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CSDIC (WEA)
B.A. OR

SECRET

FR 47

FINAL REPORT

ON

Dr Bruno KLEIST

(Ref B.A. OR/INT/B5/PF 579 dated 26 Nov 45. See also CSDIC (WEA) Preliminary Interrogation Report 31 dated 27 Oct 46).

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I. PREAMBLE

Prisoner is a 42-year-old North German, well educated, whose knowledge of POLAND, the BALTIC States and SWEDEN is derived from his period of domicile there, together with the frequent visits which he paid to those countries. According to his own statements, he was an antagonist of the German policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories long before STALLGRAND and he states that on two occasions he wrote articles expressing his views, regardless of personal safety. It was his efforts on behalf of the Estonian Swedes and the Ingermanlanders which first caused him to travel to FINLAND and SWEDEN and it was while in SWEDEN that various opportunities presented themselves for contacting the Russians with a view to terminating Soviet-German hostilities. As will be seen from the ensuing report, the efforts which Prisoner made in this direction, though carried out with RIBBENTROP's sanction, never received enough support from him for any positive results to be achieved.

By his continual submission of reports to RIBBENTROP expressing the Swedish attitude towards GERMANY's handling of Jews, deported Norwegian and Danes, and his good connections with Count Folke BERGSTRÖM, Prisoner appears to have played no small part in the eventual liberation of many hundreds of people imprisoned in GERMANY.

Prisoner states that in Jul 45 he was invited by the Asst Military Attaché in STOCKHOLM, Col BUTLER, to a long and searching interview, during which Col BUTLER requested Prisoner to place his knowledge at the disposal of the British authorities. Prisoner states that Col BUTLER was of the opinion that Prisoner had nothing to fear by so doing, as his political views were well known. Prisoner agreed to go to GERMANY and place his knowledge before the British authorities there. Before going to GERMANY, Prisoner told the Swedes what he was about to do, and asked that he might be allowed to avail himself of their hospitality again upon his return. This assurance was given to him.

Before Prisoner actually left STOCKHOLM, the Chief Secretary of the British Legation informed him that a report on him would be sent to the Foreign Office in LONDON and one to the Head of Mil Gov in GERMANY, and that he need fear no unpleasantness.

ENCLOSURE

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
Prisoner states that when he arrived at LÜBECK he was interrogated by the int authorities there and informed that he was to be released. It was only by insistence and explanation as to why he had come to GERMANY that he was allowed to join the "red group" (people for arrest) and that he was taken to NEUMÜNSTER Internment Camp and eventually brought to CSDIC(WEA). Prisoner states that many people in SWEDEN would be prepared to testify for him and he further quotes the names of Count BERNADOTTE, Herr STORCH of Furusundgatan STOCKHOLM and Mr Ivar OLSON, American Legation, THE HAGUE.

Prisoner has been cooperative, and the infm contained in the following report would appear to be reliable, though in some cases dates may not be wholly accurate, as Prisoner has a bad memory in this respect.

II. PERSONAL HISTORY SINCE 1934

1934 Became Beauftragter für Ostpreussische Wirtschaftsorganisation in BERLIN.
N-2 Nov 36 Took over "Polen und Baltikum Referat" in Büro RIBBENTROP, BERLIN.
Mid 37 Founded "Deutsch-Polnische Ges".
Summer 39 Discussions with Russians for foundation of a similar society, but without result.
Autumn 40 Went to TERUTINO in connection with the resettlement of Germans from BESARABIA; dealt with legal questions.
End 40 Returned to BERLIN.
Beg 41 Seriously ill with gall trouble.
May 41 At KARLSBAD for treatment. Summoned to join the "Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete" under ROSENBERG, dealing with ESTONIA, LITHUANIA and LATVIA.
Jan 41 Was loaned to Haupt Abt Politik in the Ostministerium, under Dr LEIBBRANDT, in BERLIN.
End 42 Trips to BALTIC countries, also FINLAND and SWEDEN.
Nov 43 Difference with ROSENBERG over policy in LITHUANIA. Appointed to "Zentralstelle Ost-Europa" by RIBBENTROP, to aid the BALTIC countries with the help of the German Red Cross. Worked on resettlement of Swedish colony in ESTONIA.
Mar 45 Went to HOEGTORP, SWEDEN. Requested by British Legation to offer his services to the British.
Sep 45 Came to LÜBECK and offered his services to the British.

CSDIC(WEA)
18 Feb 46


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for Colonel GS
Commandant CSDIC(WEA)

~~64-9-6-9-15~~

21 Feb 46

Dr Bruno KLEIST

APPENDIX A

PRISONER'S VISITS TO FINLAND AND SWEDEN FROM 1942 ONWARDS

1. Introduction

In order to present a clear picture of his connections with FINLAND, SWEDEN, and the BALTIC States, and the part which he played in the abortive attempts made by the Germans from 1942 onwards to contact the Russians, Prisoner has found it advisable to present a more or less continuous account of his movements from end 42 onwards.

2. Reasons for Prisoner's Visit to FINLAND

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Prisoner states that it was at end 42 that he began his journeys to FINLAND and SWEDEN. His reason for going to FINLAND was a request by the Finns that the population of the area SW of LENINGRAD, who are known as Ingermanlanders and were originally Finnish, be resettled in FINLAND to avoid their becoming victims of the fighting which was going on in the area of Heegru NORD. Prisoner states that in view of his good connections with the leading personalities of Heegru NORD and the understanding attitude of Generalkommissar LITZELANN in ESTONIA and SD Kommandeur SANDBERGER in ESTONIA, he was able to reach agreement with the local authorities for the carrying out of the proposed resettlement. He succeeded in by-passing Reichskommissar LOHSE in RIGA, as well as the main Amt Arbeit u Wirtschaft in the Ostministerium, applying direct to the Hauptabt Politik of the Ostministerium, with the result that an order was duly issued for the resettlement of the Ingermanlanders in FINLAND. According to Prisoner, the Ausw Amt gave their consent to the order but were obliged to withdraw it, as Amt Arbeit u Wirtschaft, whom Prisoner had succeeded in by-passing, heard of the order and issued counter-instructions, stating that the Ingermanlanders were to be used as additional labour in GERMANY. The resettlement had, however, already begun, and in a very short time about 28,000 Ingermanlanders had already been resettled in FINLAND.

3. Conversations with the Finns

Prisoner states that as a result of his part in this matter he was well received by the Finns and had a number of conversations with them on Finno-German relations and GERMANY's eastern policy. The Finns begged Prisoner to do all in his power to foster German understanding for Finnish democracy, and to make clear the fateful consequences of GERMANY's eastern policy, the catastrophic mistakes of which were recognised by all Finns. FINLAND did NOT aspire to the formation of a Finnish-Estonian "Grossstaat", as was feared in certain German circles, but was keenly interested in GERMANY's treatment of small neighbouring states and rather apprehensive of her own fate in the event of a German victory. A German victory in the EAST was regarded as highly improbable by the Finns, however, who were convinced that only a radical change in her eastern policy could save GERMANY - and FINLAND - from disaster. A complete change of political methods might throw a more favourable light on GERMANY in the eyes of the outside world and might possibly lead to an ultimate understanding with both RUSSIA and the Western Powers.

4. Personalities

Prisoner states that whilst in FINLAND he met the following personalities:

BROTHERUS

Press Attaché at Finnish Legation in STOCKHOLM.
Former asst to P. KESLÄHTI, when the latter was Secretary of State in the Finnish Foreign Office.

HELLINEN

Authority responsible for resettlement questions.

col HYNINEN Secretary of State, Finnish Foreign Office.
col IVILO Finnish Press Chief.
col KIVIMÄKI Finnish Envoy to BERLIN.
col LINNENHEIM Marshal.
col PAKASLAHTI Finnish Envoy to VICHY.
col PROCOPE Former Finnish Foreign Minister.
col RAMSAY Finnish Foreign Minister.
col TALVELA Finnish Military Attaché in BERLIN.

5. Prisoner's Conversations with KIVIMÄKI

Prisoner states that he had some detailed conversations with KIVIMÄKI, during which the two main points of discussion were:

- a) the senseless German Eastern Policy,
- b) the possibility of a German compromise peace with RUSSIA at the expense of FINLAND.

Prisoner states that he was able to assure KIVIMÄKI that even if the idea of a compromise peace with RUSSIA did exist in GERMANY, there was certainly no German politician who would ever consider approving measures which would give FINLAND to the Russians.

6. Prisoner's Meeting with TALVELA

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Prisoner states that it was through KIVIMÄKI that he first met TALVELA, the Finnish Military Attaché in BERLIN. TALVELA was both anti-Bolshevist and anti-Nazi, and really hoped that he would be able to obtain help for FINLAND from ENGLAND and AMERICA; only when this help was not forthcoming did he eventually agree to Finnish cooperation with GERMANY. Probably TALVELA and the former Finnish Foreign Minister PROCOPE form the spiritual leadership of the Finnish resistance movement against the Russians today.

