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**66TH  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE  
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66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
APO 154 US ARMY

AMC-SCCS  
ZZ-571 255

12 November 1957

SUBJECT: Monthly Report of Liaison with Official West German Agencies (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. Forwarded herewith is a Monthly Report of Liaison with Official West German Agencies for the month of October 1957.

2. Upon removal of inclosure this letter may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl: Monthly Rpt  
of Ln w/ Official West  
German Agencies (S)

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MONTHLY REPORT

of Liaison with Official West German Agencies

OCTOBER 1957

LIAISON BRANCH, CS DIVISION, SJ  
66TH CIC GROUP

Special Handling Required

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By the authority of Col. Jeff CLAY III

Date 12 November 1957

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**SUBJECT:** Monthly Report of Liaison with Official West German Agencies (U)

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ANNEX I #24 Dr. Ernst TRUECHNER, Chief of the SO, BKA  
ANNEX I #25 Richard Georg GERBER, Chief of Counterspying, BFV

MAP; Offices of German Federal and State Agencies throughout the German Federal Republic

(This map is not complete, but has been compiled and edited with as thorough a coverage as available information would allow.)

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1. (CONFIDENTIAL) SS (Security Group; "Sicherungsgruppe"), BKA (Federal Criminal Police Agency; "Bundeskriminalamt").

a. The SG, FIA has grown, during the six years in which it has existed, into an important integral part of the Federal German Republic security effort and this program's relationship to other FRG and Allied security and intelligence organizations.

b. Although the SG was created in 1951 expressly as a special bodyguard force to safeguard a limited number of high-ranking government officials, it gradually began to concern itself with a limited number of special police investigation cases. The Chief Federal Attorney ("Oberbundesanwalt" or OBA) has sole jurisdiction over pre-trial investigation and prosecution of "political offenses," including such cases as treason, espionage, subversion, etc. Since the FRG Basic Law ("Grundgesetz") provides that the states are sovereign in police matters, the OBA was dependent upon them and their police agencies for pre-trial investigations in "political" cases. With the creation of the SG, FKA the OBA was given an organization subordinate to him that could carry out investigations under his jurisdiction. The result has been an increase in SG participation in "political case" investigations and a consequent growth in the size of the organization.

c. The SG is considered an integral part of the FKA. The BKA is subordinated to the Federal Interior Ministry. The BKA is authorized to conduct police investigations when (1) requested to do so by the states or (2) so ordered by the Federal Minister of the Interior for special, important reasons. The OBA has this group under his jurisdiction from this authorization. Although the SG was originally prescribed to be only a clearing house for police information, it soon branched into its investigative function.

d. The original staff of the SG, FIA was about thirty (30) criminal policemen, drawn from the staff of the BKA. The present strength of the SG staff is approximately one hundred forty-five (145). All members are trained criminal policemen ("Kriminalpolizei") except for the Director, housekeeping personnel, drivers, and one (1) female secretary. A training course at BKA headquarters in WIESENADEN will be completed on 15 February 1958 and will provide an additional thirty-five (35) persons. The most important personalities of the organization are:

(1) Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, Director; a former district attorney ("Staatsanwalt").

(2) Joachim VAINTZIG, Deputy Director; a former member of the "Gehlen Organisation" who also serves as head of "Referat BL I".

(3) (Cnu) FIEVER, Head of the Administration Section "Z".

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Thus far there has been no further identification of the organization's remaining personnel.

e. The SG has two major functions:

- (1) Providing bodyguard protection to ranking government officials.
- (2) Conducting investigations of "political offenses" on behalf of the OEA.

The organization has also conducted a relatively small number of investigations in other types of criminal cases. These others are usually limited in scope to those that may have a direct effect on matters of a Federal Government agency.

f. The number of investigations the SG has been concerned with has increased substantially each year of operation. There has been an increase both in the number of cases the SG has been associated with and in the extent of the "political" cases handled by the OEA. The figures are as follows:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ESPIONAGE</u>	<u>HIGH TREASON &amp; SUBVERSION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1952	32	31	63
1953	45	55	100
1954	109	27	135
1955	183	19	202

g. In connection with its specialized investigations the SG maintains liaison and works in close coordination with a number of FGR police, security and intelligence organizations of special interest. These include the Federal and state agencies for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV and LfVs), the Federal Intelligence Service (BfV), the Military Counter Intelligence Service (MAD), the State Criminal Police Agencies ("Landeskriminalamt") and the Security Officers ("Gehilfschutzbeauftragten") in the various Federal ministries and agencies. The SG also keeps up liaison with the Security Liaison Officers of the Allied Forces in the Federal Republic.

h. The SG conducts only police-type overt investigations. It does not involve itself in covert operations. It receives its investigative work from cases which have been referred to the OEA, including investigation of OE cases involving the security of USAREUR. According to reports the cooperation of the SG, FGR with the CIC and other Allied agencies has been excellent.

