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EXPERIENCES OF Ic AND ABWEHR PERSONNEL

(G-2 and CI of German Wehrmacht
in Soviet Captivity

During World War II

And some conclusions Drawn

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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abwehr	German intelligence service in WWII
Aktiv	Intensively pro-Soviet operating committee made up of prisoners of war
Amt Ausl/Abwehr	Central intelligence staff in the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW)
Antifa	Abbreviation for antifascism, antifascist, Antifascist Committee
AO	Abwehr officer
Gestapo	German Secret State Police
Ic	German equivalent of US G-2
Ic/AO	Staff in high-level German headquarters responsible for collection and processing of intelligence information and for intelligence missions
KGB	Soviet Committee for State Security
MGB	Soviet Ministry for State Security
MVD	Soviet Interior Ministry
MVD troops	Troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry employed in the guarding of POW's and the maintenance of State security
OKH	German Army High Command
OKW	High Command of the German Armed Forces
OSOC	Soviet Council for Special Affairs, which convicted POW's by mail order sentences
SD	German Security Service
SS	Nazi Party elite guards
V-man	German "Vertrauensmann," i.e., confidant, agent
Wehrmacht	German Armed Forces

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PREFACE

1. Purpose

This study is to describe factually the peculiarities of Soviet captivity during and after World War II and to examine the methods of treating and interrogating persons of interest to the Soviets, whose treatment was especially harsh. From numerous individual experiences there are to be deduced the typical aspects of Soviet procedure against persons knowledgeable of classified military information. Thus, clues are to be obtained as to what such persons will have to expect, at present and in the future, in the event of capture in the East. Finally, the best methods of countering the known and expected procedures are to be examined.

2. This study is based on the following materials:

a. 31 written experience reports by Ic personnel (12), Abwehr personnel (6), military attachés (6), Ic interpreters (5), radio intelligence (2).

The attempt was made to obtain statements from persons of the most varied ranks and positions.

b. Oral statements by pertinent persons during and after captivity.

c. The personal experiences of the writer of this study gained in 10 1/2 years of captivity in the USSR.

3. The following must be considered in the evaluation of the material:

The experiences date back many years, some of them more than 10 years. The recollections are no longer clear and some interesting

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details may thus have remained unmentioned in the report. Not all of the persons questioned have had the time to write extensive reports. Some have limited themselves to highly condensed replies to the questions submitted by regarding the latter as a "questionnaire" and thus refrained from giving detailed descriptions. Thus while the questions (see ^{Appendix} ~~Enclosure 2~~) may have misled some of the persons regrettably to limit themselves, they did make certain, on the other hand, that the essential points were discussed at all and that ~~the~~ experiences rather than adventures were described.

Another fact to be remembered is that most of the experience reports come from prisoners of the capitulation period and not from persons captured during the war. There is no doubt, however, that the situations of prisoners, especially of persons knowledgeable of classified information, during and after the war differ in many respects.

Another point to be emphasized is that this report deals with "positive" material only, i.e., statements of persons who have at least tried not to fail. Whenever this may have been the case, they will, of course, not have mentioned it. There ^{are,} however, no "negative" reports whatever, i.e., reports of such persons who had completely succumbed to Soviet influence or pressure. These persons (e.g., former Major General BAMLER!) are either in East Germany or for obvious reasons unavailable for questioning.

Nevertheless, this writer considers the basic material sufficient in extent and value for the purpose of this study.

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4. Attention is called to the fact that in this study only the experiences of captured Wehrmacht personnel (officers, enlisted men, specialists) have been processed. Consequently, the attempted conclusion can apply only to this type of personnel. To agents, who are subject to entirely different personal and legal conditions, these conclusions are not applicable or only in highly modified form. On the other hand, they do apply to a great extent also to civil servants and career employees.

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A. EXPERIENCES

I. Basic Information

1. Information on the Soviet Union was exceedingly low and disseminated in the German Wehrmacht to an entirely insufficient degree. The war years changed the situation very little. There was insufficient knowledge even of the geographic and climatic conditions of the huge land mass, the peculiarities of the multination state, the role of the Great Russians in this state, the history and culture of the country; even greater by far was the ignorance of the Russian character, the mentality of the "Soviet man," the structure of the government and the economy, and especially of the political system, its ideological foundations and effects.

Hardly any officer knew the Russian language. Even rarer was the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical and historical materialism, bolshevik aims and terminology, political literature (even merely CPSU history), the role of the judicial system in the bolshevik state, etc.

The majority of the officers in such services as Ic and Abwehr was not excepted from this ignorance. The corps of interpreters (primarily Balts and ethnic Germans), hurriedly collected for the campaign, was better informed, but not carefully selected personnel-wise.

The persons questioned have repeatedly regretted the ignorance with which they got into captivity, and pointed out how much easier so many things would have been for them, how much better they would have

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acted, if only they had known more!

2. The instruction given the German soldiers on their conduct as prisoners was entirely insufficient ("The German soldier does not get captured!"). Persons knowledgeable of classified information usually had no special instructions for the event of their capture.

3. The cover for Abwehr personnel was inadequate. For example, instead of their unit designations, only the APO numbers were entered in their service record books. This was no cover, but conspicuous to friend and foe.

4. Lists of especially endangered persons were drawn up, who were not to be allowed to fall into Soviet hands. But under pressure of events or in application of military concepts of honor ("the commander does not leave his troops" etc.), such persons were frequently prevented from evacuating critical positions, flying out^{of} encircled areas, or evading capitulation in the East. Thus, the common Wehrmacht practice of alternating staff and front assignments enabled the Soviets to capture, merely from among the division chiefs of Amt Ausl/Abwehr, Generals BAMLER, von BENTVEGNI, PIEKENBROK, and Colonel GROSSKURTH, half of them still during the war! The same applies to chiefs and group leaders of the departments of Foreign Armies, Ic Supreme Command Authorities, including those of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, numerous military attachés, Abwehr officers, entire Abwehr units, etc. For no pressing reason, key figures of

the enemy information and Abwehr services were exposed to Soviet capture.

5. The distinctive features of war captivity in the Soviet Union, which differentiate it from that in Western countries, form the broad framework for the experiences of the pertinent personnel examined in this report. They must therefore be stated initially:

a. Not all prisoners of war were kept under Soviet armed forces control, but under that of the Interior Ministry (MVD) and its organs trained in political police and CI operations (comparable perhaps with GESTAPO/SD/SS guard units).

b. Not bound by international agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war. Therefore no neutral protective power, no intervention by the international Red Cross, etc.

c. Extremely rigorous living conditions regarding food, housing, medical care, etc. Further aggravation due to climate and conditions of the country. Hunger a constant condition, standard rations below minimum even after mass deaths.

d. Ruthless exploitation of labor. Compulsory labor also for officers up to and including captain, staff officers pressured to perform "voluntary" labor.

e. Years of interrupted.. postal communication with home.

f. Relentless Communist political influencing by special organizations (National Committee, Officer League, Antifa), training of cadres (Antifa schools), mass and individual influencing.

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g. Mass trials of war criminals, i.e., engagement of the judiciary, in order to retain for several more years about 20,000 prisoners of war as political hostages or as personnel potentially dangerous to bolshevism.

h. A nearly unceasing interrogation activity covering any possible subject.

II. The Capture

1. The mere fact of having been captured by the Soviets had the effect of a shock on the German soldier. He suddenly saw himself in the power of an enemy of whom he knew very little, but whom he thought capable of any arbitrary act or violence. Frequently his resistance had been weakened; physically, by previous privations (STALINGRAD and other encircled areas), hardships and wounds; or psychologically, by recent defeats, the collapse of Germany, disillusionment by National Socialism, etc. In the case of Ic and Abwehr personnel, there was moreover the justified fear that the Soviets would consider them especially interesting and dangerous.

Following are the possible dangers of the first shock due to capture:

In the event of a poor reception (as expected) by the enemy (threats, etc.), the conclusion was: all is lost now, I am at their mercy, desperation, i.e., surrender of the will to resist;

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In the event of initially good treatment (unexpected), the conclusion was: things are not so bad after all ("everything was just propaganda"), relaxation, gullibility, and thus likewise surrender of the will to resist.

Indeed, the first treatment by the enemy was entirely unpredictable and ranged from abuse and insult to correct conduct, offers of meals, good medical care, etc.

2. Usually, Ic/AO personnel were immediately separated from the other prisoners; the officers were taken to Division, Corps or, depending on their importance, Front Headquarters, where they were interrogated by the pertinent Intelligence or MVD organs. These interrogations were usually short and covered only personal identification, the combat actions just concluded, and the organization of the Ic service in the various German headquarters. One general had his first interrogation in 1944 by the then brigadier general and chief political officer in the headquarters of the Ukrainian Front, Nikita KHRUSHCHEV.

3. Persons of real interest were very soon transferred to Moscow -- almost always by air -- where they were kept in prison for further processing. Some remained in Moscow prisons uninterruptedly 2-8 years, others were released sooner, but returned for several months after long stays in various camps (some of them several times). In the beginning, all generals came first of all to Moscow prisons as a matter of principle;

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after the capitulation, also Camp 27 (KRASNOGORSK) near Moscow was used as an auxiliary for this purpose, because the prisons were overcrowded.

III. Forms of Imprisonment

1. Prison

The Soviets were proud of the fact that their courts were not giving prison sentences. Thus all prisons were used only for investigative purposes or to hold convicted persons until their evacuation to punitive camps. The exceptions from this procedure were very few. Especially important persons, however, were retained in prison even after conviction, and their sentence was changed accordingly by special orders. Thus, the key figures of the German Ic, ^{Abwehr,} ~~up there,~~ and Foreign Services served their sentences in VLADIMIR Prison (also Field Marshals von KLEIST and SCHÖRNER, German diplomats, etc.). During the investigative custody, the prisoners were generally kept in individual or small cells, after conviction in community cells holding sometimes numerous prisoners.

Political and criminal prisoners were not always separated; but during the final years there generally was such separation. Political prisoners, especially the non-Russians (Estonians, Latvians, Jews, Asians, etc.), were generally decent and helpful toward the Germans and other foreigners. In the case of the criminals, one could arrange a ^{bearable} ~~reasonable~~ modus vivendi, if one respected their rules, especially avoid being suspected of informing, but without making common cause with them, best by pleading one's status as foreigner.

