER (Ref 030/8/64/2 dated 7 Jun 45) he was mistaken when he wrote that these Germans who returned from RUSSIA were to be allowed to approach the Soviet Consulates direct. The fact that such persons were to be allowed to do (having been initially contacted by the Russian IS messenger and received their assignment) was to place letters in the private letter-boxes of these messengers; on no account were they to send their letters through the post.

25. Training

Prisoner is certain that none of these Germans who returned to the Reich ever received any training prior to leaving RUSSIA; lack of time, and also the fact that many of these people would have been unsatisfactory in any case as agents, precluded any training being given. The Russian intention was, Prisoner maintains, merely to use the opportunity to send into GERMANY a large fraction of people from which a network of agents might be selected as and when the need arose, and which in any case would be out of sympathy with the ideals of the Nazi State.

IX. ISH, ITF AND WOLLEBER

✓26. Extent of Stapo Counter-Measures

Prisoner is not of the opinion that the ISH and ITF orgs were ever completely wiped out by the Stapo. From 1933 their activities in GERMANY were suppressed and their members could no longer be active in German ports, although most certainly not all of these were arrested. The large continental ports of ANTWERP, ROTTERDAM, COPENHAGEN and OSLO remained important centres of activity. Finally, when, as a result of the war, those ports, too, were occupied by German troops, sabotage agents who were well known to the German Police were duly arrested. Nevertheless, in OSLO for instance, it was only in 1943 that, after a big outbreak of sabotage, arrests were made among a group which had been in existence for many years.

✓27. Fate of Leading Personalities known to Prisoner

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✓ WOLLEBER, Prisoner believes, is probably in RUSSIA.

✓ The FICHTEL brothers were tried, sentenced to death and executed.

✓ SCHAAP, Rimbartus, was also tried, sentenced and executed.

✓ KNUFFIKEN went to SWEDEN, where Prisoner knows he was arrested and interned by the Swedish Police at the request of the German Government; Prisoner has no knowledge of his subsequent fate.

✓28. Extent to which ISH and ITF orgs may have survived

Prisoner claims that he is unable to give anything more than a personal opinion on this point. He states that his knowledge of these orgs was confined to their sabotage activities in Western European ports (their activities in GERMANY had been completely liquidated by the Stapo long before Prisoner entered the Stapo Hauptamt). He adds that he is, of course, aware that the orgs also flourished in overseas ports and is of the opinion that they must therefore still be in existence and that whilst their activities may have ceased with the collapse of GERMANY, a reorganisation, especially of the ISH, on orders from MOSCOW, could easily be effected. /10

29. Discipline of the ISH

Prisoner believes that the ISH was disciplined on the lines of an international trade union of Communist seamen and dock-workers. The nature of the trade with which it was concerned made it easy, before the introduction of any restrictions on the movements of shipping, for its officials to travel or communicate with groups scattered throughout the world. The ISH possessed no anti-MOSCOW elements, but was, as Prisoner states, a completely Communist org which always looked to MOSCOW for inspiration, if not for actual guidance. The ITF was, however, originally a rival org under the aegis of the Second International. In the years immediately before the outbreak of war the ITF completely gave way to the ISH, which org had been undermining it for a long period, and the two orgs were amalgamated, with the ISH as a very dominant partner.

30. Edu FIMMEN

Prisoner states that he can give no important infm about this man. He only knows that he was a white-haired, serious, old gentleman with pleasant manners, who was President of the ITF and a long-standing Socialist. He lived in HOLLAND, but had many friends in foreign countries, where he was also highly esteemed. Prisoner does not believe that FIMMEN had anything to do with MOSCOW-inspired plans for the sabotage of Axis shipping. He was in charge of the MATTEOTTI fund for indigent Socialist trade union members. Prisoner states that he has no knowledge of the part played by FIMMEN and the ITF after the amalgamation with the ISH.

