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14 November 1946
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FROM : SS Anson
SUBJECT: Transmittal of SIR No 2 on Richard KEMMEL & ERATT & KEMMEL

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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT NO 2 OF
RICHARD MAUNDER 9 KLATT 3 KARBARY

1. This report concerns the relationship between MAUNDER and his principal agent, Ira IOGGIN - Ilya LARG, and contains an account of the latter's activities as a member of the German Intelligence Service.
2. MAUNDER's acquaintanceship with IOGGIN dates from December 1939, when MAUNDER was arrested by the Hungarian police for traveling without the necessary papers. (Interrogator's note: It is doubtful that this was the real reason for his arrest; more likely he had been engaged in illegal financial dealings.) He found that his cell-mate was a Dr. IOGGIN, who had been arrested for having spread non-Catholic propaganda after the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarians. IOGGIN stated that he had been a 1st Lieutenant in the Czarist Army, had fought against the Red Army during the Russian Revolution, had been imprisoned by the GPU, and had finally moved to Czechoslovakia, where he studied law.
3. After a few weeks MAUNDER was released, and his next meeting with IOGGIN was an accidental one in Budapest in June 1940. IOGGIN stated at that time that he had just been released from prison and had been forbidden to resume his law practice; he was living with a Russian friend named NISCHNIN. MAUNDER revealed that he was then in the employ of Ast WITZ under Graf KAROWA-REDWITZ and promised to do what he could to obtain similar employment for his ex-cellmate. In July 1940, MAUNDER was sent by WAFI-RECHERT, Chief of I Luft in Ast WITZ, with Obst/Lt SEIDL to Budapest to discuss the matter with IOGGIN. The latter declared that he had recognized the Germans as the one European barrier against Polishism and was willing to engage in espionage against the Reds but would first have to obtain the permission of his chief in Rome. Shortly after this initial meeting, a conference took place in Wien between Graf KAROWA-REDWITZ, Obst/Lt SEIDL, IOGGIN, and MAUNDER. Although IOGGIN refused to reveal the name of his chief, he was granted a pass to Rome and returned in two weeks with his chief's permission. However, two conditions had been attached by the mysterious chief (later discovered to be SEIDL): IOGGIN was not to reveal the sources of any information gathered by him, and he was to work under MAUNDER only. (Interrogator's note: It is far more probable that MAUNDER himself arranged this latter condition with IOGGIN in order to secure his own position in the Abwehr.) KAROWA-REDWITZ was at first extremely enthusiastic about IOGGIN, but his enthusiasm declined as the latter's demands, especially for money, increased.

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1. At this time, through investigations conducted by Ast "TIE", "TAUDER" learned the truth about IOGGIN's background: His Christian name is IOGGIN, his family name IRA; TURKUI called him IOGGIN "PEDRO" ITSON. His father had been a Czech whose opposition to the Austrian monarchy had prompted him to emigrate to Russia. IOGGIN was born in 1899 or 1900, and on the basis of age could not have been a 1st Lieutenant in 1917. It was established that he had been pulled out of a cavalry school to fight in the "RAVON" Army in 1917. He had never been granted a law degree, but had acted as a solicitor.

2. "TAUDER" was commissioned by Ast "TIE" to obtain permission from the Hungarian Abwehr for IOGGIN to remain in Budapest under the alias of ILYA IANG. In granting the papers, Obst/It "FANTOM" of the Hungarian gendarmerie stated that he could not understand why the German Abwehr was using IOGGIN, since the latter was not free of suspicion of being closer to the Reds than his statements led people to believe.

3. For a few weeks IOGGIN remained in Budapest and submitted some reports concerning Russian weapons and technical matters. In October 1940 he went to Sofia, at his own request, to establish new contacts; he was accompanied by "TAUDER" and Dr. "DUNSON", one of "TAUDER's" right-hand men. Upon "TAUDER's" return to Wien, he was informed by "WILHELM" that Dr. "DUNSON" had sent a note stating that IOGGIN and "LEUTSON" had been seen leaving the Soviet Embassy in Sofia. "LEUTSON" asserted that IOGGIN was in active contact with the Embassy. Inasmuch as the Russian Orthodox Church in Sofia is near the Soviet Embassy, the entire matter was regarded as a result of confusion and was dropped.

