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***Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 29 March - 2 April 2004  
Executive Summary***

***Future Planning Calendar***

(U//~~ATUO~~) **14 April 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **27 April 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

***Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week***



(b)(3) (U//~~ATUO~~) **DI/RO--Personnel Change**

(U//~~ATUO~~) [redacted] is the new IRO for the DI, replacing [redacted] who has taken a position in the Historical Collections Division supporting HCD's *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) effort. [redacted] was previously the Associate IRO on both the DI and DCI teams, and has a wealth of experience in the review and release world.

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(U//~~ATUO~~) **FOIA Requests**

(U//~~ATUO~~) **Request for 'JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule' Memo**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A requester is seeking re-review of a 2 January 1968 memorandum titled "JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule for January 1968." He adds that the memorandum is cited in Richard A. Mobley's book *Flash Point North Korea, the Pueblo and EC-121 Crises* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003)--and that he recognized it as being "one of the monthly memoranda I wrote for the DDI to the DCI from the late 1950s to the early 1980s."

- Noting the requester's agreement to pay any fees, the FOIA case manager accepted the request, [redacted]



*Editor: The memorandum above provides background information for the 303 Committee--a senior-level, interagency committee within the National Security Council that was established during the Johnson Administration by NSAM-303. It was responsible for Covert Action and other highly sensitive activities in the Nixon administration. The name derives from the meeting room number in the Old Executive Office Building. It was replaced by the 40 Committee in 1970. Author, Richard Mobley was a career naval intelligence officer assigned to the Defense Intelligence Liaison Office in London between 1998 and 2001.*

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~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~~~(U//AIUO)~~ **Requester Wants to Assist in Search for MIAs**


(U//AIUO) An adjunct professor at Ozark Technical College (OTC) in Springfield, Missouri, is trying to identify, via FOIA, the proper government organization to address a long-standing interest. He writes that he has sought this information from "several local, state offices and the state Veterans Administration to no avail." The requester wants to serve on one of the teams searching for MIAs in Southeast Asia. He identifies himself as a Vietnam veteran (1970-1971) who is currently an instructor of human anatomy—"so I have the skills to recognize and identify human remains....I am being considered for a full-time position at OTC, but would rather be granted the privilege of helping return some of our lost servicemen."

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(b)(5)~~(U//AIUO)~~ **NGO Seeks CIA Records on Italian Citizens**

(U//AIUO) An Italian historical researcher for the "Observatory on Organized Crime"—a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Geneva, Switzerland— is asking for records that will clarify whether his countryman, Francesco Pazienza, was a CIA asset between 1978 and 1982. He also seeks any documentation resulting from a meeting between DCI William Casey and deceased former head of Italian military intelligence (SISMI), Fulvio Martini, relating to Pazienza's extradition from the United States.

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(b)(5)~~(U//AIUO)~~ **CDC Declassification Center**~~(U//AIUO)~~ **From The Archives:**~~(U//AIUO)~~ **Soviet-Watching**

(U//AIUO) A generation of foreign policy and intelligence analysts and academics made careers out of trying to understand and interpret a closed Soviet society. One of the tools used was the precedence accorded to leading officials. Thus, a *Central Intelligence Bulletin* (CIB) article in June 1954 notes that the Soviet press has published an alphabetical listing of top leaders, rather than in the usual order of precedence. Ambassador Bolen notes that the intent behind this change may merely be to emphasize the principle of collectivity, but that if this becomes standard practice, it will deprive Malenkov of another of his few remaining attributes of preeminence. Bohlen adds that he does not believe the order of listings possesses the same conclusive significance as in Stalin's time. CIA's comment is that the alphabetical listing is "a striking departure from previous practice and appears to signify a further weakening of Malenkov's position...and an inability to agree on precedence of listing....Prior to the recent activities of, and the publicity accorded to party first secretary Khrushchev, Malenkov appeared to hold the position of 'first among equals' in the Soviet collective leadership. However, recent events have suggested a modification of the old collective leadership concept and the possible development of factional groupings within the leadership, focusing around Malenkov and Khrushchev."

- *The US Government watched very closely for signs of division in the USSR's post-Stalin leadership. Some of the assessments in this article proved accurate in February 1955, when Malenkov "resigned" as Premier. Bulganin, a Khrushchev supporter, replaced Malenkov.* 

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~~(U//AIUO)~~ **Memorandum on Domestic Intelligence**

(U//AIUO) The following undated excerpt is from a Ford Library document written on White House stationery. It serves as part of a covering memo from Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman. The memo cites..."the serious internal security threat" and makes suggestions for an "Improvement in Inter-Agency Coordination....All members of the committee [the top domestic intelligence officials of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and each of the military services]"

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and its working group, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, believe that it is imperative that a continuing mechanism be established to effectuate the coordination of domestic intelligence efforts and the evaluation of domestic intelligence data. In the past, there has been no systematic effort to mobilize the full resources of the intelligence community in the internal security area, and there has been no mechanism for preparing community-wide domestic intelligence estimates, such as is done in the foreign intelligence area by the United States Intelligence Board. Domestic intelligence information coming into the White House has been fragmentary and unevaluated. We have not had, for example, a community-wide estimate of what we might expect short or long-term in the cities, or on the campuses, or within the military establishment." The covering memo concludes: "Mr. Hoover is set in his ways and can be bull-headed as hell, but he is a loyal trooper. Twenty years ago he would never have raised the type of objections he has here, but he's getting old and worried about his legend. [Mr. Hoover refused to go along with a single conclusion drawn, or support a single recommendation made. His position was two-fold: (1) Current operations are perfectly satisfactory, and (2) No one has any business commenting on procedures he has established for the collection of intelligence by the FBI.] "He makes life tough in this area, but not impossible—for he'll respond to direction by the President and that is all we need to set the domestic intelligence house in order." [redacted]

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(D)(3)**(U//~~ATUO~~) Eulogy for the Vietnam War**

(U//~~ATUO~~) From the Ford Library, the following comment on the Vietnam War was among press clippings selected for the 7 May 1975 White House Situation Room Evening Notes: "Smith Hempstone says that it began, as most wars do, with a grand illusion, with champagne rhetoric and a commitment to high ideals. It ended with disillusionment, the bitter beer of defeat and a questioning of truths no longer held self-evident. It began with ruffles and flourishes, and the proud thunder of a distant drum. It ended, hours after the last Americans had fled, with the Muzak tapes at Saigon's American FM radio station blaring rock music to an empty house. After 30 years of warfare, the land is salted with tears and limed with graves. May we and those we abandoned find a sort of peace. And thank God it's all over. At last."

- *Smith Hempstone went on to become Ambassador to Kenya, where he continued to write dispatches in the colorful style of a newspaperman.* [redacted]

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