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16 August 1946

TO: SAINT, WASHINGTON
FROM: SAINT, LONDON
SUBJECT: Richard KLEBER & ELST

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1. Reference LOND 501.
2. Attached is our copy of the report referred to as was indicated in paragraph 9.
3. It is suggested that Salzburg, Germany, Vienna and Rome would be very interested in receiving copies of this report. I have promised the British that, due to frequent reference to cryptographic materials, no general distribution would be made and if it is sent to stations, this report will not be available to all personnel - but will be kept by the Chief of Mission.

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Dienstadt Klatt and the Max-Moritz Intelligence Reports.

FOREWORD.

From 1941 to 1945 Dienstadt Klatt in Sofia and later Budapest sent a daily supply of operational intelligence to the Abwehr in Vienna for the German Higher Command. These intelligence reports were of various types, the two main types being the so-called "Max Reports" and "Moritz Reports". The Max Reports dealt with Russian naval, military and air dispositions, chiefly between Baku and the Caucasus. The Moritz Reports dealt with Anglo-Soviet dispositions in the Mediterranean theatre and the British Middle East. Over 5,000 Max and Moritz reports were passed to the Germans in about 3 1/2 years.

We were aware of the existence, nature and distribution of these reports from the end of 1941, but, though we knew a great deal about Klatt's Dienstadt, his staff, his agents in Turkey, and his W/T communications with Vienna, and with Turkey, we remained completely mystified by the following three problems:-

1. By what channels, and from what sources, did Max and Moritz reports get to Klatt?
2. What organisations, operating from what motives, collected and communicated the Max and Moritz intelligence (or misinformation)?
3. Was there a W/T leakage of operational intelligence (or misinformation) from the British Mediterranean zone and if so how was it constituted or completed from us?

As a result of my interrogation of Klatt on July 17, 1946, reinforced by study of the admirable results of the American interrogations of Klatt and others, I venture to think that a highly probable solution of these three puzzles can now be given.

I. The Communications Puzzle.

Although from late 1941 we had excellent reasons for supposing that the Max and Moritz Reports were transmitted from their source or sources by W/T, the attempts of R.S.S. to identify these transmissions were completely unsuccessful.

The following information given in or suggested by Klatt's interrogations may enable us to make a retrospective identification of them. It must be noticed that Klatt was shifty in his answers to several of the questions put to him on this matter, particularly when he began to realise their import, so some of the clues given may be false.

1. The first W/T communications from a source in Russia to Klatt in Bulgaria came between 18th to 23rd of June, 1941, i.e. either just before or just after the outbreak of the Russo-German war. The source was a W/T operator in Tiflis. His signals were received and decoded by a Bulgarian police station in Burgas, whence they were forwarded to a Sofia police station, two functionaries of which were already in the pay of Klatt. Klatt passed these reports to Vienna first by

telephone from the German Naval Command in Sofia and then by W/T from the Sofia police station to some corresponding W/T station in Vienna. Klatt's own W/T link with Ast Vienna did not function until November 1941.

Klatt thought that the messages were in Russian. He had not provided the Burgas police with cipher instructions but he thought that the cipher used was a figure-cipher, since the Burgas police complained of the difficulty of receiving figures as distinct from letters. This W/T link ceased to function in July or August 1941, allegedly because the Tiflis W/T operator became scared when follow-up queries were sent to him (presumably from Burgas) in connection with some report which he had sent.

(Klatt was vague or evasive in his replies to questions about the initial creation of this link and about the provisions of cipher and signals-plane for the Tiflis operator and the Burgas police. He spoke of a 'Macedonian organization' or of a member of such an organization as the creator of the link. The story of the decoding being entrusted to the Burgas police is implausible. However we have independent evidence that Klatt did have agents in Burgas in 1941 and that there was a Tiflis W/T operator who was an early source of Russian intelligence. A more plausible hypothesis will be suggested later to explain the cessation of the Tiflis transmissions).

2. On July 15 1941 Klatt's White Russian collaborator (SA) Max Lang (Longin) came to Klatt with intelligence-reports very similar to those of the Tiflis operator. From then until early in 1945 all the reports of the Max and Moritz categories came to Klatt from Lang. It was not until 1942 that the titles "Max" and "Moritz" were coined to distinguish the Russian from the Mediterranean intelligence.

So the problem is how and whence did Lang get his Max and Moritz messages.

