

SECRET

032/8/48

BP

PF 600,059

INTERROGATION REPORT

Personal Particulars.

Name: CELLARIUS Christian Name: ALEXANDER

Aliases: C. KELLER and CORELL (Not used since 1941) @ Capt. Nocken

Date and place of birth: <sup>born</sup> 2 February 1898 at TROIZKI, Russia.

Nationality: German. (i.e. GERMANY)

Occupation: Merchant (diploma) IN CHARGE of KC (AMBUCH)

Rank: Prog. Kapt. FINLAND AND ESTONIA.

Height: 1m 79cm

Hair: Grey at temples, going bald.

Photograph: Build: Slim.

Face: Oval, has had beard since beginning of year.

Eyes: Pale blue.

Last Permanent Address: Christianslust, SUEDEBARROP, near SCHLESWIG.

Languages: Fluent Russian, some Finnish, Swedish and English (very little)

Father: Alexander, late company director. Deceased.

Mother: Vera, nee MALISCHEN, Russian Nationality at birth. Deceased.

Brothers and sisters:

Georg - killed in action 1915.

Margarete, married surname SUCKAU, believed to be still in Berlin.

Leo - director of GEMINDER & CO. GMBH, Spinners and dyers, REUTLINGEN. Address: Beethoven Str. 39, REUTLINGEN. Was called to the Wehrmacht at the beginning of 1944 and was last seen April 1945.

Wife: Gertrude, nee EBEL, believed to be still living at Berlin with his sister and mother in law. No children.

Identity documents:

Soldbuch Nr. 547 - Kennkarte, issued by Police at SUEDEBARROP on the 25 May, 1945. Driving Licence.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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EARLY HISTORY.

1. Was educated at MOSCOW until 1908. Then his family moved to RIGA, where his father was director of an artificial manure factory. C. stayed here until the outbreak of war in 1914.
2. That year he came to Germany via Sweden and went to OFFENBACH a/Main and hoped to join the fighting services. In 1915 he joined the Marine at KIEL and the following year became sea cadet.
3. 1918 was promoted to Lt.z.Sec and because of his perfect knowledge of Russian was called to the Admiralty staff at Berlin. Here he remained until 1920, when he became the 'Nachrichtsmittel Offizier' (Intelligence liaison officer) at the Reichswehrministerium, still with the rank of Lt.z.Sec. Later the same year he left the Navy.
4. Discharged from the services, he now decided to go into business, and to study commerce with the view of taking a diploma. He was employed by the Rly. engine works BORSIG at TEGEL near Berlin. At the same time he attended night school and in 1924 took his commercial diploma at the Hochschule. He stayed with the firm BORSIG until 1928, when the firm went bankrupt.
5. He then joined the American firm of BATES ENGINEERING Co., whose works were near Berlin, and was employed as a travelling representative.
6. In 1929 he decided to go into business on his own, buying and selling new patents. This was a complete failure and within a short time spent all his capital and had to give it up.
7. In 1930 C. joined the firm of HEINRICH KNOCK & Co. at HIRSCHBERG a/Scale and was there employed in the statistics dept. Three years later he was relieved of his post as meanwhile Hitler had come to power, and C. was not a party member, though the firm still kept him on doing minor and odd jobs. It was now clear to him that he could not succeed in business and in the following year (1934) decided to try his luck with the Marine as an ex-officer, having heard that Hitler intended to build up a large Navy again.

BRIEF HISTORY WITH OKW.

8. C. was offered a post in the dept. dealing with Russian intelligence at the OKW at Berlin - as a civilian. At that time the dept was a primitive affair, though there seemed every likelihood that an expansion would take place.
9. In 1935 he was granted the rank of Kapt. Lt. and continued to work in the same dept., which was responsible for the collection of intelligence material, mainly through press cuttings and wireless interception. Results were meagre.

FINLAND.

10. In 1939 he received orders from Admiral CANARIS to proceed to Finland as assistant Naval attache to Admiral von BONIN, naval attache to Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, whose seat was at HELSINKI. C. was issued with a diplomatic passport.
11. His appointment was in fact of a dual nature, in that he was asst. naval attache, with his office at REVAL, Estonia, and also acting as liaison officer between the OKW and the General staffs of Finland and Estonia, and as such exchanging naval intelligence information and sending his reports direct to Berlin without the knowledge of the attache, Admiral von BONIN. Information received and exchanged only concerned Russia.
12. As such he kept in close liaison with General SWENSON of the Finnish General staff and Oberst MASING of the Estonian General staff, and so frequently travelled between Finland and Estonia. Of this side of C's activities Admiral BONIN knew little or nothing, especially as his office was at REVAL.

