

Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 2-13 May 2005 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

(U//~~ATUO~~) **24 May 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)**: Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **21 June 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP)**: Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006**: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Two Weeks

(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~ATUO~~) Seeking Copy of WMD Report

(U//~~ATUO~~) A Colorado requester is interested in a copy of the "June 2002 Unclassified CIA Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions."

- *The FOIA case manager located a copy of the report from the MORI database of previously released information, and provided it to the requester.*

(b)(3)

(U//~~ATUO~~) Interest in Turkish Notable

(U//~~ATUO~~) A requester from Israel asks for information pertaining to "Fethullah Gulen-Turkish leader, and his political religious movement including his contacts with State Department personnel or other American citizens, his meetings with religious leaders of all religions (with emphasis on Jewish leaders) and other inter-faith meetings, [and] his activities in the United States and Turkey."

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(U//~~ATUO~~) Request on Cuban Military Training

(U//~~ATUO~~) Judicial Watch submitted a request concerning "reports of members of the Cuban Armed Forces conducting military training along the Texas-Mexican border, in the area between the Marfa, TX and Del Rio, TX Sectors (in the vicinity of Sanderson, TX) from 1985 to present."

- *The FOIA case manager accepted the request.*

(b)(3)
(b)(5)

(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center

(U//~~ATUO~~) From the Archives:

(U//~~ATUO~~) Sound Familiar?

(U//~~ATUO~~) From the Carter Library collection comes a memorandum dated 10 October 1979 from Donald Gregg (then serving on the National Security Council) to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski titled

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"Intelligence in the 1980s." The memorandum observes, "Having been a member of your staff now for a bit more than four months, I have been struck by the ways in which my perspective on CIA has been modified. My chief impressions from my present perspective are:

- That intelligence work, whether collection, technical innovation or analysis, is more difficult than I realized it to be.
- That the need for intelligence in the next decade will be greater than in the past.
- That the issues on which intelligence is called to make key inputs grow more and more crucial.
- That CIA, having been through a tumultuous five year period, continues to function well, but the cumulative effects of what it has been through are beginning to show.
- That CIA, already suffering from 'battle fatigue,' continues to take casualties from 'friendly fire;' its own leadership.

The Agency's sense of its own worth has been diminished. The analysts' lack confidence at times, and the collectors, particularly in areas of priority concern, are heavily overworked." [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **Stacking the Deck**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ A 5 November 1980 memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski on "Intelligence Coordination" states: "Spent the entire day preparing for the [Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)] which is being held tomorrow morning." Handwritten below, presumably by Brzezinski, was the statement, "Cards were loaded against HUMINT--no cohesive Humint packages had been prepared to compete with [the National Reconnaissance Program]. DCI likes Humint lean and mean." A subsequent 28 November "Summary of Conclusions" of the PRC (I) meeting noted, "David Aaron raised the issue of the proliferation of technical collection systems. He felt that we needed a rich HUMINT collection system and a broader analytical base, but couldn't seem to obtain funding for the program because of the juggernaut pace of development of the technical collection systems."

- *Comment: According to Christopher Andrew's For the President's Eyes Only, "Carter's view of intelligence collection had been dominated by the high-tech wonders of IMINT and SIGINT. The Iranian crisis brought home to him for the first time the importance of political intelligence from human sources. On November 9 [1978] the US ambassador in Teheran sent a cable to Washington which concluded that the Shah might be forced to abdicate. Carter reacted with a sense of personal shock. Only a few days earlier he had congratulated [DCI] Turner on doing 'a fine job.' Now he felt badly let down by the CIA." Carter sent a sealed "short, reproachful hand-written note" to Turner. "When the contents of the note leaked to the press a few days later, Turner was convinced that he had been 'set up as a scapegoat.' He discovered that three journalists had been invited to the White House and shown copies of the note." A year earlier, DCI Turner had announced a substantial cut in DO personnel. Despite the 1978 episode, the 1980 memorandum suggests that the importance of technical collection was still far outdistancing the significance of HUMINT collection among those charged with collection planning.* [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **First, Do No Harm**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ An Office of Scientific Intelligence article of February 1975 reports that Chinese psychiatrists are treating their patients with a variety of "therapies," including the study of Chairman Mao's thoughts. According to one of the Chinese doctors, a major therapeutic goal is to "help patients merge their egos with the collected ego of the state. In order to accomplish this, the works of Mao, Marx, and Lenin are discussed in a group setting. We try to educate them [the patients] to think in a correct way. Chairman Mao's philosophical works will be assigned for them to read in order to let them know where the correct thinking comes from." [REDACTED]

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