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**KAYA Okinori**

**Mr.**

**developmental contact**

**Japan**

**PP**

**None**

**PO - SONNET/1**

**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

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## Topics for Discussion with Mr. Okinori KAYA

### 1. Internal Security

#### a. Police Bill

What were causes of fiasco in Diet last fall? Is such a bill really needed? If so, what is Government strategy?

#### b. Nature of Subversive Threat

Where does KAYA feel main threat lies? We feel Japan Communist Party is relatively ineffectual, and that domestic leftist influence is mainly through Communist-infiltrated or dominated organizations such as Japan Council for the Prohibition of A & H Bombs (GENSUIKYO) and the Afro-Asia Solidarity Council (AJIA RENTASEI NIPPON IINKAI). Difficult of counteraction because such organizations exploit and pervert true popular feelings. Another possible source of subversion is large group of prisoners-of-war interned in Siberia and China after the war and indoctrinated prior to repatriation to Japan.

### 2. Relations with Bloc

Bloc continues "tough" line in relations with Japan. Bloc policy seems to consist of several steps: (1) Drive wedge between Japan and other democratic nations, (2) establish neutralist policy in Japan, (3) gain maximum possible control of Japanese foreign trade and manipulate it to (4) turn Japan into a satellite. Japan's resistance to Bloc pressures (Soviet claims to northern territories; ChiCom trade cessation) appear to have caused Bloc to modify its aims and slow down timetable.

### 3. Defense

Japan's defense establishment is growing very slowly and is far from a complete self-defense capability. Is this because Japan's economic position does not permit greater expenditures, or out of fear of adverse public reaction to a growing defense capability?

### 4. Party Politics

a. Although we do not take sides in Japanese politics, we worry about the cut-throat internal strife within the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. Such strife weakens Japan's prestige abroad and probably weakens conservative position domestically. We noted the constructive role Mr. KAYA played between ex-Prime Minister YOSHIDA and Prime Minister KISHI late last December in attempting to restore party unity. Does Mr. KAYA consider himself a mainstream faction member (supporter of KISHI) or anti-mainstream? (If Mr. KAYA keeps a foot in both streams), what other party and Government leaders share Mr. KAYA's views?

b. Prospects for Cabinet reorganization? For future general election?

c. Why do leading Japanese businessmen support the Socialist Party or Socialist candidates as well as conservatives? In that conservatives generally represent interests of businessmen, why should not the conservatives receive all of business' support?

d. We understand that Japanese business circles were influential in bringing about the recent settlement within the Liberal-Democratic Party. We are not clear just how this business influence is brought to bear. Do

**certain businessmen act as spokesmen for the business community? Is the  
business community represented by several groups or associations?**