TASKS

13. In order to build up a suitable organization, C. aided the Finns to organize a watch system along the coast, e.g. to provide them with binoculars, long range photography equipment, etc. The information thus gained would be at the disposal of the OKW. C. managed to obtain the various items required through the OKW, and such a system was eventually organized and steadily built up throughout the following years. Wireless equipment was also obtained on the same basis to establish an interception organization, listening to Russian ships, etc. Reports were sent direct to the OKW by air. This was C's chief activity during the Russian - Finnish war.
14. At the same time Finnish and Estonian officers were sent to Germany for specialized training in W/T who would later be employed in enlarging the organization.
15. Towards the end of 1939, when the outcome of the war was obvious C. agreed to help various members of the Estonian General Staff to escape to Germany. Amongst these were Oberst MÄSING (whom he got away at the end of the year), Oberst SÄRSEN, Hptm. KALLMS of the II Bureau (Estonian) and a W/T expert, Korv. Kapt. FIBBERT who was responsible for the coastal 'watch' organization and KURGWELL (see report 032/8/37). He arranged for the above to be taken on board a merchant ship complete with families and without papers.
16. WAR ROOM NOTE. (As reference was made in this paragraph to officers belonging to a special service it has been omitted).
17. In Sept. 1940, some two weeks after he arranged the evacuation of the members of the Estonian General Staff, he himself was ordered to leave, as well as all other Germans.
18. Soon after his return to Germany he was ordered to Sweden as asst. Naval attache to Kapt. von HÄHLERT (who remained at Stockholm until the end). The same dual role applied here too and C. exchanged information regarding the Russians, chiefly naval matters with Oberst AHLÉNKRUEZ of the Swedish General Staff. Most of this information came from a Finnish source, though not very much progress was made and information was scanty. During his stay at Sweden, C. made some very useful connections, though at the moment is not very willing to talk about them.

WAR WITH RUSSIA.

19. On the outbreak of war with Russia, C's value was quickly realized at Berlin. He was summoned there and received orders from Admiral GUNARIS to proceed once more to Finland as asst. attache to Admiral BONIN, but once again in the dual role.
20. When the liberation of Estonia was contemplated (the Russians still occupied it) C. was consulted because of his large and varied experience with Estonia and his valuable connections. It was proposed to land a voluntary body of armed and trained Estonians who in turn were to organize partisan groups from the many Estonians who had retired to the forests during the Russian occupation. They were also to be equipped with W/T sets to maintain communications with Finland, reporting on progress, of Russian troop concentrations and defences. In charge of this raid was to be Oberst KURG.

OPERATION ERNA.

21. The above was the cover name for this operation. C. agreed to undertake the task of collecting, equipping and landing the raiding party. It took approx. one month to enlist the required number (approx. 80). They were issued with Finnish uniforms and small arms, and German wireless sets. A number of small craft were scoured, sufficiently flat bottomed to be able to ride above the Russian mines. On 20 July 1941 C. set out with the raiding party for the Estonian coast. They were unfortunate in that they were spotted by a Russian patrol boat, which opened fire. Half the boats had to turn round and 'run' for their lives, though 40 men were successfully landed. Some time later

the remainder were successfully landed by parachute, this party being led by Cpt. REINHARDT. C. received several messages from this group, and the whole operation had proved successful.

22. Shortly afterwards Estonia was evacuated by the Russians and Oberst MESSING and the Estonian General Staff returned to their own country. C. returned to Estonia to his previous office.

AUGUST 1941.