31. WOLLWEBER, his contacts and his connections with ISH

The former German Communist official, WOLLWEBER, used individual members of the ISH to carry out the tasks of sabotage which he had been instructed to put into effect by the Russian General Staff. Those persons were, of course, ideal for such tasks. Prisoner admits that he formerly knew who most of WOLLWEBER's contacts were, but claims that he cannot now remember the names of all concerned. At that time, WOLLWEBER was living in SWEDEN, but used to make frequent trips to BELGIUM, HOLLAND, DENMARK and NORWAY. In BELGIUM his chief contacts were the FICHTEL brothers, and in HOLLAND, Rimbortus SCHAAP; the latter, Prisoner believes, was probably WOLLWEBER's chief permanent deputy for Western European ports, as he nearly always accompanied him on lecture tours as far as BELGIUM and also made trips to DENMARK.

WOLLWEBER also spent considerable periods in COPENHAGEN, where the Danish Police were well informed regarding his movements. Prisoner suggests that the Danish Criminal Police must certainly have very complete files on WOLLWEBER from which much infm could be obtained. COPENHAGEN was a main transit centre for the explosives which WOLLWEBER smuggled out of SWEDEN.

WOLLWEBER made frequent trips to OSLO, where he had a mistress who acted as a letter-box for messages brought by courier for the OSLO sabotage group.

X. ROTE HILFE - note

32. Introduction

Prisoner states that the activities of this org were the concern of Stapo dept IV A 1 and in consequence he can only give general infm relating to its aims and activities, but can give no details regarding personalities or their rates.

33. Aims

The ROTE HILFE, an international org subsidiary to the COMINTERN,

had two main aims:

- a) To provide assistance where necessary to the families of members of the COMINTERN who had been arrested or interned because of their political activities;
- b) to provide material assistance, coupled with political guidance, to oppressed sections of the population, with the object of securing their allegiance to the cause of Communism and thereby fostering a mass movement in its favour.

34. Activities

In GERMANY, before 1933, the ROTE HILFE was a legally established org linked with the KPD. After 1933, it went "underground" and became for many Communist groups virtually their only remaining means of Communist expression and initiative. Henceforth it took upon itself the provision of spiritual guidance and assistance, rather than of material aid, to the dependents of interned Communists. Prisoner adds that from the point of view of its Communist sponsors in MOSCOW, the propaganda value of its work in stimulating an atmosphere favourable to the introduction of Communism in the countries where it operated, was obviously the most important aspect of its activities. Prisoner believes that by 1933, in GERMANY, these activities had almost reached the stage of complete success and were only thwarted at the eleventh hour by the National Socialist assumption of power and the stringent anti-Communist measures which followed.

XI. BE-BE ACTIVITIES

35. Prisoner states that his knowledge of both the above and the AM activities (see Section XII of present report) is strictly limited by the fact that he did not work on these himself. All such activities had been almost completely disposed of by the time he joined the Stapo Hauptamt in 1938.

36. Firms which were penetrated by Bo-Be Agents

Prisoner believes the following to have been the firms which were especially subjected to Be-Bo espionage:

SIEMENS, BERLIN

TELEFUNKEN, BERLIN

A number of factories at SUHL and ZELLA-MEHLIS in THURINGIA.

The AUER Gasgluhlicht Gesellschaft

The SCHERING concern in the chemical industry.

37. Activities of a Be-Be Agent in a Factory

The Be-Be agent was called upon to provide regular reports on all that was happening in the works in which he was employed. Detailed infm had also to be provided from time to time on his particular tech branch of the work. Specific assignments were unusual. The Russians were really interested in all the infm that an agent could obtain, especially, in the tech field, as regards:

- a) Production
- b) Developments calculated to improve output
- c) Methods used in "finishing" manufactured articles;

and in the political field, infm on:

- a) Political attitude of workers

- b) Relationship between workers and employers
- c) Willingness to agitate for increase in pay
- d) Willingness to strike.

38. Methods of Communication and Control of Be-Be Agents

Prisoner has no real knowledge regarding the points of control of these agents outside GERMANY. He is of the opinion that the info obtained went through PRAGUE to MOSCOW by courier. The Russian Trade Representatives were also certainly involved in this work. There was no link with the regional offices of the KPD, and, although the agents themselves were all Communists, they and the very highest executives of the KPD were the only persons who were aware of the existence of the Be-Be org. This was also the case as regards the AM apparatus.

39. Type of Agent employed on Be-Be activities

Prisoner states that tech employees and engineers were used for the most part as agents, and that ordinary workers, although they were sometimes used for other forms of political work, were rarely, if ever, used on specialised Be-Be work.

