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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 2828

VIA: Air  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA - 1111

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS CLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
CLASSIFICATION

15. Sep. 1953

TO : Chief, EE  
Attn: L  
FROM : Chief of Base, Vienna  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CROOVY

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIFIC— 0 Vienna Operations Base Iceberg Program, Semi-Annual Status Report

REF: EAVA 2282

AWB	FI	RWD ARD RAV
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
See para _____	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para _____	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info cmd files		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Introduction

1. The purpose of the Vienna Operations Base Iceberg Program is to select, train, and place W/T operators and other types of stay behind agents in strategic locations in Eastern Austria (Vienna and the Soviet-occupied Provinces) to become active only well after the outbreak of hostilities and the loss of this area to hostile forces. These agents will collect and transmit via W/T intelligence on military, political and economic targets, as well as operational support data. They may report observations of bomb damage in reply to specific queries from the W/T base, but they will not engage in combat OB reporting nor in resistance or sabotage activities.

Project Summaries

2. VOB currently has six Iceberg agents, of which ~~three~~ two are fully trained and briefed W/T operators, two are approaching the end of their W/T training, and one has just embarked on the training program. Attached for Headquarters, in two copies each, are the first of what will be semi-annual summaries of each of these six Iceberg cases. The purpose of these project summaries is fourfold:

- To enable a case officer unacquainted with the operation to take over control via W/T in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities, when present case officers would not be immediately available and there would be no time for research and analysis of Headquarters' files.
- To keep Headquarters and VOB informed on a semi-annual basis of the current level of Iceberg capabilities.
- To insure that all pertinent factors in Iceberg cases are written down and forwarded to Headquarters in full.
- To provide a basis for the continuing re-evaluation of the Base's Iceberg preparations; and to facilitate the Iceberg coordinator's task of overseeing and coordinating the Iceberg Program.

CHANGE IN CLASS   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
AUTHORITY: E.O. 13526  
DATE: 11/19/2011  
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Project Iceberg  
Information 6-6-194  
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3. Also forwarded for Headquarters information, are two copies of the Iceberg Project Summary Form which was distributed to case officers as a guide for writing up the summaries.

Current Target Coverage

4. If hostilities break out within the next six months, and if all VOB Iceberg W/T agents come on the air, it is planned that the following targets will be covered:

a. C 1 and C 16 - Working together, they can report the following:

(1) Road and rail movements on the secondary route from Wiener Neustadt to Graz via Aspang and perhaps observation of the main Wiener Neustadt - Kapfenberg route through the Semmering Pass.

(2) Observation of Wiener Neustadt airfield.

(3) OB of forces stationed in Wiener Neustadt.

(4) Operational intelligence on document, travel, and mail controls.

(5) Observation of bomb damage in Wiener Neustadt.

(6) Political and economic information overtly available in the area.

(7) Small amount of industrial intelligence on Wiener Neustadt.

b. C 1

(1) Political intelligence on the KPOe and the puppet government -- personalities, organization, policies, and intentions as known to him through his position as a KPOe functionary in Vienna.

(2) Observation of OB and bomb damage in Vienna.

c. C 1 - To receive final communications briefing in September, 1953. After that date, he can report the following:

(1) Operational intelligence on document, travel, and mail controls.

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(2) Observation of OB and bomb damage in Vienna.

(3) Political and economic information overtly available in Vienna.

d. [ ] - It is hoped that he can receive final communications briefing in October, 1953. If so, he can then report essentially the same type of information listed above under [ ],

e. [ ] - In early stages of training.

Handwritten notes and scribbles on the right side of the page, including a large bracket and some illegible markings.

Attachments:

6 Semi-annual Iceberg Project Summaries (in duplicate)

2 copies of Iceberg Project Summary Form

Date of origin: 2 September 1953

Distribution:

- 3 - EE w/atts ✓
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - [ ]

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Attachment #1 to EAVA-4111

ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONY: [ ] 1

CASE OFFICER: [ ] 1

REFERENCE: [ ] 16 Project Summary

DATE: 1 July 1953

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 RECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGE DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011  
AUTH: ER 102  
DATE: 9 JUN 1984 REVIEWER: 011922

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. [ ] is a 32 year old veterinarian in a small village 50 km. southwest of Vienna. He is from an upper class family, but he has made his living completely independent of his parents and sees them only rarely. His wife, whom he married in October 1952, is now 20 years old and expecting her first child. He was inducted in the German Army in February 1941 and served as a radio teletype operator with Heeresgruppe Sud, Salonika; highest grade, Sergeant.

CONTROL AND SECURITY

2. References - PRQ was submitted as VIEN 1113, 22 January 1948. Operational clearance was received in WASH 2048, 30 January 1948. A revised Project Outline and request for renewal of Project Approval were submitted as EAVA-2825, 26 May 1953.

3. Namechecks - Headquarters files were checked in January 1948. [ ] 1-2126, 25 February 1948, indicates that British files were also checked at that time. The operational file holds no indication that CIC, G-2, or Detachment 35 files were ever checked on [ ]. These checks are now being initiated.

4. Recruitment - [ ] was a pre-war friend of [ ] 1, and this friendship was renewed after the war. After volunteering to for stay-behind radio work, he was introduced to [ ] under cover name in January 1948.

5. Intelligence Experience other than Iceberg - None of Classification 6-6-194

6. Who Knows Who:

Project ICEBERG  
JGB # 66-850/67  
Box: 10 Folds: 7

a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact - In mid-1948, [ ] 1 recruited [ ] 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 as couriers, safehouses, and guides for an overland courier route to Western Austria. [ ] 1 and 2 have minimal knowledge, knowing only that they can count on American aid through [ ] for resistance activities in the event of war. [ ] 3 and 4 have helped [ ] cache radios, believing that they were boxes of weapons. [ ] 6 and 7 know of [ ]'s radio training.

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b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent - [ ] knows that [ ] 6 has received W/T training and is slated to assist him in his work.

7. LCFLUTTER - [ ] was given the LCFLUTTER test for the first time on 4 November 1952. He showed unexplained minor emotional disturbances which could not be resolved by interrogation. [ ] appeared clear on all points, but the results are to be considered with a minimum degree of accuracy. It has since been learned that [ ] had not reported truthfully on two items of equipment given him for caching (May Progress Report, VIM/3035), and this may have been the cause of his disturbance.

8. Other Security Factors - None

#### STAY BEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS

9. [ ] is within the age group which may be subject to military or labor draft, and as the son of an upper class industrial family he will be considered in the long run as a "class enemy" of any Communist regime. Offsetting this, however, [ ] has made his living on his own, completely independent of his family, and seldom sees his parents. As a village veterinarian, he is essential to the life of his community, and as long as a reasonable emphasis is placed upon maintaining the economic efficiency in Austria, he has an excellent possibility of staying in place. If for some reason he cannot remain in place, his many contacts and intimate knowledge of the mountains in his area will enable him to live black and continue his work. Factors which will probably shorten his stay-behind life are his Wehracht W/T experience which must be presumed known to the Soviets, his overconfidence as explained in the following paragraph, and the number of persons who are already aware of his AIS contact. As long as he stays in place, [ ]'s survival is dependent upon the continued security of [ ] 6, as well as of the five other members of the [ ] net who know [ ]'s true name.

#### PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

10. [ ] is a know-it-all type, confident of his own abilities and disparaging of Soviet capabilities at every turn. He does not submit readily to control when he has contrary ideas of his own, and when contact is via radio rather than face-to-face, this problem will be multiplied. This know-it-all attitude is a security hazard because it leads him to underestimate the capability of the opposition and the importance of routine security measures. There seems little reason to doubt that he will actually try to come on the air in the event of hostilities, as he is determined to participate in anti-Soviet resistance activities. He is the type who often stresses his need for independence, and this is allegedly the reason why he has made his own living with no help from his wealthy family. It is also one aspect of his unwillingness to submit to close case officer control. [ ] stated in 1948 that [ ]'s strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist bias would probably color any peacetime reporting he might do. His political outlook has matured considerably since that time, but his sureness of the truth of his own opinions still

might make it impossible, or at least very difficult, for to distinguish fact and opinion in political reporting. His experiences as a small town veterinarian are gradually turning him from a right-wing Peoples Party adherent towards the camp of the more conservative Socialists. He is intelligent, has an opinion, albeit a dogmatic one, on practically all the world's political-economic problems, and thinks quickly. He appears to have leadership ability, and one of his most valuable qualities is his ability to make friends quickly. He appears to be a good judge of people.

### TRAINING

11. Operational Training - Operational training has been started. This does not follow the training manual, but is based on discussions of selected topics, practical exercises, and detailed discussions of what possibilities has for recruiting sub-agents and setting up contact arrangements. Training is still in its initial stages. *after six years!*

#### 12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Date Training Commenced - Wehrmacht trained W/T operator.
- b. Date Training Completed - W/T review and KUBARK procedures training, 21 April to 7 May 1948.
- c. Date Final Commo and Operational Briefing - Most recent one, 13 July 1952.
- d. Date Last Oregon Review - 6-7 June 1953.
- e. Date Next Oregon Review Due - December 1953.
- f. Present Sending and Receiving Speeds *sending 20; receiving 25.*
- g. Other Factors Affecting Current Level of Preparedness - None

### EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

#### 13. Possessed by Agent:

a. One RS-6 composed of receiver #1299, transmitter #1654, power supply #1349, filter accessory #1363 issued to  1 6 October 1952, cached temporarily for the winter in his wood shed. Put into ground 3 June but site unsatisfactory and it must be moved (see VIM/4137).

b. PYCURE signal plan, code pads and crystals were last checked in May 1953 and returned to  1 for burial on 24 May 1953. These items were put in a separate cache 3 June in the immediate vicinity of the RS-6 mentioned above. They, too, are to be moved to a more favorable location, so no cache report has been written up as yet.