7. Prisoner's Meeting with PAKASLAHTI

According to Prisoner, PAKASLAHTI, who was the Finnish Envoy to VICHY, has the most active mind and the sharpest tongue amongst present-day Finnish politicians. In Dec 42, when Prisoner last saw him, PAKASLAHTI had just resigned his position as Secretary of State in the Finnish Foreign Office to take up the appointment of Finnish Envoy to VICHY. PAKASLAHTI was convinced that the only way left for the Finns to save their country from complete disaster was for them to make peace with the Russians. Prisoner states that in his opinion, PAKASLAHTI would be the ideal man to lead FINLAND today, as he would be able to effect a delaying policy until a stronger figure could carry on and obtain better conditions for FINLAND.

8. Prisoner's Visits to SWEDEN

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The reasons for Prisoner's visits to SWEDEN between 1942 and 1945 are rather similar to those for his visits to FINLAND, namely the question of resettlement.

Some centuries ago 7000 Swedish fishermen emigrated to ESTONIA, where they retained their ancient culture and language. The Germans had decided to preserve the customs, culture and language of these people when they occupied ESTONIA, but the German measures adopted in ESTONIA failed to inspire this small Swedish community with any degree of confidence in German rule, especially as they had already been shaken previously by the Russian invasion of ESTONIA in 1940. Prisoner states that when the situation on the Eastern front became grave, SWEDEN expressed her apprehension for the safety of these fisherfolk and requested that they should be repatriated to SWEDEN. Prisoner went to SWEDEN and proposed that in order to get something done in the matter, the Swedes should first of all suggest that the sick and aged amongst these people should be transferred to SWEDEN.

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After very difficult negotiations with numerous German authorities, each of whom tried to interfere in the matter, Prisoner finally succeeded in obtaining permission from the German Government to arrange for the repatriation of about 300 people from ESTONIA to SWEDEN. Using the same tactics, Prisoner managed to arrange the transfer of a further 900 during 1943. Prisoner states that by that time the local German authorities were becoming more amenable and he finally even obtained the consent of the Ostministerium, which approved the repatriation of the remainder of the Swedish fishermen to SWEDEN. He then approached the Ausw Amt and paved the way for official sanction, advising the Swedish Ambassador to put in an official request to the Ausw Amt. The Swedish Ambassador did so, but according to Prisoner the request received so much attention that it eventually found its way to RIBBENTROP, who flatly refused to have anything to do with it. The result was that the repatriations had to be carried on secretly, and Prisoner states that during 1944 further transports, each of about 50 people, were shipped more or less secretly to SWEDEN, until the Russians finally overran ESTONIA and prevented any further repatriation. According to Prisoner only about 400 of these Estonian-Swedes remained, and these were eventually smuggled out of ESTONIA into GERMANY, where, after great difficulty and hazardous journeys, they were helped by Prisoner to get back to SWEDEN.

9. During his visits to SWEDEN in connection with the above repatriations, Prisoner met the following personalities:

KUPLIN	Gesandter	} all members of the Swedish Foreign Office.
von POST	Untriketsradet	
NYLANDER	Leg Rat	
HELLREIT	" "	

BERNLOTTE, Folke Graf	} all members of the repatriation Committee dealing with the re-settlement of the Estonian-Swedes.	
DILON, James		Kammerherr
CULMANN		Reichsantiquar
LINDHAGEN		Mayor of STOCKHOLM

GRIFENBERG	Finnish Ambassador.
BROTHERUS	Press Attaché at Finnish Legation.
SPONCH	Representative of the world Jewish Committee (see para 27).
RASCH	Wholesale merchant (see para 29).
CLAUS, Edgar	One of Prisoner's contacts to the Russians (see para 13 et seq).

OLSON, Ivar	Delegate of the War Refugee Committee at the American Embassy in STOCKHOLM (see para 28).
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THORNER, Heinz	See para 10
BÖNING, Werner	See para 11

10. Prisoner's Connection with Heinz THORNER

Prisoner first met Heinz THORNER in 1936 when the latter was RIBBENTROP's adjt. THORNER during the winter 1942-43 was the rep of the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM on the question of the repatriation of the Swedish fisherfolk from ESTONIA to SWEDEN (see para 8). Prisoner states, that as far as he knows, THORNER accompanied RIBBENTROP to LONDON when the latter was appointed German Ambassador there, but that when it was rumoured that THORNER had traces of Jewish blood, he was obliged to leave RIBBENTROP's staff and was posted to the German Ambassador in WASHINGTON (THOMPSON). According to Prisoner, THORNER was transferred from WASHINGTON to SWEDEN in 1941 and became Referent for Kultur in STOCKHOLM Sweden

Prisoner states that THORNER worked very hard in this post and in spite of the fact that it was more Nazi ideology than culture which THORNER was compelled to propagate by BERLIN, he did succeed in organising a series of cultural, scientific and artistic exhibitions, until his efforts were spoiled by the adm methods employed by the new Leiter of the Kultur Abt of the Ausw Amt, Prof SIX

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Stockholm, Sweden

controlled the German school, German academy and

Sweden

the ADA publishing firm in Sweden

Prisoner states that, as far as he knows, the following institutions in STOCKHOLM were in some way controlled by THOMNER: the German School, the German Academy, and the ODL publishing firm (which published the magazine "TIDSBILDE"). These were all situated in a building in a small side-street in STOCKHOLM called Kaptensgatan, and the German SD saw in them a very good means of camouflage. THOMNER, whose office was also in this building, was obliged to take in SD agents as packers. Prisoner states that THOMNER was very unhappy about these new "employees" (he believes there were two), especially as it was only a matter of days before THOMNER's regular staff saw through the persons in question.

Prisoner states that THOMNER clashed with SCHULLENBERG over the transport of the sick and aged Swedish fisherfolk from ESTONIA (see para 8) and that he (Prisoner) had to intervene on numerous occasions to protect THOMNER from serious consequences. Prisoner had further contact with THOMNER later on in 1944, when Prisoner was told by RIBBENTROP to send any messages concerning contact with the Russians (see Appendix D, para 1) through THOMNER to BERLIN.

11. Prisoner's Contact with Werner BÖNING

cit Germany *Poland* *Stockholm Sweden*
Prisoner states that at end 42 he met an old friend of his named Werner BÖNING, who at that time was employed in the German Kulturamt under Heinz THOMNER as Film Referent. BÖNING, who was born in WEST PRUSSIA about 1904, had been employed for a long time by a commercial firm in BERLIN and began studying political science in BERLIN in 1930. Prisoner first met BÖNING in BERLIN in 1932, when he (BÖNING) attended a lecture on POLAND given by Prisoner in a seminary in BERLIN where the main study was "The Psychology of Nations". BÖNING was at that time sitting an exam and was writing a thesis on POLAND. BÖNING went to VILNA in 1934 on a "student exchange scheme" and whilst there he contacted the Polish-German TOBIS film unit and was employed by them as interpreter. When Prisoner formed the German-Polish Society in BERLIN in 1936 he engaged BÖNING as social manager. BÖNING, by reason of his good manners and correct behaviour, proved a very suitable choice.

When war broke out in 1939 he retained the services of BÖNING because he believed that he would be a suitable person to employ in the admin of POLAND. Prisoner states, however, that when HITLER's policy towards POLAND became quite clear to him, he felt it useless to keep BÖNING back any longer, and consequently released him for the German Army. after a short period of training BÖNING was sent to STOCKHOLM as a specialist asst to the German Military Attaché there. According to Prisoner, BÖNING went back to the film industry after about a year, and then took up a post as Filmreferent at the German Legation in STOCKHOLM. Prisoner states that BÖNING, as Filmreferent, in addition to his admin and propaganda work, also had the job of obtaining foreign films. Being trained in the tech side of film work, he was content with making copies of foreign films, particularly news-reels and other topical films, in a film laboratory which he had set up in STOCKHOLM. According to Prisoner, BÖNING was able to work for a fraction of the cost which some of his colleagues in other neutral countries were charging for the same type of work.

12. Outcome of Prisoner's Contact with BÖNING

Prisoner states that he had several conversations with BÖNING in Dec 42, during which he expressed his political opinions quite openly to him, and asked BÖNING whether it would not be possible for him (BÖNING), being more or less independent, to introduce Prisoner to some English, American or Swedish persons with whom he might have political discussions. Prisoner told BÖNING he was also interested in meeting Estonians, Latvians or Lithuanians, and suggested that BÖNING's house would be a very good meeting-place for any contacts which BÖNING might be able to make for him. Prisoner states that he made the acquaintance of several people from the last three mentioned countries, but was not able to approach them officially. BÖNING agreed to try to establish the contacts which he desired, in spite of the risk which such introductions might involve, but told Prisoner that, before doing so, he would like him first of all to meet a certain very

interesting man from Eastern EUROPE. Prisoner agreed to do this, and in Dec 42 he was introduced by BÖNING to Edgar CLAUß.

cited in the interest of the subject who was in contact with the Russian Jewish Legat in Stockholm Sweden

13. Prisoner's Connections with Edgar CLAUß

According to Prisoner, Edgar CLAUß is a small stocky man of about 57-58, probably Jewish, who gives the impression of being somewhat of an adventurer. CLAUß spoke bad German, bad Russian and knew a little Latvian and Swedish. In the conversations which Prisoner had with CLAUß the latter mentioned that he had good direct connections with the Soviet Embassy in STOCKHOLM. Prisoner was told by CLAUß that the Russians felt that they and GERMANY were fighting themselves to a standstill for the eventual benefit of a third Power who would then be able to take advantage of the exhausted condition of both. CLAUß stated to Prisoner that the Russians were very keen to see the war against GERMANY brought to a speedy conclusion and that he himself intended to do everything in his power to try to bring about the termination of hostilities between GERMANY and RUSSIA, hoping, as he told Prisoner, to make a fortune out of Russo-German trade, as he had done once before. Prisoner states that in further conversations held a very short time later, CLAUß told him that he had worked at the Danish Consulate in RIG. between 1918 and 1921, and that since that time he had been entitled to use the title of Consul. According to Prisoner, CLAUß showed him a diplomatic passport bearing innumerable visas dating from 1918, but Prisoner cannot remember any further details about the passport.

