

## ***Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 10-21 January 2005 Executive Summary***

### **Future Planning Calendar**

(U//~~ALIO~~) **16 February 2005:** Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **22 February 2005:** Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

### **Overview of IRR Activities--Last Two Weeks**

#### **(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests**

##### **(U//~~ATUO~~) Gary Webb's Legacy as an Investigative Reporter**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A 13 December 2005 obituary appearing in *The New York Times* prompted three FOIA requests for CIA records on Gary Webb—who won a Pulitzer Prize in 1990 for team coverage of the 1989 [San Francisco] Bay Area earthquake. Later, he won national attention by writing a series of articles (later discredited) linking the Central Intelligence Agency to the spread of crack cocaine in Los Angeles.





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*Editor: One requester, a Ph.D., intends to use the requested records "in the furtherance of scholarly research." Another requester, a freelance journalist, acknowledges his desire to publish a series of articles on "Webb's legacy as an investigative reporter." The third requester frequently posts FOIA releases on his Website.*

##### **(U//~~ATUO~~) "Stay Behind Agent Program"—List Request**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A historian from Alaska wrote to the DCI warning that "time is running out . . . after the Second World War the FBI, CIA and Military Intelligence felt there was a real possibility that Alaska would be taken by the Soviet Union. Just in case that happened, the three agencies set up the 'Stay Behind Agent Program,' which recruited Alaskans who were willing to stay behind when the Soviets invaded and occupied Alaska. Who were the actual men and women who were chosen and trained?" He seeks their names in order to "get them on tape" if alive—or else, to advocate that they be identified on a Federal building plaque saying: "Thank You for Your Service to America."

-  the case manager to inform the requester that responsive records, should they exist, would be contained in operational files —which are exempt from the search, review and disclosure provisions of the FOIA. 

##### **(U//~~ATUO~~) End of Year Favorite—the FOIA Case Log**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A frequent FOIA requester of CIA documents is seeking the Agency's FOIA Case Log for 2004. Yet another requester, representing *The Hill* [Capitol Hill] newspaper, wishes the Case Log since October 2004. Similar requests will undoubtedly follow. The FOIA Case Log records: 1) the date of the case; 2) the case number; and, 3) the case subject. Judging from the FOIA Case Log, many requesters consider this hardcopy or diskette record to be

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a most useful resource.

- *The FOIA case manager already has accepted the first request, and mailed out the popular record.*

**(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center**

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Managing Political Intelligence—1978**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A November 1978 draft memo from Sam Hoskins and Bob Gates to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski outlines a draft program to improve political intelligence. It identifies 'Collection' and 'Analysis' as general areas on which any remedial program must focus. In scoping the task at hand, it describes the problem facing 'Management' accordingly: "Too bureaucratic an approach to the production of intelligence can stifle creative thinking, lively inquiry, and unorthodox views. It fosters 'safe' assessments in the area of political intelligence, where we all realize the risks of predicting human behavior. As senior managers become preoccupied with administrative problems, too many lose control of analysis—which then heads off in directions often of interest to the analyst, but not to the United States Government. Similarly, a structure in which line managers vie for control of their analysts with senior community officials such as NIOs [National Intelligence Officers] makes planning difficult and good management nearly impossible."

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Meshing Policy & Intelligence**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A May 1977 National Security Council (NSC) Presidential Review Memorandum from the Carter Library takes a fresh look at "Intelligence Objectivity verses Policy Relevance." It states, "Good interpretive analysis often comes close to the meshing of policy and intelligence. By tradition, however, intelligence producers have favored a passive over active support of users and have been reluctant to initiate a closer user-producer relationship. The worry has been that a closer relationship might somehow compromise the objectivity of intelligence judgments. As a result, many intelligence products have been less relevant and timely with respect to user needs than could be the case. In those areas where production and policy are closest (e.g., energy, economics, terrorism, narcotics, [arms control] SALT, MBFR, and certain territorial negotiations) maintenance of objectivity usually has not been a serious problem. There is, of course, always a danger that close working relationships between intelligence analysts and departmental staff officers, or senior policymakers, might result in biased products that are structured to support policy positions, as producers come to identify with the policies they helped develop. This is a risk, but one that can be minimized by the proper degree of professionalism on both sides, and alert management."

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Critique of a Cold Warrior**

(U//~~ATUO~~) Then-Colonel William E. Odom (later General Odom and head of the National Security Agency) wrote a memorandum to Robert Gates (later DDI and DCI) in the last months of the Carter Administration, while both served on the National Security Council staff. Odom's focus was a CIA paper on US-Soviet relations, which he strongly criticized for its "non-Marxist/Leninist view of detente." It "leaves out completely the Soviet strategy for using the Cubans and for joint operations with the Vietnamese," while ignoring Soviet "recklessness" in challenging detente in Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia. He said it was "appalling" that CIA analysts described "Soviet massive territorial [sic] acquisitions [sic] in the Baltic, Eastern Poland, parts of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Moldavia, and large parts of Karelia as a quest for security." Soviet behavior, he continued, "can only be described as Soviet expansionism and hegemonism."

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Khomeini—the New Order and Islam**

(U//~~ATUO~~) In 1978, CIA Legislative Counsel Frederick Hitz passed along to ADDI Sayre Stevens an Arabic text of Ayatollah Khomeini's book, *Islamic Government* (published in Iraq in Arabic in 1968). Hitz obtained the copy from Richard Perle, who was handing out translations of certain of the "juiciest passages" to interested journalists. According to Hitz' note to Stevens, "It was Perle's thought that we [the CIA] might be interested in translating the manuscript for possible dissemination as a revelation of Khomeini's true thinking."

(U//~~ATUO~~) Some of the translated excerpts given to the ADDI are worth noting given the character of Khomeini's subsequent rule in Iran:

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"Government in Islam . . . is, in fact, constitutional; not, however, in the commonly understood sense of constitutionalism . . . but in the sense that those in power are bound by a group of conditions and principles made clear in the Koran and by the example of the Prophet Muhammad . . . The difference between Islamic government and constitutional government—whether monarchical or republican—lies in the fact that in the latter system, it is the representatives of the people or those of the king who legislate and make laws. Whereas, the actual authority to legislate belongs exclusively to God." (pp. 41-42)

". . . it is the religious expert (faqih) and no one else who should occupy himself with the affairs of government . . . He should implement the canonical punishments, just as the Prophet did, and he should rule according to God's revelation." (p. 70)

". . . the government, authority and management over the people, as well as the collection and expenditure of revenues has been entrusted to the religious experts. Verily, God will punish and call to account anyone who takes issue with their authority." (p. 80)

"We want a ruler who would cut off the hand of his own son if he steals, and would flog and stone his near relative if he fornicates." (p. 124)

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