## XII. AM ACTIVITIES

40. Estimate of Success of Stapo Counter-Activities

Prisoner is of the opinion that the AM apparatus was completely uncovered by the Stapo by the end of 1934, even though the Ia Police who had had to deal with such matters up to 1933 had been completely ignorant regarding them. Krim Rat GIERING, who also dealt with the Be-Be activities, was the man responsible for these counter-measures, which were highly successful. In later years, efforts were made to resume activity, but these were completely fruitless. The org was broken by "turning" captured agents, granting them an indemnity and putting them to work for the Stapo.

41. Links with the KPD and Methods of Communication

There was no link with the KPD and only the highest executives in the latter knew of the existence of the AM apparatus. The AM personnel were, however, all Communists. Most of the work was done in the BERLIN area and the line of comm for couriers ran to PRAGUE, crossing the frontier in the mountains (ERZ- and RHEINBERG). At that time there was no question of any WT links.

42. "Deutsche Sabotage und Terror Organisation"

Prisoner states that this org was completely uncovered by the Stapo. The org had prepared for action, but nothing at all had been accomplished. As in all AM activities, comm was by courier through PRAGUE. There were no links with the KPD and here again only the very highest executives of the KPD knew of the existence of the org.

*Winkler* The leader of this org, PIETZUCH, was successful in avoiding arrest and fled abroad. KOSIKA was captured, "turned" and used as a V-man; Prisoner presumes that he is still free today in BERLIN or in the Russian Zone; he was a very ardent Communist and although "turned", never produced any work which was really satisfactory to the Stapo. GÜTSCHKE fled after the detection of the theft of a large quantity of explosives from Army dumps in EAST GERMANY; he was next heard of in MOSCOW.

43. "Danziger Sabotage und Terror Organisation"

When this org was "broken" by the Stapo and most of its members on German soil were arrested, those who were in DANZIG or in the Polish corridor were able to escape by ship to the Soviet Union from DANZIG, / 13

GDYNIA etc, before German representations to the govts of the Free City of DANZIG and POLAND could effectively produce any arrests. Prisoner is not able to give any infm relating to the org of these escapes and does not know how far they were in fact organised, or improvised.

Prisoner states that there was no traceable link between the organisers of sabotage and the illegal KPD. The KPD as a whole, whether it was the legal party up to 1933 or the illegal org thereafter, had no knowledge of any Be-Be or AM activities. Only the officials in the very highest circle of the party knew of these activities and knew that they were in fact being carried out by Communists under the direction of MOSCOW.

Agents to be employed in these activities, if they had been previously active in KPD work, ceased doing all such work immediately. Many of them were sent to MOSCOW, where they were given detailed training before commencing their new activities. Prisoner states that he has no knowledge of this training.

### XIII. METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN AGENTS IN GERMANY

#### 44. Preamble

This subject has been largely covered in the answers given by Prisoner to other questions and embodied in earlier reports, see especially OSDIC (WEA) IR 63 of 9 May 46 (Seventh Combined Interim Report on KOKKOW/THOMSEN/NOSSKE). The infm given below is supplementary to that already given.

#### 45. Mass Employment of Agents

Prisoner considers that one of the most outstanding features of the Russian IS was the mass employment of agents (this was intensified after the outbreak of war). The Russians intended to achieve their ends through the large number of int missions they initiated, and whilst they must obviously have taken into their calculations that this mass employment must result in heavy losses, they failed to realise that such methods could only result in their whole org becoming known to the enemy and being effectively countered.

Thus, although the Russian IS endeavoured to build up a large WT network throughout the Reich, some of their agents were captured by the Stapo and by skilful use made of "play-backs", and the whole network was eventually brought to light. This was achieved in the great majority of cases without arousing the suspicions of the Russians that they were in fact being swindled and were only receiving deception material.

Prisoner states that it is hard to understand why the Russians never considered checking the genuineness of the keying of the WT operator. With present-day tech knowledge, this would not have been difficult, and it would certainly have defeated a major part of the "turning" that was done by the Germans; for in the majority of cases of "turned" agents, a German operator had to be put to work the WT and imitate the keying as best he could. The danger of allowing the agent himself to pass the traffic was too great, and even keeping a close watch on him while he was operating provided only a very limited safeguard.