14. Prisoner's Reaction to his Contact with CLAUß

Prisoner states that his first impressions of this new contact were unfavourable, but BÖNING assured him that the German Military Attaché in STOCKHOLM could vouch for the unimpeachable character of CLAUß and his knowledge of the Soviet Union. BÖNING also told Prisoner that General JUST, the German Military Attaché in KIEV, had also had convincing proof of CLAUß' direct relations with Soviet RUSSIA in peacetime, and that he (BÖNING) had also received films from CLAUß which in his opinion could only have come from official Soviet sources. BÖNING also reminded Prisoner that CLAUß had a Swedish wife who came from a good family, and that she had probably given CLAUß a certain material background.

C. d. d.

15. Prisoner's Decision to make use of his Contact with CLAUß

Accepting BÖNING's references, Prisoner met CLAUß again and informed him that he was interested in his political views, and that he (CLAUß) could be of great service to Prisoner as an ambassador of peace - a service which Prisoner told CLAUß would receive adequate material recognition at a later date. Prisoner told CLAUß that he was interested only in establishing direct, clear-cut contact with the three main powers, RUSSIA, ENGLAND and AMERICA. Prisoner then promised CLAUß that he would return to STOCKHOLM during the first few weeks of 1943 and resume discussions with him.

16. Prisoner's Next Meeting with CLAUß

As promised, Prisoner returned to STOCKHOLM at beg 43 and met CLAUß again. According to Prisoner CLAUß asked him with apparent casualness whether he knew a certain ALEXANDROV, who, CLAUß stated, was the head of the European Dept of the Russian Foreign Office. CLAUß told Prisoner that ALEXANDROV was at that very moment in STOCKHOLM, where he was breaking his journey to LONDON, whither he was bound the next day, and that he would be back in two to three weeks' time. According to Prisoner, CLAUß then went on to say that when ALEXANDROV did return to STOCKHOLM, he would be spending several days there, and that he (ALEXANDROV) had received official permission from the Soviet Govt to have a confidential meeting with either Prisoner or Graf von der SCHULLENBURG, but not with Gesandter SCHNURER or NÖLDGE.

C. d. d.

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Prisoner asked CLAUS why the two latter persons should be excluded, and after consulting his source of info at the Russian Embassy in STOCKHOLM, CLAUS told Prisoner it was because SCHNUCKE was considered by the Russians as a rather self-seeking man, and that his desire for personal reward might endanger the security of the enterprise. NULDECKE, on the other hand, was considered to be unsuitable because, according to CLAUS' source of info, he knew nothing about politics, especially where Eastern EUROPE was concerned. CLAUS then terminated the conversation by stating that should any meeting between Prisoner or SCHULENBURG and ALEXANDROV eventually take place, it would naturally be strictly secret and be treated as a casual private conversation, though it would be necessary that either Prisoner or SCHULENBURG, or both, should have permission from the German Govt to carry on such a conversation.

17. Action taken by Prisoner following his Discussion with CLAUS

Prisoner states that he now found himself faced with rather a problem, namely whether or not he should create an official political incident out of what was originally a private adventure. He states that he decided to make a report on the matter, and accordingly he flew to BERLIN.

18. Prisoner's Meeting with Dr GRAEFE of Amt VI - Prisoner compromised by the German Military Attaché in STOCKHOLM

Prisoner states that as he was about to prepare his report for RIBBENTROP concerning his meetings with CLAUS, he received a visit from a friend of his student days, a certain Dr GRAEFE, who at that time (Jan 43) was one of SCHELLENBERG's colleagues, and also one of the ablest members of Amt VI. GRAEFE informed Prisoner that HITLER's HQ had received a report from the German Military Attaché in STOCKHOLM to the effect that a Jewish agent named CLAUS had called at his office and stated that the head of the European Dept of the Russian Foreign Office, a Jew named ALEXANDROV, had arrived in STOCKHOLM, where he was staying for three or four days and would welcome discussions with a German rep concerning the general situation. GRAEFE, quoting the German Military Attaché's report, went on to tell Prisoner that if the German rep were not forthcoming, ALEXANDROV would go on to LONDON, where he would prepare a final agreement for further Allied cooperation with RUSSIA.

GRAEFE then told Prisoner that HITLER had seen the Military Attaché's report, and referred to the matter as "an act of unmitigated Jewish provocation" and had ordered that all Germans who were in any way involved in any such dealings should be punished, and that any collaboration by Germans with Jewish agents anywhere would be dealt with most severely. GRAEFE then told Prisoner that enquiries in STOCKHOLM had revealed that he (Prisoner) had been in touch with CLAUS, and that it was for that reason that he (GRAEFE) had been sent to fetch Prisoner and bring him immediately to KALTENBRUNNER.

19. Prisoner's Meeting with KALTENBRUNNER

According to Prisoner, KALTENBRUNNER listened to his explanation and told Prisoner that his story was rather different from the facts as quoted in the Military Attaché's report and that he was more inclined to believe Prisoner's version of the incident than that of the Military Attaché. KALTENBRUNNER then said that the description of the German reps who would be accepted by the Russians and of those who would not be acceptable, as given by CLAUS to Prisoner, was so correct that he (KALTENBRUNNER) was convinced that CLAUS could not have made up such a story, and that therefore CLAUS probably did have connections with the Soviet Embassy in STOCKHOLM. KALTENBRUNNER then told Prisoner that owing to HITLER's rage about the whole idea, nothing could be done about it for the time being, but that Prisoner should leave the matter in his (KALTENBRUNNER's) hands, and he would pass it on to RIBBENTROP on the first suitable occasion. Prisoner adds that he learned from Admiral CANLIS a few days later that the whole thing arose through one of CANLIS' men in STOCKHOLM, who, knowing only a few of the psychological difficulties which were being faced at the time by the German War Leaders, had sent in an exaggerated account of Prisoner's actual contact with CLAUS, hoping thereby to urge HITLER to take favourable action on it.

According to Prisoner even CAMERIS was unable to explain why, in the report submitted by his man, ALEXANDROV, who was a pure Russian and had a German wife from the VOLGA area, should be described as being a Jew.

Prisoner states that he then took it upon himself to send a message to BÖNING for CLAUS, stating that he was ill and regretting not having been able to keep his previously arranged appointment.

20. Prisoner's Meeting with RIBBENTROP

Prisoner states that a few days later, towards end Jan 43, he was summoned by RIBBENTROP to appear at HITLER's HQ in EAST PRUSSIA (WOLF-SCHLANZE), where in the presence of the German Ambassador GAUS he was asked to tell the whole story of the (as RIBBENTROP called it) "Jewish swindler in STOCKHOLM" and to give the exact details, so that he (RIBBENTROP) could get the matter settled once and for all. Prisoner gave the infm and states that RIBBENTROP then spent a long time discussing the facts with GAUS.

According to Prisoner, a few days later he was again summoned to appear before RIBBENTROP, who told him that he could continue his contact with CLAUS if he wished, but that he (RIBBENTROP) preferred that contact should be established through some other more reliable channel, which would be available if the Russians should wish to pass any messages to GERMANY.

Prisoner states that he was told to be quite clear on one point, namely, that no mention of RIBBENTROP was to be made, and the words "peace negotiations" avoided at all costs. Prisoner states that from these instructions he gained the impression that RIBBENTROP had been granted either no powers at all by HITLER, or at the most very limited ones, and that by telling Prisoner he could continue with his contact he (RIBBENTROP) was already overstepping his authority.

Prisoner states that he then felt that he was in a worse position than when he had come to BERLIN at end 42. He returned to STOCKHOLM at end Jan 43, conscious that his powers were now indeed limited.

21. Prisoner's Next Contact with CLAUS

Prisoner states that if he remembers rightly, it was during spring 43 that he met CLAUS again. He states that CLAUS asked to be released from these so-called "peace negotiations", because he did not wish to let his Soviet friends down again, in the same way in which ALEXANDROV had been let down. CLAUS explained that ALEXANDROV had waited nearly two weeks in STOCKHOLM for Prisoner to return and had eventually left for MOSCOW, not only very angry, but also in fear for his own safety.

