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**Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 12-16 April 2004
Executive Summary**

Future Planning Calendar

(U//~~ATUO~~) **TBD - 2004** : **Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)**: Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **TBD - 2004** : **Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)**: Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006**: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week

(U//~~ATUO~~) **FOIA Requests**


(U//~~ATUO~~) **Request for Records on Operation "El Morocco"**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A St. Mary's College of California professor is asking for the declassification and release of any and all documents and materials relating to a 1945-46 operation in Poland, Austria, and Germany known as 'El Morocco,' or 'Argyrol,' or 'Argyle.'"




(U//~~ATUO~~) **Request for CIA Prepublication Review Records**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A *New York Sun* reporter is requesting all records pertaining to a [CIA] prepublication review of the contents of Richard Clarke's book, *Against All Enemies*. The reporter plans to write a series of stories, and cites the urgency of "the issues raised in Mr. Clarke's book" for the upcoming presidential election. "The public deserves to know what role the agency played in approving and/or rejecting portions of Mr. Clarke's book, and how those decisions may have influenced the timing of its publication."

- *The FOIA case manager accepted the request, but denied the reporter's implicit bid to receive expedited treatment. He was informed that exceptions are granted only when a "compelling need" is deemed to exist: 1) When the matter involves an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, or 2) When the request is made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information (i.e., a representative of the news media), and the information is relevant to a subject of public urgency concerning an actual or alleged Federal government activity.* 

(U//~~ATUO~~) **CDC Declassification Center**

(U//~~ATUO~~) **EO 12958 Reaches Its Ninth Birthday**

(U//~~ATUO~~) Former President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958—the directive that established the 25-Year Automatic Declassification Program—on 17 April 1995. Over the course of two administrations, the automatic declassification deadline (for hardcopy Agency records) shifted from 2000 to 2006. The CIA Declassification Center (CDC) uses the Washington Monument (WM) as its program logo, with one Washington Monument equalling one million pages stacked high. So far, the CDC has processed approximately 90 WMs towards its 2006 goal of 111 WMs (111 million pages). 

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
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Magnitude of Challenge Facing the 25-Year Automatic Declassification Program

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


111 Million CIA Pages ~ 111 Washington Monuments in Height

~~(U//A//FO)~~ IMS Attends DOS' Electronic Records Transfer Ceremony

~~(U//A//FO)~~ By invitation, on 13 April, the Director, IMS, C/IRRG and C/CDC attended a records transfer ceremony at the Department of State. In this ceremony, Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin joined Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to mark the transfer of the first increment of *electronic* cables from the Department of State to the National Archives and Records Administration.

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~~(U//A//FO)~~ From The Archives:

~~(U//A//FO)~~ CIA Performance on Terrorism

~~(U//A//FO)~~ The DCI files record the following exchange: On 6 December 1977, Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) wrote to notify then-DCI Stansfield Turner that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was planning to investigate the ability of the Intelligence Community to detect, observe, and counter the activities of international terrorist groups. "The Committee is interested especially in the quality of such intelligence, in the usefulness of the intelligence product to policymakers and law enforcement agencies, and in any organizational and procedural government efforts to counter terrorist activities." The Committee's findings, he added, would determine what, if any, legislative efforts ought to be taken to improve efforts in any of the above areas, while preventing an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of United States persons.

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~~(U//A//FO)~~ Congressional Focus on 'Warning Intelligence'

~~(U//A//FO)~~ A 1978 Congressional staff report titled *Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability* [Subcommittee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] details the

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lessons learned from a series of intelligence failures (from Pearl Harbor to the Arab-Israeli 1973 October War) – while focusing on the Intelligence Community's (IC) 'warning' process. It concludes: "Emphasis on collection and other problems that can be addressed by technology has overshadowed attention to improving analysis and to minimizing uncertainty in the production process....Differences among the views in the intelligence community may not be explicit, and the warning products will not indicate changes in the estimated likelihood of an event." In part, the report recommends that the DCI appoint someone, such as a special assistant, to focus on the "warning community" – i.e., those intelligence community elements that hold particular responsibility for warning.

- *Staff Report Findings: Collection efforts and advances increased after every crisis, even if collection appeared adequate prior to the event. Past crises spurred improvements in information management and warning procedures. Analytical pitfalls identified in postmortems (e.g., failure to ask pertinent questions, challenge assumptions, confront reasonable alternative hypotheses, and use structured and analytical methodologies) resulted in only limited organizational and training changes with little attention paid to improving analysis through better personnel management. Additionally, although history demonstrates that warning is likely to be ambiguous, the expectation of collecting unambiguous indications continues to prevail. Little progress is evident in developing warning products that inform users of the probability of an event; or the level of the analyst's certainty in estimating it. The President should not have to guess about warning; rather, the warning should be as explicit as possible. Finally, past cases suggest that policymakers' resistance to warning (i.e., either being unwilling or unprepared to deal with it) can contribute to "intelligence failure."*



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