

See pp. 6-9

Attachment to EGQA
11559

Dated 5 Mar 53

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Red

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

19 January 1953

CONFIDENTIAL

Review of KIBITZ-15 Net / F H B

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2011

I. GENERAL

In accordance with your request, a review of the operations of the KIBITZ-15 net is herewith forwarded for your consideration. The review was based on a thorough study of available files, answers to written questions which were submitted by the reviewer to both the case officers and the chief agent, special reports prepared by the chief agent for the review, and a thorough interrogation of the chief agent and his deputy by a polygraph examiner. The special written reports and written answers to questions were considered necessary as both the German and English files are inadequate—detailed contact reports do not exist. The reviewer briefed the polygraph examiner in detail and provided him with a set of written questions for the interview with the chief agent. The six-hour interrogation of KIBITZ-15 by the examiner was monitored by the reviewer at the time of the interrogation.

II. EXTENT AND PURPOSE OF PROJECT

- a. The KIBITZ-15 operation encompasses the development and establishment in Western Germany of a stay-behind organization consisting of trained R/T operators, agents, cut-outs, and informants who could be activated in the event of hostilities. The component parts of the organization are to consist of separate teams including a R/T operator and other agents trained to report on conditions in enemy territory. The agents are to be serviced by communications equipment and other incidental supplies which are to be cached.
- b. KIBITZ-15 was originally contacted by [] in August, 1950. []'s contact was a follow-up to a letter written by KIBITZ-15 in May, 1950, to High Commissioner, McElroy. In this letter, KIBITZ-15 stated that he represented the interests of a group of former Reichswehr officers and offered to put his and his friends' services at the dis-

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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posal of the Americans. After several meetings, [] suggested to KIBITZ-15 the establishment of a stay-behind organization. KIBITZ-15 did not like this idea in the beginning, and made it quite clear from the start that he and his friends were not suited for agent-type activities and that there will never be an organized or effective resistance movement in Germany. He requested guarantees that he would always be free to take his place in a West German army or German contingents of the European army and suggested that we use our influence to get him an appropriate position in the German Army as a reward for his services. He finally reluctantly agreed to set up W/T teams as suggested by us with the understanding that he would be in charge of organizing and controlling the net; he agreed to work with us but not for us.

- c. [] was the case officer for this project from August, 1950, until March, 1952, when the project was turned over to [] . In December, 1952, [] was hospitalized and at the present time, [] is the case officer.
- d. KIBITZ-15 contacted approximately five hundred persons in Western Germany to recruit members for his net. Of these five hundred, one hundred twenty-five were asked to participate in the stay-behind organization. These one hundred twenty-five were asked to take part in an organization which is ready to defend Western culture against Bolshevism. They were further told that this organization is led and trained by German officers who work closely with American authorities. The recruits were informed that they would receive training and would be expected to report on certain activities when and if Germany should be overrun by the Soviets.
- e. Twelve two-man teams and one singleton team have now been set up. All teams have one W/T operator trained by KUMARK communications personnel. The training of only two of the W/T operators has been completed. In the other cases, the degree of training varies from assessment for W/T training to three-quarter completion of the W/T training course. In addition, the teams have received so-called tactical training from KIBITZ-15. According to KIBITZ-15, tactical training means training in methodology of report writing and certain instructions about tactical movements of troops. In addition to the twenty-five members who have been assigned to teams, the net has thirty-eight active agents who could be made available for W/T training if and when they receive a security clearance.
- f. With the exception of the chief agent, all other agents carry out their assigned duties on a voluntary part-time basis. The chief agent gets a salary of \$1,000.00 per month plus reimbursement for expenses incurred in running the net. Other agents are only paid while they

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receives 1/2 tuition. The average family contribution for this project amounts to a maximum of \$1,000.00.

III. ACTIVITY OF SUBJECTS

- a. KIBITZ-15 has met ten KUBARK staff officers under assumed names. They are:

- | | | | |
|---------|-----|------------------------|-----|
| (1) [] | [] | (6) [] | [] |
| (2) [] | [] | (7) [] | [] |
| (3) [] | [] | (8) [] | [] |
| (4) [] | [] | (9) [] | [] |
| (5) [] | [] | (10) Gordon M. Stewart | |

It is believed, however, that KIBITZ-15 does know [] by his right name. KIBITZ-15 met [] family when he visited them for a dinner at []'s RECOG apartment. KIBITZ-15 met Gordon Stewart and [] only once.

