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UBJET: Cinterrogation seport of General Samoto (1905). (Chapter 6, Polish 1.3.; 20 July 1945).

ASTE ERCS: Our Top Secret 294-

1. We attach copies of the subject duspter for your inferention and such action that you feel may be appropriate.

2. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that CONT does not wish Peter IW-303 to be approached or interrogated at this stage.

3. The attached chapter is perhaps the most valuable of the reference report. It contains not any our first really dired, sutheritative and quantitative svidence on Folish-Jupanese collaboration and espienege during and since the war, but also a member of premising operational loads.

4. Your reactions and cosmonts will be greatly appreciated.

5. Please clear any dissemination that you may desire to make in the field with this Beauguarters.

Atlachments (3)	DESENSITIZES
C: Out (cover letter only)	
Kalisie - intelle	
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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy (2)(B) Methods/Sources (2)(G) Foreign Relations (1)	Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2001 , 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT



The Polish Intelligence Larvice

1. Background of Collaboration

The origin of collaboration between the Polish and Japaness General Staffs dates back to the Russo-Japanese war and is based on a common hatred of Ressia. In Europe it began early in the sentury between General Baron ANASHI who was military attache in Stockholm and General PILSUDSXI. A further tie was provided by officers who had been prisoners of war in Jupan and who had been so kindly treated by the Japanese that they formed a club and later when Japanese officers came to Poland as diplomatic representatives, they more often entertained by its members. A member of the JARUBIC family belonged to this slub and when Gol. SASAKI visited Poland he was invited to stay with them. (HONERA says there were many similar cases. (He adds that it was formerly a Japanese tradition to treat prisoners well and that he was profoundly aboaked to hear what had happened during World Sar II). Active collaboration between the two scuntries on a military basis began immediately after the last war, when PILSUDERI was president of Poland. ONODERA does not know the details of what took place at that time. He says that General YAMAMAKI and General FUITCORA are well informed in this regard.

Until 1959 the center of Japanese intelligence activity against Resein was always in the Parson military attache's office. An arrangement existed whereby Japanese officers were pariodically sent to Feland to study Ressian eedes with the Felich General Staff crypto-analytical section. ORODERA sites the following Japanese officers who were trained according to this agreement:

> General HYARUTAKE in the late 1920's General OKUBO



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
Col. SALAI (decommed) in the ourly 1930's COL. EUDOO UOL. SAKURAI 1936-36 Col. MIKAT

The origin of the Japanese system of analysis and compilation of material from the press and its suscessful use for intelligence purposes---which was practiced so extensively during the war---was also learned from the Poles. Col. KOMALKSKI. on authority on this system who had visited Japan and was later Polish military attache in Poltugal, was their teacher. In exphange for instruction in these motters the Japanese undertook to supply the Peles with Russian code intercepts and other intelligence material obtained from the Far East.

2. World Mar IT

As a result of this background of cooperation, when Poland was compied by the Germans and the Russians in 1939, and the Polish General Staff forced to take refuge in London, Col. GANO, the head of the P.I.S. proposed to Col. UEDA, Japanese Military attachs in Marsaw, that the J.I.S. take over the Polish intelligence organizations against Russia and Germany. This offer was efficielly refused by Tokyo Headquarters because of their ellignee to Germany. However, individual Japanese and Polish officers in Europe continued to work together under cover and Poles who had stayed behind on the continent were given Japanese or Manshurian passports and employed in the Subassies and Consulates.

> rishing to take every advantage of the possibilities of this collaboration in 1940, Col. GANO sent a Polish intelligence mission to Japan to collaborate with the Japanese throughout the Far Bast. The only name which



ONODERA remembers in this group is that of Lieutenent SKORA who he thinks was connected with crypto-analysis.