#### 46. Dropping of Agents

The Russian IS was consistent in its policy of dropping its agents in places far distant from where they were to operate; thus, agents for Western GERMANY were dropped by Russian aircraft in EAST PRUSSIA, agents for the BERLIN area in the territory of the General Gouvernement. Captured Russian agents repeatedly confirmed that they had not reckoned with such strict travel control within the Reich.

47. Co-operation of Agents

It was often ascertained that agents of different tech branches worked together; thus, a parachute agent might receive assistance from a seaman working for the Russian IS in a German harbour town.

There was also co-operation among parachute agents themselves.

48. Recalling of Agents to RUSSIA

The methods of the Russian IS also included the recalling of agents to RUSSIA to report. This, of course, was the most thorough means of checking an agent's activities, but was necessarily a slow process. It did, however, cause some awkward situations for the Stapo in "play-backs", considerable ingenuity being necessary to explain the reasons for the delay in the agent's return.

49. Provision of Addresses and Messages to Agents

Agents were provided with lists of addresses of contacts that might be useful to them in GERMANY; also they bought messages or handwritten letters from German PW in Russian captivity. The idea was that the relatives in GERMANY would be so relieved at receiving news from son, brother or husband that they would easily be induced to help the agent, at least in obtaining identity papers and accommodation.

Prisoner states that in his opinion the giving of any such written evidence of his calling to an agent was a mistake and all particulars might have been provided with greater safety by WT after the agent's reliability had been tested.

50. Provision of Documents and Money

The Russian agents were on the whole well equipped with forged documents; these were printed by the State Printing Works in MOSCOW. Food ration cards, however, were a great difficulty to the Russians after the Stapo had ordered that these be changed frequently. German 'Travel Ration Cards' were watermarked, and the Russians never succeeded in copying these.

Agents were supplied with considerable amounts in USA dollars; this idea proved a failure, for, unless the agents had connections in the Black Market, which only a very small number of them ever had, this money was useless in the open market. Strict currency regulations provided for such harsh penalties for persons found to be in possession of foreign currency that no one was willing to take any chances in this respect.

XIV. NOTE ON COMMUNIST AGENT CAPTURED IN NORTH ITALY

51. Identity

This man, referred to by Prisoner in "M" Weekly Summary No 6, para 4, dated 17 Oct 45, was the Italian Communist "MARIO", who was a General in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.

52. Activities 1942-44

"MARIO", whose real name is not known to Prisoner, was well-known to the Stapo as a prominent Italian anti-Fascist when he was arrested in PARIS in 1942. He was eventually handed over to the Italian Police at the BRENNER PASS and by them was banished to an island in the MEDITERRANEAN (ELBA?). He was released by the turn of events in 1944 and contacted the Italian Communist leader TOGLIATTI, who endeavoured to obtain for him an adm post in the then Allied-occupied zone of ITALY. These attempts were unsuccessful, Prisoner believes, because MARIO's political record was not entirely acceptable to the British or American Police. However, MARIO was accepted by the British IS as a potential agent for NORTH ITALY. /15


Prisoner believes that it was owing to the difficulty of infiltrating agents through the German lines in ITALY at that time that it was decided to land him as a parachute agent, and for this purpose he was sent to a British paratroop trg school in SOUTH ITALY and also to an establishment in BARI where he received a certain amount of int trg. It is NOT correct that he was trained in ENGLAND, but he did receive trg from the British in ITALY.

He was then dropped from an aircraft in NORTH ITALY, whence he transmitted military infm to a British WT control station near NAPLES. His chief activity, however, was the building up of a Communist org in VERONA, BOLZANO, MERANO etc.

He was arrested in Dec 44 by the Stapo and was "turned". Prisoner does not believe that the play-back with the British WT control station in NAPLES produced any useful results, as the British were constantly asking for military infm which could not be given. A Communist network in NORTH ITALY was, however, completely broken up and many arrests were made.

"MARIO" was not brought to BERLIN by the Stapo and he was at liberty in NORTH ITALY at the time of the surrender, as he had agreed to being "turned".

CSDIC(WEA)  
10 Jul 46

  
.....  
for Colonel GS  
Commandant CSDIC(WEA)

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

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