4. The trip to Sofia brought no immediate results, and for the time IOGGIN's reports continued to reach Ast "TIE" from Budapest, whether they had been brought by border-crossers. "MARCO" expressed the suspicion that these reports were deriving from the same source as other reports from agents acting under his personal supervision. Yet, this remained nothing more than a suspicion. One report submitted by IOGGIN is worthy of note: It stated that the Russian Air Force had 55,000 planes, of which 40,000 could be used in combat. "PERI" rejected the report and labeled it as nonsense, but in September 1941 Ast "TIE" was requested to re-submit the same report, since further information had confirmed the figures approximately.

5. In December 1940, IOGGIN began to increase his demands for remuneration to such an extent that "TAUDER" was forced, according to his own story, to use his own financial resources to retain the services of his principal agent. (Interrogator's note: "TAUDER" is not considered to be the type of person who would thus use his money without receiving some greater return.)

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9. On 15 June 1941, shortly before the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, MAUDER was called from Sofia by IONGIN, then in Budapest, who stated that he had been arrested by the Hungarian Atwehr and that all his intelligence paraphernalia and personal documents had been seized. MAUDER contacted MAROGNA-BUDITEZ in Wien, and Maj. FRANKENBERGER was sent to Budapest to investigate the matter. Allegedly the Hungarians had been in error in arresting IONGIN, and his materials and reports were returned to him. Investigation revealed the following facts, which were related to MAUDER by MAJ. FRANKENBERGER: About two weeks before the incident, IONGIN had received a letter from the Anti-Comintern Union in Switzerland informing him that he would soon be visited by a representative of this Union for the purpose of discussing some intelligence matters. In the letter was one half of a postage stamp; the other half was to be used by the visitor to identify himself. The unidentified visitor approached IONGIN in a coffee shop in Budapest at the time specified in the letter. The buying and selling of information was discussed, but MAUDER is uninformed as to the details of whatever agreements resulted from the conversation. A second meeting was arranged by the two to take place within a few days. As IONGIN and his new partner were about to leave the shop after this second meeting, they were approached by three men who carried papers identifying them as Hungarian police officials. One placed the Anti-Comintern representative under arrest; the other two accompanied IONGIN to his home, where all his papers were confiscated. It was the opinion of MAJ. FRANKENBERGER that the three alleged Hungarian officials were not Hungarians but were members of the Abwehr Abteilung III F in Budapest under the leadership of TORDA. IONGIN explained that it had been his intention to obtain political intelligence from the Anti-Comintern representative, whereas he was instructed to confine himself in the future to intelligence of interest to the military. Some time later, MAUDER learned that the representative from Switzerland was Dr. HILF GOTTZ, who was still later to become MAUDER's main agent in Turkey.

10. During all this time, IONGIN was careful not to mention the name of his chief in Rome, although MAROGNA-BUDITEZ frequently ventured to identify him as General TURTI, an identification denied by IONGIN. He admitted, however, that he had known his chief since 1920, when White Russians had gathered by the thousands in Gallipoli. In 1944, ROMANOV, who in that year left TURTI's organization because of differences of opinion, stated to MAUDER that IONGIN had met TURTI for the first time in the summer of 1940, when he had been granted permission to visit Rome to consult with his chief. ROMANOV explained that during that visit IONGIN had subordinated himself to TURTI in order to gain the contacts necessary for successful intelligence activities.

11. From the summer of 1940 until the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR, IONGIN submitted approximately twenty rather long reports, which he asserted had been brought to him

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from the Carpatho-Ukraine by border-crossers. It is noteworthy that during the entire period he was fearful of persecution by the Hungarian gendarmerie, although the reasons therefore were not entirely clear to FAUDER.

12. In 1942 IONCHIN, then in Sofia, increased his demands for financial returns and thereby caused KAROLIA-REBETZ to consider ousting him from the Abwehr. IONCHIN explained that the additional money was needed for the upkeep of the families of his agents; a letter signed by KAROLIA supported his demands. To settle the matter and to retain IONCHIN's services, FAUDER paid further sums out of his own pocket to the amount of 2,000 Reichmarks but later received indications that the money had been used by IONCHIN to support his sister and her husband, a certain GURJ TERNIO.