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i. The offices of the SG are located at EAD GOEDEBERG, Friedrich Durr StraBe 1. This is away from the offices of all other EIA departments which are in WIESBADEN. The EAD GOEDEBERG location is advantageous because of its close proximity to the FRG government offices in BONN. The SG personnel carry out operations throughout the Federal Republic and West BERLIN.

j. The SG maintains an entire building that was constructed recently and completed on 9 September 1957. The building is modern and of T-shaped construction. The base of the "T" is three stories high and the cross-member is five stories in height. There are one hundred twenty (120) rooms including offices, interrogation rooms, space for card indexes and files, a conference room, a small refreshments room, reception and waiting rooms, a training aids and display room, a photo laboratory and other support rooms for the custody of evidence and the storage of supplies, arms and munitions. There are three small cells on the ground floor. Outside is a courtyard with gasoline pumps and garages for SG vehicles. It also is equipped with central heating and a generator for the destruction of classified waste.

k. The following is an organizational chart showing the subdivisions of the five (5) main sections ("Referate") of the SG, EIA:

(1) Section "Z", Administrative Section. It consists of the following sub-sections:

- (a) General Administration ("Geschäftsstelle")
- (b) Personnel Administration ("Personalstelle")
- (c) Supply Administration ("Wirtschaftsstelle")
- (d) Technical Service ("Technischer Dienst")
- (e) Laboratory (Photo) ("Labor")
- (f) Files ("Karteien")

(2) Section "EL I", handles investigation of Espionage ("Landesverrat") cases and consists of the following sub-sections:

- (a) MTS BERLIN
- (b) MTS Soviet Zone ("MTS Sowjetisch.zon.")

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(3) Section "EL II", handles investigations of espionage cases and is made up of the following sub-sections:

- (a) Soviet IS ("Sowjetischer IS")
- (b) Satellite IS ("Satelliten IS")

(4) Section "EM", handles investigation of cases of high treason and subversion and is made up of the following sub-sections:

- (a) VPD
- (b) Communist Cover Organizations and FDJ ("Tarnorganisation u. FDJ")
- (c) Right Radical ("Rechtsradikal")
- (d) Sabotage
- (e) Indictments ("Strafverfahren")

(5) Section "S" (for "Schutz" or "Protection"), fulfills the bodyguard and security protection functions of the SG. It is sub-divided into two sections as follows:

- (a) Institution Security ("Objekt-Schutz")
- (b) Personnel Security ("Personal-Schutz")

2. (SECRET) M.D. Activities

a. Change in Name of M.D. Headquarters. There has been a change in the designation by name of the Zentralstelle Sicherheit (Central Security Office). The new title is amt fuer Sicherheit der Bundeswehr (Office for the Security of the West German Armed Forces).

(1) It was reported that making the status of the office an "amt" raises it to an Ober Behoerde (Higher Authority) level and places it on a comparative level with other West German intelligence and security agencies. The office now exercises almost complete operational control over the six M.D. Gruppen of the military districts of West Germany.

(2) The amt fuer Sicherheit der Bundeswehr is still under staff supervision of Colonel Gerhard WESSEL's G or J2 section in the Federal Ministry for Defense.

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b. M.D. Gruppe I Visited by L/C Franzen.

(1) On 19 September 1957 L/C Franzen visited Captain Felix SCHLOMSKI at M.D. Gruppe I in KIEL. Also present at the meeting, which lasted about two hours, were Lt. S. G. H. BESOLD and Lt. Col. MILLARD.

(2) Captain SCHLOMSKI expressed the hope that there would be an American representative stationed at S. J. TAG or another location that will be closer to his headquarters than EKRETEL. He stated that liaison with the Naval attaché's office at the American Consulate in HAMBURG has been excellent. Nevertheless, he was anxious to establish contact with another American agency.

