

*Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 30 August - 3 September 2004  
Executive Summary*

*Future Planning Calendar*

(U//~~AIUO~~) 8 September 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~AIUO~~) 28 September 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~AIUO~~) 31 December 2006: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

*Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week*

(U//~~AIUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~AIUO~~) Records Request For Deceased Citizens


(U//~~AIUO~~) A TIME magazine correspondent is asking for "all files, records and/or documents regarding the following [list of 22] deceased foreign figures." He instructs: "Please consider this also a request for all relevant documents produced under any other FOIA requests."



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(b)(5)

(U//~~AIUO~~) Seeking Copies of Certified Payroll Records

(U//~~AIUO~~) The Coalition for Fair Contracting, Inc., is requesting "copies of certified payroll records (necessary personal identifiers redacted) for Southern Insulation, subcontractor to Project Development Group, Inc. (PDG), for the period June 1-July 20, 2004." The requester adds: "The Coalition does not have a commercial use for these documents...[but, rather]...utilizes payroll records to monitor how the government ensures compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act, and to see if contractors performing work under the Act are complying with federal laws and regulations."



(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

(U//~~AIUO~~) Pursuing Records on Yuri A. Rastvorov

(U//~~AIUO~~) Following his denied appeal in 1993, a requester is again seeking "any available documents on the following incident: In January 1954, Yuri Aleskandrovich Rastvorov, a diplomatic officer of the Soviet Mission in

Japan, was granted political asylum in the United States." The requester reveals that he developed a friendship with Rastvorov and his daughter after interviewing the subject in 1994. He intends to use any available CIA records on the "Rastvorov case" to document something of his life and contribution to the United States. Mr. Dulles, he states, presented a letter of appreciation to the Soviet defector for his valuable service. Mr. Rastvorov passed away in January 2004, five days before the 50th anniversary of his defection to the "country of freedom, USA."



(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

*Editor: The requester enclosed an interesting article from The Washington Post (dated 7 February 2004) titled: "Two Countries, Two Lives –Soviet Defector Helped CIA Understand KGB." It includes this sentence: "The CIA in a declassified document, said that Rastvorov was a valuable espionage asset, 'providing background insight into the KGB and the Soviet government...a mentor to very young CIA case officers, teaching them about the Russians and the KGB.'"*


**(U//~~ATUO~~) CIA Declassification Center**

**(U//~~ATUO~~) From the Archives:**

**(U//~~ATUO~~) Intelligence Community Performance—Mayaguez Crisis**

(U//~~ATUO~~) National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger sent an undated memorandum to President Gerald Ford on the performance of "our national security mechanism" during the *Mayaguez* crisis—the May 1975 event in which Cambodian forces captured and detained the crew of the American merchant vessel *Mayaguez* until a US Marine landing and aerial bombardment of Koh Tang island forced the Cambodians to release the prisoners. Kissinger concluded that initial notification of the vessel's capture was slow in coming—largely because duty officers were reluctant to alert senior officials without prior confirmation of the initial Critic messages. But once alerted, the "intelligence-gathering apparatus worked well, particularly the technical systems involved." Kissinger also found it easier to pass messages to military commanders half a world away than to transmit them across "a few blocks in Washington." Indeed, it seemed apparent that key DoD messages on certain operations were not reaching the White House Situation Room and the State Department. Kissinger labeled this a coordination problem, rather than any intent by the Pentagon to keep the White House or State uninformed.

- *Comment: The question of whether the Intelligence Community should have predicted that an attack was imminent—given the recent attack on foreign, but not American, ships there—and warned international mariners of the danger—is relevant to today's intelligence warning environment. Kissinger concluded that Khmer Rouge intent against international shipping was unpredictable. However, he noted that DCI Colby accepted responsibility for improving the process, so that in the future the Intelligence Community would be able to pass information to offices involved in the maritime advisory process.*



**(U//~~ATUO~~) Underestimating Capabilities and Determination**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A 17 December 1970 DI Memorandum titled, "Egyptian Cross-Canal Capability" concludes: "In sum, we believe that the Egyptians would be unsuccessful if they were to undertake a large-scale crossing of the canal in an effort to wrest control of the Sinai from the Israelis. This judgment is based on our estimate that the Egyptians do not at this time have the effective capability to undertake such a large offensive, that the Israelis are capable of detecting the preparations for such an attack, and that the Israelis almost certainly would, at the time of detection, launch a preemptive strike that would cripple the Egyptian attack forces...."

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- *Comment: Less than three years later (6 October 1973), the Egyptians and the Syrians launched attacks in what is called the October War (or Yom Kippur War). The Egyptians placed bridges, crossed the Suez Canal in force, breached the "impregnable" Bar-Lev Line, and captured much of the eastern bank. Israel slowed the advances with airpower and moved reserves to the fighting. They knocked out the Egyptian bridges, leaving hundreds of Egyptian tanks stranded and unsupported on the Sinai. A cease-fire went into effect in late October. According to Christopher Andrew's For the President's Eyes Only, "what stunned Nixon was that Israeli intelligence, which he regarded as 'among the best in the world,'" had not anticipated the attack at that time.* [redacted]

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~~(U//AIUO)~~ **The Importance of Titles**

~~(U//AIUO)~~ George Carver, in 1974, served as Deputy for National Intelligence Officers. He was a prolific writer of notes who kept voluminous chrono files. Of interest from his chrono of May 1974, is the following:

31 May 1974

To: The Honorable James R. Schlesinger  
From: George A. Carver, Jr.

Subject: NIAM 11-9-74

Attached for your personal use is a copy of the NIAM on Soviet Detente Policy issued on 23 May. I had intended to give it to you at our 28 May session; but since that got scrubbed, I am sending it along via this note.

Do not be put off by the way this NIAM was summarized in the 31 May National Intelligence Daily. Particularly, do not be misled by the Daily's capsule headline ("Soviets Seen To Need Detente"). That is not an accurate gist of the study's message. I suggest you form your opinions from what the text actually says, not what others seem to think it meant or in their eyes ought to have meant.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

- *Comment:* [redacted] *The message and the tone of the title must match the text because many people—including policymakers and their staffs—glance at newspaper and finished intelligence product headlines to get a quick summary of the story's main message. Busy people may never read below the headline. Even those reading further-may recall only what they gleaned from the message the title conveys. In this case, Mr. Carver judged NIAM 11-9-74's title inaccurate, and personally intervened via a "corrective" note to the Secretary of Defense.* [redacted]

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