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COUCH 881

12267

10 July 1946.

TO : SAINT, WASHINGTON
FROM : SAINT, LONDON *JS*
SUBJECT: Polish-Japanese Intelligence Collaboration
during Wartime.
REF. : Your X 4889.

1. We have just received that attached statement written out by Capt. Joachim HORNLEDER of Abw/Abt/III F during the course of his recent interrogation. In view of the obvious identity of the KUNCEWICZ and IVANOV of this report with the KUROBNIQZ (FA-5692) and PETROW (F-6930) of your referenced report, we are forwarding copies in partial answer to the general questions.

2. Further questions for HORNLEDER have been prepared and despatched to MAOR through the BB-landers.

Attachment (1)

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TION BASED ON THIS INFORMATION

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Washington, D. C.

COUNTRY: Japan, Germany.

SUBJECT: Japanese wartime collaboration with the German Intelligence Service.

NOTE: This account is supplementary to the more general one given on pages 29-30 of Reference (a) and should therefore be used in conjunction with the latter.

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1940-1945

EVALUATION: 9-2 except as otherwise indicated.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Japanese wartime Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe: SSU, 30 September 1945, DB #1225.
- (b) ONODERA, Major General Makoto — Biographical Sketch of: SSU, 25 September 1946, DB #1226.
- (c) OHNOUCHI, Major General Hirose, et al. — Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 25 September 1946, DB #1229.
- (d) IMAGAKI Ichichi et al. — Biographical Sketches of: SSU, 27 September 1946, DB #1246.
- (e) Wartime Communication Facilities of the Japanese Military Attaches at Stockholm and Helsinki: DB #1234. Peace
- (f) March 1945 Attempt by VON RIBBENTROP to Secure a Separate between Germany and the USSR through Japanese Intermediaries: DB #1240.

1. The following information was obtained from indicated subjects of References (b) and (c) during their interrogation at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo (ONODERA from 6 May - 20 July 1946, OHNOUCHI from 3 June - 20 July), by a representative of SSU.

2. Page, paragraph and line numbers hereinafter used as subject headings (as well as otherwise unidentified page references within the text) refer to Reference (a), and items appearing beneath such headings may be considered as footnotes to or combinations of corresponding items in Reference (a).

28/ONODERA/1/10-11 and below (CANARIS, NACHTER); 15/3/6-7

In 1941 the Germans arrested and interrogated the Pole JAKUBIC, thereby confirming their suspicions of anti-German activity on the part of RYBICKOWSKI in ONODERA's office. On this occasion CANARIS proved his friendship for ONODERA by doing everything he could to protect the latter's position with the Germans. Whether or not CANARIS' support was a decisive factor, RYBICKOWSKI was able to remain at work in ONODERA's office for nearly three years thereafter and until persistent pressure by NACHTER and others resulted in Swedish intervention and his dismissal.

DB #1239

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28/ONODERA/4/1-2, 6/3-4

These reports from KRAMER were conveyed to ONODERA by WENZELAU.

28/ONODERA/5

early in 1945 ONODERA proposed that he and KRAMER pool their sources and share expenses. ONODERA refused to comply because of his general distrust of the Germans and because he had a low opinion of the abilities of KRAMER's Russian specialist, WENZELAU. Later, at the time of the German defeat, KRAMER and ONODERA agreed that the latter should be given all of the former's sources; however, KRAMER left Sweden early in May 1945 without taking any definite steps to carry out the agreement, and did not return. WENZELAU undertook to do so in KRAMER's absence but was prevented by being sent to an internment camp. Although ONODERA never obtained any accurate information about these sources, he believes them to have been Swedish because both KRAMER and WENZELAU spoke of handing them over when all their communications with other countries had ceased. He also recalls that KRAMER mentioned to him early in 1945 that a good source in Sweden cost 10,000 Kroner a month.

ONODERA says that KRAMER was generally contemptuous of German intelligence work in the Iberian peninsula but that he never told ONODERA anything specific about his sources there.

In January 1945 KRAMER approached ONODERA with a request that the latter arrange for sources among the Poles; large sums of money were mentioned. At about the same time he also tried to persuade ONODERA to act as intermediary for the Germans in buying information from the Gaullist GARHNER. In March 1945 KRAMER and WENZELAU tried to get ONODERA to put them in touch with HALLANNA and the Finnish refugee crypto-analysis group. ONODERA maintains that on all three occasions he took no steps to satisfy the Germans and made no promises to do so.

