



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SAVA 73-46

6 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard T. Kennedy  
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT : Indochina Psychological Operations

1. Per our recent conversations, I asked my Agency colleagues concerned with such matters to pull together a summary of current and feasible future activity in the psychological pressure field. Attached is the response to my request, done largely by Jack Horgan. (Note, however, that this was an internal Agency exercise, not something done by PPOG.)

2. The final section ("Recommendations for Action") is set up in "Approve/Disapprove" format for your convenience. As you will see, we again raise the question of using leaflets showing (separately or conjoined) pictures of President Nixon being cordially received by Mao and/or Brezhnev. We are not trying to be stubborn or obtuse. The potential complications that would have to be considered before use of any such leaflets was authorized are well understood. The fact remains, however, that this particular propaganda theme is known to have a devastating impact on Vietnamese of all persuasions and, particularly, Communist cadre at all levels. Thus if you want something that will work in Indochina, here is a gambit with maximum

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impact. The decision on the relative weights of potentially conflicting equities -- Indochina impact versus non-Indochina considerations -- is obviously one that has to be made at your end of the line, not mine.



George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

Memorandum - "U.S. Psychological Pressure Operations  
Vis-a-Vis North Vietnam," dated 6 April 1973

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

Orig - Addressee w/att

- 1 - DCI w/att
- 1 - DDCI w/att
- 1 - DDO w/att
- 1 - C/FE w/att
- 1 - C/VNO w/att
- 1 - JPH Chrono
- 1 -
- 1 - GAC Chrono ✓

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6 April 1973

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: U.S. Psychological Pressure Operations Vis-a-Vis  
North Vietnam

I. OBJECTIVES AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES

1. The primary objective of all U.S. Government psychological operations directed at North Vietnam from May 1972 until 28 January 1973 was to generate pressures for a peaceful settlement. With the signing of the Paris Agreements, the primary objective shifted to that of generating pressure for compliance with the Agreements. The tone of these efforts during the 60-day prisoner release period has been non-polemical and designed to encourage the DRV to approach the implementation of the Agreements in a spirit of settlement. During this non-polemical phase, however, contingency plans were developed for taking a harder line after X+60 if the DRV's behavior so warranted.

2. Our current basic assessment is that the DRV has not abandoned the idea of military conquest of the South and that further psychological pressure operations are needed to complement other, more overt, U.S. Government activities aimed at inducing the DRV to comply with the spirit and letter of the Paris Agreements. Targets for these operations are the population of North Vietnam, personnel in the North Vietnamese Army wherever they are located, and the Pathet Lao and Khmer Insurgents. There are indications that North Vietnamese personnel outside North Vietnam are now particularly susceptible to psychological messages that exploit their ardent desire to go home now that the war has been officially concluded. The methods that we can



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use to communicate are radio broadcasting, leafleting, [redacted]

[redacted] The radio and leafleting effort can be carried out both unilaterally (i.e., by the U.S. alone) and by working through the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Basic objectives of any intensified psychological effort at the moment would include the following:

(1) Encouraging DRV adherence to the terms of the Paris Agreements.

(2) Accentuating U.S. actions and statements with regard to compliance with the Paris Agreements.

(3) Pressure for cessation of DRV infiltration activity.

(4) Pressure for withdrawal of NVA forces to North Vietnam.

(5) Buttressing the outlook that the DRV should refrain from external aggression and concentrate on constructive domestic pursuits.

(6) Creating pressures for a split between the DRV and the VC, the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Insurgents.

(7) Exacerbation of morale problems within the Communist ranks, particularly among NVA troops still stationed in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

## II. CURRENT RADIO BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES

3. In the field of U.S.-controlled radio broadcasting, the Voice of America is currently broadcasting 18 hours daily over its medium wave Vietnamese-language service from transmitters located in the Philippines and South Vietnam. Five hours of original programming are carried daily. The Voice is one of the most effective media in reaching

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the DRV/NVA target. VOA's programming aims at bringing to the DRV's attention news and information on basic U.S. policy. The VOA broadcasts seven hours per week in Lao and five hours per week in Khmer. Both of the latter programs could be improved.