- b. The case officers presented themselves as U.S. government officials under direct control of Washington and connected with military planning for NATO and the European army. The last interrogation indicated, however, that KIBITZ-15 knows that he is working for KUBARK.
- c. KIBITZ-15 knows a total of nine safe houses of which six are no longer in use. All these safe houses are U.S. requisitioned properties. Two of the original safe houses are also known to other KIBITZ agents who are not connected with the KIBITZ-15 net. The house at Unterschöndorf, Bavaria, which we used until September, 1952, was originally used by CIC and later by [] as a billet. [] is now a member of Pullach.
- d. The interrogation revealed that most members of the net are in possession of weapons. These weapons were not issued by us. KIBITZ-15 states that he possesses five or six pistols and one sub-machine gun. When asked to comment on this aspect in writing, he refused to do so stating that he could not possibly ask the members of the net details about the weapons which they might have. KIBITZ-15 was issued four TR-1 radio sets. These are camouflaged in gasoline cans and three of them have been issued to members of the net.
- e. The submission by KIBITZ-15 of names and samples of writing to a graphological institute and to three private German investigation bureaus for investigation and assessment of his personnel is considered

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a definite security risk. He has submitted handwriting samples of at least nine members of the net to the Graphological Institute in Heidelberg, Hailerstrasse 1. Names and birthdates of at least five members of the net were submitted to the two investigating bureaus, Mergel and Lohmeling, respectively.

- f. During the interrogation, KIBITZ-15 stated that he carries the names of all members of his net with him in his typewriter. The security implication of this action needs little amplification.
- g. KIBITZ-15 has drawn up lengthy plans containing detailed instructions on stay-behind activities. These plans are to be given to the individual teams upon activation after the start of hostilities. These plans were shown to a few of the members of the net but according to KIBITZ-15 all copies are either in his own possession or in the safe which is used by both KIBITZ-15 and our staff officers in the Heidelberg office. These plans were mimeographed a year and a half ago and it is impossible to establish at this time exactly how many copies were produced. KIBITZ-15 did admit during the interrogation that he had some in his house which, of course, is a serious security risk.
- h. It appears highly likely that two of the so-called "63" active agents who have been recruited but not trained are also part of the TIGER field organization. (Pull 4734)
- i. KIBITZ-15 is a salesman for a tractor company and part owner in a farm machinery firm and a general sales store. Although it is not believed that any of these positions are very remunerative, they appear to be adequate as personal cover when taken together with the fact that he is quite active in veterans affairs. According to him, there have been no difficulties in connection with his cover and he believes that it is accepted by most veterans with whom he is associated and by the German government. KIBITZ-15 states that he has never informed anybody in the German government about the existence of the organization. He further believes that they do not know anything about its existence. The German government and particularly members of the Blank office with whom he has excellent personal connections, know that he is in constant contact with former officers, who were connected with him during the war, but they supposedly do not know anything about the true purpose of this connection. This question was asked repeatedly during the interview and the carriage test, and the examiner believes that KIBITZ-15 told the truth.
- j. KIBITZ-150, who is KIBITZ-15's deputy, is the manager of a novelty manufacturing company. This cover seems, however, to have serious security aspects. According to KIBITZ-15, the company is constantly operating on the verge of illegality because it produces obscene

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figurines. KIBITZ-15 agrees that this cover will have to be changed.