(3) Capt SCHLOMSKI pointed out that the M.D. Gruppe II covers the BREITEN area and that he did not want to personally contact any agency, American or otherwise, within that region without going through Colonel COBLENZ at HANNOVER. This, he stated, would not be practical. He added that the distance between KIEL and EKRETEL was too great to maintain an effective liaison effort. He emphasized the fact that a representative in the immediate vicinity of KIEL within the near future was of great importance to him.

c. Lecture to M.D. Students

(1) The USAFZUR Liaison Office to M.D. delivered a lecture before a class of twenty-eight (28) officers from various M.D. Groups and the Personnel Security Screening Office at the M.D. Training School in Romsdorf. Also present were several officers from Personnel Offices located throughout Western Germany.

(2) The organization, mission, in COMUS, overseas bases and the training and selection of security personnel were all discussed in general terms. The lecture was well received and numerous questions were asked during a discussion period. The most pertinent questions asked involved the staff supervision of security units, the conduct of complaint investigations, and the admissibility of sworn statements by agents in any court or proceeding.

d. M.D. Group V

(1) M.D. V Officials Deliver Lectures

(a) Colonel Alfred STIEBERT and Major Anton WICKELMAIER were invited as guest lecturers to a special instruction course and seminar sponsored by the Baden-Wuerttemberg LVA at the State Police School in Freiburg. Both officials lectured on M.D. activities.

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(b) Colonel SIEBERT reported that the present cooperation between the criminal police in Baden-Wuerttemberg and M.D. Group V is excellent. He said that during the week he spent at the police school he was able to effect very valuable contacts. The course was attended by police chiefs, criminal police commissariat chiefs, land police chiefs and land police commissariat chiefs from all over the state.

(2) M.D. V Equipment

(c) Some observations made at M.D. V headquarters in Stuttgart/led Constat concerning the equipment of that organization have been reported.

(b) The M.D. Group V garage is located in a hatched basement of the new M.D. building. At the time of observation there were two Opel motor passenger cars, four Volkswagen passenger cars, one motorcycle and one bus-type Volkswagen located in the garage.

(c) It was explained that the bus was used for undecover short-wave radio transmissions. The vehicle is encased as a bus with curtained windows. The front seat has room for a driver and passenger. Behind the front seat there is an instrument compartment and two seats for operators who control the short-wave sending and receiving set, located in the same compartment. The battery for the set is located behind the seats of the operators. The instrument panel in the compartment is provided with a telephone device which can be connected to any telephone line for communication. The short-wave set has a range of 300 kilometers. Entry to the instrument compartment is made through a side door in the bus. Canvas cover on top provides encasing for a short-wave antenna.

(d) Each M.D. passenger Volkswagen is equipped with a short-wave radio set. The sets have a range of approximately 150 kilometers. The radio-receiver with control buttons is fixed behind the center of the instrument panel and concealed by a cover; the hand set for the radio-receiver is kept in the small glove compartment on the right side of the instrument panel. The radio-receiver is thought to be identical to the walkie-talkie now being used by the German Army.

(c) In the new building there is a two-room photo laboratory. Among the objects observed were an automatic three-minute photo reproducing machine, electrically operated; six miniature cameras, probably 35 millimeter; one large camera with telescopic lens; one large portable metal box containing detective equipment, including fingerprint set; photographing and measuring devices; magnifying glasses and numerous other items.

6. M.D. VI Command Change. It has been reported that Lt Colonel George BELL, present commander of M.D. VI will have to give up his position because it calls for a Colonel and GS Officer as commander.

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1. 2 November 1957 SELL was to be replaced by C. by Colonel HARTM, who has recently completed the MAD training course. Colonel HARTM was formerly head of a unit in the "U" area.