The following (alleged) facts may help to identify the W/T traffic between Lang's source and Lang.

- a) The cipher was a 'combined cipher', i.e. mixed letters and figures. (Klatt's story does not rule out the Tiflis operator's cipher from having also been a 'combined cipher').
- b) The transmission time was some time between about midday and 3.30 p.m. (Central European Time). Klatt gave two discrepant accounts.
 - (1) Klatt's first story was that Lang used to bring the day's Max and Moritz reports to Klatt's residence from his own, some 20 minutes' walk distant, between 4.30 and 5.0 p.m. They were already deciphered. Further, when Klatt was in Buda Pest, Lang used on some occasions to fly from Sofia to Buda Pest, arriving there between 1.0 p.m. and 2.0 p.m. He was still able to bring the day's reports, deciphered, to Klatt between 4.30 and 5.0 p.m. Allowing an hour for deciphering, copying out and walking to Klatt's residence, this would fix the transmission time between, say 2.0 p.m. and 3.30 p.m.

(2) In his second interrogation Klatt said that he thought that the transmission time was between midday and 1.0 p.m. "since Lang would never come out to lunch". Lang normally brought the reports by hand between 2.0 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. I believe this second story to be an attempt to lead us away from the real transmission time. There is an extra reason for thinking that this second story was an afterthought. When asked in another connection whether Lang was himself a W/T operator, Klatt denied it. Yet his second story assumes that Lang had to be present during the transmission time. If Lang had only to decipher messages and not himself to receive W/T signals, he could have postponed his decoding until after lunch.

3. Max and Moritz messages came every day of the week except Sundays. They were sent from July 15, 1941, to anyhow Feb. 12, 1945.

4. Both Max and Moritz messages were brought round by Lang together. When in 1942 it was decided to head the reports "Max" and "Moritz", they were distinguished purely by their contents, i.e. from the geographical areas referred to in the texts of the messages. Both were in the Russian tongue. It follows that Max and Moritz messages issued from the same W/T source and were sent in the same transmission. We have a little evidence (not from Klatt's interrogation) that this W/T station was in the Novorossiisk area.

5. There were nearly always exactly six Max reports. Occasionally a seventh was added if of special importance. There were usually two or three Moritz reports and sometimes none. When Klatt said that the cipher was a combined-cipher he volunteered the information that at a late stage in the war the German Funkabwehr was trying to identify the Max-Moritz transmissions. On hearing Klatt's suggestion that the cipher was a 'combined-cipher', the investigators were delighted and said that this confirmed their own hypothetical identification of the wanted traffic. Since Klatt volunteered this story, we should expect it to be false, unless he supposed that we had access to the Funkabwehr's records or had interrogated or could interrogate its officers. (Such an interrogation should be made, if possible.)

6. The deciphered texts were in Russian Schlagwörter, i.e. in highly compressed 'headlines'. These had to be translated into German and expanded into intelligible prose before Klatt could send them on to Vienna. That is, each Max or Moritz report in its original condensed form would consist of only plus or minus a dozen words. (This is my estimate. Klatt wrote out some typical specimens of the original messages in their condensed form, together with their expanded renderings in German prose. These are appended.)

Note. ¹⁹⁴² Both stated that he had overheard Klatt telephoning from Buda Pest to Sofia. Something was read out to him from Sofia which Klatt then construed out of his head. It is clear from what Both said that Klatt was giving the German equivalents of certain code-expressions; he was not merely giving prose-expansions of 'headline' phrases

Klatt was interrogated on this point. He admitted with hesitation that when he was away from Sofia he did often connive over the telephone Max or Moritz messages read out to him from his Sofia station.

condensed form. But he denied that any code-expressions were used. I think that he was lying. Any German-speaking clerk could have expanded into German prose the condensed messages described by Klatt without telephoning to Buda Pest for help.

If this hypothesis is correct, then Max and Moritz messages as transmitted might have been very brief indeed, especially if, as may follow from Beth's story, the code-expressions consisted of single or perhaps coupled letters or figures.