- k. During the interrogation and in answer to a written question, KIBITZ-15 has admitted that he discussed his aim of "protecting Europe" with a member of German industry in the Spring of 1951. KIBITZ-15 refuses to give the name of the person with whom he discussed the plans. KIBITZ-15 states that the discussion was in general terms and was for the purpose of soliciting support and finding out what responsible Germans thought of his ideas. According to KIBITZ-15, nobody was told that he receives American support. The contact with German industry was supposedly dropped shortly after the initial meeting with the information that KIBITZ-15 felt that his plans were too cumbersome and could not be realized.
- l. KIBITZ-15 appears to have very little understanding of the necessity of a securely compartmentalized organization. He has unnecessarily close personal ties with some members of the organization and there is a strong possibility that he tried to solicit our financial support for some members of the net for strictly personal reasons.
- m. In 1951, the case officer and the chief agent decided to set up a notional cover organization. This notional organization was supposed to be a news service which was called "Cosmopress". Stationery giving the name Cosmopress was printed. The location of this agency was the Heidelberg safe house at Rohrbacherstrasse 56. In addition, Cosmopress had a post office box in Stuttgart. No activities were carried out to strengthen this cover and to give the appearance that Cosmopress was in fact a news service. KIBITZ-15 states that his cover organization never had any contact with the bonafide news service that carries the same name and operates in West Germany. Communications with four agents; namely, 177, 162, 191 and 171 were carried out on Cosmopress stationery. Correspondence with the investigating bureaus was also carried out on behalf of Cosmopress. A Volkswagen purchased by us was legally registered by KIBITZ-150 as a Cosmopress vehicle. The vehicle was used by KIBITZ-171, a German A/T instructor who has now been dropped. Since June, 1952, the car has been used by KIBITZ-150. [] had a number of press passes printed for Cosmopress. As far as can be ascertained at this time, only one pass is still in circulation. The cover of the Cosmopress service was discontinued with the derequisitioning of the safe house in October, 1952. Since this cover arrangement was completely inadequate, it must be considered a definite security risk, particularly since a Cosmopress agency does in fact exist.
- n. KIBITZ-171 was a A/T instructor for the net from October, 1951, until June, 1952. In the performance of his assigned duties, he came into contact with sixteen members of the net and thereby got an excellent

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insight into its operation. This worried KIBITZ-15 particularly since KILIFF-171 did not appear to be very reliable and was in constant need of funds. The German files indicate that KIBITZ-171 has threatened KIBITZ-15 and us with court action. In his correspondence with KIBITZ-171, KIBITZ-15 makes it appear that he would have continued the employment of KILIFF-171 but that his sponsors (the U. S. government) are against such action. In the course of the interrogation, KIBITZ-15 stated repeatedly that KIBITZ-171 has to be taken out of Germany. KIBITZ-171 represents a serious security risk to this operation and it is not at all certain that this risk will be considerably minimized by relocating him. He has now been turned over to BAKVA D for processing. At the moment, he does not wish to emigrate and prefers to stay in Germany particularly since we pay him \$1,475.00 a month without requesting a quid pro quo.

- o. In addition to KIBITZ-171, at least ten (130, 135, 185, 190, 197, 198, 162, 165, 168, 178) other former members of the net have severed their connection with the organization or were dropped for various reasons. Three of the ten were dropped because of their close connection with KIBITZ-171. Five of the persons dropped have had some W/T training. Every person that has received W/T training has met at least one or two KUBARK staff officers and knows the location of a safe house.

IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBJECT

a. KIBITZ-15

(1) KIBITZ-15 is a very ambitious, conceited German officer, who still believes in many of the doctrines expounded by national socialist philosophers and propagandists. He appears to be extremely intelligent and energetic. It is believed that his agreement to work with us was based mainly on the following three considerations:

- A. His dislike of civilian pursuits,
- B. The possibility that he might get the position of a Colonel or Brigadier General in the German army or European army through our influence as a reward for his work,
- C. That the fight of the white races against the colored races can only be won with American aid. (KIBITZ-15 believes that the struggle against Communism is mainly a fight between the white and the colored races.)

KIBITZ-15 is an extreme German nationalist and certainly not pro-American. He is willing to accept financial support from us

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at this time as it helps to promote ideas and plans in which he personally believes. Although he is definitely anti-Communist, he presents somewhat of a security risk because of this pronounced nationalism.

(2) Since the beginning of 1952, KIBITZ-15 has been worried considerable about his own personal status. From the available agenda of meetings between case officers and the chief agent, it would appear that this subject was taken up at almost every meeting since April, 1952. Unfortunately, it was impossible to reconstruct just exactly what was discussed because of the absence of detailed contact reports. KIBITZ-15 was thoroughly questioned on this point in the course of the interview. KIBITZ-15 requests definite answers to the following three points:

- A. Establishment of a platform which will define the legal position of his organization vis a vis Bonn, NATO and the European army,
- B. Arrangements between U.S. authorities and the Bonn government to legalize the services of KIBITZ-15,
- C. Formulation of a definite mission for the organization during peace time and in the event of war.