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The prison reception procedure was extremely tedious. The prisoner came into a waiting room, along whose walls there were small closetlike cells, the size of telephone booths, furnished only with a wall bench. In such a cell, the prisoner had to wait -- frequently many hours -- for his registration, thorough baggage and body search, medical examination, possible vaccination, confiscation of valuables, etc. One high-ranking German officer thought his stay in such a cell was to prepare him for his execution, that in this cell he would be shot in the back of the head! Others had to go through these reception and dismissal measures daily for several weeks, because they were transferred to another prison for interrogation. In one case, a prisoner spent a 48-hour weekend in such a "waiting closet." This was obviously no longer a matter of Russian formalism, but one of consciously wearing down the victims, who were treated in this manner 20 hours daily including interrogation and completely deprived of sleep.

The prisons were constructed and guarded in such a manner as to make any escape attempt seem impossible. Neither were there any rumors of such attempts. All personnel within the prisons were unarmed; the stronger, however, were the external security measures, e.g., machine guns, searchlights, etc., on the towers.

The treatment was strictly regulated by the "regime," supervised by a special regime officer. All cells were brightly illuminated; when sleeping, investigative prisoners were not permitted to cover

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their hands and faces (suicide prevention). Reveille, 0500-0600 hours; taps, 2200 hours; meals were scheduled on time. During the day, prisoners were not permitted to lie down. Twice a day, the cell mates were led to the latrine *in* formation; washing facilities were also there. Each cell also had an emergency latrine bucket, which the inmates had to empty and clean. The prisoners were permitted a half-hour open-air walk daily. For this purpose there were special yards, divided by high walls. Each yard section accommodated only the inmates of one cell, regardless whether they numbered one single man or 30. They were guarded from the towers and overpasses, which gave the guards a view of the yards. Indeed, careful arrangements were made to prevent the prisoners from meeting with each other. When guiding prisoners, the guards announced this fact by giving a knocking signal with the keys. If an encounter was still unavoidable, one prisoner was placed with his face to the wall or behind a partition set up for this purpose along the corridors, until the other prisoner had passed by. Outside the cell, the prisoner had to keep his hands on his back (ruki nazad!).

The nutrition was below minimum standards. The rations remained unchanged until 1955 (450 grams of bread, 17 grams of sugar, 500 grams of watery soup with fish or cabbage, 250 grams of porridge). Once or twice a week, the average prisoner was permitted to receive from his relatives food ^{items} ~~packages~~ (peredacha) ^{=transmittals}, which were turned over to him in his cell after a thorough examination. If a prisoner had rubles taken from him, he was credited with them and enabled to buy for this money

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food and tobacco from the prison store. The prisoner customarily had to share some of his peredacha with his cell mates; he particularly had to offer some tobacco. Smoking was permitted, as in the USSR tobacco and makhorka were considered food items. The floor guard was obliged to give the prisoners a light!

The Germans were especially exposed to hunger, as they had no peredacha, money and -- except for the final period -- no packages. At the standard rations, any length of time spent in the prisons could hardly be imagined without any injuries to health. Medical personnel (physician, very often a woman; medical technician) made daily rounds of the prison. Prisoners with a fever were taken to the prison hospital. To obtain dental care, the prisoner had to report.

Every ten days, the prisoners were taken by cell to bathe (warm showers). At the same time, clean clothes were issued, and the whole body clipped of hair. As there was no shaving, an unpleasant stubbly beard always remained. While the prisoners were bathing or taking walks, the cells were often searched thoroughly for such prohibited items as knives, pencils; the whole cell was then turned upside down. Thorough body searches ("delousings") were frequent.

Chess games (every Russian plays Chess), also ~~dominoes~~^{dominoes}, were issued to the cells upon request, as well as needle and thread for mending. The prison libraries contained, in addition to the usual political literature, also works by such Russian authors as PUSHKIN, TOLSTOI, CHEKHOV, TURGENEV, or GORKI, and by more recent Communist writers. The German writers were represented, if at all, always by

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by Heinrich HEINE, more rarely by GOETHE or SCHILLER. The books were exchanged at the cells approximately every two weeks.

Any prisoner could also request pen and paper to write petitions and complaints to the courts, the authorities, Party offices, ministries, or the Supreme Soviet.

Every prison ~~was~~ under the supervision of a public prosecutor (Prokuror), who made the rounds of the cells at intervals of several months -- if at all -- and listened to complaints.

Very important was the making of contact among the prisoners by a simple alphabetic knocking signal and by slips of paper which were posted in the latrines, thrown over the walls of the yards while taking walks, etc. Personal and factual news (e.g., reintroduction of the death sentence for certain crimes) were thus spread despite all countermeasures. There was a constant contest between the experience of the prison personnel and the inventiveness of the prisoners.

Offenses against the regime, i.e., against the prison regulations, were punished by solitary confinement. In the basement or underneath the roof there were narrow solitary cells, sometimes made of iron rods ^{= cages.} ("kletki"). The outer garments were taken from the prisoner, there was no place to sit during the day, the rations were only bread and water, all privileges (e.g., reading, ^{games,} ~~games,~~ peredacha) were withdrawn. Any length of time spent in this type of confinement would ruin even the most robust person.

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Other severities, intended not for the maintenance of discipline but as part of the interrogation method, will be discussed later.

The most notorious prisons in Moscow were as follows: LUBYANKA, BUTYRSKAYA, LEFORTOVSKAYA, MATROSKAYA, SREDENSKAYA, LEPREZHNYA. Of these, the most important were LUBYANKA, simultaneously the headquarters of the Soviet CI, and BUTYRSKAYA.

In conclusion, one may state the following: anyone whom the Soviets considered really interesting or important sooner or later arrived in one of these Moscow prisons. By experience, a stay there lasted at least 6 months; if the interrogations were still not concluded, a new arrest warrant was apparently issued for 6 months.

A stay in prison severely taxed the physical and psychological powers of resistance of the Germans, in particular, and of cultured West Europeans, in general.

Imprisonment is no shame in the USSR. Therefore the prisoner may sometimes find unexpected ^{help.} ~~health.~~ A frequent aggravation was the indifference of the personnel who, because of laziness, might shorten or cancel the walks, fail to lead the prisoners to the latrine, etc.

Prison life centered on the food dish and the latrine. A man could endure this life for a fairly long time, if he had no illusions about it and made every effort to maintain his mental and physical health.

Prisons in small provincial towns, especially the basement prisons of MVD ministries in the Soviet Republics or of MVD district headquarters,

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were often feared even more than the large Moscow or Leningrad prisons, where there was at least more order and cleanliness.

2. Prisoner-of-War Camp

Interrogated prisoners were sent to POW camps, unless they were immediately sent to Moscow prisons or dragged through MVD basements and prisons in the Soviet occupation zone. But even in the POW camps, they were frequently isolated. Thus, for example, the reception camp of TABOR, Czechoslovakia, had a special section in 1945 which comprised about 30 officers, specialists, and enlisted men of the Ic and Abwehr service.

Others were under so-called "zone restriction" in the camps, i.e., they had no permission to leave the camp even on work details. A radio intelligence man reported that he had been under zone restriction for 3 years.

Life in POW camps is known from numerous descriptions. Let us therefore point out only the following:

The camps were well guarded by MVD troops, and surrounded by wire fences and watch towers. Nevertheless, merely the labor conditions provided many opportunities for escape. Experience has shown that escapees conducting themselves skillfully and having sufficient knowledge of the language could, under fortunate circumstances, move over great distances in the Soviet Union for a long time. ^{Nearly} ~~Always~~ always impossible, however, was the crossing of the borders with their evacuated territories, death zones, and other known security measures. The

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recaptured escapees were then left to the mercies of the guard personnel, who had got into trouble because of the former.

Until 1945, the Soviets assigned officer POW's as camp foremen, etc. After 1945, the officers were removed from such assignments; the jobs of camp foremen, battalion, company, and labor brigade leaders as well as barracks foremen were then given to "activists" or such persons whom the Soviets believed they could trust. These German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Rumanian functionaries frequently aggravated the lives of the POW's more than did the Soviets. The jobs of "runner" for commissars and of guarding the solitary confinements were often given to deserters, veteran Communists, etc. In several camps there were even guard platoons made up of POW's, who guarded their comrades during their work details. In contrast to the above-mentioned zone restriction, passes (propuski) were issue to individual especially "trustworthy" prisoners or to important specialists, authorizing them to leave the camp without escort.

Greatest caution was advised against all persons holding camp jobs and against all POW's enjoying any kind of privilege!

Each camp had a "penal platoon" used for disciplinary measures, but frequently also for reception of certain categories of POW's, e.g., SS and police personnel, but also Ic/AO and General Staff officers -- in short, the platoon served to isolate undesirable and suspicious persons. The penal platoon was quartered separately, often separated from the other quarters by a wire fence and guarded by an interior sentry.
~~century.~~

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For disciplinary punishment, but especially for the holding of POW's who were being or were to be interrogated, solitary confinement cells were used. These consisted usually of most primitive earth or concrete bunkers, at times without any heating, often half below ground, but always separated by special fencing and under special guard. Accommodation in such "bunkers" was frequently much worse than that in jail. During periods of mass interrogations and convictions, these cells did not suffice and some camps converted whole barracks into auxiliary prisons.

The POW camps were distributed over the entire country, heavily concentrated in the development regions. Several camps were under one main administration; the larger camps frequently had auxiliary or external camps, depending on the work assignments.

There were exclusive officer camps and staff officer camps. Not everywhere, however, was the separation strictly adhered to. Some camps had officer companies or at least an officer platoon in addition to others; some individual officers were probably in all camps.

A special position was held by Camp KRASNOGORSK (27) which, because of its proximity to Moscow, served as a place of custody for all prisoners whom the Moscow authorities wanted readily available. There were aliens of all kinds, some of them isolated in a special section of the camp; there were POW's who had come from or were to go to Moscow prisons or who were of interest for political or other reasons. There was also an Antifa school. Such schools, however,

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were also located in various other camps. Their purpose was to train cadre personnel for the Antifa Committees, which every camp had, and moreover for future assignments in Germany.

Camp LUNOVO (20?), also near Moscow, was the headquarters of the notorious officer league (LATTMANN and STEIDLE etc.). Camp VOYKOVO (48) held only generals. There were, moreover, "regime camps," which collected such undesirables as SS and police members, recaptured escapees, ~~lets~~, persons politically denounced by "Free Germany" or "Antifa," or POW's potentially dangerous because of their influence upon their comrades. In this camp, regulations (regime) and guarding were stricter, but the treatment not necessarily worse.