2. MAD IV Personnel Change. Lt. Colonel Engelbert FUCHS has been appointed Executive Officer for MAD Group. He replaces [redacted] for Erwin RITZ who is now in charge of the CE Division. FUCHS recently had troop duty in the FRENCH area and the Intelligence field will be new to him. It is reported that he seems to be very pro-American. No other background material is available.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Liaison with German Federal Agencies.

a. A defective policy in the Personnel Security Screening Office was discussed with the German officials and the "flow" was resolved. It is expected to have a favorable effect on the issuance of security clearances under the "priority program". It should avoid any possible breach of German security regulations by officials involved in the program.

b. A priority program has been set up to clear approximately seventy (70) German officers and civilians for access to US SECRET information. These officials are scheduled to receive NIE training in the US prior to the West German Bundeswehr's appropriation of United States NIE facilities.

c. Normal liaison with the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (FV) is being maintained effectively. Contact with officials and staff members is continuous and cooperative.

d. The Liaison Officer to the FV at Bonn was invited to tour the new headquarters of the Security Group, Federal Criminal Police Agency in Bonn. Dr. Ernst FRUECHTER, Chief of the SG, expressed his appreciation for the interest and support rendered the SG by G2, USAFETM. The SG, through the FV, supplied several reports on targets of interest in connection with USAFETM's security.

e. Ministerialrat PREULL of the FRG Interior Ministry was contacted in assistance to WAREM and other ICC(G) components with the Legal Travelers exploitation program.

f. FV Personnel; Karl SCHULZ resigns his position in the FV.

(1) Karl SCHULZ was chief of the FV's Control Files from 1951 to 1957. It is reported that his resignation stemmed from criticism in the FV. His management of the control files was not considered efficient and there was considerable comment about the poor condition and organization of his section.

*Referenced  
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(2) Prior to his service with the LfV SCHULZ was employed by the "GEHELE" Organisation". It is reported that he has probably found employment now with the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), which is the agency that grew out of the old "GEHELE" Group.

4. (SECRET) LfV Activities

a. LfV BERLIN

(1) Attempted Recruitment of an LfV Employee by the NKS.  
LfV Berlin

(a) The NKS attempted to recruit Herr Registrierungsinspektor WILHELM FÖRTE, Chief of Department III/1 (radical left wing affairs), LfV BERLIN. Herr FÖRTE was contacted through his brother Gerhard FÖRTE of GERMIG, Anhalt, East Germany. The incident was reported immediately to Heinz WIECHMANN, Chief of the LfV, BERLIN.

(b) Gerhard FÖRTE was picked up by LfV officials disguised as West BERLIN police and interrogated. It is reported that he supplied pertinent information about the NKS. He was then given suggestions and told to report back to the NKS.

(c) Although the incident occurred in the US Sector of West BERLIN, Herr WIECHMANN had asked the British authorities to begin a technical coverage of Herr FÖRTE immediately. Upon inquiry, Herr WIECHMANN stated that the timeliness of the incident was of great importance and the British could initiate coverage much faster. He also indicated that the Senator of Interior, BERLIN had not been informed. He said the report would be made to the Senator when the interrogation of Gerhard FÖRTE was completed.

(d) This is just one of several incidents where Herr WIECHMANN has reportedly proceeded without notifying his superior or the III/1 authorities in a timely manner.

(2) Senator LIPSCHITZ to Travel. Senator of the Interior Joachim LIPSCHITZ, BERLIN, was scheduled to fly to Israel on 20 October 1957 for a two-week trip. He has also indicated that he will travel to the United States in January 1958.

(3) Heinz WIECHMANN Attends Meeting. Chief of the LfV, BERLIN, WIECHMANN left on 23 October 1957 to participate in a meeting at GUSLAF in the German Federal Republic. General Reinhold GEHELE, Chief of the German Positive Intelligence effort, was scheduled to speak. A large gathering of German Intelligence specialists, Federal Criminal Officials and Federal Border Police Officials were slated to be present. Since his return there has been no indication of what the content of GEHELE's speech was.

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b. LfV Rheinland/Pfalz; Technical Aids

(1) Bernhard KAESERGER, Chief of the LfV Rheinland/Pfalz has stated his desire to acquire a polygraph machine for use by the LfV. He said there is a definite need in his organization for such a machine to assist in difficult interrogations. KAESERGER has approached a firm in SWABIA that will sell the machine and also train an operator.

(2) The LfV has purchased a new type binocular-camera called a Caminox. The price was DM 1005.00. Herr (fnr) SCHLEICHER, Regierungs-  
sekretar, head of the research and file section of the LfV, announced that the camera has been used satisfactorily on several operational sur-  
veillances.

c. LfV Liaison with the BFV; Delimitations Agreement

(1) Hans-Einrich PIGHT, Chief of the LfV, Eiden-Wuerttemberg, has indicated that he is dissatisfied with the present degree of coopera-  
tion between his organization and the BFV. Herr PIGHT advocates that the  
LfV save out of operations and take over what he considers to be its proper  
function, the evaluation of LfV material and coordination of LfV operations.