CLAUS told Prisoner that from conversations which he had had with ALEXANDROV he had gained the following impressions:

That RUSSIA would not continue fighting GERMANY, in the interests of ENGLAND and AMERICA, one minute longer than was absolutely necessary. That RUSSIA feared that after GERMANY and JAPAN had been defeated, she herself would be so exhausted that the Western Allies would eventually be tempted to turn on her.

That RUSSIA was thinking of arranging a series of important internal political changes, which would demonstrate to the Germans that she truly desired to come to a peaceful agreement with them.

That RUSSIA desired, on the other hand, that GERMANY too should give some indication that she was prepared to negotiate.

That RUSSIA would accept the removal of ROSENBERG and RIBBENTROP as a sign of German good faith, if the chance of negotiation ever arose.

That RUSSIA would be prepared to accept the 1914 frontiers (CLAUS told Prisoner, however, that this point should be accepted with a "pinch of salt").

Finally, that if GERMANY continued to pursue her present policy, RUSSIA would have to continue her alliance with the Western Powers.

Claus et al.

CLAUS told Prisoner that he was of the opinion that ALEXANDROV's visit had been directly connected with the TEHRAN Conference which had been held in the meantime. CLAUS also stated that the Russians had wanted to sound all possibilities in the other direction before entering into negotiations with the Western Powers, in order to know whether they were doing the right thing in negotiating, or possibly in order to be in a position to obtain better terms at the TEHRAN conference-table.

According to Prisoner, however, CLAUS was of the opinion that the terms of the TEHRAN Conference were of such a general nature that even at the time of the Conference the Russians would still have preferred making peace with GERMANY rather than await the results of vague, long-drawn-out arrangements with the Western Allies.

In Jun 43 (about a fortnight before the MOSCOW Conference was held) CLAUS suddenly announced to Prisoner that DEKLINOV, deputy Commissar of the Russian Foreign Office, was expected in STOCKHOLM for a few days. Alive to the possibility that this visit might be the prelude of another conference (as was ALEXANDROV's in the case of TEHRAN), Prisoner decided to report immediately to RIBBENTROP.

22. Further Meetings with RIBBENTROP

Prisoner suggested that RIBBENTROP should send him back to STOCKHOLM to make further enquiries about DEKLINOV's projected visit and its implications, and drew his (RIBBENTROP's) attention to a memorandum, which he (Prisoner) had sent to RIBBENTROP about a year previously, stating how necessary it would be for GERMANY to adopt a radical change of policy both internal and external, if she intended to negotiate peace with RUSIA or especially with the Anglo-Americans.

Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP refused to consider any political arguments, and told Prisoner that fighting would go on until final victory had been achieved, and that it was foolish to believe a "fairy story" like the DEKLINOV affair.

Prisoner states that whilst he was talking to RIBBENTROP, the latter's Press Referent REICHROD came in and informed RIBBENTROP that it had just been announced on the MOSCOW wireless, and if Prisoner remembers rightly, also in the paper "PRAVDA", that DEKLINOV was going to SOFIA as Russian Ambassador. According to Prisoner, RIBBENTROP was perplexed at this news and asked him to give his opinion on the matter. Prisoner states that he then suggested to RIBBENTROP to announce in the Press that Ambassador Graf von der SCHULLENBURG was also going to SOFIA. RIBBENTROP told Prisoner that he could not send SCHULLENBURG to SOFIA. Prisoner replied that DEKLINOV would not be going to SOFIA either, but that if he (RIBBENTROP) made some announcement about SCHULLENBURG, the Russians would immediately take the hint that the Germans were prepared to negotiate. Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP then broke off the conversation, and told Prisoner next day that as long as the German Army was retreating, all signs of willingness to negotiate were to be avoided.

RIBBENTROP then told Prisoner that he should send a message to CLAUS to say that he was not able to come to STOCKHOLM, but should give no reason. According to Prisoner, RIBBENTROP also told him that he (Prisoner) should not meddle in dubious political speculation, but should note very carefully that only HITLER and he (RIBBENTROP) were responsible for GERMANY's foreign policy, and that Prisoner and his colleagues were mere tools. Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP also told him that the idea of a European Charter, which Prisoner had previously mentioned to RIBBENTROP, was just as Utopian as the granting of political rights to Eastern European peoples was dangerous.

Prisoner states that in view of all the foregoing incidents, he was very surprised when about two weeks later he was summoned to HITLER's HQ to see RIBBENTROP again. This time, according to Prisoner, RIBBENTROP did not order him to go to SWEDEN, but gave him permission to go and contact CLAUS, and if possible establish other contacts with the Russians at the same time. Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP told him that he was to pay CLAUS the sum of SKr 100,000, and then promise to pay him another 100,000 so as to make sure of his services, and to avoid his being "bought" by any other foreign power.

Prisoner states that he then told RIBBENTROP that, as it was no longer possible to catch up on the BERANOSOV incident, it meant he would have to start negotiations with CLAUS all over again. He also told RIBBENTROP that unless GERMANY was prepared to give the Russians some obvious hints as to her intentions, such as the recall of ROSENBERG or his (RIBBENTROP's) own dismissal, the whole thing would be likely to fail again. Furthermore, he told RIBBENTROP that offering large sums of money would only encourage greed and thus spoil the whole purpose of the negotiations. Prisoner finally told RIBBENTROP that it was also very necessary for him (Prisoner) to be able to give some very good reason for his presence in STOCKHOLM. It was a wonder that his activities had not already been noticed, as STOCKHOLM at that time had become the focal point on the political stage.

Prisoner then asked RIBBENTROP to put him in charge of the resettlement of the Swedish Fisherfolk from ESTONIA in SWEDEN. His reasons for making this request he gives as follows: firstly, a gesture on the part of the Germans to protect these fishermen by getting them out of the battle area would place GERMANY in a more favourable light, which was good from a propaganda point of view, and secondly, it would give Prisoner the necessary excuse for making journeys to and from SWEDEN. According to Prisoner, RIBBENTROP refused to have anything to do with the resettlement plan, because he said he had no desire to do the Swedes any favours. Prisoner then tried to persuade RIBBENTROP to sanction the release of certain Jews from German concentration camps and prisons, about whom he (Prisoner) had spoken to Count BERNLOTTE during winter 43. According to Prisoner RIBBENTROP also rejected this proposal, because, as he said, HITLER would never sanction it.

23. Payment of SKr 100,000 to CLAUS

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Prisoner states that he eventually agreed with RIBBENTROP to pay CLAUS SKr 100,000, and that he did this during the following year, passing the money to CLAUS through Werner BÖNING.

The actual payment was made by Heinz THOMER (see PIR 21 on THOMER, para 4) and Prisoner confirms that half was paid in English currency, and half in Swedish Kronen. According to Prisoner, the money came from funds personally allocated by RIBBENTROP for use in payment of special tasks.

24. Further Info given by CLAUS

Just before the YALTA Conference, CLAUS again reported to him that ALEXANDROV would shortly be arriving in STOCKHOLM. A little time after, CLAUS also announced the arrival in STOCKHOLM of ASTACHOV (former Russian Chargé d' Affaires in BERLIN). According to Prisoner, CLAUS also announced the arrival of various other Russian diplomats, and offered to contact them for Prisoner.

Prisoner states that with ITALY out of the war, and the TEHRAN, MOSCOW and YALTA Conferences having taken place, it became more and more obvious to him that any further efforts to bring about negotiated peace were futile, particularly as GERMANY was not willing to make any friendly gesture towards any of the powers with whom she hoped to negotiate.

Prisoner states that for this reason he gradually broke off his negotiations with CLAUS, but continued to treat him with politeness whenever he met him, in order to avoid unpleasantness.

25. Prisoner's Subsequent Activities

Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP made no effort to change his views, and that WERBNER still remained as adamant as ever, and continued to forbid contact with Russian diplomats. Prisoner states that it seemed useless even to try to make private contacts. Eventually, instead of using his efforts on behalf of the Estonian Swedes to conceal from foreign countries his real task, i.e. his attempts to contact the Russians, exactly the opposite happened: he used his unsuccessful attempts to contact the Russians as

a means of concealing from GERMANY the efforts he was making on behalf of the Estonian Swedes, of Jews who were imprisoned in GERMANY and for the rescue of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians from GERMANY. These efforts, he states, met with considerable success.

26. Prisoner's Opinion concerning CLAUS' Reliability

Prisoner states that three points sufficed to convince him of the genuineness of CLAUS: *proved*

a) Upon Prisoner's next visit to STOCKHOLM after the ALEXANDROV affair, BÖNING told him that an officer on the Staff of the German Military Attaché in STOCKHOLM had seen CLAUS and ALEXANDROV out shopping together in the Kungsgatan, and had reported that they seemed to be on extremely good terms with one another, which, according to Prisoner, would indicate that CLAUS' reported connections with the Soviet Government were not just theoretical.

b) Prisoner states that at the time of his first meeting with CLAUS, the latter had pointed out the following points to Prisoner from notes written in Russian:-

CLAUS told Prisoner, that RUSSIA was not interested exclusively in EUROPE, where the great number of different peoples constituting EUROPE's population did not present RUSSIA with an easy problem. RUSSIA was far more interested in CHINA, a nation of 400 million souls. CLAUS mentioned that CHINA was being taught the art of modern warfare by many teachers, but that whoever succeeded in eventually commanding this gigantic source of manpower would in a very few years have at his disposal a force of about 40 million men, which when thrown into the balance of world politics would weigh heavily in favour of the possessor. *Called*

CLAUS then told Prisoner that RUSSIA believed that no gains in EUROPE could ever balance the potential threat to her Eastern frontiers, if either JAPAN or the USA should succeed in getting this Chinese force on their side, and for that reason RUSSIA would not go far into EUROPE, but would rather concentrate her undivided attention towards the EAST.