7. It was always possible for Klatt and Lang to put their own queries or those of, say, Luftflotte IV to the source or sources of Max reports. Klatt thought that the need never arose over Moritz reports. Replies to these queries never took less than 3 - 4 days to come back and often they took 6 days. This suggests but does not prove that

- (1) Max and Moritz reports were transmitted 'blind', else anyhow some replies to merely tactical questions would have been got within 24 hours.
- (2) There was a W/T link available to Lang working to the source or sources of Max-Moritz reports, but a link which worked only once or twice a week. (These transmissions need not have been made from Sofia or even from Bulgaria. Lang had transactions, including cash transactions with Turkey and he said - as it is probably false - that he controlled a W/T station at Samsun. If so, the delay in getting replies may have been due to the slowness of Lang's communications with his transmitting station in Turkey.)

8. Klatt tried hard to sell us 'his own ideas' that Lang availed himself of the W/T facilities of a consulate (I Soviet) in Sofia and later in Buda Pest. But if the Max-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind', Lang need not have had daily access to a transmitter at all. He could have received the transmissions in his own home on an ordinary radio set. It cannot be supposed that Lang could have eluded for 3 years the vigilance of the inquisitive Dr. Delius either in working a transmitter from his own residence or in making daily visits to some other establishment equipped with a transmitter.

9. There are tenuous reasons for thinking that the Max-Moritz transmissions were regularly intercepted in Rome as well as in Sofia or Buda Pest. If so, then either in Rome or in Sofia, or both, the transmissions were intercepted without the recipient being able to 'break in'. This suggests that the Max-Moritz signals were powerful. The same conclusion would follow from the assumption that the Max-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind'.

10. I think that there was only one W/T station involved in the transmission of Max-Moritz signals. Klatt said that though there were a few days on which nothing could be received, there were no days on which a half dozen of Max-Moritz messages was received. Either these were the standard six Max messages plus the two or three Moritz messages, or there were none. When transmission on one day did not occur, eight or nine Max messages would be sent on the following day or two instead of the normal six.

II. The ostensible roles of Lang and Tufkul.

A. Lang (Activities and their ostensible motive).

Lang was a former White Russian officer. In July 1940 he offered his services to his chief, then in Rome, and thus became a member of his chief's anti-Communist White Russian organization. On the occasion of this visit to Rome he was given authority to collaborate with the German Abwehr. He was to create or exploit links with Russia, procure confidential intelligence about Russian dispositions and convey his results to the Abwehr. He was not himself an Abwehr employee, and used Klatt, who was an Abwehr employee, as his middleman.

In 1940 and early 1941 Lang succeeded in inserting some bona fide White Russians into Russian units; line crossings were bringing back dispatches from these volunteers-espies before the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Against just this contingency Lang had, in March 1941, conveyed to White agents in Russia signals, plans and cipher instructions. On about July 15 1941 his courses in Russia began to send their intelligence reports to Lang by U/P. Lang 'who knew next to no German' and Klatt 'who knew only the Russian alphabet' collaborated in insuring the Russian texts of the messages into German. This they did with the aid of an ordinary Russian-German dictionary and a Russian-German military word book.

What came later to be designated as "Max reports" were headed in Lang's original Russian texts "from E 4" or "from E 2" ... "from E 5" or from "03" or from "05". "E 1" "E 2" etc. were ordinary radio-agents; "03" "05" were their spy-master. "05" was a Captain Samuilov (? cover name), who at one time ran a Russian Army Signals School in Kuzbass. Lang himself was known as "02".

Lang spent most of his time in Sofia and even when Klatt removed to Buda Pest, Lang refused to do more than "commute" between Sofia and Buda Pest. He had no trade or profession, but he had some authority over various circles of White Russians in Sofia and Bulgaria. His residence was 3 Siska of September Street, Sofia. Lang had some White Russian agents working in Sofia, some of whom he had managed to insert into Dr. Delidze's Ast Sofia.

For a long time Lang would not disclose the identity of his "chief" in Rome, but soon after the entry of U.S.A. into the war he revealed that he was General Tufkul.

Lang firmly refused to become a member of the Abwehr and rigidly insisted that his contacts with that organization were to go through the sole mediation of Klatt. His personal remuneration and the much larger payments for the upkeep of his organization came through Klatt, and Klatt had to negotiate with the Abwehr on all questions of permits, passports etc. for Lang.

If Lang's remittances were delayed, he threatened to cut off his intelligence supplies; and any attempt by the Abwehr to investigate his methods, organization, contacts etc. were successfully resisted by the threat that Max and Herits reports would cease to be delivered. His and Tufkul's White Russian Secret Service remained unpenetrated. It is not clear whether Lang was the head of Tufkul's entire Secret Service or only of its Balkan and Russian wing. Lang's dominant motive was to destroy Bolshevism.