This, however, was the case in the penal and silent camps. Composition of inmates was about the same as in the regime camp. But the work and living conditions were especially severe; there was no mail or other services.

Some reports have mentioned CHESKAZGAN (KAZAKHSTAN) as a penal ~~prison~~ camp, and SHORA (KAZAN area) as a regime camp.

3. Rehabilitation Labor Camps

In these USSR camps, both criminal and political convicts served their sentences.

These camps were characterized by the terrorism exerted by the large secret organizations of the criminals. The Soviets were unable to cope with these organizations. Only after 1950 were vigorous measures said to have been taken. Since STALIN's death, the separation

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between political and criminal convicts has allegedly become the rule in these camps. (?)

These labor camps are located primarily in the northernmost areas of the Soviet Union. Almost all the convicted German POW's were sent ^{to} the VORKUTA area. (northwest of the Urals, north of the Artic Circle).

Their lot was extremely difficult, working under server^{est}~~est~~ climatic conditions, in small groups or singly among Soviet criminals, cut off from all contact. The food rati^t~~ons~~ were similar to those in the POW camps, but graduated according to work performance in different "kettles"; the lowest kettle, far below the barest subsistence level, was reserved for those prisoners who failed to fill their quotas or just barely did so. Also the organization and guard system of the ^{penal}~~Prison~~ camps ^{was} ~~were~~ similar to ^{that} ~~those~~ of the POW camps, except that the guarding and the regime were far more severe and the forced labor even more relentless.

Maltreatments by the "brigade^{iers}" (foremen ~~from~~ from among the convicts) were the daily rule.

After conviction there was no longer any differentiation according to rank regarding ^{rations} ~~rations~~ and labor duty, as was the case in the POW camps.

In summer 1949 there was a suspension of the deportations of the convicted German POW's to VORKUTA. During 1950, the Germans already there were gradually transfered ^r to the ^{penal} ~~Prison~~ camps especially set up

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for convicted POW's after the mass convictions around the turn of 1949-1950. There were finally three main groups of such camps, i.e., in the Urals (SVERDLOVSK and further West), in STALINGRAD, and in the UKRAINE.

These camps differed from the other rehabilitation labor camps only by a few relaxations, e.g., standard POW ^{ration} ~~ration~~ for all ^{(no} "kettles" system), normal haircuts, better work conditions (mostly construction work, no below-ground work). The clever pay system continued to be the main work incentive. The greatest improvements were the separation from the Russian criminals and the better climatic conditions.

The subsequent food package supply from home, however, was the really ~~the~~ decisive factor which prevented further decimation of the POW's.

Each labor camp was surrounded by a "zone" consisting of a double wood or barbed-wire fence 3 meters high, on both sides of which 5 meters ^{were} of ground each raked and again fenced off by barbed wire 1.50 meters high. On occasion, trip-wire entanglements were set up on the outside. Tin cans were attached to the wire to serve as rattles; dogs on running wires were used at night at spots difficult to observe. Watchtowers at the corners and at intervals of about 100 meters were occupied by sentries with machine guns and signal pistols and by searchlights. The entire zone was electrically illuminated at night. Anyone approaching the zone was fired at. Just as strict was the guarding of the labor details on their way from and to work, i.e., by very large numbers of

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escorts armed with submachine guns and, in the case of larger details, also by dogs. Every work site was surrounded by a zone with watch-towers similar to the camps.

In the convict camps there were no "Antifa Committees", "AKTIVS" and no political activity.

4. ~~Camp~~ Transports

The POW transports, sometimes taking weeks, in overcrowded freight cars, with insufficient food, water, and heat, have caused a great number of deaths. Thus, a transport of staff officers from BRESLAU to KARELIA reportedly experienced an almost 50 percent loss. There have been similar reports of transports to ^{the} CAUCASUS.

But even later, transports continued to be feared.

POW's traveled singly or in small groups also in regular trains under guard. On the other hand, convicts on the way to or from prison were always transported in prison cars, while ~~POW's~~ ^{POW's} who were not convicted were frequently transported in this manner. Such prison cars were seen attached to almost every long-distance train. These prison cars (colloquially called "STOLYPIN" after their inventor, the Russian minister after the 1905 Revolution) look like a German express car, except that the windows toward the outside are ^rbarred and not transparent, while the windows and doors toward the corridor are ^rbarred. In addition to the compartments for the prisoners, the cars have a larger compartment for the escorts, a kitchen (only

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for the escorts), and a sleeping compartment for the commanding officer. Such cars are ^{also} parked in the railroad stations as standing jails for changing and waiting transports. Tightness, lack of air, thirst, inability to go the latrine can make such transports a torture.

Large transports of convicts were carried in trains with locked freight cars. They were provided with a wooden latrine gutter and, in the winter, with a small potbelly stove. Severe cold in the winter, un^abarable heat in the summer were the normal conditions in the over-crowded cars. On top of them there were improvised guard post with machine guns, search-lights, and telephone. At every station, the cars were tested for loose planks (knocking with wooden mallets). At least three times daily, the inmates were counted, at which time the car interior was also examined. ^{Rations} ~~Rations~~ on transports were hardtack, salted fish, and water; on large transports, soup would sometimes be added.

The large transports were made up, rearranged, and distributed in the transit prisons (peresylka). There were washing facilities and warm food, essential during weeks of transportation.

Even today, convict transports are still referred to as "etap" ("going on etap" etc.) after the permanent stops along the former march route to Siberia.

Transportation from prison to railroad, to interrogation, or to court was by means of prison automobiles (called "Green Minnia" in

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Germany, "Black Raven" in the USSR. They had no windows and were always overcrowded. If a prisoner had been fortunate enough not to have met with any Russian criminals before, he might then have that experience and lose everything he was carrying on his person.

Transportation to work was also by means of regular trucks. The prisoners had to sit on the bare floor, backs toward travel direction, crowded in, and were not permitted to place their hands on the sideboards. Behind them, their backs to the cab, ~~and~~ ^{armed} guards were standing, separated from the prisoners by a wooden trellis,

The escort personnel for railroad transports were assigned by the MVD transport regiments. Every military district apparently has such an MVD transport regiment.

IV. Organization

Only very few organizational data have been obtained from the prisoners.

1. The key organization of the Soviet "CI" (RAZVEDKA) was as difficult to ascertain as the delimitation of responsibilities between MVD and MGB (now KGB), on the one hand, and between the latter and the intelligence collection service, on the other. All the prisoner had to know was that he was confronted by trained state security functionaries and that IS, reconnaissance of all types, CI, etc., were closely co-ordinated. The headquarters of the secret service was located in the LUBYANKA, where it had many subdivisions, and in ~~extensive~~ offices. There the more important interrogations took place.

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The following key functionaries were observed in the LUBYANKA:

ABAKUMOV, Minister for State Security; the Generals for State Security KOBULEV, PETROV, LEONOV (Air Force affairs ?); the Colonels GARGADZE (alias GOGLIDZE, alias BARBAROV), DR SAVEL'YEV, STERN, SCHWEITZER; and Lieutenant Colonel WEINDORF. Of these, at least ABAKUMOV, KOBULEV, LEONOV, GARGADZE, and WEINDORF have become victims of the BERLIYA purge. Dr SAVEL'YEV and SCHWEITZER claimed to have studied criminal psychology in Germany. The former had once said: "I have grown old in this house." In 1947, also the writer Il'ya ERENBURG, who held the rank of an MVD Major General (!), had an office in the LUBYANKA.

2. The Intelligence Collection Service must have been closely connected with the MVD, at least during the war. Prisoners were encountering MVD officers even in the higher headquarters at the front. One MVD Captain, when sitting on a tribunal, stated that he had been the G-2 of a division during the war. MVD units took over the prisoners close to the front.

There were three essential differences between the Soviet Intelligence Collection Service and the German IC Service:

A. concentration on commitment of numerous agents at the expense of such other services as ^{monitoring,} Radio ~~monitoring,~~ both in application and evaluation.

B. commitment of agents by the Intelligence Collection Service

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itself, ^{no} ~~made~~ clear-cut division of responsibilities between this service and EI as in Germany. Even ^{the} Division G-2 had his own "reconnaissance" ^s unit. One G-2 bragged that he had personally spent days behind the German lines.

C. surveillance of own troop and their leaders was apparently ^{the} responsibility of the Soviet G-2. Time and again, therefore, the Soviets asked German ^{about} personnel ^Λ who was responsible for keeping under surveillance the commander-in-chief, commanding officers, the Chief of Staff and his personnel, and other officers. The reply that in Germany there was no such surveillance was always received with the same incredulous amazement or with such counter-questions as: "But what if the commander is collaborating with the enemy?"

3. MVD and KGB "assistants," as they are officially called, have been holding officer grades and wearing corresponding rank insignia (since 1937?). One must not be deceived, however, into believing them to be "officers" in the Western sense or even in the Soviet Army sense. They are far removed from this military thinking or the concepts of an officer. In their case ~~there~~ can be no understanding as among soldiers ! They could be recognized by their blue caps or piping (green for Border MVD); they were frequently still referred ^v to as "Commissars" by the Russians and as "Blue Ones" by the Germans.

4. The MVD troops are organizationally adapted to the military districts of the Soviet Army.

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Each military district has a commander of MVD troops, who is in charge of guard, transport escort, and reserve regiments.

The MVD troops have their own courts martial. Their jurisdiction extended also to the POW's.

The soldiers of the MVD units were more carefully screened politically and ~~paid~~^{paid} considerably better than those of the Soviet Army.

5. The observation is important that MVD, like all other Soviet institutions, is run as a dual organization, comprising the administrative and ^{the} operational branch. The administrative branch has only such administrative and housekeeping responsibilities as food ~~rations~~^{rations}, lodging, work assignment, exterior order; the operational branch, on the other hand, is responsible for surveillance of any kind; defense against sabotage and espionage; prevention of cell formation, resistance groups, escape attempts, and corruption; for political orientation, willingness to work, morale; and for the execution of interrogations. The operational branch polices not only the prisoners, but certainly also the Soviet organs.