3. "PIOTRE IMANOS"

QNODERA's own successful and extensive collaboration with the Poles, was centered around a Polish General Staff officer who worked with him in his office for three and a half years. This happened in the following way. then GHODERA arrived in Stockholm, he found collaboration between the Japanese and the Poles already established and functioning. It has been arranged in 1940 by Col. GANO and Col. MISEMURA, ONODERA's predecessor. the had agreed that a former P.I.S. officer, MICEAEL RUBIKONSKI (RTBICKOWSKI ?) who had formerly been the head of the German section and one of Gago's best assistants should be given a Manshurian passport and a cover job in a Japanese military attache's office. At first he had been assigned to Gol. CNORCHI's office in Rigs. (See Reference B). Later when this was elosed as a result of the Russian invesion of the Baltic countries, he moved to Stechholm. When he arrived in Sweden there were two other Poles, WASLAW G/LEWICZ? GIHEVITCH and KORAR, who were also working there. They controlled an espionage group in Copenhagen and the original plan had been for all three to remain and work against Cormany and Rudsia. However, GIREVITCH was compromised when one of his agents was arrested by the owedue in Goteburg. As a result, he was obliged to cease his activities and, evantually want to Angland in 1941. Thus, RUBIKOWSKI remained as the only P.I.S. representative. In order to secure additional cover he obtained a false Aussian passport in the name of PIOTRE INANOW from Finland, where he had contacts in the Finnish police. He had previously been using the alias MICHAILOISKY.



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OBODERA worked with him on the most intimate terms until the spring of 1944 and refers to him as his "Chief of Staff." Although HUBIKONERI was employed in his office, he allowed him absolute independence in his intelligence activities and deliberately remained ignorant of the details of many of his operations. His two main targets were always Russis and Germany. He never gave OFODERA any information about the western Allies and UNODERA says that he never asked for any.


4. Contact with London

Through EUBIKOWSKI, ONODERA was several times in direct contact with General SIXORSKI and the Polish General Staff in London, even after a state of way existed between their two countries. In 1948 when Poland declared way and the Polish mission in Japan more shlighed to leave, two of the officery, SKORA and one other, made known their desire to remain in the Far East and continue their work against Russia in secret, but still in collaboration with the Jupaness. The request that this be allowed was forwarded to Pelish Handquarters in London through (NODERA's office. Within a short time General STECRENI answered that permission was given in accordance with the long tradition of collaboration between Poland and Japan. On another estancion CNODERA received a large number of paper roubles from Generaty. He wanted to send these to Moseow and MURIEOWEKI undertook to do it for him through the Polish diplomatic courier. This strongt was unsuccessful because the money was intercepted by the British at Gibralter and was returned to Stockholm. Information gathered by the Polish sission in Moscow also reached ONODERA's office. Further details regarding this will be given below.



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5. The Polish-Japanese Organization.

RUBIKONSEI had extensive connections with agents in Russia and throughout nort eastern Europe. In cooperation with CHODERA he used the Japanese diplomatic missions and their courier system to transmit reports from these agents back to his London headquarters. In exchange for this service he undertook to share the contents of the reports.

The Japanese offices which played a part is this system were located in Germany, the Baltic countries, and Finland. Berlin was the control and most active elearing-point. There, another P.I.S. officer, JAKUBIC alias RUBC2INVIC2, had been given a Japanese passport and worked in the imbasey with attaches MICRA and ISHIDA. He was assisted by a Polish women maned LAPIRSMA, who had a job as secretary in the Manchurian Legation where she worked with First Secretary HOSHINO, attaches KASAI and YAMADA, and sometimes L'KAGANA, the Manchurian Consul in Hamburg. HOSHINC was a cover name used by General AKIEUSA, one of the best Japanese specialists on Russian intelligence who had been sunt to Berlin as a Manchurian diplomet with a special mission to work through the Peles against Russia. He travelled back and forth frequently between Berlin and Mursaw. In Rosnigsberg the office of the Japanese Consul, SUGIMARA was used. By had formerly taught Russian in the Japanese language school in Harbin, where KASAI and TAMADA had been his pupils. In Rigs, before the Russian occupation, and later in Helsinki, ONCHER forwarded the reports through the Japanese courier to Stockholm. a series and the series of the OBODERA gives the following secount of what he knows of these

organizations.

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a. South eastern Russia.

After the defeat of Poland in 1939 a group of Polas took refuge



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in the Ural and Caucasus region. Among them were former members of the P.I.S. who had been briefed and organized by GANO and RUBIKOWSKI before their departure. RUBIKOWSKI tried to estublish communications with them from Stockholm. However, this preved too difficult and so a description of the organization and the list of agent's makes were sent to Tokyo. GRODERA does not know how this was used by the Japanese, but he thinks that limison with the group must have been made by the Japanese ullitary attache in Persia or Turkey. General ISCHERA, the military attache in Ankars, probably would have been in charge of this at the time.

b. Bialistok, Minak, and Smolensk.