According to CLAUS, by controlling CHINA, the Soviet would assure themselves safety in the FAR EAST, and also, with such gigantic manpower, possibly be able to expand towards INDIA and the Indian Archipelago.

c) CLAUS also expressed to Prisoner the Kremlin's dislike of RIBBENTROP, giving as their reason that RIBBENTROP had concluded the Russo-German Pact only for purposes of deception. He stated that the Russians were convinced of GERMANY's ultimate aims by the huge economic concessions promised to them by SCHURBE, concessions which in the Russian opinion could never possibly have been achieved by a Germany at war.

CLAUS told Prisoner that it was only after the fabulous offers by SCHURBE that the Russians began to press their claims for territory, just to see how far the Germans really intended to cooperate.

CLAUS stated that STALIN "plugged" this point whilst discussing the pact with RIBBENTROP in MOSCOW, and demanded from the Germans, as a line of demarcation, the East Prussian-Russian frontier instead of the DVINA Line.

CLAUS went on to say that RIBBENTROP, who was not authorised to concede such a claim, told STALIN that he would phone HITLER and ask his consent, and that later the same night RIBBENTROP returned to the Kremlin and reported to STALIN that HITLER had agreed.

CLAUS then told Prisoner that STALIN was very surprised by the rapid decision made by HITLER, and realised that the concessions had only been made because HITLER had felt pretty sure of getting them back again in a very short time.

Prisoner stated that he reported all these facts to RIBBENTROP, who was absolutely amazed at the accuracy of the report, especially of such an intimate incident as his promise to STALIN to phone HITLER and let him have a reply straightaway.

Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP confirmed the incident and told Prisoner that, when STALIN heard of the decision by HITLER to agree to the East Prussian frontier as the line of demarcation between GERMANY and RUSSIA, he got very "worked up" and was able to continue the discussions only after a few minutes in which to recover himself.

Prisoner states that the following incident might also suggest that CLAUS really was genuine in his infm:

On 4 Nov 44, according to Prisoner, OSHIMA, the Japanese Foreign Minister, was introduced to HITLER by RIBBENTROP. Prisoner states that he knows from hearsay that HITLER suggested to OSHIMA that JAPAN should act as "peace negotiator" in MOSCOW on behalf of GERMANY, and that the Japanese Foreign Minister stated that the prospects of success would be good.

Prisoner states that on 5 Nov 44 he received from STOCKHOLM a message from CLAUS, stating that the Japanese were playing a very perfidious role in MOSCOW at GERMANY's expense, by sowing seeds of hate and mistrust about the Germans, so that the Russians would continue the war against GERMANY, thus sparing JAPAN the anxiety of getting the Russians against her.

CLAUS further stated in the message to Prisoner that there was an important Russian personality in STOCKHOLM, and asked when Prisoner could come to STOCKHOLM to meet this Russian. Prisoner states that he passed the infm to RIBBENTROP, who became very perturbed. Prisoner states that it was, however, so late before he received RIBBENTROP's orders to proceed to STOCKHOLM, that even if the Russian had been there when CLAUS stated, he was not there on 16 Nov 44, which was the date Prisoner arrived in STOCKHOLM.

27. Prisoner's Contact with Mr STORCH C. d. 51

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Prisoner states that he first met Mr STORCH in STOCKHOLM early 44 and that he was introduced to him by BÖNING, who in turn had been introduced to him by CLAUS. STORCH was the American rep of the World Jewish Congress in SWEDEN, and Prisoner states that his contacts with him were never of a political nature, but were established purely for humanitarian reasons. STORCH gave him a list of names, and mentioned also the names of several Jewish Groups whose liberation from German concentration camps would be especially desirable.

Prisoner explained to STORCH in the course of their conversation that in the case of the Estonian Swedes he (Prisoner) had been very lucky in accomplishing any resettlement at all, whereas the release of Jews from concentration camps would be still more difficult and he did not hold out much hope of success. Prisoner, however, promised STORCH that he would approach the competent authorities in the matter and try to get them interested.

28. Prisoner's Contact with Mr Ivar OLSON

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Prisoner states that Ivar OLSON was a rep of the War Refugee Committee at the American Legation in STOCKHOLM and that he was introduced to OLSON in Jun 44. During the ensuing conversations OLSON expressed to Prisoner President ROOSEVELT's great desire to see the existing Jewish Groups who were interned or imprisoned in German-occupied EUROPE saved from complete eradication. Prisoner states that at the time of these conversations it was HITLER's intentions to wipe out all Jews and their consorts, whether the latter were Jewish or not, and also to transfer all PW camps to cities likely to be attacked by air. Prisoner states that he was able to exercise his influence with the authorities discussing these new orders of HITLER's against the Jews, by exploiting the remarks made to him (Prisoner) by OLSON, and at the same time exaggerating the importance of OLSON.

Prisoner is convinced that OLSON's courage in contacting him (Prisoner), which would probably have ruined OLSON had it reached the ears of the Press, was instrumental in leading to the MUSI and BERNA-DOTTE intervention, which resulted in the liberation of hundreds of victims from German concentration camps and the frustration of HITLER's plan for their eventual destruction. Prisoner states that he never used his connections with OLSON to promote any further "peace negotiations", but that they did prove helpful in the final winding-up of the war in Northern GERMANY, DENMARK and NORWAY. Prisoner states that whilst he was in STOCKHOLM at end Apr 45 finishing the work of resettlement of the Estonian Swedes, he received messages from Dr BEST (German Minister Plenipotentiary in DENMARK), from Gauleiter LOHSE (Reichskommissar for OSTLAND) and from KLUFFMANN (Reichsstatthalter HAMBURG), that they had all decided not to defend their respective territories, but to hand them over to the Western Allies without fighting.

Prisoner states that he immediately communicated this news to Mr von POST (Chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Office) and also to OLSON, pointing out that the decisions taken by the three mentioned above would probably render TERBOVEN's order to defend NORWAY, which had just been issued, more or less obsolete. Prisoner states that OLSON received the info with great satisfaction, because he was very worried by the proclamation of DONITZ as successor to HITLER and feared that he might continue the fight and thus frustrate the negotiations going on between HIMMLER and BERNA DOTTE.

29. Prisoner's Relations with RASCH

Prisoner states that he was introduced to RASCH by Stubaf FINCKE (German SD representative in SWEDEN) on 17 Dec 43. Prisoner states that RASCH is a small, active man, aged about 58-60. He owns a large house at Floragatan 4, STOCKHOLM some very valuable pictures and also a valuable racehorse. RASCH is originally of German descent, but his family have been Swedish nationals for many generations. He spent his youth in PETROGRAD and was there during the revolution of 1918 when he busied himself with the exchange of German ~~FW~~. In this connection RASCH is said to have lent a large amount of money in roubles to GERMANY, hoping that he would eventually be repaid in GERMANY in Swedish Kronen. According to Prisoner RASCH is said to have succeeded in getting the loan repaid in Kronen. He also transacted a large commercial deal with LENIN personally, a fact which he recalled in an article which he wrote for "Sovjet-Nytt", the propaganda leaflet of the Russian Embassy in STOCKHOLM in 1944 on the anniversary of LENIN's death. RASCH told Prisoner that one of his former secretaries, a German woman from the VOLGA area, had become secretary to Mme KOLLONTAY, the Russian Ambadress in SWEDEN. Prisoner states that as RASCH was so very talkative, he refrained from discussing political matters with him, and confined his conversations to questions of art and horseracing, both of which were of particular interest to RASCH.

Prisoner states that RASCH offered him a share in a very large, and in his opinion illegal, manganese transaction between SWEDEN and GERMANY, which was to be effected via FINLAND. According to Prisoner, RASCH produced certain papers concerning the proposed deal, and promised Prisoner that he would receive a commission of SKr 150,000. Prisoner told RASCH that he would mention the matter to the Commercial Attaché at the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM or even the Economics Abt of the Ausw Amt, but that he himself would not be able to accept any commission for any results which might eventually be achieved. According to Prisoner, RASCH upon hearing this immediately withdrew the whole project. When Prisoner next met RASCH in Jan 44 RASCH told him that the Soviet Embassy in STOCKHOLM held a high opinion of Prisoner, because of his very correct behaviour and knowledge, and that should he at any time wish to negotiate with a representative of the Kremlin, this could be arranged.

RASCH told Prisoner that the Russian diplomats in STOCKHOLM had of course to be very careful, but that a negotiator from MOSCOW could quite easily be sent down if BERLIN was really interested. RASCH also told Prisoner that if he wished he could meet RASCH's former secretary, who was now secretary to KOLLONTAY, and that she would confirm to Prisoner everything RASCH had told him. Prisoner told RASCH that GERMANY was not interested in negotiations, but that he personally would be very interested to meet Mme KOLLONTAY's private secretary. RASCH said he would arrange it any time Prisoner cared to mention, but he never actually did so. Prisoner states that he never saw RASCH again.