13. IONCHIN had led FAUDER to believe that the reports brought by border-crossers were originating with Red Army personnel who were actually members of the "BETUL" White Russian organization and had been enlisted in the Soviet Army. In February 1941, KAROLIA-REBETZ requested that personnel be found who, trained in W/T operation, could establish direct W/T contact with IONCHIN's agents in the USSR. FAUDER proposed to use traveling entertainers for this purpose and, additionally, to find a way for them to visit IONCHIN's agents. According to IONCHIN, the center for that part of the organization which was functioning in Russia was Kiev. FAUDER selected a certain Ivan STEIN-SCHNEIDER, Jr., who had worked in Vera, the W/T station for Ast W/T, as codist and W/T operator, to train as an acrobat with Marie SCHNEIDER, another codist in Ast W/T. STEIN was brought to Budapest, and at the same time an agent for entertainers made the arrangements with the Soviet commercial attaché in that city for the pair to tour several cities in Russia. However, STEIN's training as an acrobat lasted until June 1941, and with the outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia the project fell through. STEIN was to have brought W/T equipment to Kiev and to have sent reports directly from there to Sofia. IONCHIN had given strict instructions that his agents were not to be told that they were working for the Germans. In accordance with the plan to commence W/T communication between Kiev and Sofia, FAUDER visited the latter city and made the acquaintance of PAUL FALION, Chief of the State Police in Sofia. (Interpreter's note: FALION was known to be in Milan at the end of the war; it is uncertain whether he is still there or has changed his place of residence.) Arrangements were made to use the Bulgarian Police W/T station in Sofia, and an operator named STEINBAUER came to Sofia with W/T equipment early in June 1941. All these arrangements were made personally by FAUDER and Kent has accounted that, if one is to believe him, he had little contact with IONCHIN between February and June 1941 and is not well informed as to the latter's activity during that period, except that the usual number of reports were submitted each week.

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14. While in Sofia, KAUDER had become acquainted with a certain "SARATOV", an officer in the Bulgarian Border Police and through him had received reports concerning the Russian Black Sea fleet. When it became impossible to send STYR and Marie KUMEROVICH to the USSR they were used to transmit SARATOV's reports to Wien. This connection lasted until the summer of 1942. SARATOV was later used by KAUDER in other projects concerning Soviet affairs in the Black Sea region. (Interrogator's note: STYR and KUMEROVICH were forced to end their activity in Sofia because of the hostility of Dr. ZIMMER to any persons associated with the WITTECHOWSKI MATT.)

15. IONCIN moved to Sofia in June 1941, allegedly more out of fear of the Hungarian Police than for any other reason.

16. During his stay in Sofia, KAUDER had established contact with a member of the Macedonian Movement with a view to gathering intelligence from southern Russia. On June 1941, this contact proved its worth, and the first reports arrived concerning airports in the vicinity of Tiflis and troop movements in the Crimean area. The person from whom this information came was a Soviet T/Operator in the Tiflis airport. (The name of the person is unknown.) The network was originally established by the Macedonian (name unknown) by border-crossers residing in Turkey. After IONCIN arrived in Sofia, KAUDER showed him these reports and asked about the state of affairs with regard to his (IONCIN's) network. A few days later IONCIN brought KAUDER three or four reports which in style were remarkably similar to the reports KAUDER had obtained from Tiflis. KAUDER proceeded to enquire into the sources of IONCIN's information but was told that, as had previously been agreed, the sources of information would not be made known to the Abwehr or even to KAUDER himself.

17. In the first four weeks of IONCIN's stay in Sofia, he produced approximately 40 short reports, all of which were worked over by him and KAUDER before being submitted to Aust Wien. During the next few months, the number of reports submitted monthly rose to an average of 100, and still later approximately six reports a day were delivered concerning the Red Army and Air Force.

18. In the beginning of August 1941 Fritz Dr. ZIMMER came to Sofia to act as chief of the Luft Heidekopf, although IONCIN refused to be introduced to him and refused to serve under anybody but KAUDER. (Interrogator's note: It is more than a little likely that IONCIN's refusal was a result of conversations between himself and KAUDER; KAUDER was ever fearful that an Abwehr officer would assume control of IONCIN, and such action would have resulted in the Abwehr's dispensing with KAUDER's services.)

19. In October 1941, Dr. ZIMMER, Chief of MO Bulgaria, suggested that KAUDER work under his direction, but subject rejected the proposal on the grounds that he had initially been employed by

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Ast Wien and would be guilty of infidelity if he should join KO Bulgarie. From that time on, WAGNER's attacks on MAUDER increased in intensity and culminated in the accusation, made in the fall of 1944, that MAUDER was actually a Soviet agent. Nevertheless, the accusations were disregarded by the Abwehr, and the MAUDER-IONGIV team was allowed to continue until February 1945.

