Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 4-8 October 2004 Executive Summary

<u>Future Planning Calendar</u>

(U//AIUO) 13 October 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//AIUO) 26 October 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//ATUO) 31 December 2006: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week

(U//AHUO)-Agency Reduces Backlog in FOIA/PA Cases for Seventh Consecutive Year

(U//AIUO) For the 7th straight year, the backlog of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases fell -- in FY 2004 by 19.6 percent. The CIA received 3,055 FOIA and Privacy Act cases during the year, and closed 3,336 cases -- thus, reducing its pending case load by 281 cases.

	litigation. An agency's efforts to reduce its pending request backlog is one factor a court will consider when determining whether to "stay" the court proceedings so that an agency can have additional time to process the request that is the subject of the litigation.
	(U//AIUO) CIA Reduces EO MDR Backlog By Almost 40% (U//AIUO) In FY 2004, the Agency reduced its backlog of Mandatory Declassification Reviews (MDRs) under EO 12958 by 39.4%. The number of "old" EO-MDRs (defined as those received prior to FY 2001) was reduced by 51.7%.
	(U//AIUO) Appeals Branch Achieves New Low (U//AIUO) The Appeals & Litigation Branch of the Public Information Programs Division reduced its backlog of FOIA, Privacy, and Executive Order appeals by 19.2% in FY 2004 reducing the backlog to 211 cases, which is the lowest end-of-year pending in the ten years since statistics were kept
(b)(3)	(U//AHUQ) Final Accounting: CDC Exceeds Its FY 2004 Production Goals (U//AHUQ) The CIA Declassification Center's final end-of-FY numbers reveal that CDC ended FY 2004 well ahead of its fiscal year goals.
	(U//AIUO) FOIA Requests

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved for Release: 2019/03/27 C05578061

(U//ALLO) Interest in Paraguayan Regime Change

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/27 C05578061 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(b)(3) (b)(5)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(U//AHUO) A student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology seeks information on "the events leading up to the coup and overthrow of President Stroessner of Paraguay in February 1989." The requester is "specifically interested in communications or cables by the CIA Station Chief in Paraguay to the CIA on the political situation in Paraguay, as well as any other correspondence related to this event."
(U//AIUO) Request for 1975 Intelligence Report (U//AIUO) A requester is interested in obtaining a copy of "an internal report entitled American Intelligence: A Framework for the Future, written by James Taylor in October of 1975." The requester indicates that he is seeking this report "as part of a research paper for the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas."
• The FOIA case manager located a copy of the report from the MORI database of previously released information, and provided it to the requester.
(U//AIUO) Seeking Reports on Iraqi Nuclear Program (U//AIUO) Frequent requester Jeffrey Richelson submitted two requests for reports involving Iraq's nuclear program. The first request concerns a report titled Iraq's Hunt for Aluminum Tubes: Evidence of a Renewed Enrichment Effort, September 2002. The second request involves two Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) reports from October 1997 and June 1999, respectively, both titled Reconstitution of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program.
The FOIA case manager accepted both requests.
(U//AIUO) CIA Declassification Center
(U//AHUO) From the Archives:
(U//AHUO) From a February 1972 report on the KGB: "Andropov is among those Soviet officials who feel that the Party must reform to some degree to retain preeminence, that the USSR cannot be run effectively without its intellectual elite, and that unimaginative and uniformly repressive tactics toward the disaffected are counterproductive. The description of Andropov (by dissidents and observers) as a moderating influence in the leadership is eloquent in view of the KGB's important role over the last few years in the Party's general crackdown on intellectual and political expression."
(U//AHUO) Responsibilities of the DCI (U//AHUO) From the Carter Presidential Library collection comes this National Security Council (NSC) perspective on "Responsibilities of the DCI," dated 2 June 1977, that Rick Inderfurth prepared for Zbigniew Brzezinski: "There are three places to go to search for a definition of the DCI's responsibilities: the 1947 National Security Act, the 1949 CIA Act, and Executive Order 11905." The 1947 NSC Act established the CIA as well as the NSC. The Act provided that the CIA "was established under the National Security Council" and was to carry out its prescribed functions "under the direction of the NSC."
The Act assigned five broad functions to CIA: to <u>advise</u> the NSC in matters concerning Intelligence activities; to <u>make recommendations</u> to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence activities; to <u>correlate and evaluate</u> intelligence, and provide for appropriate dissemination;

(b)(3) (b)(5)

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

--to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as the NSC may from time to time direct.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/27 C05578061

--to perform additional services of common concern as the NSC determines;

Approved for Release: 2019/03/27 C05578061 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(U/ATOO) The NSC document continues, "Note that the responsibilities outlined above are assigned to the CIA, no
the DCI. The DCI is, of course, responsible for seeing that these functions are performed. The 1949 CIA Act made
no reference to the DCI's responsibilities, except as they relate to such matters as procurement, sources and methods,
appropriations, etc. E.O. 11905, dated February 18, 1976, states that the DCI shall be responsible directly to the
NSC and the President, and shall chair the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, act as the executive head of the CIA
and the IC staff, ensure the development and submission of a national intelligence budget, and 'act as the President's
primary advisor on foreign intelligence and provide him and other intelligence officials in the Executive Branch with
foreign intelligence.' He is also assigned the responsibility of developing national intelligence requirement and
priorities and supervising the production and dissemination of national intelligence. As the above indicates, the
DCI's responsibilities are those of an advisor, not a policymaker. This has been the case since 1947 and continues to
be the case today."

(b)(3)

cc:

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved for Release: 2019/03/27 C05578061