23. After the success of the operation ERU, C. was approached by the Marine Leitung at REVEL. It concerned a raid on the island of OESSEL which was still occupied by the Russians. A raid by naval craft was impossible, as the only ones available were too large to cross the mine infested waters, and thus the only possible way to get troops across was by means of the flat bottomed fishing craft such as are common in Estonia. A large number would be required, and as C. had good connections and the Estonians' trust, it was suggested that he should organize this. C. agreed, and managed to assemble a small fleet of a prox. 100 such small craft. The difficulty lay in the enlisting of Estonians to man these boats, as the manoeuvring of these boats required long practice and experience, and by no means every Estonian could be trusted. Towards the end of the month the landing was made with some 200 German Marines being ferried across. It was a success, and one that was widely publicised over the German wireless and in the press. C. was decorated and became known as an adventurer, a born leader and organizer, which had its repercussions in his future career.
24. During this time, and until the end of the year, C's chief interest lay with the Estonians. Soon after the departure of the Russians he foresaw trouble ahead. The Estonians greeted the Germans with open arms and were genuinely glad to see them on Estonian soil. At the same time they feared for their independence. But, as the Estonian government received repeated assurances from Germany, indeed from Hitler himself, and at another occasion from Himmler, when he came to inspect the newly recruited SS, their immediate policy was to put everything at the disposal of the newly arrived German Military government. But it was soon apparent to C. that the Military Government had no intention to keep their promises. C. was trusted by the Estonians, his name was well known in Estonia as a friend and he now realized only too well how little he could do to justify this. The newly appointed Reichskommissar was LOESE (see report 032/8/27) Estonia being only part of his territory. He was a man who did not know the meaning of the word 'diplomacy' or 'honesty'. His policy was that of a true Nazi, i.e. to exploit the occupied countries to the full and treat them as a slave nation. Boosted with recent successes in the East and West, they were now already overconfident and openly declared that Germany did not need any allies in the war against the Bolsheviks (Britain was as good as beaten already). The result was inevitable, Estonia was exploited to the full, their men sent either to Germany as slave workers, or to the front with German units, their rations cut to fill the German larder and laws created that shattered all hopes of a independent Estonia such as Hitler had promised.
25. This embittered the Estonians, and thus C. who relied on their co-operation in the past came upon many new difficulties. However, his task was to continue to build up an intelligence organization, the main activities being as follows:
26. The 'listening watch' organisation was enlarged, new personnel were trained and more equipment supplied. Interrogation of Russians and other nationals supplied material of naval interest. To this end he made frequent trips to and from Finland.
27. C. enlisted Estonians to be trained and later used as agents to be dropped behind the Russian lines. They were firstly trained in Estonia and later sent to Finland where their training continued. Altogether there were twelve, who were eventually dropped by parachute and messages from them were picked up for three months. C. believes that they must either have been picked up by the Russians or found it too dangerous and

deserted. C. states that these were the only agents that he employed from Finland or Estonia, and that generally the use of agents against the Russians was never very successful, though periodically one or two had brought back extremely useful information.

28. At the end of 1941 the Russian steamer SS SKILIN on the way from HANGOE, Finland (Russia had a 99 years lease for HANGOE) hit a mine off the Estlandish coast and drifted ashore. On board were some 3000 Russian troops which were being evacuated to Leningrad and were now interned as P.O.s in Estonia. C. was notified by telegram and immediately visited the camp where they were being interned. His idea was to form a group of Russians fighting Bolshevism and at the same time obtaining from them as much information as he could, and possibly using some who were suitable for special tasks. Thus he mustered all the Russian speakers he could lay his hands on and proceeded to interrogate them. A sufficient number was found amongst them to form such a group.

#### ABWEHR AND K.O.F. ACTIVITIES.

29. In the beginning of 1942 C. received instructions from Admiral GANARIS to assist and supervise in the building up and liaison of the recently installed Abwehr Nebenstelle ESTLAND (subsidiary to Lat HIG.) which was commanded at that time by Oberst Lt. HANSEK and was later taken over by Oberst WOGT. The reason for this assignment was again his knowledge of local conditions and personalities. Here his position was unusual, in that he could not give any direct orders to HANSEK, yet had a free hand to use any information they obtained, and had access to their files. Later the Nebenstelle became completely independent and during 1942 C's activities in Estonia were rapidly decreasing. In Finland his chief activity was the exchange of information with the General Staff, and other connections that he built up in the past. Here, his job was a great deal easier, as the Finns both insisted and maintained their independence, and the Germans had the good sense not to try and employ the same tactics as in Estonia. C. had many friends, amongst them Marshall Mannerheim, many members of the Finnish General Staff, Finnish officers and business men, members of foreign legations etc. He was trusted by the Finns, and obtained information easily and at times was entrusted with information which he was asked not to pass on to Berlin. In this, C. states, he always kept his promise.
30. Also in 1942, C. received instructions from Admiral GANARIS to form a KOF (Kriegs Organisation Finland). C. was to be the head of this organization, and at first the only other member was his asst. Lt. HORN (see report 032/8/51). This was to be purely an intelligence information service directed against the Russians and working to an extent in conjunction with the Finns. C. gradually built up this organization which was he states successful in achieving its purpose. Not many agents were used, and those that were sent over never achieved any startling successes. One of the most successful branches was the Aufklaerungstruppe (recon group) which consisted of a number of super trained skiers who, with 50 kilos on their backs were sent off behind the Russian lines. They were experts in finding their way through the vast forests, and managed to cover 30 km in a day on skis. They were armed with daggers and some were expert rifleshoots. They were sent out on definite tasks to discover Russian troop locations, concentrations, H.Q.'s and troop movements etc. Often they were away for four to six weeks before returning, and rarely came back without the required information. They did not use W/T, especially as they were picked for their qualifications as skiers, daring and ability to find their way through forests without being detected by the Russians, and as such were not of the mentality of a 'funkor'. (Brief Set up of KOF see appendix A).
31. Here C. remained until July 1944. During this time he made several trips to Sweden, ostensibly to make private purchases; (there is more behind this, but C. has not been pressed on this point). Also he made several journeys abroad, i.e. to Germany to the OKW and on one occasion to the field H.Q. of Feld Marschall von MANSTEIN when the 11th Army (Group) had been sent from the Caucasus to attack Leningrad, when von MANSTEIN wanted to know what the reaction of MANNERHEIM was towards the campaign. C. also made several trips to the front to liaise with the Heeresgruppen (Army groups) and to get

