

13 October 1952

TO : Peter Sichel  
FROM : [ ]  
SUBJECT: Review of KIBITZ  
REF : EGFA-32

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1. This review has been made to help determine the present and potential value of both the U.S.-run KIBITZ effort and the K-15 complex.

2. Our analysis, findings and recommendations are based on considerable study of the files and on our personal knowledge of the U.S. field personnel involved since the inception of the activity. Staybehind theory, dogma, headquarters philosophy and policy are reflected only to the extent to which they are known to us. Since our recommendations are in favor of a thorough reassessment of these organizations and the salvaging, at almost any cost, of all that can be salvaged, and against any further expansion in the course of reorganization, the issue of what priority staybehind activities may rate in themselves was regarded as irrelevant.

A. REVIEW OF U.S.-RUN KIBITZ BY CASES

3. KIBITZ-1: We have heard nothing about him since MOKA-24379 of 13 December 1950. This man was described as an able and willing candidate for KPD membership (ex-POW in Russia) but appears to have been put on ice because of low code aptitude. On the basis of the scanty information on hand, the suggestion is made to recontact, reassess, and, if feasible, place him into the KPD. This is not only a sound proposition per se, but in a year or so, we should be able to determine whether he can be tied into an existing staybehind team, or merits a team being built around him, or could be used in support of a team or of a DYGLAVIER-run resistance activity. Alternatively, his case should be closed out for the record. If he is re-activated, Carriage should precede any further investment. In any case, the report on him should examine whom he knows and who knows him within KIBITZ.

4. KIBITZ-2: Our last entry is MOKA-24379. He stood tied in to K-4, and it was planned to link him with K-16 as WT operator and/or courier. He was separated from K-5 and K-6. The [ ] incident should be finally reviewed. Detailed examination has to be made as to whom he knows and who knows him within the KIBITZ complex and proper action determined (e.g., does he have to be evacuated for the sake of the security of K-4, K-5 or K-6?). We assume that there is no further interest in this man per se, but even this should be in the record.

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5. KIBITZ-3: The reporting is up to date and reflects some uncertainty as to his inclination and aptitude. We suggest that a determination be reached as soon as possible. If he can be utilized, he should be given a Carriage test, measured for KPD or front organization cover, and firmed up with regard to motivation and control. If he is to be dropped, we should decide how to secure his discretion. Perhaps he should be recontacted periodically with an eye to reactivation. In either case, we should determine whom he knows and who knows him within the KIBITZ complex.

6. KIBITZ-4: Recommended by K-2. Last reported on in MGKA-24379 of 13 December 1950, at which time it was decided not to give him WT training but to use him as collector and/or courier for K-2 or K-16. What has happened since then? If he is to be used, he should be given a Carriage test. In any case, what has our last contact with him revealed? What is his present status? What, if any, contact is to be maintained with him in the future? Again, we must have the answers to whom he knows and who knows him KIBITZ-wise and an estimate of the effects thereof. Does his knowledge of K-2 mean that he knows or is known to K-5 or K-6?

7. KIBITZ-5: The last report here is MGKA-24379. He was recommended by K-2 and was considered as lone WT operator. He is physically handicapped and known as an employee of the U.S. What is his present status? Could he be reactivated? If so, would he be willing and fit to seek KPD or front organization protection? If willing and able to serve us, he should be debriefed, given a Carriage test and put into harness. If not, we should close out his record. Either way, we should clear up the Who Knows Whom aspects.

8. KIBITZ-6: Recommended by K-2. Has his mother "on the team." (Her part requires clarification.) K-2 definitely knows that K-6 is in this activity, and the question of K-2's threat to his security must be resolved, since K-6 has completed training and has two radios and a signal plan. We should also determine the facts (and their significance) of who knows whom as between K-6, K-4, K-5 and perhaps others. K-6 and mother should be given Carriage tests. The problem of false documentation also has to be worked out.

9. KIBITZ-7: Our records indicate that he is identical with [ ] and does not belong to KIBITZ complex. Who knows whom as between him and other KIBITZERS? What are his present status and our intentions with regard to him?

10. KIBITZ-8: Last reported on in MGKA-24379. Recommended by [ ]. Apparently has found two other candidates (who?) for the program. Believed dropped, but data should be provided to close out his record, including a statement on who knows whom.