The employees of the operational branch are the real masters of every prison and camp. Their orders have priority over all others. The operational branch alone decides the true fate of the prisoners. In addition to the operational "officers," there were in the camps politofficers and politinstructors responsible for the political

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indoctrination and propaganda. Some of the politainstructors were German and Austrian ~~emigrants~~. The politofficers were subordinate to the operational branch or at least completely dependent on it.

The work of the operational branch was secret, one may say clandestine. Its offices in the camps were provided, like foxes' ~~burrows~~ ^{burrows}, with various entrances and exits; the interrogation rooms had padded double doors. To assist it in its mission, the operational branch maintains an extensive network of informers.

6. The informer system is of special significance throughout the Soviet system. It is taken for granted and it is not considered quite as dishonorable for either partner as in other countries. In the camps, the main bas²s of operation for informers were such public institutions as the barber shop, dispensary, kitchen, clothes warehouse, library, because much could be heard there and because these places enabled both prisoners and Soviet personnel to enter unobtrusively. These were also the contact points where written messages could be droppped, an¹ action that would be too suspicious at the guard post.

There were informers among prisoners of all ranks, educational levels, and ages. Their presence had to be assumed in every prison cell. A prisoner in ~~solitary~~ ^{solitary} confinement would suddenly get a cell-mate ^{who} was to serve as a "nasedka" (bro^aad hen). In the camps,

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the informers came primarily of course from among the activists and Antifa members. The commissars, however, made efforts to obtain also "unmarked," less conspicuous informers and agents provocateurs. The Antifa committees also gave written evaluations of all camp inmates, which then had a bearing on the latter's return home or conviction. These committees were especially active in exposing persons under cover.

Russians are so accustomed to the informer system that they will never speak frankly in the presence of third persons. ~~The guard, for example, with whom one was just talking,~~

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The guard, for example, with whom one was just talking, would immediately be silent when one of his comrades would be approaching; or another, who had done a small favor for a prisoner, would immediately be especially rude as soon as a third person was approaching.

Informers could occasionally be recognized by their questions or by their allowances (food, cigarettes, better clothing). One could also find them out by giving them certain untrue information, which the commissar would then promptly bring up during the next interrogation. Usually it was expedient not to let the informer know that he had been recognized. In certain cases, one could utilize the informer as a mouth-piece aimed at the commissars.

Main Experience: nobody is to be trusted, even if he is a former acquaintance, without renewed testing and checking.

Particular ^{caution} ~~position~~ is advised toward any newly arriving cell-mates and roommates. ^{Caution} ~~Position~~ also ^{toward} ~~taught~~ persons who complain ^{too} much and too loudly about the Soviets!

Technical listening devices were also allegedly used. In no case, however, were they reported as proved.

V. Soviet Mentality

The experiences with Soviet behavioral and thinking patterns were as important for the prisoner's conduct during interrogations as for his relations with Soviet administrative and guard personnel and with Russian fellow prisoners. Enduring and surviving the ^{captivity} ~~captivity~~ depend considerably on understanding the Russian mentality.

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These experiences cannot be described here, but shall be touched on to indicate in which categories they ^{have} been obtained.

1. The "Soviet man" exists only in Soviet proganda. The many nationalities in the Soviet Union still retain their own characteristics. The Great Russians continue to be the decisive nationality. The small nations and Asians frequently feel discriminated against by the Great Russians. For example, escorts complained about discrimination in promotions because they were Asians.

The Russian is not subhuman (Nazi prog^anda), but his Slavic character showing Asian influences makes him quite different ~~than~~ from the Western European.

To the frugal, tough Russian, many things that the Western European feels to be a hardship seem entirely bearable.

2. The Russian likes to speak of his "expansive soul" (shirokaya natura, literally: expansive, broad nature). In it there is room for everything, and the contrasts lie side by side, e.g., hatred and helpfulness, cruelty and a certain ^{childlike} ~~kind of~~ good-naturedness, a tendency toward formalism and bureaucracy as well as an absolute talent for improvisation, inurement to hard discipline and an inclination toward sloppiness, national pride and inferiority complex. The unquotable vocabulary of popular Russian curses is matched by a pronounced prudery in other matters, and the frequently rude behavior by a great sensitivity.

These numerous contradi^ctions make the Russian often unpredictable by Western standards.

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3. The concept of time is Asian ("A thousand verst is no distance, a thousand days no time!"). "Tomorrow" may mean in ^a month, perhaps later or never. This can drive the impatient West European to distraction.

On the other hand, every order is customarily ~~emphasized~~ ^{emphasized} by "davay, davay, bystro!" (Let's go, quick).

4. Every Russian lies (GORKI: "a Russian without lies is like a rooster without feathers!"). He lies because of politeness, compassion, wickedness, and ~~evaculation~~ ^{evacuation} or even merely out of habit.

"Skoro domoy" (going home soon) was the slogan everywhere time and again, and the more so the less the chances. Favorable rumors were ~~disseminated~~ ^{disseminated}, in order to reduce any desire for escape or resistance. Evacuation to prison was explained by: "to another camp" or "to the hospital," even if no one could be convinced. In prison, one commissar said: "You have been transferred ^{red} here as a big criminal and you will never again get out of here." Minutes later, another commissar would say to the same prisoner: "We are sorry to keep you here, but the Moscow Hotels are filled. We only have a few questions for you, then you are free again!" A definitely ^e concluded interrogation will nevertheless be ended with the sentence: "We will continue tomorrow." Promises are always lies, and so are fortunately most threats.

The Russian dislikes very much to answer "yes" or "no" even to the simplest questions. Instead he will say: "Zaftra budet" (it will be tomorrow, which is the equivalent of no!) or "posmotrim" (we will see) or "write a petition" and so on.

The ambiguous term "nichevo" (it does not matter, never mind, etc.) is still in great use on many occasions. Only if one can adopt a "nichevo" attitude himself to a certain degree, will one be able to cope with the Russian character.

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On the whole, the lesson derived from the Russian mentality is as follows: nothing in the Soviet Union is quite as bad as feared, nothing quite as good as hoped for.

5. The Bolshivist system has now been in existence long enough, so that even non-Communists, indeed opponents of the system, can think only in Communist categories and speak only in ~~Party~~ ^{Party} terminology. The convinced Communist (the commissar) considers all party arguments true and cannot comprehend when they fail to have any effect.

There is general pride in the achievements of Soviet technology, science and culture, as well as great sensitivity in this area. Toward the educated West European there still remains simultaneously an inferiority complex.

Patriotic thinking following the victorious war is rather understandable. Nevertheless there are malcontents, indeed enemies of the system, even if an "opposition" is not noticeable. But any person complaining about the system or the exploiting functionaries will make sure to add that capitalists and Americans would of course be even worse.

6. It is very important to familiarize oneself with the Soviet terminology and its constant change with every prevailing situation, otherwise harmful misunderstandings could result.

Examples: humanism = humaneness; kultura = civilization, ~~breedings~~ ^{breedings}; fascist = any non-Communists (from the Pope to the Social Democrats); just and unjust war; democracy = dictatorship of the proletariat; coexistence = peacetime subversion; world peace = victory of the world revolution -- and so forth.

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VI. Interrogations

1. Periodically, certain interrogation waves were observed, for example:

a. Biographic questionnaires for all prisoners. They contained 40-50 questions about social origin, family conditions, property, education, civil and military history, foreign residences, etc. Frequently, supplemental personal histories were later requested; in the case of some prisoners, repeatedly at intervals.

b. Interrogation on military experiences (tactics, organization, technology). These questions had obviously been drawn up by the Soviet General Staff. Army officers (General Staff) were also present during such interrogations. Thus the officer who interrogated one Ic about the Ic Service was a lieutenant colonel, who expressly identified himself as a General Staff officer of the Central General Staff.

c. Interrogations obviously designed to procure material for the Nuremberg Trials, e.g., German plans in Spain, the role of the German General Staff at the time of Finland's entering the war, activity of the attaché group (General Staff = criminal organization) etc.

d. In fall 1946, interest in military IS experiences against the Western "Allies" (Britain, France, US).

e. In 1947 (?), a wave of economic questions: foreign contacts of large German firms, contacts of German concerns, industrial capacity, by no means restricted to armaments.

f. The large, long enduring wave of interrogations to convict the "war criminals"; these interrogations determined first of all the victim's "road through Russia."

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g. In 1953-1954, questions about persons of interest to the "GEHLEN Organization" or the Bundeswehr.

h. In 1955, political probing prior to return home.

For their own mental preparation, the prisoners had to gain timely recognition of such waves by mutual notification.

2. Interrogation Subjects

a. Agents

Throughout the years, this subject has continued to be the most important for the Soviets. They have an absolute panic fear of traitors and agents in their ^{own} ranks. The Soviets themselves obviously considered the employment of agents the most essential means for intelligence collection. Following are some pertinent questions:

What were the sources of the German military attaché in Moscow?

Which high-ranking Russians, ministers, generals, have worked for you?

In which ministries have you had agents?

With what Soviet citizens did you become acquainted during your peacetime travels in the Soviet Union?

What are the names of Soviet citizens who during the war collaborated with German intelligence or military units?

Who was the agent "Max," where was he located?

"Wally" agents?

Later the interest shifted also to Western agents, possibly in order to recruit them. Consequently, military attachés who had been in Western countries were repeatedly asked about agents, V-men, sources.

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b. Organization, Assignments, and Operational Methods of the German Abwehr

The organization seemed to have been known in outline (Abwehr I, II, III etc.) from the very beginning. Subsequently, the picture became gradually completed by POW statements and captured material. Thus one Abwehr specialist was shown for confirmation an exact German Abwehr table of organization with names of branch chiefs, group leaders, desk chiefs, chiefs of Abwehr stations, etc. Another Abwehr officer was shown an apparently correct list of cover names of prewar foreign V-men.

Other questions asked:

Which Abwehr officers do you know, who, like yourself, are in Soviet captivity?

Do you know General BUSCH (Abwehr, Air)?

Questions about misleading missions, Secret Field Police, Gestapo, contacts with foreign intelligence services, collaboration with allied intelligence services (e.g., Hungary).

Which was the greatest espionage case that you have uncovered?

Questions about Abwehr II missions and depots set up, about such technical data as secret inks and the method of making them legible.

c. Organization and Operation of the German Ic Service

The basic aspects were of course known. Wrongly evaluating the German organizational and operational methods by their own standards (see also page 27 [of the German text], Section IV, 2), the Soviets were unable to comprehend the following:

The delimitation between Abwehr and Ic activities; the subordination

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of the Ic only under his own chief or commander.