(2) PIGHT announced that the local LfV has cooperated fully with the BFV in the CS field. Still, according to PIGHT, the BFV operates  
against local objectives without consulting the LfV. He added that the  
LfV photostats material to answer requests from the BFV's. The LfV's find  
that often they have already obtained the material from other sources, and  
the BFV does not include evaluations or additional material.

(3) PIGHT commented that the BFV studies on foreign in-  
telligence agencies and their operations are interesting and used for  
fiction purposes.

(4) Bernhard KAESERGER, Director, LfV Rheinland-Pfalz, has visited PIGHT several times since mid-August, 1957, and it is probable that  
one of the main topics of discussion has been the LfV, BFV delimitations  
agreement and the opposition of these two LfV Directors to the agreement.

1. LfV Saarland; Director, Herr Rudolf BECK

(1) Herr Rudolf BECK, replacement for Werner KLESER as  
Chief of the LfV Saarland, is a native of the Saarland. He holds the rank  
of Oberregierungsrat (Chief government councillor) und Kriminalrat  
(Criminal Councillor). These ranks are the highest attainable for both  
administrative and criminal police officers.

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(2) Before World War II, FECH was in the police, probably the criminal police, in the Saarland. During the war, he was in some type of intelligence activity in the Army, and for a time with a subordinate headquarters of the RSHA (Main Reich Security Office) at Stuttgart.

(3) Since the war, FECH has been active in the Saarland. He was chief of the Landstriminalpolizei (State Criminal Police) and Landstriminalamt (State Criminal Office), which were combined in the Saarland. He then was assigned as police adviser attached to the Staatsanwaltschaft (State Attorney's Office) in 1955. His position before entering the LfV was director of the police school in St. Ingbert.

(4) FECH has indicated that one of his major functions will be to represent the LfV in governmental and other external circles. The appointment of FECH as chief of both collection and evaluation in the LfV seems to bear out this fact. FECH has admitted only a very modest knowledge of counter-intelligence practices.

... Brief History of the LfV Saarland.

(1) During the period of French political domination of the Saar, a section of the Criminal Police designated as P-C functioned, under strict French control, as a "political police" with the primary task of controlling and reporting on the activities of the so-called "Kleinband Parteien" (Union with the Homeland Parties), which included the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the DPS (Democratic Party of the Saar), which represented the "back to Germany" movement in Saar politics. The inevitable result of this emphasis on right-wing targets was the neglect of left-wing activities, largely tolerated by the French in any case. Today, prominent Saarland police officials complain bitterly that any proposed demonstration of the pro-German parties was covered by 30 to 40 policemen by order of the French Surete (Security Service), whereas a similar CPS (Communist Party of the Saar) or front group demonstration was covered, if at all, by three to four officials. Counter-espionage was virtually unknown since French law considers espionage a political rather than a criminal offense.

(2) Communist and left-wing infiltrated groups, therefore, flourished in the Saar during this period and received additional support from special labor union groups principally from the so-called "Einheitsgewerkschaft" (Unity Labor Union), which moved into the Saar from France and which were affiliated with the French labor movement rather than with the DGE (German Federation of Trade Unions). In order to maintain the pretent fiction that Saarland Communist front organizations were distinct from their German sisters, the groups designated themselves slightly different and in most cases promoted the notion that they existed in the Saar as geographically and structurally distinct units having no organic relationship with the Germans. This was reflected in their names, KPS and DPS (Women's League of the Saar), and was advanced as an argument as late

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April 1957 in the IFS app. 1 in Karlsruhe, Germany against the ban of the party of 9 April 1957, and will probably be used again by the DFS and by the FDJ (Free Democratic Youth) when the proposed ban is pronounced against those groups.

(3) Although no documentary material has been obtained, there are indications that the anti-conspirative pro-German elements in the German informed private intelligence organizations with the cooperation of dissident elements within the local police organizations. Many of the contributors to this intelligence effort were former members of the Abwehr (German Counter Intelligence), SF (Security Service) and SS (Elite Guard), who had considerable experience in the field. It is probable that the leading police officials today, most of whom had World War II affiliations with the aforementioned organizations, were active in the conspirative effort and, insofar as they had secret functions within the French-controlled police, led double lives. This anti-private intelligence activity, conducted in anticipation of the Saarland's return to Germany, was apparently better coordinated to some extent through the police section of the Ministry of Interior on an unofficial "cooperative" basis after French influence.

(4) On 25 October 1955, the "5-year Statute" was made the issue of a plebiscite and resulted in a resounding defeat for the French and spelled the death both of French hopes for a separatist Saarland for the French-controlled CVP (Christian People's Party) government of Minister President Johannes BEFFHAHN. Shortly thereafter, Department II-E (Temporary LCV) was formed within the Saarland Ministry of Interior in recognition of the necessity for a counterintelligence organ within the Saarland as a framework for an eventual LCV to be established later by constitutional decree. The original members of Department II-E were selected from the Saarland Criminal Police, of whom was the first chief, Inspector (then Inspector) Walter SCHWARZ.

(5) In February 1956, Dr. Hubert HEY, then Minister President of the Saarland, personally requested Werner FLEISER to assume leadership of the organization. Beyond his pre-war and wartime experience in German intelligence, FLEISER had cooperated in an unofficial capacity with Department I-A (the coordinating agency mentioned in paragraph (3) above) and engaged in earlier conspirative work with the banned pro-German parties. Consequently, he was widely known in the Saarland and especially trusted by those politicians who had now replaced the French within the government. However, FLEISER, who was employed by a private firm as a print salesman since the French authorities had forbidden him to return to the police, did not feel that he could return to government service on such short notice or without specific guarantees and requested HEY to determine the civil service grade at which he would be re-assimilated. HEY subsequently informed him that he would receive his old rank of Criminal

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Kommissar and, apparently, gave him some assurance that he would be indicated for permanent appointment as chief of a formally constituted LFV. FLEMMER finally entered Department II-E in the Spring of 1956.

(6) FLEMMER alleges that upon his initial entrance as an observer, he found II-E in a deplorable state. Agent activities were haphazard, undisciplined, and uncontrolled; information collected was unreliable and of generally poor quality; and no clarity of concept existed with regard to II-E intelligence targets. According to FLEMMER, SCHWARZ and his agents operated under the assumption that, since the pro-German parties had been banned and exposed to continual suspicion and surveillance by French intelligence and Saarland agencies under French direction, it was incumbent on II-E to reverse the situation and concentrate its investigative efforts on pre-French or former pro-French Saarland politicians and police agents.

(7) Paving his ideas on the theory and practice of the AFV (Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) already in existence in the German Federal Republic, FLEMMER recommended that II-E be relieved of the responsibility for executive action in matters of subversion and espionage and suggested the formation of separate Kommissariat (Departments) with the LFA (State Criminal Investigation Office) to exercise this function. This suggestion was adopted in the creation of Kommissariat C2, LFA, and SCHWARZ was appointed temporary chief of the new section. In addition, this helped for a time to relieve the growing tension between SCHWARZ and FLEMMER.

(8) For the most part, FLEMMER inherited the old staff of II-E with the exception of "undesirables" side-tracked to I-12. He was financed by a special fund from the Ministry of Interior and granted considerable operational freedom, since few, if any, of his superiors were experienced in intelligence matters.

(9) Inevitably, FLEMMER and II-E experienced difficulty in obtaining recognition. Both the AFV in Cologne, Germany, and the LFVs seem to have had some misgiving about dealing with the agency, in part because of the objections voiced to FLEMMER's appointment due to his prior Gestapo and SS affiliations. Within the Saarland many political figures reacted strongly to any suggestion of a "political police", which to their minds smacked of the surveillance of themselves and their parties as practiced by the French. FLEMMER was, therefore, forced to spend a good deal of time and energy in "public relations", selling himself in the process and thereby without doubt furthering his own ambition to become permanent chief of the LFV.

(10) Department II-E of the Saarland Ministry of Interior was a branch of the Ministry parallel to the police sections of Department II and, like them, subordinate to the office of the Minister. From the time

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of its inception in January 1956, it was considered the forerunner of an actual LFV to be set up along the precedents already existing within the other federal states. However, although the theory may be clearly defined, the organization itself underwent a period of adjustment and readjustment and was still far from a state of maturity or stability to the point where the organization could be described with exactness before the LFV was formally incorporated.