B. Tuskul (Activities and their ostensible motive).

General Tuskul, who had fought under Denikin after the Bolshevik Revolution, was a prominent White Russian emigre in Western Europe between the two wars. He took an active part in working to build up White Russian organizations in Paris and elsewhere and was particularly active in fostering a White Russian military elite. He was one of the most vigorous leaders of the movement to destroy Communism in Russia, Spain or elsewhere and he had worked out for himself a sovereign position in the Russia that was to be restored.

Naturally there were feuds between different sections of the scattered White Russian community and Tuskul was often involved in them. He had resided in Paris and Berlin before coming to Rome.

In empowering Lang to work the Max-Moritz intelligence system and to pass the results to the Abwehr, he had two motives, first to assist the Axis in its crusade against the Soviet regime and second to secure the funds necessary for the creation and maintenance of his White Russian organization.

When the Germans encouraged General Vlassov to build up a fighting force of anti-Soviet Russians, Tuskul tried to supplant Vlassov in the command of this force or at best to get an influential position on Vlassov's staff. Near the end of the war, Tuskul was building up his own independent corps of White Russian warriors to help the Germans in their new impending fight against Stalinism.

Even after the collapse of Germany, Tuskul would not give up the struggle. There was still a role for him and his corps, namely to assist the Anglo-Saxons to stem the tide of Communism in the Balkans. His private legion, which had not actually been committed in battle against the Russians, might yet be of service in gauling the E.A.N. in Greece or curbing Tito in Jugoslavia.

C. Max and Moritz. (Ostensible story).

Thus the Max-Moritz reports constituted a genuine leakage of operational intelligence; it was the White Russians' contribution to the Axis struggle against Communism.

This whole picture was, at least for the greater part of the war, accepted by the Abwehr, the S.D., the German High Command and probably by Klett himself. Any doubts about its genuineness was allayed by the salient fact that the Max intelligence (though not the Moritz intelligence) was constantly corroborated by aerial observation and the results of operations in the field. The information was of direct tactical and strategic value. Minor inaccuracies were often detected but, during at least the greater part of the war, there was no trace of tactical or strategic deception. The bona fides of Tuskul and Lang were proved by the veracity of the Max-intelligence. Enquiries into the Tuskul-Lang organization were vetoed on the score that it was duly laying its golden eggs.

III. Arguments against the ostensible story.

The following points prove, in my opinion, that the ostensible story given above is false.

Klett is eager to disclose everything he knows about the Abwehr, the S.D., the Bulgarian police, his own agents and contacts.

in Turkey etc. But when questioned about Lang and Turkul he lies, hesitates, 'forgets', steers the conversation away and looks uneasy. He has either much to hope or, more likely, much to fear from whatever organization Lang and Turkul serve. He knows that Soviet agents attempted to kidnap him from the Americans and he has been overheard to say that when released he will work for the Russians. The inference is that he now identifies the Lang-Turkul secrets with Soviet secrets, and is right in doing so. (I think that during the war he did not seriously suspect this. He would have been too much of a danger to Lang if he had had any good reasons for such suspicions. Moreover Klatt was well aware of the military value to Germany of the Max reports and, like everybody else, could not reconcile this fact with the notion that the Max reports were Soviet controlled. Doubtless Lang, during his five-year intimacy with Klatt, was occasionally unguarded, so there may have been a number of minor clues which together with the kidnapping attempt and confessions Klatt that Lang and therefore Turkul had all the time been Soviet agents. But before the kidnapping attempt Klatt probably swallowed the ostensible story and assumed that Lang's secrets were the secrets of a bona fide White Russian Secret Service.)

2. In 1936 (?) the White Russian leader General Miller was kidnapped from Paris and conveyed away to Leningrad. The organizers of this exploit were one Skoblin and his wife. Skoblin immediately reported his success to Turkul, then in Berlin, who dropped everything and hastened to Paris. Skoblin got away. His wife was caught but died, conveniently, in a French prison before she could reveal anything. If this story is true, it almost proves that Turkul was not a bona fide White Russian loyalist, but a Soviet spy or agent pretending, presumably an employee of the N.K.V.D. If he was, then Lang was too.