KIBITZ-15 explained in great detail that as a former German soldier he is absolutely unwilling to undertake any activities which might be contrary to German law. (However, he does not worry about the weapons which he possesses.) He does not feel that his present activities are illegal and arrives at this conclusion with the peculiar reasoning that the German government is not permitted activities of the type in which he is engaged and, therefore, they also can not prohibit them. In the same vein, he explains that he is in general opposed to Partisan activities and that neither he nor his group are willing to work as American agents. He has expressed the idea in writing that as presently constituted, his group might well get the protection of the Hague Convention in the event of hostilities. He has agreed to the concept that at present the existence of his net must be kept secret, however, he feels that at a later date German general officers might be informed about its existence and particularly its leadership.

As far as making arrangements for his services is concerned, he cited the example that Mussolini was able to request specific German officers during the last war for special assignments. KIBITZ-15 suggested that similarly, General Tedell Smith could request KIBITZ-15 from the German government. He added that of course his status of a Colonel in the German army would have to

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be continued during his assignment.

- (3) In a short yearly report, KIBITZ-15 points out that during the last year, his work has stagnated completely and that nothing has been accomplished since [] took over from [] in March, 1952. The main reason for this stagnation is our inability to clear up the status question which was explained above. In addition, KIBITZ-15 feels that the question of responsibility has not been settled and that our bureaucratic methods and the physical distance make close cooperation with the Americans impossible. A successful solution to the responsibility question would mean to KIBITZ-15 that he is put in complete charge of the organization. He feels that he should only be requested to report from time to time to a superior on his progress. With the solution of this problem, the difficulty supposedly arising out of our bureaucratic behavior would vanish as it would no longer be necessary for KIBITZ-15 to comply with detailed instructions and particularly no further MO's would have to be submitted. The animosity to [] and [] seems to stem mainly from the fact that they requested him to adhere to a very few basic administrative requirements. The main one being the clearing of personnel prior to training them as W/T operators. KIBITZ-15 considers this unnecessary as he feels that he knows Germans well enough to decide who is a Communist agent and who is not. On the other hand, KIBITZ-15 has seriously jeopardized the security of the operation by submitting names of members of the net to German investigating agencies.

- (4) KIBITZ-15 has from the beginning refused to become an American agent and as far as he is concerned, he does not hold such a position at this time. For this reason, he has also refused to sign a contract which would put our relationship on a regular basis. Instead, KIBITZ-15 has drawn up a contract of his own which does not only specify his duties but also our responsibility towards him. The interesting features of this contract are:
- A. That as soon as a German army is reestablished, KIBITZ-15 would be paid a salary which is equivalent to that paid to a Colonel in the German army,
 - B. The requirement that KIBITZ-15 would never be asked to undertake any activities which would be in violation of German law or would conflict with his responsibilities as a German citizen,
 - C. The requirement that we find a suitable assignment for him in the future German army and if this should not be possible because such an Army has not been established or is not secure,

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we would agree to find KIBITZ-15 an appropriate private or government job after the expiration of the contract.

- (5) KIBITZ-15 has had some experience in the German army but none of it appears to have been in the clandestine field. He had no experience in setting up a W/T net when we contacted him two years ago. In spite of this, he has hardly ever accepted the guidance of the case officer. There has certainly never been any control whatever over KIBITZ-15 and his activities on our behalf. Listening to KIBITZ-15's characterization of the various case officers who have been connected with this project, it appears that he divides them roughly into two categories; namely, those that tried to control or influence him, and those that let him run the show on his own terms. He only seems to like those case officers that permit him complete freedom of action. The review of his operations clearly indicates, however, that KIBITZ-15 is definitely in need of guidance as he is quite naive and ignorant about some aspects of setting up a clandestine stay-behind organization. He stated, for instance, that one of the main reasons why his organization could never be uncovered is the fact that it does not have a name. Certain passages in his written plans on W/T stay-behind activities which were to be issued to individual teams show similar naivete and verbosity. On the other hand, basic written information on his present organization is almost completely lacking. He also seems to have given little, if any, thought to the two important problems of compartmentalization and stayability. He seems to have close personal ties to many members of his net and it is hard to fight the feeling that one of the agents (182) was hired only because she is his girl friend. He has also not considered it below himself to request DM 3,000 for her so that she could be set up in an apartment and be given secretarial training in Wiesbaden.