(1) On 2 July 1957, the Landtag (Legislature) of the Saarland passed a bill authorizing the Council of Ministers to provide for and form an LFV through cabinet decree. Since that time, the Ministry of the Interior, which is directly responsible for the LFV took under consideration the basic questions such as personnel status, household and operational finance, and legal basis, all of which had to be incorporated into the final charter of the LFV. The decree that legally constituted the Saarland LFV was issued on 1 October 1957 and on this date the LFV became a fully recognized agency.

f. Dissension Within the LFV, Saarland

(1) It has been reported that there are indications of internal friction and struggle within the LFV, Saarland. Supposedly the trouble began when Rudolf FECH was appointed Chief of the LFV.

(2) The extent of the dissension has not been determined. It is felt by some officials that FECH had sympathies with the French authorities that will now be detrimental to the effectiveness of the LFV operations. It is alleged that FECH is not familiar with the intelligence field and was at one time opposed to the establishment of the LFV in the Saarland.

(3) Herr FLEMMER handles the actual operations of the organization. Most of the working files are always kept on their person by the members of the LFV. FECH allegedly does not have access to information concerning the sources of the LFV. FLEMMER was reported to have removed these files to his own office on the morning FECH assumed charge and to have told FECH they did not concern him.

(4) It is not known how much of a rift is developing between FECH and FLEMMER. It has been indicated there is a possibility that FLEMMER may not last much longer with the LFV, Saarland.

(5) It was indicated that there is a friend of FECH's being considered for an LFV position. Supposedly he will be named to head the Counter Espionage team. He is considered more pro-French than FECH and known to oppose the return of the Saarland to Germany. It is expected that if the appointment of this person goes through then there will be resignations and other changes in the LFV.

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7. Relations of the LfV Rhinland/Pfalz with the Federal Intelligence Agency (BND).

(1) Bernhard FAESBERGER, Chief of the LfV Rhinland/Pfalz, has expressed strong feelings about his people being contacted by other agencies at a local level. He has stated specifically that his employees have instructions not to deal with anyone, German or Allied, without his permission and doing so will be a violation of the LfV security and internal "modus operandi".

(2) FAESBERGER has been irked by the attempt of a BND official to recruit an LfV employee without his knowledge. FAESBERGER wrote a letter of complaint to the BND and wants it made clear that all agencies will have to deal with him. He showed the letter to allied officials to make clear the point that he is treating all people the same in this situation. Also, he wanted it known that there was no hostility in his action and he was anxious to maintain a mutually satisfactory system of cooperation with all other agencies.

h. LfV Hesse Personnel

(1) Miss Grete HEINER, acting Chief of Section I, LfV Hesse, has completed the Inspector's course given by the Land Hesse government. She ranked second in a class of twenty-three and obtained the highest average made by a woman taking the course. It was reported that after returning from her vacation she would take charge of Section IV and that Mr. Josef HEINZ would continue in Section I at least until the end of the year.

(2) Promotions recently in the LfV Hesse included Mr. Otto SCHLUCK, Chief Officer in Section III, to the rank of Forstler. Also promoted to Forstler was Mr. Ludwig GUNG, assistant chief of Section II.

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Dr. Ernst BRUECHNER

Chief, Security Group (SG), Federal Criminal Police Agency (BfA)

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Dr. Ernst BRUECHNER was born on 9 December 1909 in MAGDEBURG. His father was Paul BRUECHNER, a flower shop owner, who was killed in 1917. His mother was Helene BRUECHNER, nee PAARJANI. He is married to Elly BRUECHNER, nee DOERR, and they have three children, ages 6, 11 and 15 years.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Dr. BRUECHNER attended the Reform-Realgymnasium and the Deulgymnasium in Magdeburg. He went on to school at the Universities of Marburg and Halle where he studied political science, law and political economy. Dr. BRUECHNER speaks fluent English and has a school knowledge of French. On 1 June 1933 he took the state examination in HAUBURG and received a grade of "satisfactory". He completed the state examination in BERNIN on 6 July 1937 and was given a grade of "satisfactory".