A network in this region where Bialistok had long been a center of P.I.3. activity was organized by Col. GANO in 1939. HUBIKOWSKI arranged for the information gathered by the agents to be picked up at railway stations by the Japanese couriers travelling back and forth between Tokyo, Mossow, and Berlin. In Germany it was reserved by JAEUBIC in the Berlin Embessy. He forwarded it to Stockholm and from there it want to London.

This system functioned successfully through 1940 until one of the couriers missed a connection and contact was lost. A plan was made to runew it by sending to Moscow, a P.I.S. officer whose sover name was THYMAS, from Warsaw, where he had remained since 1939. All preparations to do this had been ecuplated including the password by which he was to contact YAMAOKA, Japanese military attache in Moscow, when the outbreak of the Musso-Germen war made it impossible.



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o. Poland; Resistance Movement.

Information obtained from the folish underground also reached London through J.JUBIC, RUBIED SEL, and their Japanese collaborators. It was gathered in the Manchurian Consulate General in marsaw under the direction of AKIKUS - HOSPHING by "THOMAS" and MISCHNIZHITSCH, one of two Polish brothers, who spoke Japanese and who had formerly been employed in the Japanese Ambassy, and forwarded through the Japanese couriers to Berlin. The Manchurians carried on the limited in Warsew because their Consulate remained open after the Japanese Embassy had closed down. This source want out of wristence at the beginning of 1942.

d. Kampas and Kosnigsberg.





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who had both moved to Stockholm. These reports covered Russian



movements in Lithuania, their army and air force and German troop concentrations.

In April 1941 JAKUBIC was errested in Berlin by the B.C. His interrogation revealed the whole network including Jupenese participation and the role of the so-called "Isald " is stockholm. At about this time ONCOMES relates that be planned to take METRONSEI with him on a trip to Berlin. The latter's visa had been obtained from the Germans with such facility that Would's became suspicious. On examining it and comparing it with his own, he found that it had a special murking. As a result of this RUBIRONARI thought it wiser to remain is Stockholm. Shen CAUDERA arrived in Borlin, he was told of JARDBIC's arrest. LAPINSKA was also arrested and in her possession the Germans found a hair brush handle of which sontained misrofilm of a report on the order of battle of the German Army on the Eastern Front. UNDDERA was shown this by ROHLEDER as proof that the Poles had been working against the Germans. He leter heard that PLAS had escaped and reached Turkey.

The German government protected cfricially to GERINA, the Japanese embassedor, who according to UNUMER., is order to alser himself put the blame on the office of the military attache in Stockholm. OMODER, says that he immediately telegraphed to Tokyo demending to be recalled and threatening to commit hari-kiri if this were not done. The answer took a long time to come and by the time it did the attack on Peerl Karbor had taken place and






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ONOUGRA was busy with other matters.

RUBLEC: SXI remained in his office is spite of the Sermans who never caused their pressure for his dismissed. MACHER, the shief of K. G. Schweden, case to OKOBER) and demanded a list of "EMANOR's" agents in Germany and Poland, threatening to protest to Tokyo through REBENTRON or KEITEL if it was not given. ONOLERA ignored this demand and it was not until almost three years later that the Swedich government intervened and RUBINGUEXI was expelled. Note: Although CHODERA claims to be ignorant of further details concerning SUGHERA's organization the account which he has given definitely confirms the evidence obtained from the Sipe letter to OGENING of July 1941, quoted in Reference A, pages 8 and 31. Suguries as to SUGHERA's present wherebouts have been made at the Japanese Foreign Office by this Readquarters. The enswer was that be had remeined in Roumanis.

e. Belsinki.

RUBIKOWSKI had two sources in Finland. One was a Polish T///) office: named RUARA who received information from agents in Emssia. The other was the F.I.S. shere he was in contact with POTEONEN, PAASOMEN's assistant in charge of espionage. CNODERA knows no details of this relationship nor of the type of information explange.