b. The KIBITZ-15 net:

- (1) As pointed out above, approximately one hundred twenty-five agents have been recruited for this net. A month ago, KIBITZ-15 was ordered to decrease the number of agents. The case officer and the chief agent have now agreed to keep sixty-three active agents. Nineteen of these sixty-three agents have received full security clearance from Washington. Clearance requests have only been submitted for three additional agents.
- (2) KIBITZ-15 has not really given his consent to a cut in the number of agents. He still feels that he should be permitted to set up teams all over Western Germany and still comes up with the number of one hundred fifty teams. His whole concept of operations differs considerably from ours. He does not believe very strongly in the security measures which we consider essential but rather feels that the loss of teams which will occur during war time can best be overcome by starting out with the largest possible number in the beginning; he will be most happy to start with more than

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one hundred fifty. This concept is undoubtedly to a large measure the result of his personal ambitions. During the interrogation, he indicated that he alone would like to be responsible for setting up W/T nets in West Germany. He stated most unequivocally that he will not agree to continue his assignment if we do not increase the present scope of the operation beyond the existing thirteen teams.

- (3) Twenty-five of these active agents have now been assigned to teams. Our records and those submitted by KIBITZ-15 in answer to a written question do not exactly agree on the composition of these teams. However, since his information is more up-to-date and since he appears to be running this operation, his statements form the basis of this short analysis. On three of the twenty-five persons who are supposedly assigned to teams, we do not have any information at all. Ten of the persons have not received security clearances.

The W/T operators of eleven teams were soldiers, most of whom fought on the Eastern front against Russia. One W/T operator is a housewife and one a disabled soldier. The average age of the operators is thirty-seven. Little or no consideration seems to have been given to the occupation of the person who was accepted for W/T training. Obviously the stayability of a thirty-seven year old person during times of war is not very good unless he holds an essential job. Moreover, we have trained young men who were only twenty-seven or twenty-eight (KIBITZ-198, 192) years old. To make matters worse, these two and KIBITZ-199 work for Würzburg Military Post. This seems hardly the right occupation for a W/T stay-behind man. These three operators form the nuclei for three teams although they also know each other. Similarly, it is extremely hard to understand why KIBITZ-177 was ever selected for W/T training. KIBITZ-177 is a thirty-seven year old waiter, a refugee from East Germany. While in East Germany, he was a member of STLINEN. He took part in the Spanish Civil War as a member of the German army contingent. A person with this background would appear to have little stayability. In spite of this, KIBITZ-15 has asked us to loan KIBITZ-177 \$7,000.00 so that he can buy a small hotel.

- (4) The background of the team members is enumerated on Chart I. Chart II shows who knows who in the teams. The information on Chart II is based on written statements by KIBITZ-15 and [] KIBITZ-15 has been most reluctant to supply the reviewer with exact information and it must be presumed that even more members know each other than is indicated on the chart. As pointed out above, very little thought has been given by the chief agent to compartmentation or stayability aspects of setting up a stay-

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Behind organization. Only in the last few months has the agent received guidance on these problems. There is no indication in the files that the chief agent ever received adequate instruction or guidance on the setting up of a stay-behind organization. The reviewer does not feel that the teams as now constituted represent a valuable asset for stay-behind activities; they do not have stayability nor is the organization properly compartmentalized.

V. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this operation be discontinued as soon as possible. The operation has not been securely conducted nor have we had any control or large measure of influence over the chief agent.

It is obviously the function of an Intelligence Agency to set up w/t stay-behind nets, but this has to be done in a professional manner. It might be possible to develop the services of KIBITZ-150 for future operations in the stay-behind field. He seems to be more amenable than his chief to American guidance and would probably be willing to work for us as an agent. He could be entrusted to establish six new secure two-man teams. We can, however, only approach KIBITZ-150 after we have arranged an acceptable job for KIBITZ-15. KIBITZ-15's talent as an organizer could be put to good use by letting him set up a net in the East Zone. An approach to KIBITZ-15 should, however, only be made if we have a suitable senior case officer who will be able to direct KIBITZ-15's activities.