They were not to be convinced that the superior of an Army Ic was not the Ic of an Army Group, that the Army Ic was not the superior of the Corps Ic, etc.

In general, the questions asked, over and over again, dealt with agents. There was relatively little interest in the actual methods used in compiling a picture of the enemy situation. Only few questions were asked about such important reconnaissance means as radio interception, artillery observation, etc.

d. Activity of Military Attachés, Organization and Missions of Attaché Group in OKH

Following are some examples of questions asked:

Collaboration of military attachés with Abwehr? (the Soviets did not believe that the service regulations did not specify any such collaboration).

Reporting of military attachés?

Their collaboration in the preparation of war?

Detachments of German officers to other armies and vice versa.

Special interest: what were the names of Red Army officers controlled by you in Germany?

Participation of foreign officers in German maneuvers?

Public figures abroad, especially those considered anti-Soviet or for whose defamation material was needed. Political, economic, military questions about the host country. Contacts with other military attachés, especially with the Soviet military attaché.

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All these questions, however, took second place to that about agents (see above).

e. Foreign Travel

Such travel, even if entirely private, was of the greatest interest. Time and again, the questions were as follows:

What secret mission did you have?

On whose orders did you go there, who gave you the funds, to whom did you report during and after your trip?

Truthful answers that the trip had been for recreation, ~~family~~ ^{family} visit, or the like, were not believed. It was inconceivable for the Soviets that anyone -- not to say an officer -- could use his leave simply for a foreign trip without having an espionage or diversionary mission. Thus one is forced to conclude that any Soviet citizen abroad has a mission, if no other than occasionally demonstrating, as artist, scientist, , or athlete, the harmlessness of the system.

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f. GEHLEN Organization and Bundeswehr

Questions about persons:

Do you know GEHLEN, BUNTROCK, HEUSINGER, SPEIDEL, MATZKY, FÖRSCH, von TIPPELSKIRCH, FETT, WESSEL, LAEGELER, von MELLENTHIN, von WANGHEHEIM?

Evaluation?

(In one case when a POW refused to answer, he ^{was} told: "We may discuss this without worry. MELLENTHIN and BUNTROCK are traitors who have sold themselves to the Americans.")

What will GEHLEN do with you, when you come home now?

The purpose of these questions was obviously to obtain, on the one hand, pertinent evaluations of these persons and, on the other, material against them which could be used in an attempt to prevent their further military employment.

g. Many interrogations were designed only as personal and political probings, to ascertain morale, for mail evaluation or dissemination of rumors ("slogans"), and maybe omitted in this report.

Endeavors

3. Recruitment ~~endeavors~~

Their ^{aim} ~~was~~ was to gain the following:

a. Collaborators for political purposes (National Committee, Officer League, and their war-time subversive and propaganda activity, Antifa, "Peace" movement, etc., after the war).

b. Informers for the duration of the captivity.

c. Agents for the ~~duration of the~~ ^{time after} captivity.

It goes without saying that successful recruitment under (a) included utilization under (b) and (c). One must remember the "Antifascist Oath," which obligated the person to work for Communism anywhere and at any time. At least all the graduates of the Antifa schools took this oath.

The Soviets, however, were also anxious to gain persons who were not politically marked and therefore recognizable from the very outset. This even more so, the more they had to realize that the overwhelming majority of prisoners continued to maintain a negative attitude toward the exertion of political influence and toward the persons who had come under it.

The recruitment efforts under (a) became somewhat less intense after 1945 and the dissolution of the National Committee and the Officer League. However, a politically ~~negative~~ negative attitude often could still have such unpleasant consequences as solitary confinement, the penal platoon, the penal camp, unpleasant labor assignments, etc..

Attempts under (b) were made very frequently, but could be quickly shaken off by taking a firm stand, which did not necessarily even result in any unpleasant personal consequences.

The procedure in this matter was generally rather primitive.

Promises of better living conditions were made, but especially ^{of} earlier release, ~~coupled~~ ^{coupled} with threats ("If you do not cooperate, you reveal yourself as an enemy of the Soviet Union, as a fascist"), ^{coercive} ~~measures~~ measures, prosecution as war criminal, etc.

Greater efforts were made in recruitment attempts under (a) and especially (c).

Examples:

(1) Repeated attempts to recruit a Corps Ic (Reserve Officer) in 1945 - 1946 to act as informer and collaborate in uncovering covert SS officers; in return, the Ic was to be reunited with his family.

(2) One Division Ic (Reserve Officer) was given 32 days of solitary confinement, because he refused to act as informer against covert SS men.

(3) Recruitment for a mission in Egypt was attempted in the case of a colonel (former chief of the "Foreign Police Forces" branch in the Prussian Interior Ministry), of whom the Soviets knew that he was well informed about Egypt and that he spoke perfect English; the colonel was to be repaid with an immediate return home. He was not told the specifics of the mission, but it was obviously directed against Britain (1949!).

(4) One Abwehr lieutenant colonel (with fluency in Russian) was promised in 1955 immediate release in Kirovograd, if he were ready to become a German-language instructor (!) at the secondary school and at the medical school. His wife (!) would be able to join him immediately at Soviet expense and would have a completely furnished apartment at her disposal.

In August 1955, the same officer was requested in Vladimir to make German-language broadcasts via radio Moscow against Adenauer and the Americans. After several rejections, he was requested to speak at a press conference in Moscow. He would previously be informed of what he was to say. He rejected and three days later a very intelligent looking

lieutenant colonel from Moscow told him that they wanted to help him. First of all, he was to write to his wife (at that time in Leipzig) and to his son (Cologne). He became curious and accepted. After he had completed half of the letter, he was told what he was to add in German. In both cases, it was somewhat as follows: "The bearer is an acquaintance of mine from a camp. His words are my words. Do as he says, as this is happening upon my request." When he refused to write, he was threatened and given solitary confinement. However, threatened with severest penalties should he ever mention the demand made on him, he was transferred to a communal cell a few days later. He nevertheless informed a few trustworthy comrades.

Futile recruitment attempts generally ended in the prisoner's signing a pledge of silence under threat of punishment quoted from an article of the Soviet Penal Code.

(5) Two Generals (chief of Abwehr branch and a military attaché) were enabled to correspond with their wives, in order to lure the latter to East Berlin. Realizing this intention, one of the generals refused any further correspondence, while the other continued to write (giving, as ordered, Berlin as the place of mailing!), but inserting clear instructions for his wife, not to consent to anything.

(6) In 1954, a commanding general, whose daughter in the meantime had obtained employment with a US office (a fact completely unknown to him at the time!), was flown to Karlshorst in a standard civil aircraft; he was wearing civilian clothes specially issued in Moscow; in Karlshorst, pressure was exerted on him to have his wife ~~to~~ come to Berlin. When he refused, he was returned to the Soviet Union and

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transferred to camp Voykovo.

(7) In March 1955, an unpleasant, concentrated effort was made to recruit a general (military attaché) for work after his return home. The graphic threats were not carried out.

It is known that especially just before the 1955 release numerous recruitment attempts were made, primarily in the case of officers with family or other contacts in the economy or abroad.

Of special note was the endeavor to get hold of the family of the person to be recruited.

4. The ~~same~~ Interrogators

They differed greatly in mental capacity and level of education. Only the Moscow key functionaries (cf IV.1. above) and very few leading MVD men in the provinces were above average even by ~~camp~~ Western standards. They were excellent linguists (some spoke German without any accent), were thoroughly informed on Germany and German conditions (some had spent years there or were even of German or German-Jewish descent), had good general knowledge and psychological understanding. This group was absolutely dangerous. Below them, the decline was rapid. The small commissars in the camps often were to be feared only because of a certain slyness and experience; otherwise they were mostly primitive and naive especially about foreign conditions, military organization, and the like. It was nevertheless a mistake to underestimate them because, in addition to unscrupulousness in the choice of means, they all had training in interrogation tactics as well as political propaganda instruction. This was recognizable by the fact that interrogations

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almost always began the same way ("How are you?" etc.) and, on the lower levels, continued rather mechanically according to rule. In the camps it was noticed that the texts of the more important questions had obviously been framed in Moscow. Moscow specialists, however, also visited the camps and provincial prisons to attend interrogations.

5. All protocols were transcribed by hand by the interrogator in the following form: Question and answer. Each page had to be signed separately by the person interrogated. In fact, the latter should insist on this, in order to prevent any subsequent distortions.

The alteration of a protocol was very embarrassing for the interrogator, because he would then have to rewrite everything by hand. By refusing to sign, on the other hand, the person interrogated did have a certain means available to make certain that the answer was formulated to his liking. Outright protocol forgeries were seldom noted, but the more so in accurate translations and unfavorable formulations. However, one Abwehr officer (fluent in Russian) did find in his files falsified protocols, bearing a forgery of his signature.

Written statements (except personal histories) were demanded only in individual cases.

6. The interpreters also differed greatly in knowledge and ability. They were frequently women, most often Jews. They were, of course, never neutral! Occasionally, they tried to influence the

interrogations malevolently.

Caution in "private" conversations with interpreters during interrogation breaks!

Nevertheless, the services of an interpreter should be waived only by persons who know Russian like their native language. Even good knowledge of the language does not suffice for interrogations, because the additional mental strain of translation causes early fatigue. This is detrimental to the content. The person interrogated would thus, moreover, give up that extra time that he would gain while the interpreter was translating the question which he, the prisoner, had already understood in Russian, as well as his answer.

Whether or not the person interrogated should admit altogether his knowledge of Russian depends entirely on the individual situation. Admitting may be useful, in order to exert some control over the interpreter; moreover, one could then request to personally read the Russian protocols, rather than have them read in German. If one cannot read Russian, he should insist that he sign only a written translation of the protocol. By sufficient steadfastness, refusals to sign Russian protocols, have met with success.

7. The interrogation methods were characterized by the following:

a. Generally by the " carrot and stick" system. Psychologically and physically there were, on the one hand, relaxations, temptations, and promises, while on the other there were extortions,

coercive measures, and pressures of all kinds.

Psychological Methods : Appeals to intellect, education, reason, love of "fatherland" and "peace".

Attempts at political convincing, references to power and achievements of the Soviet Union.

Promises (better treatment, food, release from prison, permission to write, return home).

Reference to family ("You do want to see your wife again!" or "Your wife is also in our power," or "The power of the MVD extends far, we can get hold also of your wife, even if she is in the West").