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c. One RS-1 composed of receiver # 2116, transmitter #437, power plant # 234, and a spare parts kit was turned over to Grice 1 February 1951. Set was buried in Netting, Lower Austria. Cache location described in MAVA-7776. The set was not waterproofed and is believed to be long since inoperative.

d. One SSTR-1 composed of transmitter # 5215, receiver # 5872, power pack # 5240 and spare parts kit turned over to [ ] 1 February 1951. Set was buried in Netting, Lower Austria. Cache location described in MAVA 7776. The set was waterproofed by Limber in soldered metal boxes. It may be inoperative by now.

e. One SSP-11 hand generator serial number unknown concealed in the home of Grice 4. Date [ ] received this is unknown.

f. One SSP-12 gasoline generator # 470 concealed in the attic of Grice's home. It is not possible to cache the SSP-12. Date [ ] received this is unknown.

14. On Hand, Assigned to Agent - [ ] will be given another RS-6 to cache as soon as the one he already has has been cached properly.

15. On Order - None

16. Not Yet Ordered, but Desired - None.

OPERATIONAL PLAN - (Valid from 1 July - 31 December 1953)

17. Area of Operations - Gutenstein and Wiener Neustadt, Lower Austria.

18. Time of Activation - At least thirty days after the outbreak of hostilities.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets:

a. The following targets have been given to [ ], and he is attempting to develop contacts to cover as many of them as possible:

(1) Road and rail movements on the following routes: main route from Wiener Neustadt to Kapfenberg via the Semmering Pass, secondary route from Wiener Neustadt to Graz via Aspang, and main route from Sopron to Wiener Neustadt.

(2) OB of the forces stationed in the area south of Vienna (Wiener Neustadt, Baden, Moedling, Eisenstadt, and Neunkirchen).

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- (3) Observation of airfields in area south of Vienna.
- (4) Observation of bomb damage in area south of Vienna in reply to specific questions asked by the Base.
- (5) Operational intelligence on document, travel, and mail controls.
- (6) Production of war materials in the industrial area south of Vienna.

b. G's current contacts will probably enable him to cover the following of the above name targets:

- (1) Road and rail movements on the secondary route from Wiener Neustadt to Graz via Aspang and perhaps observation of the main Wiener Neustadt - Kapfenberg route.
- (2) Observation of Wiener Neustadt airfield.
- (3) OB of forces stationed in Wiener Neustadt.
- (4) Operational intelligence on document, travel, and mail controls.
- (5) Observation of bomb damage in Wiener Neustadt.
- (6) Small amount of industrial intelligence on Wiener Neustadt.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions - C 1 will spend the first four to six months assessing the situation and building up a few of his basic contacts. During this period he will be principal agent and W/T operator. He will then be joined by C 16, for whom he will provide support facilities so that C 16 can live black in the Schneeberg or Raxalpe. C 16 will be main W/T operator, and C 1 will then be alternate W/T operator and P/A. If necessary, C 1 can organize a reception team for air drops in the vicinity of Gutenstein.

21. W/T Plan - C 1's transmissions will probably not be more frequent than once a week or once every second week. They will concern mostly operational matters. The bulk of the intelligence transmissions will probably be done by C 16. Possible sending locations have not yet been discussed with C 1

22. Contacts:

- a. Superiors - C 1 is a P/A and no superiors are envisaged.

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b. Subordinates - C 16 will be C 1's W/T man. Contact plan between them is currently being worked out. C 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 know of C 1's American contact and will probably be worked into his organization. They are personal friends and no contact plan is necessary.

c. Personal Contacts - C 1's many friends in the Gutenstein-Wiener Neustadt area are currently being discussed with him and assessed to see what role they might be able to play in his stay behind work. The results of this assessment will be written up and the individuals name checked, but none will be recruited until after the outbreak of hostilities.

23. Wartime Contact Plan - This is currently being worked out in conjunction with a similar plan for C 16. It will be submitted as soon as completed.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

24. Contact with C 1 will probably be impossible in the event of an emergency. If so, anything designated for him should be given to C 16, who could then pass it on to C 1. There is an RS-6 designated for C 1 in the VOB storeroom which will be given him as soon as feasible. He is fully briefed, trained, and equipped and should be ready to come on the air, but review of his final operational and communications briefing would definitely be advisable if the opportunity to do so is available. If money and/or barter goods has not already been cached for him, he should be given if possible a minimum of AS 20,000 for expenses in the early months of operation.

