

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>Secret</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. <b>FCIA 14095</b>
TO INFO	Chief of Station, [ ] ✓ Chief, FE Chief of Station, [ ]		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. <b>201-</b>
FROM	Chief of Station, [ ]	DATE <b>28 March 1961</b>	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
SUBJECT	Meeting with KAYA Kinori (6320/1490/5381/1397)	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>1. [ ] called me on 18 March saying that KAYA Kinori wanted to see me that morning, but as that was not possible, we made a date for Sunday morning. All I could discover about KAYA's visit was that he was in Hong Kong from Taipei, having visited there as head of a Diet delegation. I saw him in his hotel room, and [ ] was there, along with NEM Kijiro of the Consulate, who acted as interpreter. KAYA asked us to have lunch with him, which we did, and we were joined by FUJITA (fnm), who was travelling as his secretary and who was introduced as head of the political section of the <u>Sankai Shinbun</u>. They were here for only two days, and as there was no past personal connection or reference, I was a little puzzled as to why I was considered worth seeing by KAYA. Thereafter they visited the New Territories and left Sunday evening for Tokyo. I am sending KAYA a note by [ ] to express my pleasure at seeing him and asking him to let me know if he comes to Hong Kong again, so that I can have him to my home, etc. If it will be of any use to you to have me follow up in any other way, let me know.</p> <p>2. Explaining that he had met ASCHAN on a visit to the States a few years ago, and that he was close to Ambassador MacArthur, he asked for a briefing on China's subversive activities, as seen in Hong Kong, especially as they concern Japan. I gave him what had to be a highly general briefing on this point, which I am not sure satisfied him, and we discussed China's political and economic objectives in a general way, too. He asked for a briefing on the agricultural situation and this was fairly general; he had been pretty well briefed by the Nationalists.</p> <p>3. He had seen CHIANG Kai-shek in Taipei and had visited Chinmen. He asked for my analysis of why the British are pushing the Americans so hard on the China issue now, and he felt that we should make it clear to the British (stemming partly from what I said but also from what CHIANG said, I reckon) that the United States will not abandon the Nationalists. He pointed out the strength of Chinmen but also its importance to the morale of the Nationalists. My theme was that the U.S. will not abandon the Nationalists, and that when Washington and the new administration search for more effective ways of opposing the Communist Chinese, not all of which means will be agreeable to the Nationalists, the Nationalists will take an understandably quick, sensitive, and worried reaction to them.</p> <p>4. KAYA is worried by a tendency in Japan for the Japanese to be swayed by Communist (both Soviet and Chinese) arguments that Japan had better reach an understanding now, rather than later. This tendency is encouraged by doubt about the U.S. stand on China (Japan wants to switch before we do if we are going to switch.) It is also encouraged by the success of the Communists at picturing us as warmongers and by Japanese doubts that we intend to or can win the long-term economic contest with the Communist bloc. Hence, we should make our stand on China clearer and should also improve our position and our image on the other two subjects.</p> <p>5. Concerning Japan, he speaks of how he keeps in touch with YOSHIDA, still the most important Japanese politician. KAYA himself, he says, was instrumental in advising KISHI to run the Security Treaty through; one motive was to save Japan money. If the motive is selfish, it allows for expenditures in the field of social welfare. Now KAYA is asking YOSHIDA to put the social welfare bill through; this is the "other half" of the Security Treaty and KAYA finds it amusing that he of the right wing is undercutting the left wing in this way.</p>			
FORM 10-57 53 (40)		USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>Secret</b>
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(E) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(C) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>		Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005	28 Mar. 61 <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO. <b>1</b>

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6. He was friendly enough and he didn't refer in any way to his protracted stay in Sugamo.

C      J

27 March 1961

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