up to date information. For these journeys he had sanction from Berlin, in fact he had a completely free hand to travel wherever he wished. (Admiral BORN had to apply for permission to travel to Estonia at that time, when he was only Naval attache to Finland).

#### COMMUNICATIONS.

32. J. kept in close touch with the OKW by wireless, and for this purpose had a W/T station at MASSARIE near HELSINKI. Also he used this station to receive messages from agents, and from the north of Finland, Lapland.

#### EVACUATION OF FINLAND.

33. On the 14 September 1944 C. had to leave Finland and went to Estonia. Prior to his departure he dissolved the KOF and its members were sent by ship back to Danzig, as a result of the Russian ultimatum that all Germans had to leave Finland within 14 days. C. had arranged with Oberst HALLAMA of the Finnish General staff to keep in touch with him in Estonia, in particular as Oberst H. was now the head of a hurriedly formed resistance movement in Finland. But C's chief concern was to get further information about the Russians. Their methods of communication were firstly by wireless - C. took with him the necessary gear and retained one operator on his personal staff - and secondly by a secret cable which existed between HELSINKI and ESTONIA. The latter was later blown by the Finns, as they feared its detection by the Russians, and thus C. now relied on the W/T.
34. C. flew to Reval with Lt. HORN to await events, maintaining W/T link with HALLAMA. After a few days he grew impatient as no results were being obtained, and he wanted to establish his own connection in Germany, i.e. with BELSIG station near Berlin in the event of a Russian occupation of Estonia, which now seemed imminent.
35. Thus he left for Germany via the island of RUEGEN by air, and thence by rail to Berlin - STARNSDORF, where the BELSIG radio station was. He had previously arranged with the Finns to get into touch with him there at a certain time, but owing to his belated arrival this failed. However, he asked the Leiter of the station, Dr. FORRETSCHKIN to continue trying, but this too proved unsuccessful.
36. C. then went to the RSHA at WALDORF to Oberst Lt. OHLITZ to report progress and found that his reception there was not what he had expected. At first he was told that Oberst Lt. OHLITZ could not see him and saw his representative Major KLING. His attitude struck C. as most unreasonable, as he accused him of having failed to obtain information that was worth anything, and furthermore that he had left Estonia without orders. C. explained that he had left HORN behind to take charge in his absence at REVAL, and that the other implications were completely unjustified and unfounded.
37. A few days later (end of Sept) C. was summoned by SCHELLEBERG. He had met him on previous visits to Berlin, though had never before acted under his orders. Here too his reception was extremely cold. However, after a long discussion SCHELLEBERG told C. that he was to form a Sonder Kommando - N.

#### SONDER KOMMANDO - N.

38. Its purpose was to continue to obtain information from Finnish sources other than direct communication by wireless. Its object was to enlist a number of voluntary Finnish nationals who would be trained and eventually sent to Finland as agents to contact the already existing underground intelligence organisation (see para 33). They were to be dropped either by parachute or taken across in "U" boats. In C's opinion this was a typical RSHA idea, worked out on paper, but with no consideration as to whether the plan was feasible or the necessary material in men and equipment could be found. However he had no choice and agreed to go ahead with it, as at least there was a chance to establish a definite connection with the Finns. Other agents were also to be trained to operate in the Finnish Meer Busen, some as sailors to pick up what information they could and send

their information by wireless to BELSIG, from where it was to be passed on to J. However none of these plans were ever carried into effect.

