

Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 13-24 June 2005 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

(U//~~ATUO~~) **28 June 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **13 July 2005: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Two Weeks

(U//~~ATUO~~) New FRUS Volumes Available on the ARP Database

(U//~~ATUO~~) The Policy and Plans Staff (PPS) recently added three new *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) volumes to The Agency Release Panel (ARP) database: "1969-1976 Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971" (Nixon); "1964-1968 Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico" (Johnson); "1964-1968 Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana" (Johnson).

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(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~ATUO~~) Request on Stealth Fighter

(U//~~ATUO~~) A Colorado requester seeks "information, records, and documents on the stealth airplane designated the F-117A. Specifically, I am requesting any and all information, records, and documents which are dated June 8, 1980 or earlier relating to the F-117A's radar absorbent material." The requester states that "the F-117A has obvious permanent historical value for its role in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom."

- *The FOIA case manager advised the requester that an earlier search on behalf of another requester found no responsive records. The requester was advised to contact the US Air Force for further assistance.*

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(U//~~ATUO~~) Interest in "Gonzo" Journalist

(U//~~ATUO~~) A requester with the *Frederick* (MD) *News Post* asks for information concerning "'gonzo' reporter and journalist Hunter S. Thompson." The requester states that he is "gathering information on Mr. Thompson that is of current interest to the public because of his recent death and status as a public figure."



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(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center

~~(U//ATUO)~~ From the Archives:

~~(U//ATUO)~~ Lesson Learned from Vietnamese Assessments

~~(U//ATUO)~~ In a July 1975 letter to the editors of the Intelligence Community's Review of National Intelligence (RONI), the director of the Imagery Analysis Service (IAS) provided his insights into the IC's analytical track record for dealing with Vietnam. The director noted that the IC had done a better job of analyzing the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and likely courses of action of the Communists in Indochina than of the non-Communists. "Most of the 'shock' developments throughout these three decades have been related to the unanticipated failures or deficiencies of the non-Communists--political and military--in coping with foreseen levels of Communist capabilities and pressures." Among the examples he cited were the Tet offensive--which "stemmed primarily from exaggerated perceptions of the cumulative effects of the application of US military power over the preceding two-and-a-half years, rather than from a lack of indications of an impending major enemy offensive"--and the final denouement--the collapse of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The D/IAS concluded: "This record clearly highlights a long-standing source of frustration to intelligence analysts and their consumers--that of making net assessments in 'real-world' situations when inputs on one side of the equation are influenced by the subjective views and judgments of operating officials committed to the successful execution of policies, strategies and programs. Too often is the net judgment subverted or dominated by the overconfident and insistent views of operators and policy-makers concerning the 'progress' achieved by friendly activities. . ." The impartial appraisals "were often discounted or ignored by the more subjective, optimistic--and influential--views of the operators. Clearly, one lesson to be learned. . . is the need to evolve a mechanism for providing the policy maker with truly objective net assessments in situations where the US is operationally committed--a mechanism that will effectively blend, if not balance, the voices of the Pollyannas with those of the Cassandras." [redacted]

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ Strategy in Vietnam and U.S. Governmental Organization

~~(U//ATUO)~~ The Nixon Library contains a National Security Council paper titled "The Viet-Nam War: Organizing for a Political Strategy," drafted in December 1968. It opens with: "Even the best strategies and wisest policies need proper organization, wisely led and staffed, to realize their full effectiveness." The paper outlines four possible organizational options to overcome "the large, unwieldy and bureaucratic nature" of the five agencies most directly concerned with prosecuting the war. The NSC advocates establishing "a special White House staff" to oversee everything. The paper states that there are "three crucial decision elements basic to a meaningful effort and outcome in Viet-Nam: (1) Presidential objectives; (2) the Vietnamese milieu; (3) bureaucratic capabilities." [redacted]

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(b)(3) [redacted]
This is a record.
[redacted]

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