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Dr. BRUECHNER was given his first appointment on 2 August 1933 as "Referendar". Following promotions were:

3 February 1938: "Probensassor"  
 11 January 1939: "Gerichtssassor"  
 1 October 1939: "Staatsanwalt"

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) Dr. BRUECHNER's employment history includes:

Date	Activity	Place
1933 - 1937	Apprenticeship as Referendar (included leave of absence to work on his doctorate.)	Courts & Public Prosecutor's office in Eszirk of the Oberrandengericht in HAUBURG
20 July 37 - 7 Nov 37	Assistant "in hoheren Justizdienst" (district attorney)	Public Prosecutor's Office, TORGAU
8 Nov 37 - 30 Nov 37	Assistant "in hoheren Justizdienst" (district attorney)	Public Prosecutor's Office, HALLE

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Place</u>
15 Dec 37 - 2 Jan 38	Assistant "in mittleren Justizdienst" ("Amtsrat")	Public Prosecutor's office, KORBHUSEN
1 Oct 38 - 31 Jan 39	Administration of Judge's office.	Landgericht MAGDEBURG
1 Feb 39 - 2 Aug 53	District attorney (1947-52 in charge of political offenses; since 1952 in charge of economic offenses of special importance.)	Prosecuting authorities, ITZEHOE
3 Aug 53 -	Division chief of the Bundeskriminalamt	BKA, Wiesbaden, SG headquarters in BORN

5. (CONFIDENTIAL) Dr. BRUECKNER entered the SA on 10 October 1937 and earned the rank of Sturmann. On 1 October 1937 he entered the former NSDAP; he did not hold any offices. He was not employed by any offices of the Gestapo or the SD. On 2 March 1948 his denazification was certified under the category "Entlastet".

6. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reports have indicated that since Dr. BRUECKNER became Chief of the SG, BKA he has been cooperative and just in his dealings with the allied agencies. He is considered a competent and effective leader for the SG.

7. (SECRET) Dr. BRUECKNER made a trip to the United States in October 1954. Upon his return to Germany he expressed enthusiasm over his trip and admiration for the United States. He is held in high esteem by the Federal Interior Ministry. Despite his comparative youth Dr. BRUECKNER had been considered at one time as a possibility for Chief of the FIV to succeed Otto JOHN.

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Richard Georg Heinrich GERVEN

Head, Dept. IV (Counterespionage), EFV

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Richard GERVEN was born 19 March 1900 in  
KLEIN, Germany. He holds the rank of Hauptsturmführer.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) He attended elementary school in KLEIN from  
1907 to 1912. He was in Burgschule in KLEIN from 1912 to 1914. From  
1914 to 1916 GERVEN was an unpaid assistant with the W LFF Co. in  
KLEIN.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) In 1916 he began pre-school training for non-  
commissioned officers. He then attended police schools, criminal police  
specialist courses and the advanced police officers' school in EICHE. He  
also received training at the Polizeipolizeis in MÜNCHEN. At this same  
time he was working in the capacity of a police official.

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) In 1939 he was assigned with the Abwehr and re-  
mained with that group until his capture by the British in 1945. He was  
detained in Great Britain until 1947. During the war he spent most of his  
time in Holland and Belgium but also traveled in several other  
European countries. He applied for membership in the NSDAP in May 1933 but  
his membership was unconfirmed and he was refused a membership book. He  
has no affiliation with other NSDAP associated organizations.

5. (CONFIDENTIAL) GERVEN was unemployed from 1947 to June 1948 and  
then entered the service of the Rheinland/Westphalen Interior Ministry in  
DÜSSELDORF until March 1950. From March 1950 to 1952 he was employed by  
the EFV headquarters in MÜNCHEN as Foreign Service Director. In 1952  
he entered the EFV organization.

6. (CONFIDENTIAL) In January 1955 GERVEN had a nervous breakdown.  
It was reported that the cause was probably censure and criticism to  
which GERVEN had been subjected due to some errors in his direction of  
Department II. He returned to work in March 1955, although there had been  
considerable rumor about his being replaced by someone else.

7. (SECRET) GERVEN has been described in the following manner by a  
member of the EFV who has associated with him. "Department II Chief GERVEN  
is incapable of directing a department. His attitude and character do not  
suit him for more than the position of a good case officer or section head.  
Although not inherently malicious, he has listened to cronies who have given  
him poor counsel and led him into many intrigues. He is now too securely  
in the hands of these cronies to overcome their influence on him." Despite  
criticism and apparent disappointment by some EFV members, GERVEN has held  
onto his job as a Department chief."

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9. (CONFIDENTIAL) GERIE: has a colloquial knowledge of Dutch, learned while he was in HOLLAND during the war. He also has a school knowledge of English, undertaken while he was a PW in Great Britain.

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