According to Prisoner, FINCKE was of the opinion that RASCH was a Russian agent, through whom the German Embassy amongst others was carrying on illegal business. FINCKE also told Prisoner that possibly RASCH was not so wealthy as he made out and that his property may have belonged to the Soviet, who merely lent it to RASCH for the sake of appearances. Prisoner states that he considers FINCKE's opinion rather exaggerated, because he does not think RASCH was intelligent or discreet enough to be of any use in agent activities.

30. Prisoner's Connections with BERNDOTTE

Prisoner states that he first met BERNDOTTE in 1942 in BERLIN, when he (Prisoner) was invited by RICHERTS (Swedish Ambassador to GERMANY) to a private dinner-party at which only the Ambassador, BERNDOTTE and Prisoner were present.

According to Prisoner, after the attempt on HITLER's life on 20 Jul 44, BERNDOTTE repeatedly tried to contact Prisoner, with a view to discussing the problems of the Norwegians and Danes who had been deported to GERMANY, as well as the Jewish question, but RIBBENTROP would not permit Prisoner to meet BERNDOTTE, neither would he (RIBBENTROP) receive him. In spite of Prisoner's arguments with RIBBENTROP concerning the ultimate value of such a contact, RIBBENTROP remained adamant. Prisoner states that it was only after it had become known that HIMMLER had succeeded in contacting BERNDOTTE in Apr 45 that RIBBENTROP changed his ideas. He then violently attacked Prisoner, asking him why he had not contacted BERNDOTTE before. Prisoner states that RIBBENTROP subsequently received BERNDOTTE for a long conversation.

Prisoner states that negotiations which followed and which finally led to the capitulation were entirely in HIMMLER's hands. It was only during the first part of BERNDOTTE's BERLIN visit that he (Prisoner) was able to help, mainly by doing all in his power to overcome inter-departmental friction and by keeping BERNDOTTE informed of the situation and the requirements, both tactical and personal, necessary to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

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APPENDIX B

FOREIGN RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS IN SWEDEN DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA

1. Introduction

Prisoner states that after gaining their independence in 1918 the three BALTIC States, ESTONIA, LATVIA and LITHUANIA, whose territory has so often been the scene of conflict between EAST and WEST, toyed with the idea of holding a key position between WESTERN EUROPE and SOVIET RUSSIA. These dreams were abruptly terminated by the Russian occupation of 1940. The policy adopted by the Russians, though moderate at first, soon convinced the three States that their hopes for the future must lie with the Western Powers.

The German occupation of the BALTIC States in Sep 41 was regarded as a real liberation, and all three States proved themselves anxious to collaborate, even after the German policy of economic exploitation and domination began to reveal itself. The three States had decided to stand with EUROPE against RUSSIA, as was proved by the outstanding bravery of their soldiers in the fight against the Red Army.

After the collapse of the German NE front in 1943 a flood of refugees from the BALTIC States poured into GERMANY and about 30,000 Estonians contrived to cross to SWEDEN. Prisoner and his colleagues did their best to persuade the German military authorities and police to help the refugees, firstly for humanitarian reasons and secondly with the idea of conserving the nucleus of a resistance movement.

2. Estonians in SWEDEN

Prisoner states that the 30,000 Estonians in SWEDEN include a large proportion of the Estonian intelligentsia (diplomats, politicians, scientists, lawyers, journalists, artists, etc), which in itself presents great political potentialities. According to Prisoner, all these Estonians, even some of the lesser categories, are prepared to act as a constant political virus against the oppressors of their country; he has himself often experienced examples of their willingness to help against the Russians. Many Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians were bitter when SWEDEN celebrated the liberation of NORWAY and DENMARK, stating that the truth concerning the three BALTIC States was being withheld from the world and that these small nations were being completely deprived of their human and political rights. These views were not expressed by the Estonian newspapers in STOCKHOLM, however, because they were obliged to respect the policy adopted by the Swedish Press.

3. Personalities in the Estonian anti-Russian Resistance Movement in SWEDEN

- BLOOM Capt. Member of former Estonian IS.
- CHRISTIAN (Col.) Chief of the Russian section of former Estonian IS. *Member anti-USSR Resistance Movement Sweden*
- PERSON President of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce.
- LARETEI Estonian Envoy to SWEDEN.
- PETERSEN (Col.) Most important member of the Estonian Resistance Movement. Cooperated with Prisoner during the transfer of the Estonian Swedes. According to Prisoner is at present cooperating with the Swedish IS.
- RAY Estonian Envoy to SWEDEN.
- SHEEL Well-known Estonian banker.
- SINKA (Col.) Member of former Estonian IS.

Sweden Member the anti Russian Resistance Movement Sweden

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VARNI. Last Estonian Minister in FINLAND. ?
 WELLMER. Press Attaché to VARNI.
 WENDT. Dr. Member of the Commercial Dept in the former
 Estonian Foreign Office.

4. Latvians in SWEDEN

According to Prisoner the Latvian anti-Russian Resistance Movement in SWEDEN is very much smaller than that of the Estonians, the total number of Latvians in SWEDEN not being more than 3000 at the most. Prisoner states, however, that the Latvians are very patriotic and would be prepared to offer energetic resistance to the Russians, whom they hate bitterly.

As in the case of the Estonians, Prisoner met a number of prominent Latvians in SWEDEN, because, as he states, it was his duty to contact any anti-Russian personalities for political reasons. He also met some of them when they came to his Zentralstelle OSTEUROPA in BERLIN, Kurfürstenstr.

5. Personalities in the Latvian anti-Russian Resistance Movement in SWEDEN

- ~~ADERSONS, Janis~~ Expert on agriculture to BANGERSKIS (see below).
- ~~BLODIS~~ Prof.
- ~~BANGERSKIS, (Gen)~~ *ASweden* Coordinated and formed the Latvian National Resistance Movement. Prisoner states that BANGERSKIS is compromised because of his rank of SS Gruf in the Latvian Legion. He adds that BANGERSKIS is LATVIA's Grand Old Man. Propaganda Minister in ULMANIS Government 1938-39. Was in a concentration camp during the German occupation of LATVIA. Prisoner obtained his release and transfer to SWEDEN.
- ~~BERZINS, Alfred~~ *ASweden* Was the last democratic Prime Minister of LATVIA before the ULMANIS coup d'état. *Member anti-USSR Resistance Sweden*
- ~~BLUODNIEKS~~ Was the last democratic Prime Minister of LATVIA before the ULMANIS coup d'état. Wife of a Latvian patriot who was deported in 1940 to RUSSIA.
- ~~CLAPE Ima~~ (Col) Very alert and active propagandist, and according to Prisoner a very popular member of the Resistance Movement. *Sweden*
- ~~FREIMANIS, (Col)~~ *ASweden* Expert on economics to BANGERSKIS.
- ~~MIESIS~~ Dr. Has the best knowledge of Latvian nationalist movements. Was blinded during the war. Cooperated with Prisoner.
- ~~THELEN~~ Adviser to BANGERSKIS on general political questions.
- ~~WITOLDS~~ Last Latvian Minister to SWEDEN.
- ~~ZALNEIS~~

6. Lithuanians in SWEDEN

According to Prisoner, the smallest of the anti-Russian Resistance Movements in SWEDEN is the Lithuanian, there being not more than 500-1000 Lithuanians in SWEDEN.

7. Personalities in the Lithuanian anti-Russian Resistance Movement

Prisoner has met some of the more prominent anti-Soviet Lithuanians, either politically or at his Zentralstelle OSTEUROPA in BERLIN. These are mentioned in the following list:-

- ~~GILLIS~~ Last Lithuanian envoy to SWEDEN.
- ~~SCHWINIUS~~ Former Lithuanian Envoy to SWEDEN, and well-known writer.
- ~~VOKIETAITIS~~ Journalist. Formerly very active in social work in LITHUANIA.

[Handwritten scribbles and markings at the bottom of the page]

The following, Prisoner hopes, are in the British Zone of GERMANY:

These

X BRUZGIES	Bishop of KAUNAS.
X DYSA	Lithuanian Consul General.
X PETRAITIS	Dean of the KAUNAS Seminary for Priests. Escaped from the Bolshevik massacre at MINSK.
X PLECHAVICIUS	Gen. Former Chief of the Lithuanian GS. Very popular for his manly resistance to the unreasonable German demands during the occupation of LITHUANIA.
X RASTIKIS	Gen. member of the Christian Democratic Party in LITHUANIA.
X SKIPTIS	Member of the People's Socialist Party in LITHUANIA, and head of the BERLIN Association of Lithuanians.
X SKIRPA	Former Lithuanian Envoy to SWEDEN, strongest political personality in LITHUANIA.
X SKVIRECKAS	Count; Archbishop of LITHUANIA.
X ZIELINSKAS	One of SKIRPA's collaborators.