ONODERA believes that KRAMER got the best of the bargain in their exchange of intelligence. The most important items among those with which ONODERA furnished him (U.S., British and French troop movements; military and political developments in Finland; Soviet troop movements on the Finnish front; etc.) were four Soviet codes: one NKVD five-digit code with complete analysis, another with incomplete analysis and two military combat communication codes, possibly for tank units. ONODERA says that he gave the Germans only the analytical, working material, never the descriptive method. He had strict orders from Tokyo to this effect. He denies categorically ever having given KRAMER material from decoded Swiss or Swedish telegrams, or codes of other European countries. The former he never received from HALLANNA and the Finnish crypto-analysis group; the latter he did receive on microfilm and offer to KRAMER in exchange for having it developed and printed, but KRAMER delayed so long in accepting that ONODERA sent the microfilm to Finland for processing and did not himself receive the prints until July 1945, long after KRAMER had left Sweden. (See pages 42-46 & 49 for mention of intelligence which ONODERA obtained from KRAMER.)

29/ONODERA/6/3-5

I.e., because the anti-German nature of some of RIBIKOWSKI's activities had been revealed by JAKURIC under interrogation.

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29/ONODERA/5/10-13

The reason for this roundabout liaison was the Germans' fear of attracting the attention of Swedish authorities to their intelligence connection with the Finnish refugees in Sweden. The Swedish Government particularly wished at the time to avoid any situation which might give the Soviets a justifiable cause for exerting pressure.

In the proposed system of communication, messages from CELLARIUS were to come from Berlin in the Japanese diplomatic pouch; HALLSTROM was to use his accustomed channels with ONODERA, a member of his Finnish group calling on the latter at regular intervals; ONODERA could also contact KILBENIUS (page 23) by telephone, addressing him as "CARLSON." ONODERA was to share any of the results obtained.

Before the system had a chance to take effect, HALLSTROM discovered a clandestine W/T set operated against the Finns by CELLARIUS' former secretary in Helsinki, and thereafter deliberately avoided any contact with CELLARIUS. His liaison man had called on ONODERA only once, and although ONODERA was in touch with KILBENIUS several times the latter quit after waiting four months and receiving only 500 Kroner from the Germans in compensation for his part in the scheme.

29/ONODERA/6/10-11

About this same time (October 1944) HORN approached ONODERA, again on behalf of CELLARIUS, to receive a passport which ONODERA had promised to issue for MILAU, one of CELLARIUS' Finnish W/T operators who was to have worked for the Japanese after the Finnish surrender.

29/ONODERA/5 (cont. on 30)

In the autumn of 1944, as it became increasingly apparent that the Germans would soon be obliged to leave Norway, ONODERA decided to try to take over and run from Stockholm the agents who the Abwehr was operating out of Norway and Denmark. To propose and discuss this plan with VON BOMM, VON CALLEN, and ROHLER and SALZINGER of Abwehr IIIIF, he went to Oslo in September 1944 and to Copenhagen in November. ROHLER and SALZINGER came from Berlin headquarters especially for one of the meetings. The Germans agreed to accept his plan and an arrangement was made through which ONODERA would receive the names of agents and a W/T communication system. In return he agreed to supply Abt III with information concerning Soviet espionage activities in Stockholm. He claims to know nothing about the cover name "OBKRJABER" which was allegedly assigned to him. ONODERA says that his own illness early in 1945 and the subsequent development of the war prevented the plan from materializing. (Had he succeeded in this effort to take over the Ast Oslo espionage organization, ONODERA would have used the first of the two W/T sets described on page 3 of Reference (e).)

In December 1944 ONODERA planned with VON CALLEN to send four Polish agents to the United States and Great Britain. VON CALLEN, who is half Polish, was to do the recruiting in Germany and see that the agents got as far as Stockholm, where ONODERA was to make all other arrangements. VON CALLEN gave him a list of names of which he professes to remember only one: Frau VON HANUR (?). He recalls that the brother of the Polish Ambassador to Turkey was also mentioned. The German surrender occurred before any action could be taken (evaluate B-3).

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30/ONOUCHI/2

ONOUCHI took over a German W/T set from GELLARIUS. See DN #1234, page 3.

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