· Lity · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917
Manuary (Odeos) 1923. Borraicas X	<u>90-153</u> CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • PRIORITY 2 Intelligence Information Cable IN 45439
	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
STATE/INR DIA	NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA
	ns information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 15, U.S.C. he transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
	070131Z CITE
COUNTRY	DIST 7 FEBRUARY 1968 SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI SUBJECT	5 FEBRUARY 1968 INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF POPULAR REACTIONS IN THE
	PROVINCES TO THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGO (6 FEBRUARY 1968) SOURCE THIS IS A COMPILATION OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT PREPARED BY CAS RESEARCH UNIT IN THEW FIELD. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY: MORE CONDITIONED TO VIOLENCE THAN THE PEOPLER OF SAIGON,,, THE RESIDENTS OF SOME PROVINCIAL CITES KNEW THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD ATTACK, BUT NOT HOLD, THEIR CITIES. THERE WAS SOME CONDEMNATION OF "OVERREACTION" BY THE ALLIED FORCE, AND THE VC ARE MORT RESPECTED AND FEARED BY THE POPULACE FOR THE NATION-WIDE STRENGTH OF THE RECENT ATTACKS. BUT ALL OF THIS WAS OVER-SHADOWED BY A POLARIZATION OF VIEWS THAT MAKE THE "MIDDLE OF THE ROAD" UNTENABLE AND STRONG SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR EITHER THE VC OR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). THE INITIAL POPULAR FEELING

∷&R

Approved for Release Date ______IAN_1001


	Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917			
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••		1N 45439	1.3(a)(4)	
	:	PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES		
• (classification) (dissem controls)			1.3(a)(4)	

IS ANTI-VC AND PRO-GVN. END-SUMMARY.

AN INITIAL ASSESSMENTOF POPULAR REACTION IN PROVINCIAL CITIES (LITTLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AS YET ON REACTIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE) INDICATES THAT IT PARALLELS THAT IN SAIGON. (AN ASSESSMENT OF SAIGON ATTITUDES IS AVAILABLE | THERE ARE, HOWEVER, TWO EXCEPTIONS. FIRST, THE PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL CITIES HAVE SEEN THE WAR CLOSE UP FOR A LONG TIME AND WERE PERHAPS LESS AWED BY HOSTILITIES IN THEIR OWN AREA. THEY KNEW THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD ATTACK THEIR CITIES BUT WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE VC COULD NOT HOLD THE CITIES. HOWEVER, THEY WERE IMPRESSED BY THE COUNTRY-WIDE NATURE OF THE ACTION. SECOND. THERE WAS GREAT DESTRUCTION IN SOME PROVINCIAL CITIES; AND WHILE THIS GENERALLY RESULTED IN INCREASED CONDEMNATION OF THE VIETCONG IT ALSO RESULTED IN CONDEMNATION OF "OVER REACTION" BY ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND U.S. MILITARY. THIS FEELING WAS ESPECIALLY BITTER WHEN THE REACTION WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LOOTING BY ARVN TROOPS. AS WAS REPORTED IN SEVERAL IV CORPS CITIES.

2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUTHORITIES IN DEALING WITH SUBSEQUENT PROBLEMS, REFUGEES AND FOOD PRIMARILY, MAY WELL BE CRUCIAL IN FUTURE POPULAR REACTION TO THE GVN. HOWEVER,

1.3(a)(4)



INITIALLY AT LEAST, ANY RECRIMINATIONS SEEM OVER-SHADOWED BY THE POLARIZATION WHICH MADE THE "MIDDLE OF THE SERVICE OF THE SERVICE OF THE POPULATION IS NOW REPORTED SERVICE OF THE ATTACK "100 PERCENT" BEHIND THE GVN. IN DANANG IT IS FELT THAT THE ATTACK LESSENED THE REDINESS OF THE POPULACE TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE GVN, AND BUDDHIST MONKS THERE ACTUALLY COMPLAINED THAT THE POLICE WERE NOT GETTING OUT TO THEIR PAGODAS FAST ENOUGH WHEN THEY CALLED. IN MOC HOA, KIEN TUAONG PROVINCE, IT IS FELT THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES NOW ARE TO BE SOLIDLY AGAINST THE VC OR AGAINST THE GVN. UNIVERSALLY, THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE DID NOT SUPPORT THE VC.