8. Need for Organisation and Coordination

Prisoner states that he formed the impression that all these groups of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were inclined to lack unity and that only by organisation and coordination would it be possible to make use of them politically. He had two plans in mind to achieve this object, namely:

a) To persuade the Swedes to create a "BALTIC Institute" similar to the Polish Institute in GDYNIA, which would combine scientific and political activities. Prisoner believed that by creating such an institute, SWEDEN would be able to build up a "clearing centre" for political and scientific activities which would impress on the world that amongst the individual nations living around the shores of the BALTIC Sea, there were Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, in addition to Swedes and Danes, etc. Prisoner believed that the creation of such an Institute would also help the BALTIC scientists materially.

b) To persuade Swedish commercial circles to develop the Industrial Exhibition (held each year in STOCKHOLM and known as St Eriks Fair) into an International Fair for the BALTIC.

Prisoner states that the experience which he had with the Eastern Fair in KÖNIGSBERG, where in three years he had been able to increase the number of countries represented from two to eleven, convinced him that St Erik's Fair could be extended as an economic proposition. At the same time Prisoner visualised the setting-up of a commercial institute as part and parcel of the Fair, similar to that which had been set up in KÖNIGSBERG (called the "Wirtschaftsinstitut für die Oststaaten, issuing its own periodical "OSTEUROPA Markt"). This commercial institute would have built up a network of commercial connections throughout the BALTIC, and would have been useful in coordinating the various groups politically. Prisoner states that he would have employed in this connection Dr WENDT (see para 3) who was one of the most versatile Estonians and a specialist on International Exhibitions.

Prisoner states that a BALTIC Institute would have been good camouflage for a NE Resistance Block against RUSSIA, and that a SE Block could then be formed by setting up a similar Institute in the BALKANS.

CSDIC (WEA)
BAOR
21 Feb 46

APPENDIX C TO FR 47

SECRET

Dr Bruno KLEIST

APPENDIX C

GERMAN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA 1939-45

1. Introduction

Prisoner claims to have written two reports long before STALINGRAD and the German débâcle pointing out the dangers of German official policy in the EAST. Subsequent events have only served to confirm his original conviction that GERMANY's Eastern policy was fundamentally mistaken, owing to a complete misapprehension of the psychological and political factors involved in relations with SOVIET RUSSIA. The following notes illustrate Prisoner's reactions to German policy towards RUSSIA in the period 1939-45.

2. Background to the Problem of Russo-German Relations

In the six years preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 any serious preoccupation with the Soviet problem as distinct from official propaganda was discouraged in GERMANY. Serious study of Russian language and history and attempts to analyse contemporary conditions in the USSR were outlawed and replaced by emotional rant against Bolshevism. The world-wide power of the Comintern was opposed by a futile organisation known as the "Anti-Komintern Verein", led by a mediocre official who knew neither RUSSIA nor its language and sought to oppose the skilful and elaborately scientific Marxist system by means of the primitive slogans of an official propaganda destined for home consumption.

Through this narrow-minded policy all positive knowledge of and realistic judgement on conditions in the USSR were prevented and instead the myth of the impenetrable Russian Sphinx was created which in 1939 became an important factor in foreign affairs.

An indication of future policy was the fact that the Carpatho-Ukrainian State, founded in 1938, was NOT used as the starting point for far-sighted anti-Soviet politics aiming at the national disintegration of the USSR, but was exploited in the purely military sense with the idea of extending the encirclement of POLAND.

The lack of political action may, however, be explained by unwillingness to prejudice preparations for an eventual Russo-German Pact.

3. The Russo-German Pact of 1939

This Pact appeared to have the effect of relieving existing tension between the two powers. Military and commercially interested circles listened readily to RIBBENTROP's arguments in its favour, especially as he gave the impression of being honestly convinced that the Führer had succeeded in establishing Germano-Russian relations on a satisfactory basis. In reality HITLER had not the slightest intention of creating a permanent understanding with RUSSIA.

Gradually the dangers of this apparent achievement became obvious with the sacrifice of the BALTIC States and half of POLAND and BESSARABIA. The westward move of Bolshevism had definitely begun.

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It was argued in some circles that the Soviet had undergone great social change in a bourgeois sense and that the power of Communism had been weakened, but this was mere wishful thinking.

4. HITLER's Reason for attacking RUSSIA

The main reason for HITLER's decision to attack RUSSIA was NOT a desire to defeat Communism, or to provide a food granary for EUROPE, or to remove the threat in the EAST while fighting the Western Powers, but simply to conquer more territory for the German people - "Lebensraum for the next thousand years." He confirmed this during the first days of the Eastern Campaign when he said: "until yesterday I have been a National Socialist, to-day I am an Imperialist."

5. Consequences of HITLER's Attitude

HITLER's preoccupation with space and soil led him to disregard the people who lived on the territories he conquered. By neglecting the interests of the indigenous population he threw away the greatest chance ever offered of rousing the Soviet masses against a system of privation and oppression. Instead of following the line of political penetration with slogans such as "Free Land for the Peasant" and consequently weakening the resistance of the Red Army, he imposed a tyrannical administration which only increased hostility towards GERMANY. The thesis that it would have been possible to "liberate" the various Soviet Republics is supported by the large numbers of Russian deserters during the first months of the campaign, by the readiness of many of them to fight on the German side and by the favourable reception given to the German Army by the Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasian populations. STALIN himself expressed uneasiness in a speech to his people at the beginning of the campaign, imploring them to fight to the bitter end. Eighteen months later, when German methods had been revealed, he was able to refer ironically to the "little fools in BERLIN" ("duratschki w BERLINJE") who were successfully teaching the real meaning of the war to RUSSIA.

6. Reactions to the Attack on RUSSIA

The beginning of the Eastern Campaign came as a great shock to the German people, though certain elements were in favour of the action taken. These were firstly the big business men, headed by GOERING, SCHLOTTERER and RIECKE, whose attitude was determined partly by self-interest; and secondly groups of high Party and SA officials who were able to pour by the thousand into the new jobs created. Within the SS two tendencies soon became visible: on the one hand Gestapo officials were only too eager to carry out HITLER's negative policy of repression, on the other hand a group composed of certain members of the SD realised the mistakeness of HITLER's policy and soon went over to the opposition.

7. ROSENBERG's Policy

RIBBENTROP had been completely unprepared for the campaign and appointed ROSENBERG as Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. ROSENBERG's view was that the peoples comprising the USSR would react favourably to the proclamation of a "national liberation campaign against the tyranny of MOSCOW" and thus enable the German Army to win another Blitzkrieg, after which the Reich could establish its rule in the EAST according to its own requirements. He underestimated the power of the NKVD, however, as he overestimated the vigour of the nationalist movement, which could only have been developed step by step as the result of a far-sighted Eastern policy. Subsequently he realised the centrifugal tendencies of the non-Russian "nations" and advised the creation of a Caucasian Union, a Ukrainian State and a somewhat curtailed Russian State. He insisted on the title of "Reichskommissariat" for the areas "OSTLAND", "UKRAINE", "RUSSIA" and "CAUCASUS".

8. Erich KOCH's Policy

Martin BORMANN and GOERING together were responsible for the appointment of KOCH to the post of Reichskommissar for the UKRAINE, an appointment which not only upset ROSENBERG's work, but had far wider implications in its effect on European opinion. KOCH carried through HITLER's "imperialistic" policy with the utmost brutality, establishing a purely German adm with complete disregard for the local inhabitants and for local conditions. ROSENBERG opposed KOCH stubbornly, but the latter was backed by HITLER; and KOCH's actions were finally approved in a letter sent to ROSENBERG by BORMANN in Aug 42 (see Annexe to this Appendix).

The general trend of German policy was illustrated by KOCH's methods and by his decision to join former Polish territory in Western Ukraine to the General Gouvernement and hand over "TRANSNISTRIA" incl ODESSA to ROUMANIA. Significant too were the brutal methods employed by SAUCKEL in his "Ost Arbeiter Aktion". Weak efforts by ROSENBERG to re-establish the law of private property or to extend the educational system in the UKRAINE were overruled by KOCH. Persons advocating such measures - as for example CRANZ (Chief of the Press Dept), Dr LEIBBRANDT (head of the Political Dept) and Prof Hans KOCH - were immediately dismissed.

9. Lack of Unity in Germany's Eastern Policy

In the CAUCASUS, Consul General BRAUTIGAM, as political adviser, issued special orders for the individual treatment of various nationalities, but was overruled by SCHICKEDANZ, the proposed Commissar for the CAUCASUS. Advice from competent authorities and repeated warnings from the Dept "Fremde Heere Ost" of OKH were disregarded or called "defeatist".

In addition, the "Reichsministerium für die Besetzten Ostgebiete" was unwieldy and topheavy and ROSENBERG lacked the energy to make it efficient. There was too much dissension between individuals and too little coordination between the various depts. The German-occupied Eastern territories were governed by Reichskommissare, Generalkommissare and Gebietskommissare, which was not sufficient to control a purely German adm, but too much if it was intended to set up self-governing States. HIMMLER and GOERING further weakened the adm by taking out personnel for Police and Four-Year Plan appointments.