39. The following months C. spent trying to fulfill his promises to SCHELLENBERG, without getting the promised help. He set up his new quarters at HERINGSDORF near SIEBELNDE. At this time the only staff he had was his asst. Lt. HORN, who arrived from Estonia in Sept., one M.C.O. Uffz. HEINE and a driver Gefr. HORN. At HERINGSDORF he sat and waited for the promised arrival of the Finns, for the equipment that had been promised to him, and spent most of his time writing letters to Lit VI as time was going by and nothing was being achieved.

#### CONNECTIONS WITH STOCKHOLM

40. Meanwhile, at the beginning of October he had arranged to meet a Finnish Officer by the name of KUHEMIUS at Stockholm. He applied for permission to go from Lit VI, which was refused, though no reason was given. He could only assume that he either was not trusted to go alone to Sweden, or that SCHELLENBERG did not want him to interfere or get wind of any arrangements that might have existed in Sweden in connection with Lit VI, knowing that C. was well known and trusted in the Scandinavian countries. When C. protested against this and explained that a valuable source of information was wasted needlessly, permission was finally given for his asst. Lt. HORN to go to Stockholm in his place (see report HORN 032/8/51). HORN went to Sweden and saw KUHEMIUS. He took with him certain wireless equipment - spare parts etc - and brought back information from Finland as well as codes and cyphers for further communication by wireless.
41. A further means of obtaining information from Sweden was in use through General Major HELMUT GRODEK, the Japanese military attache in Stockholm. C. knew him well, and previously managed to make certain private purchases through him in Sweden and had them delivered to Germany through diplomatic channels. Thus, C. now used this opportunity of obtaining information from Finland, in that a Finnish officer brought the information to Sweden and handed it to Gen. Maj. G.O. who then sent it through the Japanese diplomatic bag to Gen. Maj. YOKOKAWA, chief of the MIL. attache's office in Berlin, and who then sent it on to C.
42. On this occasion HORN brought some of the information back, and the remainder went through the Japanese diplomatic bag.
43. At the same time, C. learnt that Major PAULUS, who had meanwhile become the head of Lit VI MIL, also went to Sweden to meet members of the Swedish Abwehr for the same purpose, though possibly in connection with Britain as well as Russia. He learnt from HORN on his return that PAULUS had behaved most undiplomatically and had thus met with no success.

NOTE. C. has not volunteered any information regarding the nature of these visits, and what type of information was obtained. He states that he is prepared to divulge everything, but would preferably not do so in this theatre of war. He was not pressed.

44. Meanwhile at HERINGSDORF C. established a transmitting and receiving station in order that he could keep in constant touch with BELSIG radio station, which was still in contact with Finland. Messages were exchanged daily from here, though not such information of any value came through, in fact C. felt that the Finns were 'getting cold feet'. For this reason he grew all the more impatient to get the Sonder Kommando going, as soon as possible to find out what was behind it all.

#### RECRUITING OF AGENTS FOR SONDER KOMMANDO - N.

45. C. was now informed by Lit VI that he had to recruit his own staff of Finns from among who were in a concentration camp at or near DANZIG. This, C. thought was typical, for amongst concentration camp inmates he could have great difficulties in getting volunteers for such a venture, which was anyway for the Germans benefit more than the Finns. But as this was the only hope, he decided to give it a trial. He visited the