3. INFORMATION COVERING THE PERIOD UP TO 2400 HOURS 5 FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT THE MORALE SITUATION IS IMPROVING IN SOME AREAS. SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS, AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS, BOTH BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC, HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SOME AREAS AND REFUGEES ARE BEING CARED FOR. AN EXCPTION IS QUANG TRI, WHERE THE MORALE IN THE CITY IS DESCRIBED AS "NOT GOOD", WITH SOME PROMINENT OFFICIALS ATTEMPTING TO GET THEIR FAMILIES OUT. POLICE ARE STILL NOT FUNCTIONING IN PHAN THIET, ALTHOUGH SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS ARE. IN PHAN RANG THE POLICE ARE REPORTED TO BE DOING AN OUTSTANDING JOB. IN QUI NHON,

1.3(8)(4)

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917

45439

OF 5 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE4

WHEREIT HEENEMY PLAN WAS TO CAPTURE THE PROVINCE CHIEF AND MAKE HIM BROADCAST AN APPEAL TO SUPPORT TH COALITION GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS NO COOPRATION WITH THE VC BY GVN AUTHORITIES OR BY THE PEOPLE. AND TH ENEMY PLAN FAILED. ANT I-VC FEELING IN QUI NHON HAS "INCREASED CONSIDERABLY." IN VINH LONG, WHERE 50 PERCENT OF THE CITY WAS DESTROYED, THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT IN POPULAR ATTITUDE TOWARD INCREASED BLAME FOR THE VC AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE GVN AND U.S. ACTION. IN CAN THO THE ADVENT OF U.S. TROOPS INTO PROVINCE CITIES IS REPORTED TO BESPARKING THE MORALE OF THE GVN FORCES AND IMPROVING THEIR EFFECTIVENSS. 4. TH VC MAY HAVE WON A POLITICAL VICTORY. THEY ARE MORE RESPECTED AND MORE FEARED BY THE VERY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW SO INCENSED AGAINST AND DISGUSTED WITH THEM. IN CHAU DOC IT IS THE "GENERAL OPINION" THAT THE VC HURT THE GVN MORE THAN THE GVN HURT THENC. PEOPLE IN THECOUNTRYSIDE AROUND CA MAU BELIEVETHE VC PROPAGANDA THAT THE VC HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY. IN DANANG:IT IS THE "GENERAL CONSENSUS" THAT THE VC WON A POLITICAL VICTORY IN PROVING THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT FORCES FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACK, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ADMITTED THAT THE ATTACK ENDED WITH A MILITARY VICTORY FOR THE U.S. AND GVN.

(classification)

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917

the set of the same of a second	Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011917				
		IN	45439		
, ,	•				1.3(a)(4)
· · · · · ·	· · ·	PAG	E 5 OF 5	PAGES	
				•	1.3(a)(4)
(classification) (dissem	controls)		•		

5. AS IN SAIGON, THE GRATEST SUCCESS MAY HAVE BEEN IN FANNING THE FLAMES OF THE PARANOIA WHICH ALWAYS UNDERLINES VIETNAMESE POLITICAL THINKING. THERE ARE APPARENTLY WIDE-SPREAD AND ELABORATE RUMORS IN DANANG TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS ATTACK WAS "PERMITTED". ACCORDING TO THESE RUMORS, THE U.S. PERMITTED, EVEN IF IT DID NOT COLLUDE WITH, THE VC TO BRING THIS PRESSURE ON THE GVN IN PREPARATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT AND/OR THE CEDING OF THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES (A PERENNIAL RUMOR). (COMMENT: THE VC MAY FEEL THAT THEY CAN FAN THESE FLAMES FURTHER IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME. NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE MIGHT BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS AN ADMISSION OF A VC VICTORY. AND THERE/SEEMS TO BE. IN SOME PROVINCIAL CITIES, AN INCREASED DESIRE TO SEE EVEN MORE VIGOROUS ACTION AGAINST THE VC AT THIS TIME. THE PRESSURES FOR PEACE. NOT NOW EVIDENT, MAY EMERGE LATER. THE ABOVE POPULAR REACTION IS BASED UPON A VERY LIMITED SAMPLING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI.