

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Nov 53 (?)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MEETING WITH PELOPS

Reference is made to the attached record of the meeting last winter. Commitments are indicated in the right hand column below in relation to our objectives and the points which PELOPS may raise.

I. Our general objectives with PELOPS are first to persuade him to shift the emphasis of joint KUBARK-AIN ^{to current} intelligence activities and secondly to get control of whatever joint KUBARK-AIN operations there are in the future. We should remind PELOPS that in the interests of AIN's position vis-a-vis their rivals in all the countries in which they are active that an efficient intelligence service is necessary. PELOPS should also be reminded that FI operations against Soviet Armenia are the most effective way of hurting the Soviets now. Such activities are the groundwork for future activities in the event of war. Regardless of the proportion of our joint operations which are current intelligence, we must get control of joint operations. This objective can be met by establishing the following understanding with PELOPS: first, that we must be provided with complete operational information; secondly, that AIN must submit candidates for key jobs for our approval or disapproval on the basis of the principles of clandestine operating and thirdly that we will pay the expenses for those parts of joint operations which we consider to be operationally sound. In brief, we must make PELOPS understand that regardless of our respect and admiration for him it just simply isn't sensible for us to "buy the complete package" from him (or from), for that matter). In personnel, finances, and planning we must be in on all the details if such operations are to be of use to us.

COMMITMENT: AIN agreed to engage in FI operations for our joint benefit. As the case of the "athletic director" and the total lack of production indicates they haven't met their commitment.

II. Our Specific Interests in Iran (A) To build joint current intelligence operations to the level of competence at which they can undertake REDSOX REDCAP, and REDBIRD operations under our direction. (B) To establish secure stay-behind nets for (a) intelligence and (b) escape and evasion purposes. (C) To inform PELOPS that we are still dissatisfied with AIN-IRAN. (D) What is needed most is a working level deputy trained by us. If feasible might be replaced. At the very least he should spend more time on joint ops, with us than he has.

COMMITMENT: We have trained WT operators and have sets ready for transfer to AIN.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Our specific interest in Syria Lebanon: E To penetrate of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties. F To interrogate returnees from the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. G To set up secure stay-behind intelligence and escape and evasion nets. H To get under Breitbach's control the activities of the five PECULIUM trainees.

We have met our commitment to train two WT trainers. As soon as secure arrangements have been made we can turn over the equipment.

III. Matters PELOPS is likely to raise, our interests in connection with each, and the commitments which have been made concerning them.

AIN/PENDANT

PELOPS all along has been far more interested in this type training than in FI training. He is worried lest his Armenian young men be killed as defenseless civilians by the Soviet or Turkish armies. If he could get them organized and trained they would have a better chance of survival. PELOPS would like to lead an Armenian Division in the event of war and claims (perhaps correctly) that other peoples of the Caucasus would defect from the Russians and rally to his banner.

Our interests: Guerilla forces might be useful to us if they can live off the land. Early organization of large units offers the danger of (1) penetration by the Communists, (2) embarrassment of the United States position with the Syrian or Lebanese, if the existence of PELOPS forces is discovered.

COMMITMENT: We are committed to give paramilitary training to 20 men.

Arms, ammunition, and military equipment. PELOPS may request reimbursement for the money he spent for arms for Iran (\$2,000.). He may bring up the matter of arms, ammo and equipment for the 2000 man AIN army he plans to raise.

Our interest: Although we realize that security interests prevented sending arms to Iran and although we appreciate the difficult struggle AIN has in northern Iran particularly, we cannot spend another \$2,000. (PELOPS should recognize that we have spent over \$13,000 for his intelligence activities which have up to now been fruitless).

COMMITMENT: KUBARK would make every effort to provide AIN with arms and ammo in small quantities. If possible they were to be shipped as follows (AIN PEON):

Lebanon	110
Syria	70
Iran	70

Although after the PENDANT's are trained it may be necessary to cache a small quantity of arms, ammunition, food and so forth. We should not commit ourselves to anything of this sort however.

Evacuation of AIN Personnel.

PELOPS has frequently requested that we arrange for and execute the evacuation of several hundred prominent AINists. Our interest

is to evacuate the twenty or thirty AINists whose knowledge of our personnel and plans would help the Soviets if they overrun the area.

COMMITMENT: We have made none concerning evacuation.

Payment for expenses incurred by PELOPS for intelligence activities in Syria-Lebanon.

Since July 52 we have been paying PELOPS \$1,000. per month for his intelligence operations. For several months before July PELOPS paid expenses and has not been reimbursed for them.

Our interest is not to pay for these in view of the valueless nature of such activities which have cost us \$13,000 already.

COMMITMENT: According to [] there was a "vague" commitment to meet much expenses until we could set up operations under our guidance.

Extension of Joint Operations to Greece, Ethiopia, Iraq, Egypt and so forth.

PELOPS has suggested this before. He seems primarily to want pouch facilities.

Our interests dictate that unless present joint operations improve it would be unwise to extend joint operations to other countries and thus expose other personnel to AIN.

No commitment.

Transfer to AIN of WT equipment.

Our interest: This can be done as soon as secure arrangements are made.

COMMITMENT: This follows logically from our commitment to train WT operators.

Guidance from [] concerning AIN participation in anti-Soviet political organizations.

Our interest is to do nothing more than provide the sort of advice [] has been transmitting. We must recognize that PELOPS is primarily interested in this sort of thing.

COMMITMENT: PELOPS claims that we agreed to provide such guidance. Our record of the meetings in winter 1952 do not show this.

US intercession with the Turks to restrain them from wiping out the Armenians in an attack against the Armenia.

Altho no commitment should be made. PELOPS may be reassured on this point.

COMMITMENT: No commitment has been made.

US support for a free Armenia at a post World War III peace conference.

Although no commitment should be made PELOPS might be reminded that at a Peace Conference the position of those who have worked all along for victory will be stronger and receive a consideration by the victorious powers.

COMMITMENT: No commitment has been made.

Cameras for AIN in Syria Lebanon:

PELOPS may ask about reimbursement of cameras he has bought for document photography.

Our interests: Although we do not need AIN to take pictures of "strategic installations in Syria Lebanon" we can go along with this. [] has been instructed to charge the cost of cameras to Project AIN PECULIUM.

COMMITMENT: We are committed to provide them with money to buy \$800. worth of cameras.