20. In November or December 1941, IONGIV revealed to WAGNER that WAGNER's III F Division, principally through Sonderführer Kleinbühl, had completed a dossier concerning the activities and espionage connections of both IONGIV and MAUDER. IONGIV explained that he knew of this dossier from some White Russians who were working for WAGNER. MAUDER asserts that he promptly forwarded IONGIV's word of honor that he was not actually submitting deception material to the Abwehr and gathering intelligence for some other intelligence service from his acquaintances in KO Bulgarie. IONGIV replied that his anti-Bolshevist attitude was well known and that he was to be either completely trusted or promptly dismissed by the Abwehr. MAUDER related the incident to WILHELM KIRCH, whose attitude was that as long as the reports were worthwhile he would lend no credence to the suspicion that IONGIV was a double agent.

21. In October 1941, IONGIV journeyed to Bulgaria to find some White Russians who might add to the effectiveness of his network. He returned with Georg ROZICHOV, who requested a passport to Turkey, there to establish some White Russian contacts. Within a few days MAUDER received a severe reprimand from Ast Wien for attempting to use agents who were in the employ of Ast Blerado; ROZICHOV was named. Confronted with this, ROZICHOV admitted that he was an agent for Lt. KATI of Ast Blerado and that he had been hoping for a long time to visit Turkey. IONGIV, too, admitted that these facts were known to him but explained that his purposes would have been better accomplished if MAUDER did not become acquainted with the facts.

22. Early in 1942, IONGIV visited his chief in Rome again; by this time Ast Wien was convinced that the chief was TRITTI. He returned with the problem that his chief had an American travelers' check for \$1500, which had become valueless with the entry of the United States into the war. Since Obst FIECHER-BROCK of the Abwehr in Berlin had forbidden his subordinates to have anything to do with TRITTI (a Special Interrogation Report No. 1 on MAUDER concerning this), WAPPELMEISTER arranged for Ast Rome to honor the check unofficially; the amount paid was 17,000 lire. Earlier, MAUDER had told IONGIV of the suspicion entertained by III F, Ast Wien, that he was buying his reports from the Japanese. IONGIV had denied that the TRITTI organization had ever been in contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service, whereupon MAUDER inquired about the source of the check. IONGIV's answer was evasive but indicated that some property which belonged to the TRITTI organization had been sold to the Japanese.

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23. Shortly after the check incident, IOFGIN revealed that his reports had been coming from seven individuals residing in Turkey and that he was in need of money to maintain these contacts, since the TURKUI organization lacked the wherewithal to continue doing so. IOFGIN made a point of demanding the money in American dollars - \$150 a day per month, - KAUDER's attempts to persuade IOFGIN to accept Turkish money were of no avail, and it was finally agreed that IOFGIN should receive \$700 a month; later the amount was raised to \$1500 a month. (Interrogator's note: "Was this money actually being paid to agents in Turkey or was it being sent to TURKUI, whose source of money from American had been cut off in December 1941?")

24. Approximately at the same time, IOFGIN demanded that TURKUI - he named his chief from this time on - receive political support from the Reich and be placed in charge of all White Russian officers in Germany. On this point George ROMANOFF (s. Special Interrogation Report No 1 on KAUDER) entered the picture again to conduct the negotiations. With the intervention of Maj I.G. FRIEDE, FIECHENBERGER, ban on entanglements with TURKUI was lifted, and his organization was promised political support; in return, it was to spread anti-Bolshevik propaganda. FRIEDE was not enthusiastic about supporting TURKUI, and his relief was evident when he was succeeded in this position by FIECHENBERGER.

25. In May 1943, ROMANOFF, as TURKUI's representative, visited KAUDER and stated TURKUI's demands that eight named persons from Germany and its satellites be given passports to visit him in Rome and that he himself receive \$700 a month. In return, IOFGIN would continue to work for the Abwehr. Further, TURKUI desired that the Budapest branch of his organization be given official recognition. When MAROGNA-REDYITZ refused to continue meeting IOFGIN's and TURKUI's increasing demands for money, IOFGIN delivered to KAUDER the ultimatum that either the Abwehr would provide the money as requested or he would cease to submit reports. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that IOFGIN continued his intelligence activity, although KATZNER persistently refused at the time to grant him \$700 a month.