I shall argue that the hypothesis that Turkul and Lang were and are - agents of the N.K.V.D. explains every mystery in the Max-Koritz matter, including the biggest mystery of all, namely, the general veracity and military importance of the Max reports.

3. When the Abwehr accepted the collaboration of Lang, the Hungarian Secret Police were astonished. They were convinced that their former gold-bird Lang was a Soviet agent. We do not know what had convinced them. Dr. Dehne had similar suspicions.

4. It is incredible on general grounds that a bona fide White Russian spy-network could have operated daily from July 1941 to February 1945 without the Russians discovering it. And we can be sure on special grounds that the Russians had some knowledge of the apparent leakage. Yet the Russians never stopped to look and Lang never seems to have felt the quills proper to a bona fide White Russian lest the intelligence which he was selling to the Germans might have become deception material.

5. The W/T procedure and the cipher-type of the Max-Koritz transmissions (according to our speculative reconstruction of them) are of fairly standard Russian secret service patterns. (Check with M.E.)

6. The cover nomenclature 'R.1' and '02' etc have a similar flavour. (Check)

7. Supposing that at least in the beginning the sources of Max reports were bona fide White Russians, working as spies from devotion to the anti-Communist cause, it is hard to explain the existence of Koritz reports. For these reports were of poor quality and were fairly soon recognized by the Germans to be operationally worthless. Klatt was actually permitted to feed

the Spanish Ambassador in Ankara, Pret, with Moritz reports. Klett himself volunteered in interrogation his belief that he himself could, from study of newspapers and public broadcasts, have conducted reports as good as the Moritz reports, though he denied ever having done so.

Now if the supposed bona fide White Russian sources of these reports had no intelligence source in the British Middle East, they could have had no motive for conducting Moritz reports. For they could not have wished Lang to receive or pass on misinformation. If on the other hand they had a source in, say Egypt, in W/T communication with themselves, this source would have been able and presumably anxious to send a fair amount of good information.

8. Turkul and Lang have never yet been the victims of kidnapping or liquidation attempts. They dwell apparently without qualms in the cauldron of 1946 Salzburg. These supposedly inveterate and active crusaders against Bolshevism enjoy charmed lives - or else unjeopardized lives.

9. For all his anti-Bolshevist fervor, Turkul never succeeded in getting his White Russian legionaries into actual battle against Soviet armies. True, he is said to have despatched three or four score White Russians to help the Spanish Falange against the Reds. They perished almost to a man.

IV. The real story.

Turkul had for many years been an agent of the N.K.V.D. Lang had been so at least since 1940. Both are still agents of that unostentatious organization. The pre-war function of Turkul was to penetrate and steer White Russian anti-Soviet organizations. He was more than a spy; he was an agent provocateur. He was probably in contact with, if not in control of, a bona fide White Russian Secret Service, i.e. one for which convinced anti-Communists were ready to work. They certainly needed to secure themselves against penetration and treachery and there exist other grounds as well for thinking that they had a counter-espionage organization. Besides this Turkul had an inner secret service of his own, the one which executed the wishes of the N.K.V.D. Lang was high up in this inner service and was probably also high up in what may be called the official White Russian Secret Service.

The Russo-German war only slightly modified Turkul's assignments, though it considerably modified his methods.

He had still to supervise and hamstring the bona fide White Russians, but as the Axis powers would inevitably try to mobilize White Russian sympathies, intelligence and perhaps battalions, Turkul would have not only to keep the confidence of the White Russians but also to win the confidence of the Axis military and political leaders. He would have to gull Axis Secret Services as well as his fellow White Russians; to make himself ~~more~~ indispensable to the Axis in order to be useful to the N.K.V.D. and Soviet Russia.

Moreover he would need money, the money which the N.K.V.D. could no longer get to him. (We may guess that Turkul's staunchness in continuing his work for the N.K.V.D. derived less from ideological sympathy than from love of money plus fear of ultimate reprisals).

All these ends were achieved by one simple device. The N.K.V.D. supplied Turtul's subordinate Lang with cunning and voracious operational intelligence from Russia and Lend sold it to the Abwehr. The more the German Higher Command liked the commodity, the more money, influence and immunity from investigation his organization received for providing it.

