

Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 22 August-2 September 2005 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **14 September 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **27 September 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Two Weeks

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **FOIA Requests**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **Interest in Counterterrorism Guidelines**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ A requester with the Associated Press asks for "copies of agency guidelines for undercover counterterrorism activities involving CIA personnel or anyone working on behalf or under the direction of the agency. We seek copies of such guidelines presently in effect and copies of previous guidelines since 1985."

- *The FOIA case manager informed the requester that should any responsive records exist, they would be contained in operational files, and those files of the CIA are exempt from the search, review, publication, and disclosure provisions of the FOIA.*

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ **Request on Indonesian Airliner Hijacking**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ The National Security Archive seeks records relating to "the 28 March 1981 hijacking of an Indonesian DC-9 jetliner by Muslim extremists and the resulting rescue by Indonesian special forces. The extremists belonged to the Komando Jihad (Commando Jihad, Holy War Command) organization and the rescue occurred in Bangkok airport, Thailand."

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ **CIA Declassification Center**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **Interagency Referral Center: Ribbon Cutting**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ On Tuesday, 23 August, CDC managers traveled to NARA, College Park, Maryland, to meet with our NARA Team and attend the official opening of the Interagency Referral Center (IRC). The IRC is an effort by NARA to set up another venue where referrals can be reviewed and final processing performed by NARA to make declassified material available to the public. Referrals at NARA dated prior to 1982 must be completed by 31 December 2009. The IRC will facilitate that review in conjunction with the Declassified Document Support System (DDSS). DDSS is under development by IMS/ITG and it will support the declassification community as a whole by allowing the tracking of referrals that are outside the scope and capacity of the IRC. The Assistant Archivist for Records Services--Washington, D.C. made the introductory remarks. The Deputy Archivist of the United States, the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) also spoke. All speakers lauded the cooperative effort necessary for the establishment and successful operation of the IRC. Various agencies and individuals received presentations for their contributions toward the

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establishment of the IRC. The Assistant Archivist for Records Services presented a "Certificate of Appreciation" to the C/CDC for the CIA Declassification Center. [redacted]

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ From the Archives:

~~(U//ATUO)~~ Intelligence Practices in the 17th Century

~~(U//ATUO)~~ An article from the Spring 1961 issue of *Studies in Intelligence* states that Queen Elizabeth I of England is often credited with running the first organized spy network in the Western world, but the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) was running one of their own against her. Four Jesuit priests were sent to England from Rome as undercover operatives, but only one, John Gerard, operated successfully for 18 years--albeit with a four-year stint in the Tower of London from which he famously escaped, and resumed his work. The colleagues who infiltrated with him were captured, and executed only a few years into their missions. Gerard was exfiltrated under diplomatic cover with the Spanish Ambassador's entourage after the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, in which Catholic conspirators planned to blow up Parliament and the new king, James I. Among the intelligence techniques Gerard practiced are some still in use today, such as safe houses, counterintelligence deception, false names, and clandestine correspondence. Secret writing in this period, however, relied on invisible ink rather than one-time pads. Gerard noted in his memoirs that he used orange juice instead of lemon juice because once heat brought out the orange juice, it remained, whereas lemon juice would fade. This meant the recipient of a letter written in orange juice would know whether or not it had been read. Through a network of loyal Catholics and carefully bribed guards, Gerard was able to maintain clandestine correspondence with his "Superior" in Rome during his stay in the Tower of London. [redacted]

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ Bulgarian Government Asks Emigres to Return, or Else!

~~(U//ATUO)~~ In an attempt to induce Bulgarian emigres to return to Bulgaria by November 1954, Sofia broadcast the following offer: "Dear Brother, There is a government law that all immigrants who are now in other countries can return to Bulgaria within a year. All their crimes will be forgiven. Our dear homeland government wants to have all her people come back to our territory. They promise to find work for all. This kind offer expires by November 1954. If you do not return by then, you will be condemned to death." [redacted]

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ Nixon Administration Seeks Change in Intelligence Community

~~(U//ATUO)~~ President Nixon, on November 5, 1971, issued a memorandum, "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community," in which he accepted various recommendations for improving the functioning of the Intelligence Community, set forth major directives for it, and provided a series of directives for action, including the assignment of major responsibilities to the Director of Central Intelligence. Prior to this memorandum, the environment within the Intelligence Community was characterized as follows:

- The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was absorbed in day-to-day operational management of CIA.
- Involvement of the DCI's personal staff in community management was minimal and generally ineffective.
- The community was "managed" by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and its multiple committees through consensus and logrolling of competing agencies.
- The Secretary of Defense, with the bulk of resources, exercised no strong leadership within Defense - his staff support was diffused and programs were not coordinated.
- Intelligence functions were scattered and disorganized, stimulating bureaucratic competition for resources.
- Policy-level guidance on substantive intelligence needs was absent.
- Review of quality, scope, and timeliness of the community's product was neither systematic nor continuing. [redacted]

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This is a record.

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