Emphasizing the futility of any resistance ("Do you wish to fight against this apparatus ?")

Blackmail with letters (During the interrogation of an Iç who for years had had no communication from his family, the commissar took out a stack of letters and postcards, on which the prisoner immediately recognized the handwriting of his wife. When the commissar obtained no satisfactory replies, he put the letters away again).

Reviling the prisoner as a liar, idiot, fascist; threatening him with death, conviction, arrest, maltreatment, torture, disappearance without a trace.

Examples: "When I push this button, your corpse will be lying in the yard in five minutes ! " ; holding a pistol against the prisoner's head; "Do you want your lungs to burst in a low-pressure

chamber?"; "You will never get out of here!" ; Threatening with a big club; calling in a "boxer" and asking, "Do you want him to continue your interrogation?"; "With hunger, cold, and beatings, we will get you to give answers;" "We will skin you alive;" or "We could simply just forget you!". In one case where this last threat was used, the prisoner was taken to the basement of the prison and shown cells occupied by old men who had become utterly feeble-minded.

Physical Methods: Better food rations, food packages, "commissar breakfasts, " cigarettes, money for purchases, improved accommodations ranging from better cells to a dacha (country house), reduction or withdrawal of food rations.

Attrition through lack of sleep :

Standing at attention for hours during interrogations.

Dressed in winter clothes, prisoner remains in front of a hot stove during interrogation.

Aggravated imprisonment (solitary confinement, cages, cold cells, dark cells, cells with ~~glaring~~ ^{glaring} lights, upright cages, upright cages with slanted floors, water cages).

Maltreatments, The following must be differentiated:

On the one hand, the brutal beatings by camp commissars and interpreters, especially during the first years, including knocking out teeth, etc., in the case of SS, police and similar personnel, but also occasionally in the case of officers and specialists of the I_c Service. On the other hand, the fits of rage of the disappointed commissars (e.g., GARGADZE's attempt to choke a general; a blow given by a

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commissar with a marble blotter holder to a colonel, who thus lost almost all his teeth); and finally, as the most extreme measure, systematically and consciously applied maltreatment and torture.

Maltreatment of officers was not especially frequent. The Soviets, however, did not shrink from maltreating^{even} high-ranking officers, if they were unable to achieve their goals in any other way. Thus, there is proof of maltreatment even in the case of several generals, including maltreatment on orders or in the presence of General Kobulev.

As a rule, physical maltreatment is prohibited in the Soviet Union. Its application as a coercive measure required special permission or special orders.

Maltreatment was executed by punching, kicking, whips, steel fagots, etc., applied also to genitals or soles (bastinado).

The application of ~~the~~ drugs, injections, medicaments has not been reported anywhere with any certainty. Only one person questioned mentioned his suspicion that he might have been given prepared cookies, since he became suspiciously tired after he had eaten them. (?)

b. Use of Time. The time available to the Soviets is infinite. Months and years can be used to clarify one single question.

c. Constant Repetition. The same questions were repeated as often as the references to the senselessness of any opposition.

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Tiring endurance interrogations (up to 36 hours) were carried out, at times with a change of interrogators; or, weeks later, a new commissar was assigned, who started the whole affair all over again with the same questions. Since impatient West Europeans are no match for this procedure, it can induce them to make confessions merely to get away from these questions and these commissars.

d. Interrogations were carried out almost always at night . The main reason might have been to rob the victim of sleep; another reason, the Russian preference for night work.

e. Careful Preparation . There was always the impression that, prior to the interrogation, the interrogator had thoroughly informed himself, from files and by inquiries, about the character and personal history of the person to be interrogated, and had planned his approach.

Appendix 3 gives an outline of the process of interrogation and treatment in a politically oriented case.

Appendix 4 indicates the process of a terroristic investigation .

8. The tactics used in the interrogation itself depended very much on the personality of the interrogator. Notably, the attempt was made to achieve the goal by circumvention or surprise.

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The beginning was always polite, a probing for personal and political attitude, loosening up by discussing neutral subjects, finding out weaknesses and sore spots. In between, suddenly a factual question, a sudden switch to "severity," insults, threats, an equally sudden turn toward softening, intimidation, and urging to talk. An attempt to create the impression that all the information had already been given by others, and to pin down contradictions to previous statements.

9. Recommended Behavior When Facing These Methods

There was remarkable unanimity on this subject among all persons questioned. The following points were especially emphasized:

General attitude: Calm, determined, composed, polite. Do not be influenced by the fact that you are unshaven, starved and ragged, while the commissar is well-nourished and well-groomed. Put yourself on the same level. Arrogance is just as harmful as ingratiating or, indeed, subservience. Speak as little as possible, so as not to give any leads for new questions.

Do hide your light under a bushel, and calmly accept sneers and ridicule. Plead weakness of memory because of sickness, injuries, imprisonment and hunger.

Plead that in accordance with such secrecy orders as Hitler's Order No 1, one could not possibly know anything.

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Never admit anything on your own. Do not offer the slightest assistance. Any initial yielding results in further extortion, possibly maltreatment. Absolute concentration on the subject. During ~~interrogation~~ ^{interrogation} breaks, always recapitulate what you have said or written up to that time, so that you will not contradict yourself even weeks or months later.

Stick to the truth as far as possible; lies and deceptions do not withstand the subtle methods and have very unpleasant results (exceptions are the few cases where a well-prepared "legend" consistently adhered to, promises success).

Remain calm. In the face of threats, do not display fear, but do not try to ridicule these threats. The best attitude would be possibly as follows: "I realize that I am entirely in your power. I expect, however, that the Soviet Union will maintain, even toward me, the principles of justice and humaneness." This appeal was sometimes effective, especially since physical maltreatment during interrogations was generally prohibited (see above). Against such maltreatment, as long as it was not systematic torture, energetic protests were therefore successful, in some cases even simply returning the blows vigorously.

In the face of insults, bellowing, etc., a composed silence is best. In some cases, especially if the prisoner spoke Russian, application of the same sound volume and a similar vocabulary was also effective.

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Favors, such as special meals, should be rejected, firmly but politely. Do not show that you are hungry, that you are suffering under the privations and imprisonment. The same applies to the separation from one's family. This would merely give further leads for new torments.

Basic rule: So long as the commissar rages, threatens, etc., everything is in order. When he gets friendly and pleasant, then watch out! In that case, either the prisoner himself had already made a mistake or the other side was preparing another dirty trick!

In solitary confinement, intensive intellectual concentration is needed on any kind of problem, no matter what, as long as it occupies the mind intensively enough to let it escape the grinding effect of the waiting and the vicious circle of interrogations. One military attaché, for example, reported that he had successfully occupied himself with architectural and interior designing plans and ideas down to the last detail.

Recruitment attempts should be rejected clearly and sharply at their first indication. One may thus spare himself a great deal of additional bother. Completely erroneous is any thought of trying to outmaneuver the Soviets and therefore indicating cooperation at first. In this kind of game, the dialectically trained commissar is always the winner. Initial ^{yielding} ~~leading~~ in any case leads always to repeated torment. Only the person who said, "No", at the very beginning could

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expect finally to be left alone (even though late and after great difficulties).

After the interrogations, one is honor bound to make unobtrusive contact with (trustworthy!) fellow-prisoners who are subject to the same kind of interrogation. They will thus gain time and leads to prepare themselves for their own interrogation.

One should not inform even well-meaning comrades of any "secrets," i.e., matters which ^{one} must or wants to conceal. Every fellow-prisoner, even if he is no informer, is potentially dangerous, because the confidant may one day be blackmailed or even tortured. Therefore, do not burden and endanger anyone with any confidential information, unless it is of importance for himself.

In certain cases, a hunger strike may be an effective weapon. The Soviets have to report any hunger strike to their superiors. This, in itself, is unpleasant for them.

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If, for example, the prisoner is interested in calling attention to himself, bringing about an interrogation, or expressing a clear protest, he may be successful with a hunger strike. A hunger strike may also be successful in cases where arbitrariness of subordinate organs must be fought, where commissars are acting contrary to Soviet regulations. The strike will have no success in situations where the Soviets are acting within the limits of their laws and regulations or upon higher orders .

In any case, the hunger strike remains as the last ^{resort} ~~means~~ and the prisoner must fully realize just how much energy it will take and the grave damages he may well risk to his already rundown state of health. The strike should therefore be started only in important cases and after careful consideration and, once begun, it must be carried through unflaggingly.

The Soviets react usually by, first of all, trying to break the strike by persuasion and promises of all kinds. If unsuccessful or if ~~the~~ ^{the} "hard line" is anyway under consideration, the hunger strike is broken ~~through~~ ^{by means of} forced feeding, which usually takes the form of gross maltreatment. (The prisoner is held by escorts or ~~is~~ ^{dressed} in a strait jacket, then injection of a hose into the nose, etc.)

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VII. Convictions

Ic, Abwehr, and other personnel were convicted during the great wave of 1949 - 1950, only in a few cases even earlier. It goes without saying that all such (recognized) persons were convicted. Only among the lower ranks might there have been some insignificant exceptions. The ~~second thing~~ ^{sentencing} was done by the "War Tribunals of the MVD Troops" in very summary proceedings, often lasting only a few minutes, usually without prosecutor, defense, and witnesses. Some prisoners were even convicted by mail order sentences of the "Council for Special Affairs" (Osoboye Soveshchaniye, "OSO") . These sentences were passed in Moscow in the absence of the accused and without trial, merely on the basis of records, and were forwarded in writing.

All these persons were convicted in accordance with Article 58 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR (or with corresponding articles of other Soviet Republics, e.g., Article 68 in the Belorussian Republic). In these convictions, reference was always made to Section VI (Espionage) and often additionally to Section IV (counter-revolutionary activity in collaboration with the international bourgeoisie).

All were given the "maximum penalty" for these crimes, at that time, 25 years in a labor rehabilitation camp. (In the meantime, the death penalty has been reintroduced for these crimes).

Some of the grounds for conviction were simply ludicrous (in the case of one Division Ic, they were literally given as follows:

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"Because he had admittedly observed Soviet ^{positions} ~~positions~~ and their rear areas through field glasses from the German position and had thus engaged in espionage."); some were laconic ("for espionage"); or mail order convictions merely indicated penalty and article.

