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***Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 7 - 11 June 2004  
Executive Summary***

***Future Planning Calendar***

**(U//AIUO) 16 June 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

**(U//AIUO) 14-15 June 2004: Historical Review Panel:** Next semi-annual meeting.

**(U//AIUO) 31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

***Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week***

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

**(U//AIUO) FOIA Requests**

**(U//AIUO) Seeking All Documents Relating to PDD 28**

**(U//AIUO)** Frequent requester, The National Security Archive, is seeking all documents "produced in response to, as input for, or otherwise relating to Presidential Decision Directive 28 (PDD 28), which was signed by President Bill Clinton circa 1993. The Directive relates to U.S. policy in Latin America." Also, the requester wants a copy of PDD 28 reviewed for maximum declassification.

- *The FOIA case manager accepted the request,* [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Request for CIA Interrogation Transcript**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A Pakistani national, who is awaiting a refugee hearing in Canada, wants to be able to 'document' his credibility. Upon entering Canada via train, he asserts that he was returned to US immigration authorities and interrogated by the CIA and FBI. He states: "I described the danger that I was facing in Pakistan, and my need to find safety for my family in another country." He requests "the transcript of my interview with the CIA in its entirety, as well as any other information that may have been jotted down..."

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- [Redacted] the FOIA case manager informed the requester that with regard to information requested on foreign nationals, it is CIA policy to neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of any Agency records. To be helpful, the case manager provided the contact address for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the reply letter. [Redacted]

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**(U//~~ATUO~~) NYC Public Library Submits FOIA Request**

(U//~~ATUO~~) The New York Public Library's Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture is requesting CIA files on Abdullah H. Abdur-Razzaq— who was a close associate of Malcolm X after he separated from the Nation of Islam organization in 1964. Mr. Abdur-Razzaq handled the daily business of two successor organizations when Malcolm X traveled overseas. The Schomburg Center writes: "...it is assumed that Mr. Abdur-Razzaq's activities were monitored by the same local and federal agencies that monitored Malcolm X's activities, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency."

- The FOIA case manager informed the requester that prior to processing this request, we require: 1) the subject's date and place of birth, and citizenship status, to enable us to distinguish between individuals with the same or similar names, and, 2) the requester's prior commitment to pay the cost of reproducing released records—as stipulated under the "educational and noncommercial scientific institution" fee category. [Redacted]

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**(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center**

**(U//~~ATUO~~) From The Archives:**

**(U//~~ATUO~~) The Cuban Crisis—Soviet Benefits**

(U//~~ATUO~~) In March 1963, the Office of National Estimates (ONE) produced a memo for the DCI on "Possible Soviet Courses of Action in and with Respect to Cuba." It concluded that "whatever else they do, the Soviets probably see excellent opportunities for themselves in the American reactions to the crisis. It will not be difficult for them to keep the Cuban situation confused, so that (a) it will continue to be a bitter but uncertain US domestic issue right up to the presidential election of 1964, and (b) public debate will continue to reveal the workings and cripple the effectiveness of American intelligence." The memo noted that the continuing debate over whether all of the missiles had been removed, "whether the councils of the government are divided between doves and hawks," and "whether the news is 'managed,' has probably led the Soviets to count on confusion and vacillation to hobble American policy." Regarding US intelligence, the ONE memo asserts that the Soviets derive two major benefits from the crisis: (1) The discovery and identification of the missile bases "has somehow turned into a proof of incompetence, and the public impression that American Intelligence is inefficient and unreliable will persist to the Soviet advantage for years to come." And, more importantly, (2) "US Intelligence was goaded into revealing so much about its workings, from initial collection through analysis, to the part it played in policy decisions, that the Soviets will know exactly what mistakes to avoid in the future" and may even take the opportunity to engage in disinformation. [Redacted]

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**(U//~~ATUO~~) A Call... Not Made**

(U//~~ATUO~~) From the Ford collection comes a 7 October 1975 "draft" document, written by an unknown staffer,

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titled: "Recommended Telephone Call" for the President to make to DCI Bill Colby. Dated "as soon as possible," its stated purpose is "to provide assurances that Colby is not to be replaced." A background section notes that "recent [press] articles hint that Colby will be replaced as DCI," and that he has been "under considerable attack from various forces within the administration and he is also being investigated by the Justice Department in connection with alleged improprieties at the CIA. Assuming you intend to retain Colby at least for the immediate future, it is important that he have some reassurance..." The document's 'talking points' propose the following conversation language: "Bill, I have read some of the Press speculation in recent articles that I consider replacing you as Director of Central Intelligence... I have not authorized these stories and want you to know that you have my confidence in the job you are doing. I think it's important that you focus on the problems ahead with the confidence that you have my full backing."

- *There is no indication that the message was delivered by President Ford to DCI Colby and subsequent events suggest it was not. According to a Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) publication: "on Sunday, 2 November 1975, Colby was summoned to the White House, where the President asked for his resignation as DCI...DDCI Walters intervened to point out that it would not be practical to leave CIA without a chief in the middle of Congressional investigations," and the President asked the DCI to stay on until George Bush could be brought back from China and confirmed as DCI. Bush replaced Colby on 30 January 1976.* [redacted]

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**(U//~~ATUO~~) Dangerous Water Sports**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A 22 June 1976 document (from the Ford collection) contains a Defense Intelligence Agency article on an incident on the Mekong. It states, "Pathet Lao troops, stationed on the Vientiane bank of the Mekong, fired upon a group of US and Australian diplomats turned water skiers June 20. Apparently, none of the sportsmen was displaying his ID card on his bathing suit, and an overzealous local commander, concerned over possible smuggling operations from Thailand caused the incident."

- *The Communist Pathet Lao took control of Vientiane in August 1975. Life sometimes imitates art, and there are loose visual similarities between this incident and the scene in Francis Ford Coppola's 1979 motion picture "Apocalypse Now," when Robert Duvall's character, Lt. Colonel Kilgore, leads his air cavalry troops in an assault on a coastal Viet Cong village in part to have two of his men surf the breaking waves while the firefight is still underway.* [redacted]

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