11. KIBITZ-9 and 9-a: Last reported on in MGKA-24379. K-9 was recommended by [ ]. Has brought in K-9-a (who is still considered, per MGFA-32, for activation). K-9 was described as a trained comco man. Data to close out K-9's record should include reasons for dropping, Who Knows Whom facts, and tie-in with K-9-a and others. If K-9-a is not dropped, despite his "cold feet," he should be given a Carriage test. The fact that K-9-a has been a POW in Russia may be put to use in guiding him toward KPD "protection."

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12. [ ] A study should be made of all Who Knows Whom facts as between [ ] and KIBITZ personnel, U.S.-run and K-15 alike, and recommendations made for the necessary counter-measures, including evacuation. He seems to be playing, or at least to have played, quite a key role in KIBITZ.)

13. KIBITZ-10 and 10a: Our only complete team. A great deal of work has been put into this team, and no effort should be spared to bring it to and keep it at par. (K-10 keeps his signal plan in a locked strong box, believed to be a weak spot in an operation which otherwise demonstrates good workmanship.) The toughest job facing us is to work up wearable false identities for this team, which may yet prove too good to be regarded as expendable in Phase A.

Since K-10 was recommended by [ ], we should look into the Who Knows Whom aspects and determine the necessary safety measures. Are K-10 or K-10a known to others?

Carriage tests should be administered.

14. KIBITZ-11 and 11a: Last report (ECFA-32) states that K-11 was being slowly developed. He was meant to team up with K-11a, but this was upset by his move to the British Zone. Suggest that this team, if that is what it still is, be put on ice for the present, especially since K-11a appears to be a bad SS type. Also, 11a should not be asked to do any more recruiting.

15. KIBITZ-12: A staff member's hunting friend. Field reported that he could not be used as a staybehind because his son was still a PW of the Russians, but that we were examining the possibilities of utilizing his hunting preserves for safe housing, drop zones, and so forth. Is this still being considered? If so, the matter should be turned over to DYOLAVIER, who might arrange for K-12's evacuation to secure the wartime use of the land. If not, the record should be closed out.

16. KIBITZ-13: A reading of the last progress report, dated 10 April 1951, indicates that he was under consideration as a staybehind recruiter, possibly as instructor of WT operators, as guinea pig (to test out false identity procedures for other staybehinds) and/or as general factotum in the KIBITZ program. We have had no real reports of his exploitation since April 1951 except for the indication in ECFA-32 that he is being used as a "spotter and recruiter with a target of only one or two WT agents." It is felt that K-13 is unsuitable for any such purpose on several counts. In any case, would he not have to be evacuated if he does provide even one or two operators? We should certainly make no further use of him without submitting him to a Carriage test. Who Knows Whom data should also be established and assessed.

17. KIBITZ-14: Owner of a Stuttgart radio shop, on whom we have spent exorbitant time and whom we had intended to use as spotter and recruiter. He knows that GADGER is a key man in the KIBITZ complex. We have information on the progress of K-14 since clearance for his use was issued, in the Fall of 1951. What is his present status? If he is to be used, he should get Carriage. In any case, Who Knows Whom data should be recorded and assessed.

18. KIBITZ-16: This former SS Lieutenant-Colonel from Esslingen was willing to form a team (with his "doltish" brother-in-law as the WT man). Operational clearance was granted in January 1952. HOPA-32 indicates that progress has been slow. We need information on planned use, possibility of Carriage, and who knows whom.

19. KIBITZ-17: A German Commo ex-Lieutenant, recommended by [ ] Willing to do anything. It was intended to use him as spotter and/or general factotum in the KIBITZ complex (our only record being MKA-23924 of 3 November 1950). Is he still aboard? If so, is it possible to use him as a WT operator instead? If not, close out and provide Who Knows Whom data.

20. U.S.-held KIBITZ Prospects: The planned use of (or decision to drop) K-18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24—all of whom K-10 had intended to recruit—and of K-25 and K-26—whom K-6 had intended to bring in—should be reported up to date. Who Knows Whom data, as between each of them and anyone in the "live" parts of KIBITZ should be determined and recorded.

### B. THE KIBITZ-15 "SHOW"

21. KIBITZ-15: Much ink has been spilled on the personality, qualifications, qualities, intentions, and uses of this ex-SS colonel—including the question whether he is an ex-colonel or ex-major. After two years, most of the basic questions remain unanswered, while new ones seem to arise with every fresh contact.