10. Suggested Reorientation of Policy

After the retreat from the CAUCASUS and from STALINGRAD, the invasion of NORTH AFRICA and the collapse of ITALY, RIBBENTROP, under the incessant pressure of advisers such as ABETZ, BEST, HILGER, ROST and BRAUN von STUMM, suggested to HITLER in his EAST PRUSSIAN "Fairy-Tale Forest" that policy should be completely reorientated by real collaboration with FRANCE, abandonment of the QUISLING regime in NORWAY, continuance of good relations with DENMARK, recognition of the sovereign rights of LATVIA, LITHUANIA and ESTONIA and the formation of a VLASSOV government for the Eastern occupied territories. These suggestions were all rejected by the Führer.

On one occasion, in spring 43, he is reported to have shouted: "I am not interested in your French utopics. If you want to make politics, get me a peace with ENGLAND or RUSSIA." Devotedly asked by RIBBENTROP whether ENGLAND or RUSSIA was preferred, he answered: "ENGLAND, of course, but if that is impossible get me one with RUSSIA" (Source - Ambassador HEWEL, LO between HITLER and RIBBENTROP). As HITLER would never give formal orders for peace contacts to be established and it was consequently not possible to carry out the necessary political preliminaries, RIBBENTROP's few "peace ambassadors" such as

BERBER in SWITZERLAND, and HESSE, PFLEIDERER and Prisoner in SWEDEN, were reduced to playing ridiculous rôles in a drama of terrible earnestness.

11. Possibility of Peace with RUSSIA in 1942/43

The creation of new industrial areas in the URALS (SVERDLOVSK, CHELYABINSK etc), made independent by the colossal grain factories of TURKESTAN, shifted the centre of gravity of the Soviet Union to the EAST to an extent which has not been fully appreciated in EUROPE. As a consequence of this movement towards the EAST, the USSR was bound to take a serious interest in Asiatic affairs, especially in the gigantic populations of CHINA and INDIA, with their immense potentialities in manpower. It is possible, therefore, that up to 1943 the Kremlin would have been satisfied with small but easily gained advantages in EUROPE, with a free hand for the big game in the EAST. A German peace with RUSSIA was theoretically possible in 1942/43 if GERMANY had guaranteed RUSSIA's sovereignty within her former boundaries at a time when the Western Powers could only make vague promises for the future.

12. German Fear of the USSR

The German attitude towards RUSSIA is best expressed by the flight of millions of Germans to the WEST rather than be overrun by the Russians. Fear was the prevailing feeling in GERMANY. The idea of strict adherence to EUROPE as a Western counter-balance to Communism was found even among such bitter opponents of the Nazi system as Graf KANTZ and Graf FINCKENSTEIN of EAST PRUSSIA, Ambassador von SCHULENBURG and Herr von TROTT of the Ausw Amt, Dr BONDE and Dr ZÜCHNER of the German Legation in STOCKHOLM, Lt Col Dr H von RAUMER of the Air Ministry, Admiral CANARIS and his collaborators Col LAHUSEN and Col STOLZE, Prisoner's co-editors of the periodical "OST EUROPA", Dr SCHÜTTE and Dr MARKERT, and among such experts on RUSSIA as Botschaftsrat HILGER, Consul General ROST, Prof von MENDE, Prof Hans KOCH, Prof OBERLÄNDER, Prof RAUPPACH and Prof KNÜPFNER.

13. The National Committee "Freies Deutschland"

The existence of this organisation seems to contradict the thesis of German fear of RUSSIA. One must take psychological factors into consideration, however. The German soldier who was taken prisoner on the Eastern Front expected to be shot out of hand by the dreaded Bolsheviks. If, on the contrary, he was well treated, sent to a comfortable camp with special privileges and incessantly plied with propaganda, he ultimately came to believe in RUSSIA's good intentions towards GERMANY. The "National Committee" did not, however, exert much propagandistic influence on the German Army as such, being used by the Russians chiefly for obtaining int material, in the same way as VLASSOV was used by the Germans.

14. Gen VLASSOV

VLASSOV was badly handled by the Germans. Through the many intrigues around him and his cavalier treatment at the hands of various German authorities, he finally lost interest in the original project of setting up a Russian state with himself at its head. The German authorities were not satisfied as to VLASSOV's reliability. There was no possibility of his going back to Soviet RUSSIA, but it was feared that he might already have offered his services to the Western Powers. Botschafter HILGER and Consul General ROST, both of the Ausw Amt, were concerned with VLASSOV, while the difficult task of 'managing' him was entrusted to Riga-born SS Führer KRÖGER.

15. Failure of German Policy vis-à-vis the BALTIC States

When GERMANY occupied LATVIA, ESTONIA and LITHUANIA in Sep 41, she was welcomed as a liberator and held all the trump cards of future policy in her hands. Instead of winning over the three BALTIC States

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by an enlightened political and social policy, she alienated them by reducing them to Generalbezirke under the Reichskommissariat, by germanising governmental institutions and names of streets, by dissolving the national Army and Police forces and by imposing a lower scale of rations on the native population than that received by their German "guests". Prisoner called for a more enlightened policy towards the three BALTIC States in his thesis: "Totaler Krieg fordert totale Politik", advocating preferential treatment for at least some parts of the occupied area, restitution of property, re-introduction of a European system of economics and reinstatement as self-governing states; but his advice met with implacable hostility from the tough mass of German officialdom and from certain economic interests.

Many Balts were prepared to fight on the side of GERMANY against the Red Army, but were discouraged by HIMMLER's insistence on the formation of SS Legions instead of normal Wehrmacht divisions. In spite of this and the general treatment meted out to the BALTIC States, the Estonian and Latvian Legions fought bravely against the Red Army and there are many men of both these countries now in exile who are prepared to form National Committees against the Russians.

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CSDIC (WEA)

B. OR

27 Feb 46

APPENDIX C TO FR 47

SECRET

Dr Bruno KLEIST

ANNEXE TO APPENDIX C

Contents of a letter dated 7 Aug 42 from BORMANN to ROSENBERG:

Prisoner states that while working in BERLIN during 1942 he chanced to see a letter addressed to Dr Alfred ROSENBERG from Martin BORMANN. The letter was dated 7 Aug 42 and laid down some of the principles which HITLER wished ROSENBERG to observe in his treatment of the population of the German-occupied Eastern Territories. Though Prisoner cannot quote the letter verbatim he states that the following is an accurate reconstruction of its contents:

"I herewith submit to you some of the principles laid down by the Führer concerning treatment of the population in the German-occupied Eastern Territories:

1. The greatest danger threatening us from the EAST is the tremendously high birth-rate of the Slav peoples. It would therefore be a sign of political ignorance if a German lawyer were to condemn a Ukrainian woman for practising abortion.

On the contrary, the Führer is of the opinion that the sale of contraceptives should be boosted as much as possible. For the same reason he orders that all hygienic measures, preventive action against epidemics, inoculation or other sanitary precautions be avoided as far as the civilian population is concerned.

2. For similar reasons everything must be avoided which would further the development of an intellectual upper class. All types of high schools, colleges and universities must be closed and never opened again. The entire educational system must be limited to elementary schooling which will embrace only reading, writing and the most primitive type of arithmetic.

3. Under no circumstances are destroyed towns to be rebuilt; no clearing-up work will be undertaken or any other improvements carried out. For hygienic as well as general political reasons, German troops or civilian administrators are not to be quartered in towns. It is better to house them provisionally in huts outside the town area. The construction of new townships for German settlements will be considered later."

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part 3

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CSDIC (WEA)
BAOR
21 Feb 46

APPENDIX D TO FR 47

SECRET

Dr Bruno KLEIST

APPENDIX D

MISCELLANEOUS

1. S.LINDER *Called.*

According to Prisoner, a special WT operator was sent to STOCKHO at end 44 for the purpose of encoding and transmitting to BERLIN any messages which Prisoner had to send to RIBBENTROP in connection with "peace negotiations". Prisoner states that it may well be that the WT operator's name was S.LINDER, though he never actually met the man.

Any messages which Prisoner received from CLAUS concerning contact with the Russians were passed on to THORNER, who, he states, then passed them on to the special WT operator allotted to THORNER by BERLIN specially for that purpose. Prisoner states that he has no knowledge of any of the codes or call-signs used by this WT operator, and that a call-sign or cover-name "GOLD" is completely unknown to him.

Prisoner states that he was aware at that time that the Ausw Am had its own WT station, but that he knows no details about it.

Called BERGER

Prisoner was asked whether the name BERGER meant anything to him especially in connection with Werner BÖNING (Appendix A, para 11).

He states that he has never heard any mention of the name BERGER in connection with BÖNING and adds that the only meaning the name has for him is in connection with SS Ogruf BERGER, Chief of the SS Hauptamt, who took over the Hauptamt Politik in the Reichsministerium for the German-occupied Eastern Territories at end 43.

Called KRAMER Karl Heinz

Prisoner states that this name is entirely unknown to him.

Called KLEYENSTÜBER

Prisoner states that this name is unknown to him.

Called BENTHEIM, Maj von

Prisoner states that this name is unknown to him.

Called WAGNER, Obst Dr Hans

Prisoner states that he has heard the name before, and that he may possibly have been introduced to WAGNER at some function or other but he knows nothing of his work or of his whereabouts.

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July 24/46
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