- the camp and found that they were all extremely disgruntled as their treatment had been very poor, worse than the treatment of other nationalities. However, C. managed to recruit seven, mostly Finnish fishing skippers who had been put into the camp as they would not volunteer to fight for Germany, having been previously promised that they were to be sent home.
46. C. took them to HERRINGSDORF to train them. He did not have a great deal of time, as all the agents had to be dropped off before June, as then the bright nights would start, and any such operations would then be out of the question.
47. In December 1944 another group similar to that of C. was formed by the Leiter of Group F of Lit VI, Dr. PEPPEL. His report dealt with the Scandinavian countries, and he believes Britain as well. The purpose of this Kommando (which had no cover name) was purely political but operating in the same area as C. This group was also formed at HERRINGSDORF, which was more than a coincidence. In charge of this Kommando was Oberstf. WISSELMANN, responsible to PEPPEL. W. was responsible for training and administration, but as C. had the experience and knowledge of Baltic countries he was to land these agents in the respective countries, by the same methods as with his own men.
48. WISSELMANN's quarters were at HERRINGSDORF, Herringdorf, whereas C. with the Kommando H were at the Naval 'GOLF HOTEL'.
49. Later, WISSELMANN was killed in an air raid on the Gestapo H.Q. at Copenhagen and Ustf. LAUREL took over. He was of Finnish nationality and had been a previous member of the Finnish SS. The total number of his Kommando at that time was 12 men.
50. In Feb. 1945 C. managed to obtain permission from SCHELLERSBERG to proceed to Finland by U Boat from BREITZIG. The official reason for this voyage was to collect German POWs and Finns that wanted to get away. This was an ideal opportunity for C. to try and obtain first hand information. On arrival at the Finnish coast they waited and eventually a boat came alongside and brought in Oberst FABRICIUS and two Finnish soldiers who came on board the U Boat and were taken back to Germany. Oberst FABRICIUS was a member of the Finnish underground intelligence and Free movement and pro-German and came to make certain connections in Germany and obtain and exchange information. (C. is not at all clear on this subject and according to instructions has not been pressed.)
51. Some two weeks later FABRICIUS was dropped by parachute in Finland again, C. having made all the arrangements for this.
52. C. arranged with FABRICIUS that later he intended to come to Finland by the same method. He would land somewhere in the hinterland and stay unknown to anybody at a loghut (to this end he grew his beard) and there meet Finnish officers from the Free movement and collect reports and return to Germany again after four weeks or so. However this plan never materialised, for when the Russians advanced on STETTIN he received orders from Lit VI to find new quarters near HILBURG or BREITZIG. Thus he went there, but found this impossible and then went to the Marine stab at KIEL where he was also unsuccessful, then on to RITZBURG and finally to HERRINGSDORF near FLENSBURG, where he found suitable quarters in the Naval barracks. Ustf. LAUREL with his Kommando was also quartered there.
53. In April 1945 he managed to get a yawl for private purposes from the Heranotische Jagdverband. This was a small fishing boat by the name of 'ROTHEN', without auxiliary motor.
54. After testing her for seaworthiness, he decided to use her to take his Kommando to Sweden if all else failed. He equipped her for such a voyage, though no wireless equipment was taken aboard (see report ZSIDLER 052/8/15) who stated that C. had a boat in Flensburg harbour for the escape of members of Lit VI complete with wireless installations. On being further questioned about this, he stated that there was a steamer anchored off Flensburg, which was the newly installed wireless station of the DOENITZ government and was known as 'HILVEL INSTITUTE'. Its object was to maintain communications with the South of Germany and Berlin.
55. At the end of April Ustf. LAUREL left with his Kommando for Norway, where they had instructions to report to the SS Leitstelle at OSLO. C. does not believe that they could ever be actively employed, as all the members were very young and inexperienced, and they had only one idea, to get home by the shortest route.



56. At the beginning of May C. decided that it was time to go to Sweden. At Flensburg everything was chaos, and nothing further could be achieved. His intention was, that now connections with Finland were finally severed and Germany was beaten, he would hand over all his Finnish connections and information to the Swedish General Staff.
57. However, in the last minute he decided he would risk the British attitude, as after all he could not hope to achieve much in SWEDEN after the collapse of Germany and in any case the Swedish authorities would have to make his presence there public, which most likely would mean being handed over to the Russians on whose black list he appears.
58. Thus his Kommando left without him on the 2 May, to try and make their way back to Finland as best as they could.
59. C. went to SUEDEBJÖRF near SKILLEBYG where he had rented rooms since March and had lived with Pvl. HELSINGIUS. A few days later his niece (report 032/8/47) arrived, and all three stayed there until C. was arrested.

