Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 2-6 February 2004 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

(U//AIUO) 24 February 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//AIUO) 23 March 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//ATUO) 31 December 2006: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week

(U//AIUO) CIA Protection of Budget Upheld

(U//AIUO) On 18 December 2001, Steven Aftergood, Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), submitted a FOIA request seeking disclosure of the aggregate US intelligence budget for FY 2002. On 6 May 2002, the Agency relied on FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) to protect the information from disclosure. As a result, on 12 June 2002, Mr. Aftergood filed suit in federal court. On 6 February 2004, the court ruled in favor of the Agency, upholding the Agency's use of exemption (b)(3) to protect the FY 2002 budget. The court cited to the National Security Act, which requires the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. The court did not address the Agency's use of FOIA exemption (b)(1).

(U//AHUQ) Briefing on the DDRS Database

(U//AIUO) A briefing will be held at the CIA Library on the other major database of declassified documents, the Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS) on <u>18 February 2004, at 1030 hours</u>. The DDRS database contains many early FOIA cases from all Federal agencies-whereas, the Digital National Security Archives database draws its material mainly from Presidential Library collections

(U//AIUO) FOIA Requests

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(U//ATUO) Detailed Request for "Global Trends 2015"

(U//ALLO) A Spokane, Washington, requester seeks information or records on "Title: Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts. (Publish date:12/1/2000, release date: 3/9/2001, case # F-2001-0000, copyright O [sic], Release decision RIFPUB, Classification U)."

Editor: The 68-page threat assessment is a product of the 15-member National Intelligence Council (NIC) based at CIA Headquarters. It represents an attempt by the US intelligence community to look beyond its secret sources and involve academia and the private sector in forecasting world trends through 2015. Released on 18 December 2000, it concludes that terrorist attacks against the United States through 2015 "will become increasingly sophisticated and designed to create mass casualties. We expect the trend toward greater lethality...to continue." It also predicts that "chemical and biological threats to the United States will increase....Some terrorists or insurgents will attempt to use such weapons against U.S. interests –against the United States itself, its forces or facilities overseas, or its allies."

(U//AIUO) Request for SIGINT Satellite Records

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(b)(3) (b)(5) (U//AIUO) A frequent requester and author is seeking: "Briefing on SIGINT Satellite plans..., Need for Revision of SIGINT Satellite Requirements [and] Urgent Need for SIGINT Satellite Collection Against Soviet ABM/AES Systems." [The requester cites specific COMOR records.]

(b)(3) (b)(5) Editor: COMOR –Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance –was a United States Intelligence Board (USIB – later renamed National Foreign Intelligence Board --NFIB) subcommittee established in 1960. It coordinated intelligence collection requirements from all involved elements of the government for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems. Related to his request, Jeffrey T. Richelson, has authored America's Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (University Press of Kansas, 1999) and America's Secret Eyes in Space (Harper & Row, 1990).

(U//AIUQ) Interest in Espionage Literature

(U//AIUO) A frequent requester from the Federal Correctional Institution in Estill, SC, is asking for a "list of all the titles available in the CIA's library collection on espionage literature and fiction books."

• The FOIA case manager acknowledged the request, and is seeking a prior fee commitment to cover the cost of processing the search.

(U//AIUO) CDC Declassification Center

(U//AHO) From The Archives:

(U//AIUO) Was it Feedback?

(U//AUO) A 3 August 1966 National Security Council (NSC) document had critiques paper-clipped to four CIA single-page analytic products. The notes stated: "There is a tendency to report items only to 'cover your tracks.' A report of a coup in the offing-as much as a month away-or minor reports of internal difficulties in a country give the impression that we're reporting this although we really don't know what's going on so that you can't bitch next month when it happens that we never tell you anything. Once a situation is reported, every day thereafter an item appears even though nothing new or startling has occurred-a sort of record keeping report. These items as they are published also presume that the reader remembers what happened yesterday or the day before. Reports on occurrences in areas where the writer feels the reader might not have sufficient background to know the story tend to be verbose and full of little details which are unimportant to the overall picture and lose the reader before he gets to the conclusions or analyses of what this portends for U.S. policy-if such an analysis is even contained in the item....This item appeared in the 26 July issue of the *Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB)*; however, I can find no mention of it in the *President' s Daily Brief (PDB)* even though [the senior foreign official] was due to visit with the President shortly....Technical material is used quite frequently without any explanation as to its importance to the U.S. national security or even a layman's explanation of what is involved....Items are not self-contained and refer to back issues, in some instances as far as a month before."

• Some of this criticism may be exaggerated and too focused on a few examples as representing a pattern. Criticism that suggests CIA is "verbose" can be somewhat countered by instances when "PDB" briefers have returned with requests from policymakers for more details. However, these notes reflect a perception by at least one NSC staffer that some CIA reporting was of limited value to policymakers. The author and recipient of the notes is unknown. We also don't know if the criticism was forwarded to CIA, where it might have gotten attention, or was kept within NSC.

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(U//AIUO) From Prague Spring to Soviet Winter

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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(U//AUC) During spring/summer 1968, *Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB)* issues record rising tensions between Czechoslovakia and the USSR over the Czech leadership's experiments with democratic reform. On <u>11 May</u>, the *CIB* reports that the official Czech news agency has "tardily and somewhat wanly acknowledged reports of Soviet troop movements" toward Czechoslovakia. As the Soviets threatened military action, they also were browbeating other East European governments to intercede with the Czechs. Several did, but Yugoslav's Tito and Romania's Ceausescu refused. A <u>31 July *CIB*</u> reports that the Soviet military buildup along Czech borders continues relentlessly, even as Soviet-Czech discussions are occurring at Cierna. "Prague, nevertheless, seems determined to defend itself against Moscow's pressure....Yesterday's *Rude Pravo*, the official Czech communist paper, said such pressure would set a precedent for a revival of Stalinist methods for other socialist countries as well. Initially, the talks at Cierna seemed to allow some accommodation. The *CIB* of <u>2 August</u> reports that the Czech side went some way toward meeting Soviet demands for strengthening Prague's links with the Warsaw Pact military alliance. While the Czechs report that the Russians sanction Czechoslovakia's domestic reform program, the *CIB* notes that it is by no means certain that the Czechs enjoy a relatively free hand in domestic affairs. And, there is no substantial change in the status of Soviet troops on the Czech border.

(U//AtUQ) The <u>19 August</u> *CIB* reports that Soviet pressure remains high, and that for the second time in three days *Pravda* is condemning the "upsurge of subversive activities" in Czechoslovakia. The *CIB* explains that Czech party leaders "apparently have failed in their attempt to persuade many leading Czech editors to refrain from attacking the Soviet Union. During a meeting on 17 August, 70 editors reportedly refused to accept restrictions on freedom of the press." The <u>22 August</u> *CIB* reports the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces and some Warsaw Pact allies. "The swift and well-coordinated advance...resulted in the seizure of the Czech capital with a suddenness that left the Czech leaders with virtually no alternative but to accept the fait accompli," which included the arrest of the most liberal leaders, including party chief Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, party secretary Cisar, and National Assembly chairman Smrkovsky. Despite the fact that the population was ordered to remain calm, the result was sporadic and spontaneous civil resistance, including a one-minute nationwide work stoppage.

• The crisis in Czechoslovakia continued for several months. Czech leaders struggled to maintain the right to practice some freedom at home, but, by October, party leader Dubcek was forced to shelve democratic reform, outlaw other political parties, eliminate "liberals" from the Communist party, and censor the press. Not until the collapse of the Soviet empire did the Czechs and the Slovaks win their freedom.

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