26. In September 1943, KAUDER felt it necessary because of the war situation to move the Malkokoff from Sofia to Budapest. IOFGIN objected to this, although his reasons for insisting on remaining in Sofia were not made clear. At any rate, it was finally agreed that the intelligence reports would be sent by T/T to Sofia and Budapest alternately for ten-day periods. (Interrogator's note: It would be interesting to learn the reasons for IOFGIN's insist not to remain in Sofia until forced by the advancing Soviets to withdraw to Budapest. Certainly if his network was genuine, there would have been no difficulty for him in receiving T/T reports in Budapest.) At this time, IOFGIN insisted that TURKUI, who had been brought from Rome to Wien, although he had desired to be transported directly from Rome to Budapest, be brought to the

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to the Hungarian capital. (See Special Interrogation Report No 1 on KAUER for a full account of this.) KAUER states that at this point he again inquired into the sources of the information submitted by IONCIN and was again denied an answer. However, IONCIN provided an indication of things to come by relating that during a previous visit to Wien, he had been invited to a conference with BROGGA-REDITS and WILHELMSTRICH and had left with the impression that they were seeking a way to continue using him and at the same time to rid themselves of KAUER. (Interrogator's note: It is known that at this time BROGGA's attacks on and accusations against KAUER were becoming a source of embarrassment to Nazi Wien. Furthermore, the Gestapo's persecution of KAUER's mother, a Jewess, and the Gestapo's obvious desire to put KAUER himself out of circulation were causing BROGGA-REDITS, KAUER's benefactor, more than a few troubled moments.) Yet, both BROGGA-REDITS and WILHELMSTRICH later denied to KAUER that they had ever had such a conversation with IONCIN.

27. One source was mentioned by IONCIN after the battle of Kiev: a Stabskapitän KOHIO of the Red Army Signal Corps, who allegedly had submitted excellent information until he was wounded during the German attack on that city. After half a year, KOHIO was heard from again and reported that he was the commanding officer and chief instructor in a T/T school in Kuzbass. KAUER suggested that KOHIO send his reports by coding them and giving them to his students as exercises in T/T. The suggestion was adopted, and for six months thereafter the information was thus submitted.

28. As soon as TRUHL had moved to Budapest late in 1942, both he and IONCIN put pressure on KAUER for increased financial rewards until BROGGA-REDITS capitulated to the demands.

29. Dr. Hans DEWITZ, KAUER's right-hand assistant in the Hildekopf, was sent to Sofia to work with IONCIN in coding the reports to be sent to Wien, and although an initial, mutual antipathy developed between the two, KAUER was able, with TRUHL's help, to counsel the two to cooperate for the good of the service - and KAUER's continued employment in the Abwehr. Later, IONCIN demanded a pass which would allow him to roam Bulgaria at will. When DEWITZ's initial efforts to obtain the pass from the police failed, IONCIN refused to work with DEWITZ in any capacity and insisted that KAUER come to Sofia to settle the matter. Upon KAUER's arrival, he was told by DEWITZ that BROGGA (DEWITZ) was circulating the story that KAUER had been generated from the Abwehr and that his - BROGGA's - suspicions of KAUER had been correct. IONCIN then explained that his real reason for calling KAUER to Sofia had been to find out whether there was any truth to the rumor.

30. It is noteworthy that IONCIN was ever desirous of preventing a close relationship between KAUER and TRUHL. Accordingly, he

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persuaded TURNU to leave negotiations about intelligence matters to KAUDER and him (IOFGIN) and negotiations about political support for the TURNU organization to KAUDER and ROMANO. Thus, it would be unnecessary for KAUDER to have direct contact with TURNU.

31. When ROMANO and TURNU came to the meeting of the ways (s. Special Interrogation Report No 1 on KAUDER), ROMANO's bitterness against TURNU led him to write to White Russians in Belgrade and Sofia declaring that they should suspend all work with IOFGIN because of the latter's untrustworthiness and because of suspicions attached to him. In this way, ROMANO hoped to put an end to IOFGIN's intelligence activities, since he knew that TURNU and his organization drew their money as a result of this activity. However, ROMANO's efforts in this direction came to naught.

32. After Bulgaria's war activity had been neutralized by the Russians, IOFGIN moved to Budapest. Here he increased his demands for money, and KAUDER sent Dr DEUTSCH to discuss the matter with TURNU. DEUTSCH returned with the information that he had failed to see TURNU, because the latter had been in conference with an SS officer. The next day TURNU explained that the SS officer was actually a member of his Union who was serving in the SS. Subsequently, IOFGIN asserted that if TURNU did not receive immediate political support from the Union, he would find it elsewhere. KAUDER believes that TURNU was negotiating with the SS to this end, although the incident described above is the only basis for this assumption.