CONCLUSION:

60. This report is by no means a complete record of all C's activities. For the past ten years he has been engaged in all sorts of enterprises, the more important ones being briefly described in this report. C. is extremely intelligent, far seeing and well informed. He has extensive connections especially in Finland, Sweden and Estonia, and amongst his friends are many of the leading personalities of those countries. Within his own sphere, his importance can be judged by the fact that he had a free hand and could travel wherever he pleased without special permission from Berlin, until he came under the orders of the RSEK in July 1944, and until that time had the full backing of the OKW and OKL. He has an extensive knowledge of intelligence services and organisations in the Baltic countries, and to an extent of Russia, and with the exception of the latter knows most of the important members personally, as well as many of the leading personalities of Germany. He has a bad memory for names and a worse one for dates, and for this he relies entirely on his asst. Lt. HORN (see report 032/8/51). He has not volunteered any specific information regarding the Finnish Free Government or any other underground organisation that is supposed to be still in existence. He is afraid to mention names of individuals in this theatre of war, but has declared himself only too willing to put his entire knowledge at our disposal, including names and details of such organisations, and his personal connections - though for this he must have HORN with him as mentioned above. HORN has already volunteered some of the information, though C. states that he is not entirely informed. He has asked to be sent to England to give detailed information there. It is clear from his account that he is an adventurer, and on such on many occasions disagreed with the Nazi over-organised and coarse methods.

RECOMMENDATION.

61. C. together with his asst. Lt. HORN should be sent to England for detailed interrogation.

(sd)..... Capt.

23 June 1945.

032/8/48

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APPENDIX A.

Intelligence and Wehr Organisation  
in Finland (KCF)

1. Before 1941.

Exchange of information with the Finnish General Staff, only concerned with Russia.

Leiter: Prog. Kapt. CELLARIUS, Alexander. Seat HELSINKI.  
Officer i/o office: Hptn. SCHULZHAUPT.  
Asst. Lt. HOEN (report 032/8/51)

Aussenstelle at the Finnish H.Q. at MIKKELI.

Leiter: Major PAULS. - *in NTC/54*

2. After 1941.

Wehr in South Finland, i.e. in German occupied territory.

Leiter: at first Major BLOCK  
then Major DELONGE  
then Major KIGEL (remained until the end)  
Staff: Hptn. von ZIEHL and Hptn. PAUL.

Their function was liaison with the Finnish General Staff, though only in matters concerning the Wehrmacht, and had no jurisdiction on the civil sector. This was dealt with exclusively by the Finnish Wehr (see Appendix to report on HORT).

- Note:
- 1) The c/s officers were under command of C. for discipline etc., though operationally came under command of Berlin.
  - 2) One officer (Oberst Lt. FREISING) was attached to the 20 Mountain L.O.K. with the Army in the North of Finland. He was not under C's command.
  - 3) Lt. Koldekopf (report centre) was attached to the 20 Mt. L.O.K. in North Finland.  
Leiter: St. SILLI. - *captured*  
This was operationally under command of Kommando Melde Gebiet Stettin, but for discipline etc. - under command of the Army Group.

~~SECRET~~

*File CTS interrogation  
with results  
CELLARIUS r/s*

COMBATTANT INTELLIGENCE WAR ROOM

Ref. FF 600 059

LONDON

Subject. ALEXANDER CELLARIUS KO Finland  
War Room Summary of CMI Report of 23 June

NB. The various and different categories of work against Russia based on Finland and Estonia have been catalogued A-Z throughout.  
The latter categories of work against Russia based on Germany have been catalogued A-Z C throughout.  
The number on the right hand side refer to the paragraphs in the original report.

- |                  |  |                       |
|------------------|--|-----------------------|
| 1934 - 9         | As civilian and then (1935) as Capt Lt in Russian section of "O K F Intelligence" (presumably Abv Amt).<br>Source: [redacted] photos cuttings  |                       |
| 1939             | Ordered by CELLARIUS to proceed Finland and Estonia as ANA to Admiral von MULLER and to maintain contact with Finnish and Estonian ISS and send reports direct to Berlin concerning Russia.<br>(a) Contacts General S. JENSEN Finnish G.S.<br>Oberst. MASING Estonian G.S.<br>(b) Developed Coast watching System<br>(c) developed W/T interception<br>(d) sent suitable officers for W/T training<br>(e) made many intelligence contacts.                     | 1<br>1<br>1<br>1<br>2 |
| 1940             | helped members of Estonian G.S. and families to escape to Germany and shortly afterwards followed them.<br>Oberst MASING<br>Oberst SAARSEN<br>Hptm KARLIS (2 iams and W/T Bureau)<br>Korv Kapt FIEBIGER (Coastal watch)<br>KURGWAL (arrested FF 002:91)  | 15                    |
| Sept. 1940       | Sent to Sweden as ANA to meet von MULLERT and to exchange inf. regarding Russians with Swedish IS.<br>(A) Contact with Oberst ADLERBERG<br>(11) made very useful contacts<br>(NB according to HOLA CELLARIUS was also Abv representative in Finland at this time and introduced him to Finnish officers.   | 18                    |
| June ? 1941      | Sent back to Finland.  | 19                    |
| July 1941        | Organised Commando Sea and later parachute raid ERMA against Estonia   | 20                    |
| Aug 1941         | With German re-occupation resumed work in Estonia.   | 22                    |
| Aug 1941         | Organised successful commando raid on Ousal Island   | 23                    |
| Second half 1941 | Chiefly occupied in Estonia and continued work started in 1939 against growing Estonian resentment of German occupation methods. In addition Cellarius developed:<br>(f) Interrogation of Russians and other nationals<br>(g) Recruited 12 Estonians who were eventually dropped by parachute behind the Russian lines but who all ceased transmission after 3 months.<br>(h) Recruited Russians from captured SS Stalin for "Anti Solcho last special tasks". | 24<br>26<br>28        |