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CHART I

KIBITZ TEAMS

TEAM	NAME	AGE	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION-SALARY	CLEARANCE	MILITARY-POLITICAL	R/T TRAINING
Team 1	KIBITZ-156	37	Albisheim, Pfrima/ Pf, Alleestr. 1	Bricklayer; DM 280.00	Yes	Sergeant, Luft- waffe	100% complete
	KIBITZ-256	25	Same as 156	Housewife, (of 156)	No		None
Team 2	KIBITZ-180	39	Bachnang, Untere au 24	Tanner; DM 250.00	Yes	Sergeant, Luft- waffe, eastern front	100% complete
	KIBITZ-181		Bachnang, Postgasse	No further info available			
Team 3	KIBITZ-191	31	Kaiserslautern Donnerbergstr. 29	Insurance sales- man, DM 500-600.00	Yes	Disabled in Russia	75% complete
	KIBITZ-291		Same as 191	Housewife, (of 191)		No further info available	
Team 4	KIBITZ-199	37	Würzburg, Jaeger- str. 5	Würzburg Military Post, civ personnel office; DM 495.00	Yes	1st Lt in anti-aircraft training	50% complete
	KIBITZ-200	43	Same as 199	Housewife, (of 199)	Yes	Was plane ob- server	50% complete

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TEAM	NAME	AGE	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION-SALARY	CLEARANCE	MILITARY-POLITICAL	S/T TRAINING
Team 5	KIBITZ-137	34	Gauersheim, Pfalz Mainzerstr. 109	Farmer	Yes	Infantry officer	None
	KIBITZ-237	29	Same as 137	Housewife, (of 137)	Yes	None	None
Team 6	KIBITZ-127	36	Stuttgart, Park- str. 14	Interior furn- ishings carpen- ter; DM 340.00	Yes	Gas officer on Eastern front	50% complete
	KIBITZ-227	36	Same as 127	Housewife, (of 127)	No	No further info available	
Team 7	KIBITZ-177	37	Mühlacker, Sttm. Stuttgarterstr. 17	Waiter; DM 400.00	Yes	Gas sergeant on Eastern front, was member of REIPEK in East Zons.	50% complete
	KIBITZ-277		Same as 177	Housewife, (of 177)		No further info available	
Team 8	KIBITZ-182	37	Dielkirchen/Pfalz Hauptstr. 52	Housewife	Yes	En.	75% complete
	KIBITZ-134		Gernsheim/Rhein (Rheinstraßpolizei)	Rheinstraßpolizei		No further info available	

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TEAM	NAME	AGE	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION-SALARY	CLEARANCE	MILITARY-POLITICAL	% TRAINING
Team 9	ALBITE-221	40	Köln-Salk, Dieselstr. 63	City insurance office; DM 350.00	Yes	Longtime fuse 106 Lt in anti- aircraft	10% complete
	ALBITE-121		No identifying data available-probably wife of 221				
Team 10	ALBITE-161	30	Gutersheim, Pfalz Barnheimerweg 31	Electrical fore- man; DM 200.00	Yes	Luftwaffe ins- pector	10% complete
	ALBITE-261	28	Gutersheim, Pfalz, Kreis Kirchheimbil- anden, Rhineland Palatinate	Housewife, (of 161)	No	No further info available	
Team 11	ALBITE-173	34	Stuttgart/S Bockheimstr. 41	Merchandise; DM 450.00	Yes	Sergeant on Eastern front	50% complete
	ALBITE-273		same as 173	Housewife, (of 173)	No	No further info available	
Team 12	ALBITE-192	27	Würzburg Steinbachtal 10	Würzburg Military Post & student; DM 300.00	Yes	Captain, Luft- waffe	complete


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
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TEAM	NAME	AGE	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION- SALARY	CLEARANCE	MILITARY- POLITICAL	W/T TRAINING
Team 13	KIBITZ-198	28	Würzburg, Fallenbergweg 21a	Würzburg Military Post & student civ personnel officer; DM 395.00	Yes	Lt.	25% complete
	KIBITZ-120		Würzburg, Egloffsteinstr. 7/1	No further info available			

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