4. Another effective USG-sponsored voice aimed at the DRV target is the "Voice of Mother Vietnam" -- a Saigon Station-supported, South Vietnamese-managed radio established last summer. Over a short period of time this has become a high-impact medium. The radio currently broadcasts 49 hours daily with three hours of original programming over three short wave transmitters and one medium wave transmitter located in South Vietnam. The radio's main target is North Vietnam proper; but its in-country South Vietnamese capability is currently being expanded. By the end of April, a new medium wave transmitter will be activated that will target Communist forces in the Military Regions 3 and 4 of South Vietnam. This radio is currently emphasizing what the cease-fire agreement promises for the people of Vietnam in human and individual terms.

5. The Saigon Station currently broadcasts a black radio titled "Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriot's League." This radio purports to originate with a group of dissident North Vietnamese Communists who oppose the aggressive and self-serving policies of the Lao Dong Party. It urges national reunification by peaceful means and a greater effort to develop the North Vietnamese economy. One hour of fresh programming is broadcast daily for a total of seven hours per day over two high frequency transmitters. The Station also plans to develop another new black radio which will attempt to cause rifts between Southern and Northern Vietnamese Communists. This black radio, which will purport to originate with an element of the PRG/NLF, will voice the growing discontent of the PRG/NLF with the policies of the DRV/LDP and air real or notional differences developing among Vietnamese Communist elements. We plan to commence broadcasting this program in late April if 40 Committee approval is obtained.

6. The three non-Communist countries of Indochina each carry radio programs aimed at the NVA/VC. For example, in South Vietnam,

the principal concentrations of NVA forces are within easy range of seven GVN transmitters. Programming reflects the GVN's concern with having NVA forces withdraw; though the GVN consumes most of its energy in propagandizing its own population with themes that are not effective against the DRV. The GVN's radio efforts have considerable room for improvement, as do those of the RLG and the GKR.

III. CURRENT LEAFLET OPERATIONS

7. Although active in Cambodia, the U.S. Government is currently not engaging in leafleting activity in North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Laos. South Vietnam and Laos have their own leaflet programs. Both programs could be made more effective.

8. The Laos picture is somewhat clouded at the moment. RLG leafleting is continuing within the limited capabilities of the government's assets, and we hope to increase the RLG leafleting capability through extending greater U.S. support, primarily in themes.

9. In Cambodia, there are two U.S. leaflet programs still in operation. One is strictly a unilateral U.S. leaflet program aimed at North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. The leaflet themes in this program are designed to promote adherence to the Paris Agreements and foster a desire to return home on the part of the NVA. The second on-going effort involves the printing and delivery of GKR-prepared leaflets aimed at the Khmer Insurgents. The themes in this GKR program emphasize Cambodian nationalism and unity against foreign (Vietnamese Communist) influence and promote the view that the NVA/VC aggressors keep the Cambodian nation separated in violation of the Paris Agreement's provisions that call for the departure of foreign forces from Cambodia.

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Per 3 May 73  
 Conversation  
 with D. Kennedy  
 A.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

(1) Structuring close cooperative working relations with the governments of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in order to bring their programs (radio and leaflet) more in line with U.S. objectives.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Examination of patterns of radio propagation in Indochina of all friendly radios to assure that the maximum coverage of the Communist target is achieved.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Leaflets depicting President Nixon and Chairman Mao and President Nixon and Brezhnev with an appropriate non-polemical message were employed by the GVN for a short time in 1972 before they were discontinued at U.S. request. There is ample evidence indicating that these leaflets were particularly effective. Even the most dedicated Communist cadre are deeply disturbed by the thought of Sino-American and/or Soviet-American rapprochement and all that that implies for the Vietnamese revolution. We recognize that there are wider ramifications for our world-wide position in the use of such leaflets. Nonetheless, from the limited perspective of what would be certain to have a great impact on the Vietnamese Communists,

we would propose that the GVN be allowed to resume the use of such leaflets over its own territory.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove ✓ (for now)

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Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

(6) Increase overt and covert efforts through leafleting and radio broadcasts to exacerbate tensions between the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Insurgents.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove  \_\_\_\_\_

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

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Approve

Disapprove