

# DISPATCH

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO

EGPW-10298  
EGPW-10298TO Chief of Base, Frankfurt  
INFO Chief of Station, Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

x-ref

FROM Chief, JR

DATE

16 MAR 1960

SUBJECT ~~DESENSITIZED~~ REINWOOD, Status of Operation

RE: "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED

Your comments

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

- A. EGPA-29043 dated 13 January 1960  
B. EGPW-9748 dated 7 December 1959

1. We regret highly for the obvious delinquency in Headquarters correspondence and coordination in this operation. We hasten to assure you, however, that much thought had been given to the problem of the lost notebook and that it had been decided here that the best approach would be to attempt no contact with the   for about one year. In the future we will take all steps to obviate any unilateral actions and to keep all correspondence up to date.

2. We will attempt to answer your specific questions in paragraph 1 of Reference A below with our lettering corresponding to your letter sub-paragraphs of Reference A, paragraph 1:

a. As is obvious from Reference B, the material contained in   notebook would be both damaging and compromising if it were to fall into the hands of Soviet Security Service.

b. The material contained in the lost notebook was in the Latin alphabet and was, according to source, legible.

c. As an expansion of the information contained in Reference B, the following items were listed in the lost notebook: Names, addresses and biographic data on Soviets believed to be disaffected; propaganda rumors; the bare notations on "VOA, Vatican Radio"; Washington street names indicating the routes of a surveillance problem here to which   had been submitted; the numbers from telephone poles along the Riga-Leningrad line. The notebook also contained a days and hour photograph log of pictures taken in the Soviet Union and a rough sketch of one of the streets on which was located one of the assigned Riga addresses (Subject did not remember the specific address).   stated that he did not recall having marked "RFK" in the notebook.

d. The notebook was an ordinary loose leaf type (small format) quite obviously of American manufacture. There is no reason to believe that anyone finding it would be more than passingly tempted to keep it rather than turn it in to the authorities.

e. The subject matter of the notebook, handwriting, etc., certainly add up to a compromise if the notebook found its way into the hands of the Soviet Security Service.

f. We are pushing separately the assessment of   message No. 5 transmitted to Headquarters as FROM 6004.

3. If the statements reflected in Reference B are correct, it would mean that   lost the notebook sometime between leaving his Riga hotel and arriving at his Lwow hotel. Obviously he could have either lost the item or he could have had it stolen from him. We feel that it would be rather unlikely that the RIS picked his pocket; if the RIS were to suspect an individual sufficiently they would--rather than picking his pocket--arrest him, search him, confiscate any compromising material, and direct the individual to leave the country soonest. (This would appear to be their mode of approach on the basis of our experience in other actual cases.) If   pocket was picked, it is highly improbable that the

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

USE PREVIOUS EDITION  
REPLACES FORMS  
SI 28, SI 28A, AND SI 28B  
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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that would turn in the notebook to the authorities. (One point of interest: Even is historically known for its playbooks and you will note in messages with Reference B that [ ] was in killing crews both at the Kiev airport and at his hotel so that it would not be too unlikely that one of the Soviets present could in fact have been a playbook and could have followed Subject of the notebook thinking it to be a billfold.) If Subject lost his notebook in Blizn or in Kiev and if this notebook were found by a non-Russian Soviet, there is, we feel, a good possibility that this notebook would not be turned in; if however a Russian were to find such a booklet the chances would seem better than fair that he would turn the book in to the authorities. If Subject lost the notebook on either the airplane or the bus, then it can be also assumed that the item would be turned over to the authorities.

4. Assuming that the notebook did find its way into the hands of the Soviet authorities then there is little doubt that [ ] is compromised at least to the extent that the Soviets would consider him at least a potential target of the AIB. Note that both his name and his precise home address were in the booklet. This when considered in conjunction with the items listed would leave little doubt in our minds that the finger of Soviet suspicion has been pointed at this man. What action the Soviets would take at this point we are of course at a loss to say, but at the very least it would seem that he would be subject to a background investigation and to complete mail censorship. In view of this it is obvious that we should in no way further jeopardize this individual by writing to him, either directly or even through a mail drop. Rather or not—as a result of the notebook incident—[ ] has been contacted and turned, is a question which we would not be able to hazard a guess; this may become evident through analysis of his future correspondence to us.

5. [ ] of course, is more fortunate because the notebook contained only the mail drop which we have been using in our correspondence with him. If [ ] is being thoroughly investigated by the FBI, his friends will also fall under suspicion and unfortunately [ ] falls in this category. Additionally since [ ] must be friendly with the individual who serves as his drop-off, then Soviet interest in him [ ] would come from two directions. We feel however that in comparison with [ ] would the FBI interest in [ ] could very well be peripheral.

6. If attempt has been made to assess the initial elementness of the complex, which could actually be considered rather questionable because of the Kibario's surmise of this operation. As is obvious, our approach has been formulated on the basis that the operation was clean at its inception. We had hoped that this activity could be continued on such an assumption until such time that the analysis of the traffic would indicate that a reorganized was in order.

7. At this point, as a result of the notebook loss, the operation obviously cannot be continued as heretofore. We cannot continue writing to [ ] through international mail since this could spell compromise if [ ] is under close scrutiny and if the operation is still not rolled-up. On the assumption that [ ] is in fact a nationalistic Latvian who would like to cooperate with us, we feel that he should be warned regarding the compromise (obviously it would not do to mention the loss of the notebook which could reflect nothing but gross negligence on the part of the [ ] Both [ ] and [ ] should be warned not to write to [ ] again/15 and we cannot, of course, use [ ]'s live drop. One possible equipment which we should like to offer for your consideration is the following: write an S/V message to [ ] of his home address (with appropriate instructions) and mail it internally warning him in this message regarding the probable national above; he could approach [ ] and determine (if the leading is highly anti-Communist) whether [ ] had recently been investigated or contacted by the FBI; if not then [ ] could warn him to be extra cautious, etc. Of course there would seem to be no particular reason why [ ] could not keep writing operational traffic to us in a disguised hand, assuming they did so using a false return address. Obviously both [ ] could choose now live drops to whom we could correspond internally. The above seems to be a reduction of subjecting whatever chance might be left of this operation. We would appreciate your comments regarding this course of action as soon as possible.

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8. In future handling, we feel that the operation should be played as though it were clean, but information emanating from these sources be viewed with caution.

9. We should like to mention again that we will exert all efforts in order to obviate any future situation such as you described in paragraph 4 of Reference A.

14 March 1960

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