Any type of activity in the Abwehr and Ic Services was interpreted as espionage; Foreign and General Staff Service (i.e. preparation for war to overthrow the Soviet system) was moreover interpreted as counter-revolutionary activity in collaboration with the international bourgeoisie. On the latter ground (Article 58,4), however, some individual prisoners also were convicted who were said to have worked against the National Committee for Antifa while in captivity.

B. WHAT IS TO BE EXPECTED FOR THE FUTURE?

I. General

1. In a future war, the only possible enemy will be the Soviet Union. Only its procedures must be concentrated on. Even its satellites do not have to be considered, since they will proceed in every detail like the Soviet Union.

2. The possibility must be considered that also ~~persons~~ persons with knowledge of classified information will again be captured by the Soviets. Employment of atomic weapons, parachute operations, tank raids, partisans, and underground movements may rapidly create

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entirely unexpected situations. Indeed, even in the Cold War, such situations may well be imagined (aircraft emergency landings, kidnappings,).

3. The extent of the Soviet Union's general adherence to the (generally satisfactory) Regulations of the Geneva Conference of 12 August 1949 on Treatment of Prisoners of War is already a doubtful matter. That the Soviet Union will not do so in the case of persons with knowledge of classified information is ~~probable~~ ^{probable}. Also in future, application is to be feared of all means of pressure against persons suspected by the Soviets of having important information.

That prisoners of war in the Soviet Union will ~~rather~~ ^{never} remain in the custody of the Army, but in that of the MVD or similar organization is a certainty. Also certain is ^{that} the methods of political influencing and political abuse of POW's will not be abandoned.

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II. Specifics

1. The methods of Soviet guarding, treatment, and interrogation of prisoners are based on experiences dating far back to Tsarist days and on the national character. The Russians (including ^{the} bolsheviks) are very ^{conservative in} ~~conservative on~~ matters of organization and procedure.

Therefore, the experiences described in Section A above, in general, will remain valid also for the future. There is the possibility for some purely external alterations, mitigations, or intensifications of some aspects, but there will be no change whatever in essentials.

Also the judiciary will retain its role as a means of the political and the class struggle (cf. VYSHINSKIY'S ~~book~~ book: The Soviet Judiciary), despite present-day revisions of the penal code. The engagement of the judiciary against POW's must be expected also in future.

2. In the interrogation organs, we must expect significantly raised standards, especially on the lower levels, and considerably better knowledge of foreign, and especially German, conditions. The tremendous experiences of World War II will certainly determine a better selection and training of this personnel. ~~and training~~ During and after the war, extensive foreign contacts have been made. The level of general education has risen. Thus, even more refined interrogations ^{tactics} _^ than ever before ^{must} ~~may~~ be expected. There will also be

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increased utilization of psychological findings and procedures.

Future prisoners will face an improved and even more dangerous organization!

3. As advances are made in science and technology, greater importance will ^{be} given to the use of technical listening devices and drugs, whose role to date has been ~~significant~~ insignificant.

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4. The experiences of the Korean War indicate an extremely high percentage ^{of} prisoners who ~~had~~ ^{have} succumb^{ed} to Communist influence. According to an article by Major William E. Mayer, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, of the thousand U.S. soldiers who had been prisoners in Korea and ^{whose histories} ~~whose histories~~ he studied, no less than one third had become victims of ~~the~~ Communist "brain washing". He had ^{excepted} ~~excluded~~ from his study those who had experienced physical torture, as well as deserters and criminals.

These are alarmingly great successes, especially if one considers that they were achieved against soldiers who in no way had to bear up ^{under} ~~under~~ such additional afflictions as the total collapse of their home^lland, the ^eradication of state and army, as had been the case of the German prisoners of the last war.

If we disregard the silly and dangerous term "brain washing," we must conclude that, because of refined ^{methods,} ~~methods,~~ a high percentage of prisoners in Communist captivity are likely to break ^{down} ~~also~~ in future.

There is moreover ^{proof} ~~with~~ that actual terrorist methods can hardly be withstood by anyone.

The conclusion is that whenever a person with knowledge of classified information becomes a prisoner of the Communists, we must assume that the latter will obtain ^{this} ~~the~~ information. At any rate, our own command staff must take this into consideration.

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5. Since a future war can be imagined only as a conflict between two camps of utterly divergent political philosoph^{ies,} political influenc^e of prisoners in Communist captiv^aity will presumably be stepped up even further than during the last war.. In no case will Communism give up trying to ^{utilize} ~~use~~ prisoners against their own camp for prop^aganda, ^{subversion,} ~~subversion,~~ espionage, and political purposes, and perhaps even for military commⁱtment.

Persons with knowledge of classified information and primarily intelligence officers will be especially desirable objects of such attempts, because (1) via the device of ^{"politics,"} ~~subversion,~~ they may be made to divulge their knowledge, and (2) their employ^ment against their own camp promises great ^a prop^aganda and material advantages.

In order to create the impression that the political indoctrination is generated by the prisoners themselves, some of it will again be carried out by special organizations set up ^{expressly} ~~for~~ for the prisoners along the lines of those of "Free Germany" and Antifa.

Thus there is no doubt that there will again be organ^{ized} "National Committees, Liberation Committees, Freedom Armies, Peace Movements," or however they will be called to fit the current situation. The more so, since the card-carrying Communists and fellow travelers among the prisoners will be available as trained cad^{re}s and helpers for such organizations, aided, in turn, by "nonconformist" intellectuals (cf. their behavior in the Cold War!).

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C. CONCLUSIONS

Following are at least some of the conclusions that must be drawn from the experiences and assumptions discussed above.

I. Organization and Personnel

1. Measures to prevent persons with ^{knowledge of} classified information, primarily high-grade and valuable ones, from falling into enemy hands:

Abandoning the practice of rotating such persons between headquarters and front assignments, even though ^rcontrary to tradition and military sentiment. Any resulting career disadvantages ^{must be} ~~must be~~ compensated for.

Timely withdrawal of ^{Abwehr,} ~~Abwehr,~~ radio reconnaissance, and other units from critical situations.

2. Measures to assure better cover for Abwehr personnel. Such service assignments, even previous ones, must not be ⁿmentioned in any personal military records.

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3. Limitation of the number of witting persons and of the volume of any individual's knowledge to a minimum.

Ignorance is the ^{best} protection against blackmail.

Advisable therefore are orders such as HITLER's former "Order No 1," a system of compartmentation, ^{cover} ~~give~~ names and designations (the former not only for agents!).

4. In the selection and evaluation of witting persons, character must have absolute priority over intellect, skill, and professional knowledge. There must be no "weak spots" in character and personal conduct, which the Soviets would immediately work on.

Soft and sensitive natures and such who absolutely cannot do without their comforts break down more easily.

5. No ambiguous positions must be created, such as the former "Sonderfuehrer" (specialists) who, neither fish nor fowl, built up inferiority complexes and were unable to develop a sense of belonging. They were thus more easily endangered.

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II. Training, Instruction, Direction

1. Attempts at learning to endure privation and torture, as carried out in the U.S., are childish and useless. One cannot practice hunger or enduring confinement and maltreatment, since the subject knows from the outset that the exercise can not go to extremes and must have a time limitation. Hard field duty will teach the soldier sufficiently that man is able to endure much more lack of sleep, hunger, thirst, and exertion than he may at first think possible.

2. Special instruction on Soviet conditions and Russian mentality should be given to all persons with knowledge of classified information, at least to those of the Intelligence, Ic, and military foreign services. This instruction should cover the following:

- a. Russian language courses (simultaneously a good introduction to the Russian mentality).
- b. Literature (as much as possible in Russian) by such authors as PUSHKIN, CHEKHOV, TOLSTOY, GORKI, MAYAKOVSKI, SHOLOKHOV, DUDINTSEV, and PASTERNAK. (Penetrating the Russian character.)
- c. Information on the Soviet Union (geographic, political, sociological, economic, and military).
- d. The principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, dialectical and historical

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materialism.

- e. Goals and roads of Communism.
- f. Organization and operation of the Soviet ~~and~~ clandestine and interrogation services.

The seriousness of this type of study cannot be ^{as} emphasized enough. It should therefore be followed up by examinations.

3. Each soldier, even if unwitting of classified information, must be ~~thoroughly~~ ^{thoroughly} informed about what he has to expect in possible captivity and about his conduct as prisoner. He must be instructed on the following:

a. His responsibility for the circumstances of his capture and for his conduct in captivity. Both matters will be investigated after his return and any offenses will be severely ^e punished.

b. Assurance that his loyalty will be matched by that of the government, which will care for his family, his mail contact, etc., and which will intercede for him where ever possible.

c. Rights and duties of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Conference. What may he demand in accordance with these international regulations?

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d. What kind of living conditions, treatment, methods of interrogation and influencing must he expect from the enemy? (Known dangers lose much of ~~the~~^{their} terror, known methods much of ~~the~~^{their} effect!)

e. What information is he permitted and what is he not permitted to give? (cf. C III!)

f. ~~Conduct~~^{Conduct} advisable during interrogations, against blackmail and informers.

g. Strict prohibition of any "political" ~~commitment~~^{commitment} or activity, especially joining any "organizations" or signing resolutions. (Reason: Political activity presupposes freedom of information, opinion, and decision, a freedom not applicable in captivity. In this situation, therefore, "politics" is tantamount to collaboration with the enemy and ~~is~~^{thus} punishable upon the prisoner's return.)

h. The duty of comradeship, solidarity, and mutual help is the only effective means against the enemy.

i. Relationship between superior and subordinate remains in effect. (Continued duty of superiors to give spiritual guidance and care wherever possible, duty of subordinates to respect and obey.) This relationship expires, if the superior is overtly or covertly collaborating with the enemy.

Continued

k. "Brain washing" is no excuse for breaking down. It does not exempt from responsibility and is no protection against punishment. The same applies to physical tortures which, if proved, may ~~merely~~ ^{merely} serve as extenuating circumstances. "Brain washing" is merely a term applied to certain quite natural and known, ~~though subtle,~~ ^{though subtle,} methods.

4. Which witting persons, if any, would require special directives in case of captivity, in addition to the training and instructions described under (2) and (3) above?