33. In September 1944 TURNU requested KAUDER to arrange for the transportation of 30 members of his Union from Belgrade to Budapest. Although KAUDER was becoming weary of such requests, he realized the importance to his own future of keeping the goodwill of IOFGIN and TURNU. Consequently, he submitted again, although it developed that only eight of the thirty shared any desire to join TURNU in Budapest. In October, TURNU expressed the wish that he and all his cohorts be moved to Berlin, since the Budapest area was too close to Budapest for comfort. At this time, KAUDER noticed that relations between IOFGIN and TURNU were somewhat strained and that IOFGIN was not so eager to follow his chief. However, after the "LISCO"-TURNU meeting had taken place in Berlin, IOFGIN exhibited his old faithfulness once again. (For an account of the relationship between TURNU and "LISCO", see Special Interrogation Report No 1 on KAUDER.)

34. At the end of October 1944, the advance of the Soviets made it necessary to choose retreat positions for the "Lidokopf". KAUDER wanted to move the entire headquarters to Gorna, but IOFGIN insisted on moving his offices to Frsburg. On the night of 2-3 November, IOFGIN moved to Gorna, remained there two days, and then

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continued on to Grossburg. There he demanded that the money for himself and for TITCHEL be paid in gold pieces rather than in dollars.

35. Subsequently, IONGIN inquired whether it would be possible, in case Grossburg had to be evacuated, for him to flee to Switzerland. WUNDER submitted this inquiry to him, the suspicion was raised there that he himself had hopes of emigrating to Switzerland. (Interrogator's note: The suspicion probably had some basis in fact, although WUNDER doubts that he entertained the idea at that time.) In any case, the authorities in Bern refused to aid any person in gaining entry into Switzerland.

36. In the beginning of February 1945, IONGIN declared that the war situation was hopeless for the Germans and that he wanted to cease operations. WUNDER believes that this was the culmination of all the reflections which had met IONGIN's demands from the Abwehr. IONGIN remarked also that he was beginning to consider himself a traitor to Russia in having caused the death of so many Russian troops through his intelligence activity. (Interrogator's note: In the light of IONGIN's present whereabouts, this is worth keeping in mind.) Nevertheless, IONGIN recognized the difficulties that would arise for him by his leaving the Abwehr and continued to submit reports.

37. In February 1945, WUNDER was arrested on charges of having engaged in unlawful financial dealings and was interrogated by Eptm TITCHEL. During the interrogation he was informed that IONGIN was still functioning under the supervision of Lt. TITCHEL and that TITCHEL and IONGIN were receiving more money than they had previously. (For an account, chronologically written, of WUNDER's arrest and subsequent career, see the OSI Report IAW 41, dated 7 September 1945.) In May 1945, WUNDER, IONGIN, TITCHEL and their cohorts were arrested by American authorities, and WUNDER saw IONGIN for the last time in a jail in Salzburg. IONGIN requested him not to mention the regularity with which he had submitted intelligence reports nor to state the sums which had been paid to him.

38. WUNDER has the following to say about IONGIN's activity from 1940 to 1945: During his Abwehr career, IONGIN submitted approximately 5,500 VT reports, of which about 10% concerned tactical matters. Of these tactical reports, about 25% were determined to contain correct information. It was noted by Abwehr officers that the numbers of Soviet Air Forces units were never given - at least, never correctly; in the few instances in which they were given, they were determined to be false. The reports from the USSR were labeled the Max Reports; those from the Near East, concerning Anglo-American affairs, were known as the Horitz Reports. The Horitz reports numbered about 1,000; the source of most of these was once named by IONGIN as a White Russian officer. The evaluation office in Berlin considered these reports of little worth, although it is

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noteworthy that the numbers of air force units, when given in the
Moritz reports, were later found to be correct. (Interrogator's
note: WUNDER is careful to assert that IONGIN alone was responsi-
ble for gathering intelligence concerning the Western Powers in
the Near East, but it is known that he himself was directly involved
in such activity.)

39. WUNDER presents the following view of the IONGIN-TURUI rela-
tionship: He is convinced that IONGIN first joined the TURUI
organization in 1940 and had not had any previous relationship with
the White Russian general. In return for the intelligence connec-
tions which he obtained from TURUI, IONGIN pressed the latter for
political and financial support for the TURUI White Russian
Organization, although it is questionable that any great part of
the money that went to TURUI was ever passed on to his subordinates.
There is little doubt that IONGIN was to some extent intimidated by TUR-
UI - until he learned more of the latter's character in Bulgaria.
However, when it seemed that TURUI was to receive a position of
importance on the TURUI staff, IONGIN removed his loyalty to his
chief, hoping to benefit from the TURUI-TURUI arrangement.

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