

SPECIAL POINTS.

- 1) KOPKOW realises fully his situation, and knows it is hardly possible for him to hide much or cover up his activities. As a number of his office staff were captured together with him, he is aware that he can easily be crossed-checked and he repeatedly said "If you don't believe me there are plenty of people here you can ask". His attitude is that his only chance for a milder judgement is to tell as much as possible. He also declared he is fully prepared to make any declaration of loyalty required.
- 2) Interrogator made use of this frame of mind. Further it was also realized that it would be hardly possible to catch K. out on contradictions etc. through cross-questioning as he is not only too intelligent for that, but has had a very thorough criminalistic training, and knows all the tricks of the trade.
- 3) Therefore K. was warned from the start, that he would not be treated as any small agent, but if one wanted to know something from him he would be asked point blank. That had the advantage for him that he always knew, where he stood, but on the other hand if he slipped up and tried to conceal something important and he was bound to be found out sooner or later, then he had damaged his prospects for good and all.

Attitude towards USSR.

- 4) One thing is very obvious, and runs like a red thread through the whole statement that is K's antipathy towards the U.S.S.R. He is not only through his East Prussian upbringing biased against them, but also through his whole career he was to 90% engaged on work against Communism. His knowledge of the West is far inferior often second hand with few exceptions, like the "Funkspiele" as France, Belgium, Holland in respect to sabotage were dealt directly by the Asts Paris, Brussels, The Hague etc.
- 5) Many of K's stories must be considered in connection with above mentioned attitude towards the USSR, for instance the instructions given to the Russian agents to continue their work even after the liberation of the territory they were working in by British Forces (See statements Page 26 c) and the remarks of Gen. Iwanoff (loc cit & Notes 6). They have a very distinct tendency.
- 6) Is KOPKOW deliberately trying to throw suspicion between the English and Russians or is he genuinely telling matter of facts? (For a similar sample see STEINERT report Appendix No 2 para 15) The most probably answer to this question seems, that a conflict between the USSR would suit him down to the ground. All the same it is probable that the stories he is telling are true, only they have a normal explanation and nothing hostile towards England; but this would not enter the anti-Russian biased brain of K.

CONFLICT GESTAPO-ABWEHR.

- 7) Another fact worth mentioning is the bad co-operation between Abwehr and Gestapo, which now can be taken as an established fact. Although it doesn't appear very often in his statements K. commented upon this fact in connection with the happenings of 20th July 44. He declared that although the hostile attitude of the Abwehr towards the regime was known, the Gestapo was taken by surprise when suddenly faced with the deadly hostility of the Abwehr and parts of the higher Officer Corps towards Hitler and the Nazi Party.
- 8) It seems that in this case even the Gestapo was partly blinded through GOEBBELS propaganda that the whole nation was behind it's beloved Fuehrer, although just they ought to have known better.

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- 9) One point which was raised with K. was about active sabotage. As his Dept. had perhaps the most thorough knowledge of it and its technique, one would naturally think that Amt. IV A 2 would have been extensively used for giving advice; especially later when the whole Abwehr was swallowed by the RSHA.
- 10) K. denies this, and admits, it sounds unbelievable that all the experience collected by his Dienststelle wasn't made use of. This he ascribes to bureaucratic and departmental jealousies, and rivalries, for instance SKORZENY with his whole outfit of Jagdverbaende was going his own ways, and not bothering about the rest of the RSHA. Considering the ways of officialdom this is a probable explanation.

PLANS FOR AFTER THE WAR?

- 11) Before closing these comments one more point must be touched. What was K's attitude after the dissolution of the RSHA, did he have any Werewolf ideas et. or was he thinking of continuing Gestapo activities? This ought to have been dealt with in K's personal report (Ref. 64) but only after cross-checking with other internees and with his statements could one form an opinion.
- 12) KOPKOW firmly denies that his Dept. had anything to do with "Duntschuh" (See K's statements Page 31) and no clue could be found in other interrogations.
- 13) Quite some importance was attached to his attitude during the days at Dahme, when the whole group was trying to hide. It is certain that K. was not welcome in their midst. FUHRMANN, DOCK & SCHEFFKA had arrived previously, and they naturally feared one would be more on the look-out for someone of K's standing than of small fry like themselves. Further they still had the uncomfortable feeling of being in the presence of their boss.
- 14) The conversation naturally always reverted to the future. All claim that the prevailing opinion was that resistance was futile and their greatest problem was to get back to their proper names and to legality.
- 15) Only one man stated K had "ideas" for the future. This was STEINERT (See Appendix No) Again everyone concerned and present during these talks was cross-checked (They were all in separate cells, and had no means of communication) but all denied; and stuck to their original statements that no conspiracy for the future had been mentioned or discussed.
- 16) STEINERT reinterrogated amplified his tale insofar as that K. had still tried to lay down the law with his opinions, so that they cold-shouldered him for a few days. K; then behaved himself, and everything was alright, but STEINERT could not substantiate his original assertion that K. had talked of future subversive activities.

1 DEDUCTIONS.

- 17) There is no doubt that KOPKOW was a convinced National-Socialist, and quite in agreement with its principles, but he owed his career hardly to his party activities except the start; that means his entry into the Stapo. His quick promotion is certainly due to his capabilities and intelligence. He has an extremely matter of face and methodical brain, very suitable for police work. His is also a very typical German mind, which classifies immediately each case, and must have it in the proper box, where it belongs.
- 18) Although some of his subordinates rather disliked him, and were obviously jealous of his quick promotion, they all considered him a good and efficient superior. On the whole he seems to have bothered more about his staff in the end, than other members of the "Fuehrungsstabe" who only thought of themselves.

19) Naturally the crucial point in these statements is, if K. has told all the truth and is reliable. This was considered from following point of view. It cannot be expected that a man of his position can put down or remember to the very last detail every incident of his professional career. But does his statement give a sufficiently clear picture of

- a) his and his Dept's activities,
- b) the methods used,
- c) organization of RSHA IV A 2.

20) Ad a) Here the statement speaks for itself. K. sometimes goes into details, which have hardly any O.I. interest, but have been left to illustrate the far reaching activity of the Gestapo. One must note here, as has already been mentioned in the preamble, that he was prepared to give further material, but sometimes had to be cut short as the statement was getting too lengthy. Interrogator is of the opinion that in this respect nothing of importance has been left out. His subordinates were interrogated, but disclosed no new side of K's activities which he hadn't touched.

21) Ad b) Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case is to look into the methods used by this Dept. of the Gestapo. Now KOPKOW considers himself as purely a criminalist, and most of his staff was recruited from police officials. This was inherent in the type of work IV A 2 was doing, which called for policemen and not for politicians. (Therefore, it was possible that some of the people employed were not even party members e.g. STEINERT) Amt IV A 2 was purely a matter of fact specialist department, and the Nazis took good care that its efficiency wasn't impaired through fanatical political amateurs. All the same its fundamental tendency dating from its origin was a political one - guarding of the existing regime - only through the necessity of the war, was it forced to turn into a "Fachreferat", using police methods.

22) Ad c) Great importance was attached to this, and here KOPKOW required to give latest and exactest information not only of his Dept., but of the whole Amt IV. Personalities he had given were carefully revised and amplified by the other detained persons of his Dienststelle.

All 3 important points no concealment of vital information could be proved against K.

CONCLUSION:

23) It is believed KOPKOW has given all vital information, and his statements seem reliable.

RECOMMENDATION: INTERMENT.

24) [Faint text, possibly a recommendation or further details regarding the case, including names like STEINERT and KOPKOW.]

25) [Faint text, possibly a recommendation or further details regarding the case.]