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ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: [ ]

DATE: 1 July 1953

CASE OFFICER: [ ]

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS   
 RECLASSIFICATION  
 CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S  
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: 29/1  
 AUTH: HR 10-2

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. [ ] is a 32-year-old electrician in a <sup>USIA controlled Vienna</sup> factory. He lived most of his life in Salzburg and considers himself as being from that province, not as a Viennese. His father was a minor post office official, and [ ] still retains much of the social and political outlook of that class, even though he is himself now a laborer. He has aspirations of again raising himself above the laboring class by obtaining a desk job in his factory. He attended six classes of Gymnasium in Salzburg and a trade school where he learned his trade as an electrician. He is basically a Socialist but joined the Communist Party in 1947 at KUBARK's request. He was inducted in the German army in February 1941 and served as a radio operator and monitor in Greece, Yugoslavia, France, and Holland until captured by American forces in February 1945. He is a homosexual and is unmarried.

CONTROL AND SECURITY

2. References: PRQ submitted as VIEN 409, 24 June 1947. Operational clearance was received in WASH 3798, 1 July 1947. A revised Project Outline and request for renewal of Project Approval were submitted as EAVA-2870, 29 May 1953.

3. Namechecks: Headquarters files and Frankfurt and [ ] station files were checked with negative results in July 1947. Whether British files were also checked in London at that time, as was the case with [ ], is not clear. The operational file holds no indication that any checks have been made since that date or that CIC, G-2, or Detachment 35 files have ever been checked on [ ]. These checks are now being initiated.

4. Recruitment: [ ] was recruited by [ ] in January 1947 to take a position as janitor in the Soviet Mission in Salzburg. Upon instructions from [ ] he joined the FOeJ in summer 1947 and the KPOe in fall 1947. [ ] contacted [ ] in November 1947 and was his first staff case officer. [ ] was first considered as an Iceberg asset in February 1948.

5. Intelligence Experience other than Iceberg: [ ] is a low-level penetration of the KPOe and reports positive intelligence on KPOe developments as well as on production in his USIA firm. He has always submitted his reports orally.

6. Who Knows Who:

Iceberg  
 Classification: 6-6-194  
 66-850/67  
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a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact: [ ] knows that [ ] joined the KPOe upon instructions from American intelligence. Whether [ ] also knows that he received Iceberg W/T training is not clear. [ ] was dropped without prejudice by the Base in 1950 and is allegedly now in Land Salzburg as director of a boy's prep school. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, [ ] would probably try to escape to the West. [ ]'s mother also knows that he is in contact with American intelligence.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent: None.

7. LCFLUTTER: Test was given 31 October 1952 and [ ] was clear on all points, admitting, of course, his homosexuality. Test results were judged to be accurate.

8. Other Security Factors: [ ]'s homosexuality is a security threat. It leaves him open to blackmail by anyone learning of his position as a KPOe functionary; he may become involved in a public scandal which would result in his dismissal from the KPOe; it opens doubts concerning his emotional stability under stress and the ease with which he might be doubled, but his six years of successful penetration of the KPOe might indicate that these doubts are not justified. On the brighter side, it must be pointed out that his homosexual drive has become steadily weaker in recent years. In the past twelve months he has had five or six homosexual contacts, all with one-time pickups who did not learn his name. This problem is discussed in considerable detail in VIM/3973 and VIM/4297, paragraphs 8-10.

#### STAYBEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS

9. [ ]'s staybehind potential appears excellent. As a KPOe functionary, his position vis a vis the occupying regime is assured. Unless transferred to a full-time party post, his job as electrician in a factory producing heavy machinery will probably assure his being able to remain in Vienna. His six years of KPOe penetration to date have trained him well in the arts of existence under a hostile regime. He was a Wehrmacht W/T operator, but due to his party membership, this should not endanger his security.

#### PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

10. [ ] shows absolutely none of the outward appearances or traits often associated with a homosexual. Except for very bad teeth which he sometimes tries to cover up when smiling, he is a good-looking, rugged type. His eyes are large and bright and betray a determination bearing on fanaticism. He is a hard-headed, realistic type, who appears to have a sound appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of Communism and of the risks involved in his penetration of the KPOe. His motivation in taking the risks appears to be ideological, while the annoyances and discomforts of his life as a party member are assuaged by financial remuneration of AS 1200 per month. This ideological motivation, allegedly strengthened by his six years of KPOe penetration, is

discussed in detail in VIM/3972, Annex E. He has learned to trust no one and desires to do his staybehind work completely alone. His progress within the KPOe proves his ability at leading the double life and allows favorable conclusions to be drawn regarding his emotional stability under stress. Regardless of [ ]'s homosexuality, the case officer does not feel he is going out on a limb in predicting that, if it is physically possible for him to do so, [ ] will come on the air in time of emergency and will work with diligence.

#### TRAINING

11. Operational Training: None has been given to date. As [ ] will work alone, very little is necessary. As time permits, he will be given training in reports and cable writing.

#### 12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Date Training Commenced: Wehrmacht trained W/T operator.
- b. Date Training Completed: W/T review and KUBARK procedures training, 13-16 July 1948.
- c. Date Final Commo and Operational Briefing: 12 July 1952.
- d. Date Last OREGON Review: 2-6 January 1953.
- e. Date Next OREGON Review Due: Scheduled for 3 August 1953.
- f. Present Sending and Receiving Speeds: Sending, 15 groups per minute; receiving, 18 groups per minute.
- g. Other Factors Affecting Current Level of Preparedness: Received review of sending, receiving, commo procedures, and codes in Vienna in June 1953.

#### EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

13. Possessed by Agent: Due to the security hazard inherent in his homosexuality, [ ] will be given no equipment until after the outbreak of hostilities.

14. On Hand, Assigned to Agent: [ ]'s radio equipment is being put in caches that will be made known to him through a dead drop after the outbreak of hostilities.

- a. Cached: Cached in Neuwaldegg on the outskirts of Vienna is one RS-6 composed of the following parts: Receiver RR-6XX #1404, Transmitter RT-6XX #1090, Power Supply RP-6XX #1195, and Filter Accessory RA-6XX #1282. Cache report has not yet been written. It is pending the burial of the signal plan, code pads, and crystals in separate caches in the immediate area of the RS-6.

b. To Be Cached: Still to be cached are □ □'s signal plan, code pads, crystals, an RS-1, and a hand generator model GN-58.

15. On Order: None.

16. Not Yet Ordered, but Desired: Local currency and/or bartered goods and a weapon should be cached where it can be made known to □ □ through a dead drop or W/T after the outbreak of hostilities, but details of this plan have not yet been worked out.

OPERATIONAL PLAN (Valid from 1 July - 31 December 1953)

17. Area of Operation: Vienna, Austria.

18. Time of Activation: At least thirty days after outbreak of hostilities.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets: Political intelligence on the KPOe and the puppet government -- personalities, organization, policies, intentions. Access through his position as KPOe Betriebs level functionary. Observation of military targets in Vienna.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions: W/T operator and lone wolf information source.

21. W/T Plan: Although it has not yet been discussed with □ □, it can be seen now that working out the mechanics of his sending will be a major difficulty. □ □'s six years in the party have isolated him from reliable anti-Communist contacts, and he now knows of no one whom he could trust to help him. One person would be desirable to help him recover the cache, operate the hand generator, or act as lookout during sending and save him time by scouting around for sending locations.

22. Contacts:

a. Superiors: None.

b. Subordinates: Due to his homosexuality, he will never be put in contact with any of the Base's other contacts.

c. Personal Contacts: In war-time, □ □ might have to recruit one or two of his friends to help him, but who these will be, □ □ now has no idea. He has no trusted anti-Communist friends.

23. War-time Contact Plan: This is currently being worked out.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

24. A dead drop will be set up through which will be transmitted to  
□ the location of his radio caches, plus a review of final instructions.  
Material for this drop will be prepared now and be ready to place in the drop  
on a moment's notice. If possible, he should be given a minimum of AS 20,000  
for use in renting apartments as sending sites, and the false ID card currently  
on file.

ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: [ ] 6

DATE: 1 July 1953

CASE OFFICER: [ ] 1

REFERENCE: [ ] Project Summary

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASSIFICATION TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: 10 70-2  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. [ ] 6 is a 26-year-old medical student at the University of Vienna. He lives with his elderly, lower middle class parents who are proprietors of a small milk shop in the British sector of Vienna. He will complete his schooling in the Fall of 1954. He saw service as a private in the German infantry during the final year of the war and was wounded just prior to being taken prisoner by American forces.

CONTROL AND SECURITY

2. References: PRQ, Part I, submitted as MAVA-5808, 20 June 1950. Final operational clearance was granted 7 May 1951, no reference. A revised Project Outline and request for renewal of the [ ] Project, of which [ ] 6 is a part, have been submitted with EAVA-2825, 26 May 1953.

3. Namechecks: VOB, G-2, Vienna CIC, and CID checks were made in late 1950 with negative results. All American files will be rechecked to pick up any recent traces.

4. Recruitment: [ ] 6 was recruited for Iceberg courier and letterbox duties by his personal friend [ ] 1 in March 1948. He was later selected for W/T training and met by [ ] 1, his first American case officer, in August 1950.

5. Intelligence Experience other than Iceberg: None.

6. Who Knows Whom:

a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact: [ ] 1 of course, knows that [ ] 6 has received W/T training. [ ] 4 and 7 know that [ ] 6 is working with [ ] 1, but they do not know he has received W/T training.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent: [ ] 6, of course, knows that [ ] 1 is also an AIS Iceberg W/T agent. He knows that [ ] 4 and 7 are also working for [ ] 1 and may assume that [ ] 3 is also doing so.

7. LCFLUTTER: Test given on 3 November 1952 with no derogatory results. [ ] 6 is an exceptionally weak reactor, so results have only minimum accuracy.

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8. Other Security Factors: It should be pointed out that [ ] and [ ] 6 are part of the same project, that they have mutual knowledge of one another's activities, and that any security factor affecting the one must automatically affect the other.

#### STAYBEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS

9. [ ] 6's age makes him subject to military or labor draft. Under ideal conditions he would complete his medical studies in the Fall of 1954, but it is believed probable that he will give them up prior to this time and seek a paying job. For this, as well as other, operational reasons, it is tentatively planned to have [ ] 6 leave Vienna four to six months after the outbreak of hostilities and live black with [ ]'s assistance in the mountains southwest of Vienna. His survival in this area will be closely connected with the continued security of [ ] .

#### PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

10. [ ] 6 is a very quiet, introverted type. He leads practically no social life, but spends all his time either studying or helping his parents in their milk shop. He has several persons whom he considers as close friends due to long time school or neighborhood associations, but in actual fact he is not close to any of them. This is a serious limitation in his Iceberg work and is perhaps the most important reason why our operational planning envisages [ ] 6 as an alternate operator for [ ] 1, rather than establishing [ ] 6 independently in Vienna. [ ] 6 does not have and appears incapable of developing the contacts necessary for recruiting either witting or unwitting personnel to assist him in his operations. He does not enjoy dealing with people, giving cover stories, and the like. He appears to be a slow, methodical thinker, and has not done particularly well in his medical studies. Although lacking the drive and out-going personality which are desirable, he appears strong on reliability. He has been brought up with a strong Catholic, bourgeois morality which should hold him firmly in the anti-Communist camp.

#### TRAINING

11. Operational Training: Basic operational training based on the Training Manual was begun in September 1952 and has been completed through the sections on clandestine communications. During the summer months, while [ ] 6 has additional time available, practical exercises will be given in counter-surveillance, dead drops, clandestine meetings, observation, reporting and cable writing.

#### 12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Training commenced January 1951.
- b. Training completed 30 September 1952.



- c. Final communications briefing given 17 October 1952.
- d. Last OREGON review 27-30 April 1953.
- e. Next OREGON review due prior to 30 October 1953.
- f. Present sending speed 18 wpm; receiving speed 20 wpm.
- g. His final communications and operational briefing is being reviewed on a minimum of once every second month.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

13. Possessed by Agent: [ ] 6 has two RS-6s, both of which were cached in November 1952. One was cached by [ ] in Neuwaldegg on the western edge of Vienna, reference EAVAs 1505 and 1553, 22 and 27 January 1953, respectively. [ ] was taken to the spot and shown the cache location in February 1953. [ ] 6 has another RS-6 which he cached himself in the dirt floor of the cellar of his parent's milk shop. In this same location but in separate caches are [ ] 6's cryptographic materials, crystals, and signal plan. List of these materials was sent to Chief, EUCA, in an unnumbered memorandum dated 7 November 1952.

14. On Hand, Assigned to Agent: None.

15. On Order: None.

16. Not Yet Ordered, but Desired: Local currency and/or barter goods and a weapon should be cached where it can be made known to [ ] 6 through a dead drop or W/T after the outbreak of hostilities, but details of this plan have not yet been worked out.

OPERATIONAL PLAN (1 July - 31 December 1953)

17. Area of Operations: [ ] 6 will remain at his home in Vienna for the months immediately following the outbreak of hostilities. When it becomes apparent that [ ] 6 will not be able to work in place, or at such time as he is needed as an alternate operator by [ ] 3, [ ] 6 will leave Vienna and travel black to the Raxalpe or Schneeberg, 50 to 75 km. southwest of Vienna. There he will live black in an area prepared for him by [ ] 3.

18. Time of Activation: Contact with the Base will not begin until at least thirty days after the outbreak of hostilities, and it is anticipated that [ ] 6 will not start producing positive intelligence until he is tied in with the [ ] 3 operation southwest of Vienna approximately four to six months after the start of hostilities.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets: Prior to his departure from Vienna, [ ] 6's targets will be operational data and OB and bomb damage observation missions in the Vienna area in reply to EEIs given by the Base. After joining [ ] 1, his targets will be identical with those of [ ] 3. (See Iceberg Project Summary.)

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions: C 16 is envisaged primarily as an assistant W/T operator for C 1, who because of his cover job and P/A duties will have little time to spare for a full W/T role. If necessary, C 16 also has the intelligence and is being trained for P/A work, but as already explained, his personality would limit his effectiveness.

21. W/T Plan: During his stay in Vienna, C 16's transmissions will probably be very infrequent, as he will not want to recruit a W/T support structure for only temporary use. He will take as few risks as possible prior to joining C 1, because his arrest would also mean the compromising of C 1. He has a friend in the real estate business who may be willing to help him obtain sending locations, but this is not at all sure. After going into the mountains, his W/T security problem will be greatly simplified, and the main problems will center around finding secure food and shelter for his clandestine existence. Responsibility for this will fall largely on C 1.

22. Contacts:

a. Superiors: C 1 is considered to be C 16's superior. Their contact arrangements during the time C 16 is still in Vienna are considered in paragraph 23 as part of the wartime contact plan of each of the agents.

b. Subordinates: None of VOB's current assets will be tied in with the C 1 - C 16 operation.

c. Personal Contacts: Biographic data on four of C 16's friends and potential collaborators was submitted to Headquarters with EAVA-1339 (VIM/599). Further information is being gradually assembled.