#### In his favor appear to be:

- a. His unquenchable energy;
- b. His organizing ability;
- c. His initiative and originality of appreciation of the staybehind field (to the extent of his portrayal, perhaps with some justification, as theoretician and writer of dogma on the subject);
- d. His influence on his numerous ex-Wehrmacht friends, on whom he has been drawing most heavily in his recruitment efforts.

#### Against K-15, partly uncited, but always adequately evidenced, appear to be:

- a. His SS record and (especially) his admittedly unregenerated Nazism, anti-non-Aryanism, Anglophobia, Francophobia;
- b. Apparent megalomania and seriously questionable motivation (including his exaggeration of past rank and wartime achievements, lack of veracity in other matters, e.g., K-197 incident, and consuming concern with his own career.)
- c. Rejection of (or at least obstinate resistance to) U. S. guidance and control.

22. The conditions prevailing in our staybehind effort in Germany at (and since) the time of our "recruitment" of K-15 were such as to cause our discerning and stressing the favorable characteristics of the man, rather than his negative qualities. The relative inexperience and immaturity of the case-officer personnel responsible for KIBITZ up to the Spring of 1952, the difficulties besetting U.S. personnel trying to recruit staybehind personnel, our eagerness to show results in this thankless field, and the lack of headquarters guidance up to a year ago, all militated against any sort of professional assessment of this great gift horse and against our getting even a good look at the other horses in the K-15 staybehind stable. The only real evidence cited against K-15 was not the result of any research effort, but rather the accidental appearance on the Washington scene of [redacted], a member of the organization, who happened to know K-15 years ago. (See MOKM-7976 of 20 February 1951). While the worst of the charges contained in [redacted]'s report stand factually or circumstantially proved (evaluation of K-15 as a last-ditch Nazi, as a hoodlum, and even as an anti-American) and the reasoning in his favor (MOKA-31713 of 17 September 1951) stands up rather poorly, we have allowed and encouraged K-15 to grow like Topsy, compound his errors, and firm up his unhealthy relationship with us.

(N.B: In this connection, we are sorely in need of the report on [redacted]'s meeting with and evaluation of K-15. This should be drawn up on the basis of [redacted]'s and [redacted]'s recollections.)

23. KIBITZ-15 "Network": This "network" involves some 150 individuals, of whom perhaps one third are "organized". K-15 himself, if left to himself, would admittedly continue to recruit until he literally had the equivalent of a regiment, to go with the rank he claims and/or covets. The chief case officer would have him curbed and his "network" trimmed down to size, say thirty at most, organized into a dozen tight and mutually insulated teams. Headquarters inclines to even more drastic curtailment, if not outright liquidation.

24. We do not have a fraction of the information required to evaluate the K-15 chain and determine who is worth what, who knows whom, or who might be of use in the event of a Soviet occupation and for how long. We believe that this information cannot be extracted from or through K-15, and that such information could not be relied on anyway, under the relationship now prevailing between K-15 and ourselves. (The case of K-171, better documented than those of most other K-15 net members, is a good illustration: The man was recruited as WT operator and dropped, but we know virtually nothing about him, his staybehind work, or the reasons for and security and other circumstances of his release.)

25. [redacted] has been mentioned in connection with the K-15 complex as well as with U.S.-run KIBITZ. The facts on this relationship should be secured and assessed. It is believed that the same applies to [redacted].

26. Since [redacted] has taken over from [redacted], field and headquarters thinking on and assessments of the K-15 complex have been converging more and more closely. [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and others at headquarters and [redacted] in Frankfurt are all opposed to our continuing to deal with several scores of K-15 wildcats in an opaque K-15 bag. All want to unravel the "network", closely assess every man involved, select those, if any, who are able, willing and suited to be

in staybehind work, organize them into small, securely controlled and viable teams, to be managed by K-15 and K-150 (if these individuals are, in turn, assessed and found qualified) or by other American or American-approved leaders. The problem is merely how to best go about this.