*and X2-ITS-8 F.24*

*2/4/1*

beginning 1942 On instructions of GILBERT supervised setting up of "Nest" 29  
 NESTLE subsidiary to "AST RICA" under "Oberst Lt HANSEN" (See  
 HANSEN Shnaef unnumbered) who handed over to Oberst VOGT (See  
 VOIGT Shnaef 940 b)

1942 Instructed by GILBERT to set up NO Finland purely against Russians 30  
 (i) Agents by inst. Finland generally unsuccessful  
 (j) Organized "Kullerstruppe" who made ski-rocco tours  
 within the border line (maximum duration 6 weeks -  
 NO 7/1)

1942 - July made several trips to Sweden and to Germany etc remaining gener- 31  
 ally in Finland

1943/4 (i) according to HORN GILBERTS helped Kapt NEUMANN Shnaef 4390  
 recruited EP 60266 from his LEF later PAK 166)

14 Sept 44 Felt to dissolve KOF on German evacuation and retired to Finland 33  
 (A) maintained cable and W/T link with Oberst HALLAKA of  
 Finnish G.S. and leader of newly made anti Russian  
 resistance group.

Sept 1944 Sought interview with Oberst Lt OULETZ 36  
 (NB. Ouletz was EP 602765) to discuss plans but was  
 fobbed off onto Major ELTIN (See Shnaef 280 and 14492 2 1/a to  
 Ouletz). Later in month succeeded to SCHLEIBERBERG who ordered him  
 to organize 37  
 (L) Sonderkdo N Finna to return by U Boat or para-  
 chute to Finland and develop existing anti Russian  
 underground. This never operated.  
 (NB according to HORN GILBERTS used the cover name  
 "HORNEN" when in touch with this Sonderkdo)

End 1944 Awaited recruits for Sonderkdo N at Heringendorf near Svirowande 39

Oct 1944 Could not obtain permission from Amt VI to proceed Sweden but 40  
 his assistant R D W HORN (arrested EP 602864) was allowed to go  
 and made contact with  
 (C) Finnish officer named  
 KEMMIS with whom arranged intelligence contact 41  
 to whom gave W/T material  
 (D) Japanese Lt General Major MAKATO OHOJIMA with whom  
 arranged courier Service from Finland to Germany.

at the same time Major PAULUS formerly of KOF and now "Leiter  
 Amt VI III" also made an unfruitful visit to Sweden. 43

Dec 44 For PAKTSCHEN Leiter Gruppe 2 of Amt VI (See PAKTSCHEN of Amt VID  
 Shnaef ) 47  
 also started similar Kommando at Heringendorf, which was commanded  
 by a certain Ostuf WASSERMAN (Not known to War Room) and on his  
 death by Ostuf LAUREL (also unknown to War Room).

Feb 1945 Proceeded by U Boat to Finland and 50  
 (E) brought back Oberst FABRICIUS, member of Anti Russian  
 resistance whom he briefed and sent back by para-  
 chute 51  
 (NB according to HORN they brought back a certain  
 Dr Jonas)

March/April 1945 Moved with Sonderkdo N to hubback near Flensburg 52

End April 1945 Ostuf LAUREL left with his Kdo to report to NS Leitstelle in 55  
 Oslo.

2 May 1945

Sonderok N left for Finland presumably on the great Netrum  
which he had procured. OSKARSIUS stayed behind.  
(NB. According to ROBE the Films were not given any T/T sets  
but only S.T. material when they set off)

WROLD  
4 August 1945.

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