It is quite possible that Lang readily did insert some fine White Russians into the Russian forces in 1940-41 - and betrayed them to the N.K.V.D. as he did so. Indeed it is quite possible that the N.K.V.D. let them run, under covert supervision, during part of the shako of the war. So long as their intelligence was relayed through one central station controlled by the N.K.V.D. they would do no harm and might act as unconscious gofers, other miscreants or idiots who might come to assist their labours.

I guess that the early disappearance of the rifle V/R operation coincided with the installation by the N.K.V.D. of their controlled central station.

Were Max reports 'shako'?

It was no part of the concern of the N.K.V.D. to assist Russian generals to win battles or campaigns. Its business was to penetrate and temper with anti-Communist organizations. Its enemy was not the Axis Powers but, inter alia, the White Russians. Consequently while the NK's system was indeed a double-cross, it was not a method of leading the Axis General Staffs astray in tactical or strategic matters; it was a method of consolidating its agent, Turtul's control over White Russian activities.

It is conceivable that the N.K.V.D. did not at the start or perhaps ever take the Soviet military authorities into its confidence about the Max-leakage. Nonetheless care was taken that no obviously special military intelligence should be given in Max reports; but the major consideration was that the Max information should have a high reputation for truth - a reputation which it certainly got. It is also possible, though I think unlikely, that the N.K.V.D. did take on the extra non-commitment of penetrating Axis Secret Services. If so, Lang and perhaps Turtul had to be put into a strong enough position to find out what was wanted about the Abwehr etc. But my guess is that this duplication of shako was not imposed on Lang and Turtul, save insofar as it would be expedient to know what knowledge the Abwehr etc. had of their secrets. Lang admitted to Klatt that he had agents planted in Ast Sofia, through whom he, Lang, had discovered what Dr. Delius was planning against himself. It is quite natural, therefore, that the most suspicious Germans never found a trace of strategic or tactical deception in the Max reports. Had the N.K.V.D. allowed any grounds for such suspicions to appear in the Max reports, the obtainable Lang-Turtul story would have been 'blown'. It is also quite compatible with the single-minded ruthlessness of the N.K.V.D. that it should deliberately have issued Max-reports which were likely to lead to the sinking of a Russian convoy, the bombing of a new airfield or the destruction of a Russian division. When Lang confessed to Klatt that he hated to think of the thousands of Russians whose death he had brought about, the explanation may be not that Lang was, as Klatt thought, beginning to sever from his White Russian hatred of the Soviet regime but that he deplored the price paid by Russia for the build-up that the N.K.V.D. had given to him and Turtul.

What of Moritz reports?

The actual incidents reported in them were generally fictitious, though the designations of the larger army and airforce units tended to be correct. On the basis of published communiques, war reporters articles, and perhaps Military Attachee appreciations, an intelligent student could have produced most of Moritz without having a source of his own in the area. Some of his guesses would be correct.

Had there been a sensible eye-witness in the area, he could hardly have achieved such a high percentage of errors or maintained so high a level of vagueness. Moreover he would have found out how the English commanders' surnames are spelled. What motives could have led the source of Max reports to concoct the Moritz reports?

- (a) Axis forces were engaged on more fronts than one. So the H.K.V.D. may have thought to secure more money and credit for Turkul's organization by giving him Mediterranean intelligence to sell than he could get if restricted to intelligence from the Eastern Front.
- (b) But a more likely hypothesis is this. Turkul himself was in Rome until just after Mussolini's fall. Perhaps Turkul was himself in receipt of Max-Moritz reports and was selling Moritz and/or Max reports to the Italians behind the backs of the Germans. There is some slender evidence to support this theory.
 - (1) Klatt volunteered the statement that on one occasion the German Military Attache in Rome passed to Berlin three reports which turned out to be verbally identical with three Max or Moritz reports sent in by Klatt to Vienna on the same day. The Abwehr was suspicious but as usual dropped its investigation. If this story is true, it implies that someone in Rome was able both to intercept and decipher the Max-Moritz transmissions. This someone would have to be Turkul or one of his trusted staff. But Turkul's sole obvious motive for taking Max-Moritz reports would be that he could get something by doing so. He may therefore have been getting money and/or standing from Mussolini by selling to him what Lang was concurrently selling to the Abwehr. If so, he would have to have been selling his goods to a purchaser on a level higher than any at which intelligence exchanges took place between the Italians and the Germans.
 - (2) Immediately after Mussolini's fall, Klatt, at Lang's instigation, prevailed on Eleyen-Stuber to fly both of them from Sofia to Rome in order to extract Turkul from Italy. The pretext given to the Abwehr was that it was imperative to prevent the Max-Moritz secret from becoming known to the expected British and American invaders of Italy.