27. There is no alternative to a painstaking investigation to accomplish the rehabilitation of the K-15 complex or the salvaging of any of its assets. First must come the task of bringing K-15 around to a sufficiently cooperative attitude (i.e., to soften him up, even at the price of certain promises and attractive baits) to the point where he would submit to a full debriefing and help us debrief and assess the members of his "network". Next must come the actual debriefing and preliminary assessment of K-15, K-150 (his deputy), and such K-15 "network" members as may merit the effort. If there is enough to be salvaged, the third step must be the detailed assessment and processing of each individual (including the development of full personality information, vetting, Carriage, determination of security, stayability, and so forth.) Only then could we proceed with the organization of these individuals into tight, workmanlike teams, the teaming to be largely determined on the basis of who knows whom (See Paragraph 9b of ECFA-32.)

28. Once this is accomplished, we shall also know whether and to what extent K-15 is indispensable, whether he should or could be harnessed to the job of reorganization, or whether it is advisable and feasible to eliminate him from the picture altogether.

29. K-15 might be found suitable to maintain the leadership of the reorganized network as an autonomous unit; or unsuitable, but willing to work under our control; or perhaps willing and able to sell the "show" to us at a price.

30. Should K-15 be willing to lead the network on our terms, he would have to be roped in tightly. The most detailed debriefing on his past activities, motivations, loyalties, and connections would have to be made and followed up with Carriage tests. (According to [ ], he was "anxious" to undergo such a test and to have his recruits submit to it.) His honest or dishonest ideological and practical objections to American control would have to be eradicated at all costs (which may not be as hard as pictured, since his original letter to McCloy offered the group's services to the Americans!) The compensations would have to be attractive enough to secure and hold such allegiance and obedience as may be achieved by long re-education. All promises held out at the initiation of the investigation (see Para. 27 above) that can be met should be met (military rank—under German Government-in-exile and/or in U.S. Army in wartime, or possibly in the NATO establishment; full pay of that rank to start immediately, albeit with the excess over say DM 1000 per month being held in escrow; leadership of the network from our wartime WF base of operations or communications; USA visit for orientation, re-education and morale purposes; firm evacuation arrangements for K-15, K-150 and families.)

31. We shall either succeed in roping K-15 in, or we shall have to liquidate the "network" as now constituted, and salvage what few of his assets we can.

32. Should the K-15 organization be trimmed to size and brought up to professional quality, we shall have to make careful preparations to meet the

contingencies of its running afoul of the West German security authorities.

33. Whether the K-15 organization is actually or potentially victim of RIS or KFD penetration cannot now be answered, but we must proceed on the assumption that it is until the investigation is completed and until it is compartmented professionally enough to assure against across-the-board penetration. Indeed, for the present we may not even assume that K-15 himself is either actually or potentially not an RIS agent.

G. IS AN INVESTIGATION JUSTIFIED?

34. As may be judged from Section A of this review, the investigation of U.S.-run KIBITZ will be comparatively simple and take a senior officer (with understanding of staybehind activities and a knowledge of Germany and Germans) four to six weeks to accomplish, including the individual reassessment of every man involved, examination of present and planned team line-ups, past and planned security arrangement, past and planned training arrangements, classification into short, medium and long-range stayables and allocation of suitable tasks, equipment and types of signal plan, and such other steps as may have to be taken before this complex can be turned back to Scatchard for management.

35. As evidenced in Section B above, it will take a senior officer with all the qualifications noted in Para. 34 above plus negotiating talent, not only to accomplish the investigation of the K-15 network, but probably also to take charge of the re-organized network. It may take the investigator two to four weeks merely to determine whether the K-15 complex can be rehabilitated or not. If he finds that it can be rehabilitated or partially salvaged, it might take him from six to twelve weeks to assess the men selected for the organization, organize them into teams, and block out the general pattern of action.

36. Assuming that our investigator begins with U.S.-run KIBITZ and proceeds with K-15 afterwards, he will require at least six to eighteen weeks, depending on his findings. Ideally, the investigation should be tackled by an officer available for the subsequent permanent management of KIBITZ (i.e., assuming that the K-15 organization is rehabilitated, rendering the total KIBITZ effort too large and complex for [ ] ). Since it is believed that no officer with the requisite qualifications is presently available for a permanent assignment and that the most qualified person available is [ ] , we recommend that the investigation be assigned to him and the question of permanent management be left in abeyance.