23. Wartime Contact Plan: Plans for courier contact, accomodation address, and dead drop are being worked out at the present time in conjunction with a similar plan for C 1.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

24. C 16 is ready to come on the air in event of emergency. If time is available, his wartime contact plan and his final communications and operational briefing should be reviewed, together with another brief but explicit statement of exactly what is expected of him. If money and/or barter goods have not already been cached for him, he should be given at the last minute a minimum of AS 20,000 for expenses during the early months of operation.

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Attachment #4 to EAVA-4111

ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: [ ] [ ]

CASE OFFICER: [ ] [ ]

DATE: 1 July 1953

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. [ ] is 46 years old, has a wife but no children, and resides in a middle class apartment in a Western sector of Vienna with his wife's aged parents. He is perfectly contented with his job as radio repairman and salesman in a comparatively high class (frequent American customers) radio store in the American sector. During service in the German Wehrmacht from January 1940 to the end of the war, he rose from Private to Master Sergeant. He spent three years on the Russian front, where he was wounded twice, and was captured by the Americans at the end of the war while fighting on the Western front.

CONTROL AND SECURITY

2. References - PRC, Part I submitted as MAVV 3433, 31 August 1949, brought up to date by EAVA-302, 23 September 1952. POC granted in WASH-1024, 24 March 1949. POC received in MAVV 4823, 26 August 1952. A revised Project Outline and request for renewal of Project Approval were submitted as EAVA-2540.

3. Namechecks -

- a. Grass neighborhood and Meldeamt in June 1952; confirmation of basic biographical data, nothing derogatory.
- b. Headquarters checks in MAVV 10072, April 1952, negative.
- c. VOB, CIC, and CID checks in March 1952, negative.
- d. G-2 and Detachment 35 checks in April 1952, negative

4. Recruitment - [ ] [ ] knew of [ ] [ ]'s resistance activities during World War II, and in late 1948 or early January 1949 he volunteered to [ ] [ ] to assist in any resistance work against the Soviets which might be carried on at any time in the future. Acting under instructions from [ ] [ ] [ ] brought this subject up with [ ] [ ] again in early 1952. [ ] [ ] again expressed his willingness, and, after appropriate clearances had been obtained, [ ] [ ] passed [ ] [ ] instructions for establishing contact with a member of an "Austrian resistance group". [ ] [ ] met [ ] [ ] at this meeting on 16 July 1952 and recruited him for participation as a W/T operator in an American-sponsored Austrian resistance group. The

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Attachment #4 to EAVA - 4111

recruitment plan is written up in MAVA 11279, 13 May 1952, and the actual report of the recruitment was forwarded with MAVA 11931, 4 August 1952 (MIL/8069).

5. Previous Intelligence Experience - None.

6. Who Knows Who:

a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact - As a result of his participation in the spotting and recruitment, [ ] knows that [ ] has been recruited as an Iceberg W/T operator. If [ ] is not evacuated prior to the outbreak of hostilities, this knowledge is a distinct security hazard as [ ] has had intelligence contact under true name with several other agents and is likely to be picked up if and when the Soviets take control of the area.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent - Knows [ ] personally, ~~but not of his AIS contact.~~

7. LCFLUTTER - Test given on 3 November 1952 with no derogatory results. [ ] is a weak reactor, so results are only fairly accurate.

8. Other Security Factors - None known.

STAY BEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS

9. As long as [ ] is not compromised by [ ], his stay behind survival potential is reasonably good. Being 46 at the present time, he will probably escape immediate drafting for labor service outside of Vienna. But, on the other hand, his employment in a quality radio store will be insecure under Soviet occupation, and, if he becomes unemployed, it is difficult to foresee what might happen to him. Politically he has been completely inactive, and he is truly the "little gray man" type who never attracts any attention to himself. He cannot be considered a member of the bourgeoisie and possesses no property the Soviets might desire to confiscate. His knowledge of radio repair work and the fact that he has frequent American customers (although never American social contacts) could conceivably be a source of Soviet suspicion.

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

10. [ ] is a quiet, introverted character who leads a very limited social life. He is a hard worker and does not have to be prodded to do a job which he knows has to be done. He will follow instructions and regulations to the letter, but is incapable of thinking out answers to problems for himself. If a particular instance obviously calls for an exception to the rule or a departure from given instructions, he would stick to the rule anyway, just because it is a rule. Given a body of general principles, he is incapable of applying these principles to particular cases. For this reason, he is not

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capable of P/A work, and [ ] feels he should not be left as a lone operator. His technical abilities and natural bent will make him an excellent W/T operator, but if he is to last in a stay-behind situation he will need operational guidance from a P/A at frequent intervals. [ ] feels that [ ]'s motivation stems from his basic moral orientation and a feeling of obligation to work for the West in any way in which he is asked and in which he is capable. Important factors in considering whether or not he will actually come on the air when the time comes are his love for anything connected with radio, and his feeling of obligation to keep his promises. [ ]'s abilities and motivation are considered in more detail in EAVA 2247 (VIM/2203).