But this pretext is incredible. The Italian mainland was still uninvaded; German commands and Abwehr officers felt no fears about their present safety in Rome or their future withdrawal from it. Either, therefore, Lang was in an irrational panic or there was some immediate danger to Turkul quite other than the risk of Turkul falling into Anglo-Saxon hands. Perhaps it was not Anglo-Saxon landings but the fall of Mussolini that jeopardised Turkul and his work.

Klatt's own story unintentionally supports this theory. When he and Lang met Turkul, Turkul was vehemently opposed to the project of flying to Vienna. Either Buda Pest or somewhere was his attitude, and only with the greatest of difficulty was he persuaded to halt at Vienna, and under the strongest assurances that his further flight to Buda-Pest would quickly follow. For some reason Turkul did not wish to be on German soil. The inference is that he did not wish to be where the Abwehr or the S.D. could get him, and that he expected them to wish to get him because Mussolini's fall was likely to result in the exposure of what had been literally his double-dealing. (No such exposure actually occurred).

- (3) Almost as soon as Turkul reached Buda Pest, the Abwehr had to pay more for their Mar-Moritz reports, for 700 dollars per month had now to be found for Turkul himself. Who had subverted him before and for what return?

The suggestion is therefore that the N.K.V.D. contacted Moritz reports so that Turkul should have something to sell to Mussolini in which Mussolini would be interested - and that Mussolini was interested enough to pay Turkul perhaps 700 dollars a month for them. Here again the N.K.V.D. would have had no motive for trying to make Moritz messages the vehicles of strategic deception. It was probably regretted by the N.K.V.D. that the veracity-level of Moritz reports was so low. Probably they consoled themselves with the reflection that the Italian Intelligence Service was unlikely to discover how low this level was.

- Note 1. If this hypothesis is true, it confirms the theory that the Mar-Moritz transmissions were made 'blind'. For either Turkul's or Lang's operator would have to be receiving 'blind' and if one could, both might.
- 2. The hypothesis would also explain why U.S.S. was unable to detect any suitable unauthorised V/T transmissions taking place in the British Middle East. For according to the theory, no such transmissions occurred.

Some Corollaries:

The view put forward is that Turkul and Lang were agents of the N.K.V.D. with the primary assignment of penetrating and managing anti-Communist organizations in Europe, and particularly White Russian organizations. The Mar-Moritz reports were maintained by their employers in order to secure for their employees money, influence and immunity from Axis investigation. The whole scheme required that at least the Mar reports should be generally true and of genuine operational utility to the Germans; and that the Moritz reports should at least seem plausible to the Italians. No strategic or tactical deception was practiced, for the object was not to louse German armies into Russian debauched but to inveigle White Russians into Turkul's snares.

The N.K.V.D. deceived the White Russians and the Axis Secret Services about the true roles of Turkul and Lang by making them retailers of operational truths. It sacrificed Soviet soldiers in order to strengthen its own hold over anti-Communists in the rest of Europe.

If this account is true, a new light is thrown upon Turkul's offer of help to Mannerheim in Finland; his positive contribution to the Falangist cause in Spain; his attempt to oust Mikoyan from Command of his White Russian Army and, in that, to secure in it a staff appointment for himself; the formation of his own independent Corps of White Russians; his otherwise farcical offer of collaboration with the Japanese against Communism in the Balkans. The Japanese were not deprived of the chance to benefit from his co-operation (check this). There is still time for the Government of India or the National Government in China to take this ardent crusader. Even if he becomes the target of vitriolic abuse in the Soviet press, his bones will remain unbroken and his work will go on.

Subsidiary points-

1. According to Klatt and to inherent probabilities Lang was the only person in Sofia or Buda Pest who could decipher the Max-Meritz signals. Yet when asked whether Max and Moritz reports ceased to be passed to Vienna on the occasions when Lang was away, e.g. on a visit to Rome, Klatt showed the greatest hesitation and uneasiness. He finally said that this was so and that on Lang's return back messages were deciphered and those that had not lost their utility were passed on to Vienna in addition to the current day's reports. (This suggests that Lang would not, or would not, tell the secret of Max and Moritz transmissions to suspend traffic during his absences, which slightly corroborates the view that these transmissions were 'blind').