37. Whether the game is worth the candle is a question which must be answered in the affirmative, the alternative being to liquidate outright. There is plainly no sense in sinking thousands of junior case officer hours, to say nothing of dollars, into the activity, as we have done year after year, without periodically subjecting it to professional scrutiny. It is possible, though not probable, that a thorough investigation—followed up, as it would be in the case of [ ] , by astute negotiation—might pay off in a small but workmanlike U.S.-run staybehind activity plus a considerably larger but still professionally run, autonomous, but closely supervised, German activity.

38. In the last analysis, the investigation will be worth as much as the investigator. Unless we send the right man to do the job, we recommend against any investigation and in favor of handing the K-15 "network" over to DYCLAVIER or ZIPPER, to liquidate it sight unseen. We do not believe ourselves capable of running the K-15 "network" for deception. Incidentally, the value of the proposed exercise to   and to Training should be very great indeed. DYCLIMB

39. If the investigator is to accomplish his task in the minimum time, all possible preparations should be made in the field ahead of his arrival.   should be informed at the earliest moment and advised on the preparatory measures to be taken (e.g., extraction from K-15 of all possible data—actual " dossiers" perhaps—on every member and phase of the group "in preparation for the visit of the senior official negotiator from Washington;" completion of the maximum number of FRQ's on members of the "network" and their vetting and tracing; assessment of each man's present and potential stayability and the possibilities of improving this through KFD and similar protection; assessment of peacetime and wartime mobility of each man; data on present or planned deployment; across-the-board Who Knows Whom data; administration of Carriage tests in indicated cases and arrangements for such tests to be administered to the others; and such of the above measures as may be applicable with regard to U.S.-run KIBITZ members).

40. Finally, should the investigation determine the future viability of K-15 (in any form) as a key agent of ours, the investigator would probably be the best person to act as his conducting officer to the U.S.A.

#### D. MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS ON STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY

41. While it is beyond the scope of this case review to discuss policy, patterns, or priorities of staybehind work generally or of its various types and phases, some of the observations made in the course of our preparing this review may be worth passing on to the interested FI, Commo and Training officers, both here and in the field.

DYCLEMATIS DYCLUTEH and DYCLIMB

42. Trade Unions: We note that the original intention to exploit German trade union interest in staybehind work generally and the plan to use   specifically have died on the vine. The idea is much too good to be left for dead.

43. Too little attention is being given either here or in the field to the use of women staybehinds, especially as radio operators. Much the same applies to intrinsically favoured types of individuals (e.g., game wardens, foresters, railroad telegraphers, and service personnel).

DYCLUTEH

44. It is suggested that Commo study and advise on the use of hop field wires and poles in the hiding and/or simplifying and facilitating the erection of an antenna.

45. The issue of above-ground versus underground ET caches has been dealt with too sporadically. We are ignorant of what may have been done in connection with the mounting evidence that underground burials are largely a waste (both because of deterioration and because wartime recovery would be practicable in the rarest instances only.) EE should get the facts and policy on this and pass them to the

field (KIBITZ, BOB and ZIPPER).

46. Insufficient thought, study or guidance appear to have been given in the matter of cipher security within teams, on the relative virtues of staybehind singletons, versus cells, versus units generally, and on the best management of each.

47. I should be advised to seek the guidance of ZIPPER (perhaps by studying the Frankfurt Storch files) with regard to the distribution of teams near targets. It has already been noted by others that our KIBITZ effort is concentrated in one or two regions and without regard to their importance.

48. Evacuation of individuals who might compromise staybehind activities in the event of war (and some even in peacetime) has been given inadequate attention. Indeed, most neglected in our field reporting are the critical Who Knows Whom aspects of each case. Perhaps staybehind project forms could be drawn so as to force fuller reporting of this.

49. The use of radio amateurs should be studied further. They may have their uses as expendable, hit-and-run types immediately after the outbreak of war. They should not be mixed with non-hams, but rather used as one-man (see-hear-and send) "teams".

50. Attention should also be given to the use of operator-training safelounges and/or the employment of the same German personnel of such houses for too long.

51. Finally, we can expect nothing but trouble if we use uncleared Germans as spotters and recruiters and junior case officers who know neither Germans, nor Germany, nor even German, to go on recruiting trips. The improvement of our KIBITZ effort must begin with the beginning, i.e., with our patterns of spotting and recruitment.