

SECRET

6 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Visit of Mr. KAYA Okinori, 6 February 1959

1. Mr. KAYA Okinori called on the Director at his office at 1130 hours, 6 February 1959. He was accompanied by Mr. OMORI Seichi, Third Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Mr. OMORI interpreted during the meeting. Present from FE Division were Messrs. [] and []. The meeting lasted until 1145 hours. Mr. OMORI took notes throughout the meeting.

2. After an exchange of amenities Mr. KAYA stated that he would spend the next week in New York, followed by two weeks in England, France, Belgium and Denmark. He would return to Tokyo via the North Pole, arriving on 5 March. Mr. KAYA also presented a letter of introduction to the Director from former Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru (copy attached).

3. Citing the internal troubles of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), Mr. KAYA stated that he had held extensive discussions with Mr. YOSHIDA last December and it was on Mr. YOSHIDA's recommendation that Mr. KAYA sought this meeting with the Director. Mr. FURUYA Toru and Mr. [] were most helpful in arranging the meeting. Mr. KAYA stated that the LDP's Internal Security Committee (CHIAN TAISAKU TOKUBETSU HINKAI), of which he is a member, is responsible for studying means of preventing Communist infiltration and subversion of Japan. Mr. KAYA has concluded that Japan is exceptionally vulnerable to Communist efforts: (a) because it is a major Communist target in Asia, and (b) because of the imbalance between sparse resources and a growing population. The main job is to determine how to resist both the direct and indirect attacks of Communism.

4. Mr. KAYA had two requests of the Director:

a. Mr. CHIBA Saburo, Chairman of the Internal Security Committee, had recently visited Hong Kong, where he had met with the local CIA representative (Mr. KAYA could not remember his name) and had requested an exchange of intelligence between the Internal Security Committee and CIA so that the Committee would be equipped with information enabling it to educate the Japanese people on the dangers of

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SECRET

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SECRET

Communism. Mr. KAYA hopes such an exchange will take place. (The Director replied that we maintain liaison through appropriate channels and are in close touch with the Cabinet Research Chamber.)

b. Japan's defensive strength is very weak in relation to Communist China and the Soviet Union. Mr. KAYA believes that the U. S. maintains a strong military capability in order to protect Japan as well as the rest of the free world against Communist aggression. Some Japanese, however, do not understand the U. S. 's intention in defending Japan, and the Communists take advantage of this lack of understanding. They have had partial success in appealing for separation of Japan from the U. S. through the abrogation of the Security Treaty. Mr. KAYA desires to combat this situation but in order to be assured that his own opinions conform with those of the U. S. Government, he has prepared a questionnaire which he hopes leading American officials will be able to answer. The Director suggested that this was a matter properly presented to the Department of State. Mr. KAYA replied that he had presented this to Mr. Howard Parsons, with whom he had had a two hour discussion, and that Mr. Parsons was in agreement with many of the points. Mr. KAYA had also met with Admiral Hayward, of the Navy Policy Planning Board, for two hours and the Admiral had expressed full agreement with the points in the questionnaire. Mr. KAYA went on to say that the main purpose of his visit to the U. S. was to get authoritative American opinions on the questions in this questionnaire in order to use these opinions to educate the Japanese people. He made it clear that he wished to be able to quote names. He went on to explain in some detail the reasons why many Japanese desired the abrogation of the Security Treaty.

5. The Director responded to the above by stating he would speak to the State Department regarding the questionnaire and by stating that CIA can be helpful to the Japanese in preventing Communist infiltration and penetration. Mr. KAYA stated that Communist tactics in Japan were to operate through front organizations whose ostensible aims conceal the true purpose behind Communist direction of the fronts. Mr. KAYA felt that CIA could help him and his colleagues in better understanding how to prevent secret penetration by Communist agents and how to detect Communist activity hidden within front organizations. Mr. [] asked which front or fronts Mr. KAYA considered the most threatening. Without responding directly to this question Mr. KAYA referred to the teacher rating legislation, saying that those who alleged that Government control of teacher ratings was an evil have advocated illegal and violent defiance of the Government. He added that, while the Japanese Socialist Party seems to be separate and distinct from the Communist Party, the JSP in fact follows a Communist line. Mr. KAYA underlined the problem

SECRET

of coping with the Communist system of mass communications through public media, a system which makes Japan appear to the outsider as much farther to the left than it actually is. Mr. [] stated our awareness of this problem and of the impetus toward leftism provided by the Japanese intellectuals. He compared the situation to that in the U. S. in the early 1930s and opined that Japan must go through the same phases as the U. S. in order to arrive at a balanced objective view of Communism. Mr. [] cited labor as a principal battleground in the fight against Communism in the U. S. The Director stated that one of the most effective ways to combat front activity was to bring to the surface evidence of Communist control, to pinpoint the channels, methods and personnel involved and to highlight the ultimate Communist purposes behind the fronts.

6. Everyone agreed that cooperation between CIA and the Japanese regarding countersubversion was most desirable and that the subject was one of major interest to CIA. It was suggested that a further talk be held between Mr. KAYA and Mr. [] upon the former's return to Japan. It was stated that Mr. [] would be made aware of this.

7. Mr. KAYA stated that while a detailed plan would be drawn up, he desired at this time to outline the five principal points of his program:

a. National Defense. Withdrawal of U. S. Forces from Japan would seriously weaken Japanese security; therefore, Mr. KAYA favored the maintenance of a Security Treaty and the continued presence of U. S. Forces in Japan. The Director stated that he knew of no plans to withdraw U. S. Forces.

b. Internal Security. Legislation is urgently needed to prevent espionage, to protect State secrets, to maintain public security and to give the police sufficient power to cope with attempts to overthrow the Government.

c. Progressive Conservatism. Many Japanese, particularly the younger generation, do not understand the progressive nature of true conservatism and feel that the terms "progressive" and "Communist" or "socialist" go hand in hand. (The Director suggested that, in contrasting Progressive Conservatism with Communism, greater publicity be given to the Chinese communes, stressing the slave labor aspects of this system.)

d. Youth. The Liberal-Democratic Party should make a great effort to increase the confidence of the younger generation in the Party.

SECRET

c. The Welfare State. The Conservative Party must publicize its contribution toward raising the standards of living in Japan. Next year increased pensions will go into effect. There must be more measures toward social security and the "Welfare State." Mr. KAYA feels that the Japanese economy can catch up with Western levels, and that the current per capita income in Japan (1/10 of that in the U. S. and 1/5 of that of England) must be raised. This is an integral part of the anti-Communist struggle.

8. The Director commended Mr. KAYA for his deep understanding and awareness of the Communist threat and for his determination to take active and constructive steps to combat it. It was again stressed that matters of detail regarding any cooperation by CIA in this endeavor would best be discussed in the field and that Mr. [] would be informed accordingly.

[]
Chief, FE/PAO

Attachments:

- a. Letter of Introduction described in para 2 above
- b. Questionnaire

DDP/FE/JAO: [] :eb (10 February 1959)

Copies to: DCI
DDCI
DDP
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence

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