If Klatt's story is true it follows that Lang had at least one operator who could take the traffic in his absence, which in itself seems quite likely. But Klatt showed embarrassment in that Klatt himself was able to decipher the signals and did so when Lang was away, in which case he knows very much more than he has said. I am, for other reasons, sure that he knows at least a little more than he has said.

For one thing Klatt tripped up both in asserting that Lang knew next to no German and that he, Klatt, knew no Russian, save the alphabet. For, forgetting this assertion, he gave a circumstantial account of how he and Lang collaborated in translating the Russian texts into German - a collaboration which would be difficult on the "Jack Sprat" basis. Moreover when asked at another time in what language he and Lang conversed, Klatt unguardedly said "German". I am sure that in fact Klatt knew the Bulgarian language quite well and enough Russian at least to be able to read it. He also admitted that when he, Klatt, was away from Sofia, his W/T operator was able to deputise for him in producing the German text, though he (I think) knew no Russian or Hungarian. (The question whether there were gaps in the forwarding of reports to Vienna is one that we may be able to check for ourselves. If there were no such gaps, we shall have to assume that Lang allowed either Klatt or one of his own subordinates to decipher Max-Meritz signals. Klatt's embarrassment would then strongly indicate that he and Lang had taken the great risk of sharing a cardinal secret of the organization for which Lang worked).

2. Klatt asserted that on nearly every day there were precisely six Max reports, plus a very occasional seventh when of special

appearance. On subsequent reflection it occurs to me that the explanation for this fixed number may have been as follows. According to his own account the Max network consisted of 5 W/T spies known as "R 1" - "R 5". I suggest that each of these sent in one report daily and that the boss of the central station, probably "05", added one of his own. It makes no difference whether this network was notional or real, or whether, if real, the W/T spies were bona fide or were W.K.V.D.'s pseudo spies. Klatt might be asked whether there was always one message per day for each of the "R" sources.

3. There is a conflict of evidence about the date at which Lang entered Turkul's service. According to one account Lang went to Turkul in July 1940 only to get permission to collaborate with the Abwehr via Klatt; he had already been in Turkul's service for an unknown length of time. According to another account he first became a member of Turkul's organization in July 1940. The former seems the more likely. The W.K.V.D. would hardly have given Lang such a delicate and important mission had they not tested his capacities and reliability over a lengthy period.

4. Klatt has fairly satisfactorily cleared up the question of the connections between his Mienstella and the W/T system of the Bulgarian Police. From June 20 (approx) to August 1941, the Burgoe police station received the signals of the fifths W/T operator, and forwarded them or the decodes of them to the Sofia Police W/T station, whence they were passed to Klatt. (I have doubts about parts of this story, namely about how the fifths-Burgoe link was created and how the Burgoe police got their W/T and cipher instructions). After August 1941 the Bulgarian Police had nothing directly to do with security W/T traffic from Russia. They continued to assist Klatt, first by letting him pass his own messages to Vienna over their W/T link with some W/T station (a police station) in Vienna, and later by letting him install his own W/T station "Schwert" in police premises.

These arrangements have nothing to do with the Max-Merits transmissions, nor, as we might have expected, did Lang entrust any of his secrets to the venal Bulgarian police.

5. Klatt also explained satisfactorily the nature of his "IBIS" reports. These were secured by the friendly and venal harbour-master of Varna, one Garapov, from a ship's captain who usually plied between Varna and Istanbul. Consequently this reports tended to deal chiefly with Turkish coastal matters. This captain announced once that he had been chartered to sail from Istanbul to Aden and offered to send information by W/T to Varna while on route. It is not clear that he actually did so. Only one IBIS report was of any interest. It announced an impending landing at Dumluk on the day on which that landing occurred.

Klatt confessed that he had been accused of heading as 'IBIS reports' what were really Merits reports, in order to get a cash for having found a new active source. He denied having done this.

6. Klatt first rented his house in Boulevard Ferdinand in July 1940. This suggests that preparations for his war-work were well advanced nearly a year before the German march into Russia. It also suggests that Lang's plans were ripening by this date. If so, he cannot have begun his espionage work only after his visit to Rome in July 1940.