Before the Russian invasion of the Baltie countries, RUBIKOWSKI received the information in Riga. Later, lisison was carried out by .ULIO (sover name SCHAIDT) who frequently came to Stockholm for that purpose. Many of the reports from Helsinki



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were sent to Stockholm through CNOUCHI and the Japanese diplomatic bag, and others, Obolinka thinks, through United states diplometic couriers. He explains this by the fact that American officials in Sweden and Finland were also interested in Aussian intelligence. The Finnish organization functioned until August 1944.

f. Barne.

There were two Polish agents at Merwa. They covered Russian troop movements and transportation of war material and sent their reports to Belsinki through AMLIG. Later, after 1940, they established in direct communication with Britain over the northern route.

g. Riga.

Two Poles worked for RUBIKO-SKI in Latvia. They were NUBRIHUITZ and a woman whose name began with "N" and ended with "KA". (See also Reference 2). Before 1940 they were in direct contect with HUBIKONSKI and OHORHG. After the Specian invacion they communicated through AULIC and Estor on sailors in MAASING's ormanization. They coased operations after the beginning of the Esses-German war.

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In Angust 1941 when Generel SIKORSKI's government sent an official mission to Moscow for the first time, a P.I.S. officer accompasied them. He was able to send information through to London whence it went to UNUMERA in Stockholm through the Polish diplematic bag. This source produced excellent information





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until 1942 when it was compromised through Russian penetration of Polish codes. (See below B nos. 1,2,3,4, & 5.)

ONODERA mays that the Poles believed for a while that the enuse of this had been a lack which occurred when the Japanese pussed on the information to the Germans, however, the evidence subsequently given at the trials of the people involved revealed that it had been through the codes.

6. Recelts.

CHOINCRA was given the fallowing information from reports which HUBIKOWSKI received from these sources:

- A. February to June 1941:
 - 1. Hunsian troop movements in Lithuanis, Latvia, and East Foland.
 - 11. The concentration of German forces in kast Prussia and near . Baroaw.
 - iii. The establishment of German air bases in Poland.

Note: Through reports if and iff, OMONER: was able to shack and confirm other information which revealed the German plan to attack Russis.


iv. Figures on railroad transportation of Russian troops and war materials in Eastern Poland.

B. July 1941 to December 1948.

- i. The Russian operational plan for the "Central Front".
- 11. Reports on Russian General Staff conversations in Ostober 1941. These gave an account of the discussion between







UTALIN, who wanted to defend Messow at all costs, and TINOSHERKO, who wanted to retreat behind the Volga.

- iii. Movement of Russian reserves called back from the Volgm line to defend Kosecow (winter 1941-1942).
- iv. Russian General Staff estimates of German operations in 1962. (STALD: feared a German attack spainst the left wing of the Moscow front)
- v. Russian plans is the spring of 1942 for strategic retreat to the Don-Stalingrad-Volga-Kaban line.
- vi. Reports concerning the removal of Russian war industry to the Ural region.
- 0. After 1942
 - 1. Prequent reports giving ostinates of Russian strategic reserves.

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- 11. Ressian troop movements on north-eastern and central fronts.
- 111. Order of battle of the German Army.
- iv. Prequent reports with estimates of the production of German war industries.

In addition to providing facilities for communication, CHODERA

gave the roles information under the following headings:

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- 1. Russian troop novements is Surops and Asia. From Tokyo, German, Hungarian, and Finnish sources.
- 11. der potential of the USER. From Tokyo and German sources.
- 111. Order of battle of the Russian Army. From German sources.
- iv. Technical developments in Germany and Russia. From German sources.

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7. The Expulsion of "INAMON"

At the beginning of 1944 the Germans finally succeeded in obtaining Smediah support for the exputation of HURIKOWSKI. General KHARIM came to OROMERA privately and told him that the Smedish government had positive evidence that "IMANGS" was an international syy-----working for all, against all-----and that unloss ONOMERA promised to get rid of him at once, the government would take official setion. GNOMERA tried in vaim to get this decision changed by appealing to PETERSEN and KARDP. He was fimally obliged to arrange for HURIKOWSKI's departure. He at first considered anding him to Finland, where PAASONEN was willing to receive him but after several months, he want to England, and later to Italy. ONOMERA's last message from him was received just before repatriction and same from the Hendquarters of General ANDERS' AFMY.