III. Obligatory Silence

Regarding obligatory silence, what demands can ^a reasonably be made on prisoners, especially those with knowledge of classified information, in Communist captivity? (Cf. II, 3e)

The opinions expressed on ^{this} ~~the~~ crucial question ^{are} ~~is~~ highly divergent !
In one point, however, they all agree, i.e., that the prisoner must maintain absolute silence about anything whose revelation might damage his own side (e.g., intentions, new weapons, intelligence secrets, etc.), that he must not give any information on his comrades, even at the risk of severe reprisals.
Where, however, ^{is the} ~~the~~ ^a boundary between ^{si} ~~admis~~ ^{si} ~~ible~~ and ~~inadmis~~ ^{ible} statements?
What are real secrets, what not, what no longer? Who is to decide?

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One opinion is approximately as follows:

The prisoner must give the enemy no other information than the following: name, rank, APO (age, civilian occupation). He is to give only the information already contained in his pay book. Any further statements, especially filling out questionnaires, start a spiraling process without end. Even limited permission to give, under certain conditions, information beyond these points is a compromise resulting in mental anguish for the prisoner and in the enemy's success in obtaining after all the information he desires.

No exception must therefore be made for persons with knowledge of classified information. They must invoke international regulations and consistently refuse to give any further information. They must accept any possibly resulting reprisals, tortures, or death, just as the simple soldier is expected to risk his life on the battlefield. Any special instructions or special obligations are therefore superfluous. The more so, since any other soldier may at one time or other also become knowledgeable of classified information.

The opposing opinion is as follows:

This arrangement is no match for Soviet methods. The assumption is unrealistic that such demands can be fulfilled. Nothing impossible should be demanded, else even the possible would not be done. The prisoner would feel guilty and liable even when there was no harm done and would then

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continue even further than permitted. The comparison with the battlefield is not applicable. There the soldier may still have a chance of getting through, while as a prisoner he sees himself entirely passive, alone, and defenseless at the mercy of an all-powerful enemy and his incalculable torments. Nobody will undergo torture or death, in order to keep secret things which he must consider entirely harmless and unimportant, although they may go beyond the above-mentioned points.

His trainingⁿ and experience must help each prisoner to decide for himself when to keep silent and when to accept the direst consequences for his silence.

Thus, the limitations on the giving of information must be defined in negative terms, i.e., the prisoner must be made clearly to understand primarily what he is not permitted to say.

Obviously, the first opinion has the great advantage of clarity and simplicity. Whether it is realistic is a moot^{point} point.

The second opinion undoubtedly places the responsibility on the prisoner, presupposes thorough training, and harbors great dangers because of its vague border lines. Is the opinion nevertheless the only possible one?

The proponents of the second opinion have added the following detailed suggestions:

Strict prohibition of any written comment or statement, including personal history, under threat of penalty.

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Compartmentation of information for persons with knowledge of classified information, similar to the previous concepts of "Secret," "Top Secret," "Eyes Only," and accordingly determining what information may be divulged under pressure in extreme cases and what information must be withheld under any conditions at all times.

Threat of punishment upon the prisoner's return even for negligence^g in the keeping of secrets and for failure^o of exercising at least passive resistance. Special instructions for bearers of top secret information and holders of certain assignments. Such persons should possibly be equipped with poison to enable them altogether to escape captivity by death. Interrogations should be practiced like war games in training courses under certain preconditions, during which participants would assume the roles of interrogator and prisoner, and thus work out and ascertain how far the prisoner with knowledge of classified information may go in his replies.

* * * * *

In conclusion we may state that the most important problem to be solved on the basis of our experiences is the decision as to what demands regarding the duty of silence can be reasonably^a made on the captured soldiers in general and on those with knowledge of classified information in particular. This decision must be made quickly and clearly on the basis of sober evaluation, under consideration of all human, military, and legal

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aspects.

No matter how this decision may turn out, it must be formulated unequivocally and impressed upon each soldier, official, etc., and especially upon those with knowledge of classified information.

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Appendix 1

NAME REGISTER

[N O T E : This Register lists the names
of all persons referred to in this study.]

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QUESTIONNAIRE

Appendix 2

Please include in your report, among other things, information on the following questions:

1. Briefly describe when, where, how you were captured, in which camps and prisons you were kept, when you were released, convicted.

2. When did you begin noticing an interest in your person regarding your former service assignment?

3. What information was wanted of you? What seemed of particular interest?

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4. Interrogation methods! Were written statements demanded?

5. Was pressure exerted (imprisonment, special camp, threats, maltreatments, etc.)?

6. What did the Soviets already seem to know of the special subject?

7. Who conducted the interrogations (experts? Soviet Army officers? MVD personnel?); Did key functionaries appear? What was the intellectual level of the interrogators?

8. Any special experiences? recruitment attempts?

9. What were the indications of the Soviet IS operational methods and organization in the camps and prisons (operational unit, its relationship to other administrative organs, recruitment of informers and agents)?

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10. What behavior do you recommend toward the methods applied to you?

11. What (reasonable) demands, in your opinion, can be made on persons with knowledge of classified information regarding their conduct in Soviet captivity? How should they be instructed and obligated for this event?

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Appendix 3Appendix 3Outline of an Interrogation:

1. Psychological and physical attrition by means of the most primitive and enduring imprisonment: Months of solitary confinement, no interrogation, rejection of any request for a hearing, cutting off any possibility for occupation (no books, no games), ^{deprivation} ~~deprivation~~ of sleep, minimum food rations, criminal treatment (body searches, fingerprinting, photograph like that of criminal).

= Stewing in one's own juice!

2. Unnerving and tiring weeks of interrogation, primarily after midnight. Constant interchange between intimidation by rudeness, shouting, threatening (also with death penalty for alleged war crimes), on the one hand, and studied politeness, promises, ~~and~~ relaxations in the prison routine, ^{and} providing a so-called commissar's breakfast, on the other.

Surprising the prisoner with unexpected "factual information" on some of the questions, originating ^{allegedly} ~~allegedly~~ from fellow prisoners of other reliable sources.

= Confusing and softening-up process.

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3. Transfer from solitary confinement^e to a prison cell shared with other German prisoners. Exploitation of the tortured prisoner's natural need, ~~and~~ ^{after} his long loneliness, to unburden himself in the company of his fellow prisoners. Listening in on these talks by means of listening devices or interrogation and blackmail of fellow prisoners.

= Finding leads and points of attack against the prisoner.

4. Renewed uninterrupted interrogation as under (2) above.

= Cat-and-mouse game.

If goal has not been reached by this time, the following change of methods takes place:

5. Transfer to a camp which, compared with the prison, will seem to the prisoner as ^agreat relief and will loosen him up. Display of complete Soviet disinterest in the prisoner. Actually, however, constant covert surveillance by camp commissars, informers, and listening devices aimed at obtaining new leads from unwitting conversations.

6. Depending on the success of the "camp life" and the psychological evaluation of the prisoner:

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Either renewed transfer to prison with aggravated living conditions, massive threats, continu^{ous} ~~with~~ interrogation, presentation of written incriminating material, engagement of informers.

= Hard procedure.

Or transferred to an "object" (i.e., dacha or something similar) with relatively good food rations, usually together with several other Germans who have been more or less softened up, there to be further processed and softened up gradually in "friendly conversations" with the latter or with various specialists who have come from Moscow, allegedly to care for the health and well-being of the prisoner.

= Soft procedure.

7. Considering the time, patience, and tenacity of the Soviets, the game described under (1) through (6) can be continued alternately for months and years until either success or the collapse of the "patient" is achieved.

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Appendix 4Appendix 4Procedure of a Terroristic Investigation

Over-all Direction: General KOBULEV and Colonel GARGADZE, both of State Security

First Phase

Duation: About 4 weeks

Interrogators: General PETROV of State Security, assisted by Major MAYOROV

Several hours of interrogation daily under constant serious maltreatment with leather whips and monotonous, automatic ^{at} repetition of the question: "Upon whose request, with what orders and for what purpose did you go to Russia in 1932 and 1934, and which agents did you visit there?" The entire 4 weeks were devoted to this question. After 4 weeks, this phase was broken off as unsuccessful and the second phase began.

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Second Phase

Duration: ^{Again} 4 weeks

Divided Direction: (a) "Legal" interrogator; Colonel GARGADZE; (b) "Slugger group"--one Major, one Captain, and a "boxer"

Over-all direction and interrogation as above, but divided roles. In well played team work, GARGADZE played the "cultural~~ist~~" interrogator. He tried to induce the prisoner, on rational and moral grounds only, to make a "confession"; he tried to persuade and explain the hopelessness of resistance. He never touched the prisoner personally, but threatened constantly that he would turn him over to the "slugger group" and then actually did so, so that the prisoner might "become reasonable." The slugger group always continued the interrogation with brute violence. Every day (except Sundays), the nightly maltreatments ~~were~~ ^{were} repeated, for periods up to 8 hours.

The "boxer" began by punching the prisoner's face and entire body; then followed maltreatment of the naked body, especially the genitals, by means of leather and wire whips (6-strand twisted cable wire). These maltreatments were continued in ever new, alternating, and supplementing variations until either the "slugger group" ran out of breath or the subject of interrogation had broken down physically, thus forcing a suspension of the interrogation. The climax of the maltreatments was an 8 1/2-hour "bastinado" during Easter night 1945.

Since the prisoner's attempted hunger strike was unsuccessful because of forced artificial feeding, he saw his only way out of this senseless and

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intolerable torture by making a fictitious "confession." As he had nothing to confess, he invented an "espionage mystery novel," which the Russians promptly^p swallowed. This provided him with a breathing spell of 2-3 weeks, which permitted at least a partial^a healing of his injuries.

Third Phase

Duration: About 3 weeks

Interrogator: GARGADZE

Enthusiasm, satisfaction, praise for the "confession." The prisoner was told that he had finally become "reasonable" and that "a common language" had been found. Every night for many weeks, the prisoner was busy writing down his "novel". For this purpose, he was transferred^r daily from the BUTYRSKAYA to the LUBYANKA prison and subjected to all pertinent measures.

In the meantime, the Soviets made inquiries and found out that the entire "novel" was a spontan^eous invention. Speechlessness, indignation, rage. "Why have you done this?" The prisoner explained that this had been his only possibility to avoid the bestial^m maltreatments, because every time he spoke the truth, he had been cruelly maltreated. He would repeat this every time, if they should ever touch him again! This was first answered by insults, then by a softer approach. He was advised that misleading the Soviet Secret Service was a maximum crime. He was asked to

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promise never to do this again. Reply: "This depends entirely on you and your interrogation methods."

From that time on, the prisoner was never again ~~revisited~~ touched.

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