8. The STEPHAN SONTOO.

Before leaving RUBIKOdEEI made an agreement to send CHODERA information from England for which he was to be paid in dellars. His reports were to be signed "JUHARNSON" and were to be handed to CHODERA by BRAERNINSEL or one of his assistants. CHODERA was to reach HUBIKOdEEI through a Pole named STAPHAN GADOMERI. His letters were to be inscribed with three names: Mr. MENG, BZABA, and STEPHAN. ONODERA reacted about 25 letters from this source.

At first in the summer of 1944 the information was good. It concerned Allied military activities in India and Burns. At the end of the year it began to deteriorate. The reports then told of an impending dritish attack on Bornso which was belied by all other developments of the war. They gave much information about Japanase war crimes, and stories about the low morals of the







Japanese troops. At this time ONODARA became sonvinced that he was receiving deception material, however, he continued to send monsy, paying in all about 10,000 American dollars for the information. He feels sure that it all went to the British, but he declares himself more than happy to have paid this price for the entry of RUBIKOWSKI into Great Britain. After three and a half years working in a Japanese office it was swident that some price would have to be paid. ONODERA says that at heart, he would much pather think of RUBIKOWSKI as having sent deception material, and thus rumnined to the end, leval to the same of the western Allies.

9. Contacts after V & Day

After the German surrender ONODERA received occasional personal letters from MOBINOWCHI and two messages from Gel. GANO. They all came through BRZESIMINERI's effice. One of GAND's messages announced the impending Ressian declaration of war against Japan, and the other gave details of the movement of ten Ressian divisions to the Far Eastern front.

10. After V J Day

CNORERA's contacts with the Pules continued even after the Japanese surrender. He mays that in October 1945 BREZESEVINSKI came to see him on behalf of Col. GARO, asked if he was in mood of money, and said that if he was not on good terms with the new Japanese government, the Poles would take eare of him and his family. Later, when the Japanese repatriation party was in Haples, CHODERA was interviewed by a Franch colonel mamed GODEFROT who showed him a latter from Col. GABO recommending the best treatment for CHODERA-----"a faithful friend of Poland." He has absolute confidence in his prestige with the Poles and offers to use it in establishing a working sontact between them and United States services.



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11. STACHUNIAK & DONGA.

ONODERA mays that in 1944, a young Pole who gave his name as DONGA came to the military attuche's office and was interviewed by KIGOSHI. He emid that he had escaped from Poland and was on his way to America. He offered his services to the Japanese. KIGOSHI introduced him to ONODERA, but he made a very bad impression and it was decided to break off contact immediately. ONODERA denies that DONGA told him anything about having formerly worked for the Abushr or being directed to Stockholm by the Japanese military attache's office in Berlin.

12. Japaness specialists.

ONDERA has supplied the following list of Japanese officers who have all been at one time on duty as military attaches in Poland and should be informed of Polich activities in the Far East during the war.

- Note: The manue of those considered to be aspecially well qualified are marked with an asteriak.
- "In joy General YAMAKAKI Masstaka, Swice on duty in Poland, first in the twenties and again from 1934 to 1936. Later commanded the Japanese forces in Borneo (?)
- Col. General OKABE Recombure. Tempher in the war college on duty in Poland during the twenties.


Lt. General HIROCHI Kiichiro. In Poland during the twenties.

Intelligence officer. At the end of the war commendar in Morth Japan (7)

Lt. General SUZUKI Shigeyasu.

In Paland about 1929, operations officar.





*Lt. General HATA Eikosaburo.

On duty in Poland 1930 to 1932. Intelligence officer, organization specialist. Sorked in Russian section of Dapt. II. Later assistant military attache in Moscow, 1936.

Lt. General YAEADIDA Genzoo.

On duty in Foland 1938 to 1934. Chief of Japanese military intelligence in Earbin, 1940 (?)

Lt. General YUJITSUKA

Assistant to YANADIDA in Warsaw. Intelligence officer, Ressian specialist. Said to know a lot about penstration of the U.S.S.R.

Lt. General SAMADA Skigere

On duty in Poland 1936 to 1938. Intelligence officer. At the end of the war, commander in Shanghai (?)

"Majar General UEDA Massa

On duty in Poland 1938 to 1939. Cooperated closely with Col. GMRO. Intelligence efficer, worked in General Staff, Dept. 2, Emasian section.

"Majer General FUJITSUKA

Military attache to Romania, 1939 to 1942. Well informed on . Polish collaboration with the Japanese in south eastern Europe.

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