TRAINING

11. Operational Training - [ ] has received a general briefing on the nature of clandestine operations, a security briefing, and instruction in counter-surveillance techniques, but his regular operational training will not begin until after he has completed his W/T training, probably in September 1953.

12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Training commenced 18 August 1952.
- b. Training will be completed in the Fall of 1953.
- c. thru e. Not applicable.
- f. Sending speed 12 wpm. Receiving speed 14 wpm.
- g. None.

*actually was Sept 1954*

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:

13. thru 16. Not yet applicable

OPERATIONAL PLAN (1 July - 31 December 1953)

17. Area of Operation - [ ] will remain in place at his current residence in Vienna.

18. Time of Activation - At least thirty days after outbreak of hostilities.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets - None designated as yet; [ ] has no special access to any target.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions - [ ] has been classified as an excellent W/T student, and it is expected that he will make an excellent operator. He is not, however, capable of performing P/A functions, and it would be better if he did not have to operate as a lone wolf more than a minimum length of time. (See personality assessment in paragraph 10.)

21. W/T Plan - The operation has not yet progressed far enough for a W/T operational plan to be developed.

22. Contacts - As [redacted] is still in the W/T training phase, the operation has not yet progressed this far.

23. Wartime Contact Plan - This has not yet been worked out with Grattest  
1. It will be done at the earliest convenient date.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN:

24. In the event of emergency, [redacted] should first be given a war-time contact plan, plus a pep talk and a briefing on what to expect. He should be given a radio from the VCB storeroom with brief instructions for caching it. If time permits, he should be given a signal plan plus final briefing which might enable him to come on the air in spite of his incompleting training. If possible, he should be given at the last minute a minimum of AS 20,000 for use in renting apartments for W/T sending locations.

ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: GRAUGEND 1

CASE OFFICER: [ ]

1 July 1953

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS \_\_\_\_\_  
 RECLASSIFIED \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECLASSIFIED \_\_\_\_\_  
 UNCLASSIFIED \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE: ~~9-1-66~~ <sup>JUN 1966</sup> REVIEWER: 911972

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

1. GRAUGEND 1 was born on 1 August 1923, Vienna, Austria, is an only child, protestant, divorced, and lives with his widowed father, a retired Lt. Colonel of the Austrian Army, at Vienna XII, Zennogasse 5. He graduated from highschool in 1942 and then served as a lieutenant in an Austrian Artillery Regiment from 1942 to 1945. A POW of the U. S. forces from 1945 to 1947, he now works as overseer for the Transforst, A.G. During the summer, this company cuts lumber in Heiligenbluth, Kaernten. The owner of the company, [ ], is an old friend of GRAUGEND 1's father.

CONTROL AND SECURITY:

2. References:

- a. PRQ-I - MAVA-9826, 14 November 1951.  
- MAVA-10588, 15 February 1952.
- b. PRQ-II- EAVA-1578, 29 January 1953.
- c. POC - DIR-28269, 17 November 1952.
- d. FOC - EAVW-1029, 25 March 1953.
- e. Project Outline and Renewal is pending.

3. Namechecks:

- a. Meldeamt, Grass - MIL/3051, September 1950.
- b. G-2, USFA - SLZ/4903, 5 November 1951, negative.
- c. CIC, CID, Vienna - MIL/5504, 5 November 1951, negative.
- e. CIC Central File, Ft. Holabird - EAVW-1029, 25 March 1953 indicates that subject "at some time following World War II was suspected of war crimes but was discharged (sic)."
- f. Current CIC and G-2 checks pending.

4. Recruitment:

- a. On 9 January 1953, [ ] was introduced to GRAUGEND 1 by [ ], who had recommended him. [ ]

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stated to GRAUGEND 1 that [ ] had recommended him for intelligence work against the Soviets should war break out and Austria be overrun by the Red Army. [ ] emphasized that GRAUGEND 1 would not be required to become active in an intelligence sense prior to total Soviet occupation and that the job he would be expected to perform would not be spectacular resistance work such as sabotage or guerilla warfare, but rather collection and reporting of intelligence. [ ] explained the work would entail several months of W/T training which would require complete cooperation and serious concentration. GRAUGEND 1 stated his willingness to cooperate and help the West in a war against the Soviets (EAVA-1532).

5. Intelligence Experience other than Iceberg:

GRAUGEND 1 has had no previous intelligence experience.

6. Who Knows Who:

a. Persons with knowledge of AIS contact: [ ] who recommended GRAUGEND 1, knows that [ ] recruited him as a staybehind W/T operator. [ ] presumably does not know the identity of the subsequent case officers.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent: GRAUGEND 1 probably assumes but does not know definitely that [ ] is working for AIS.

7. LCFLUTTER:

GRAUGEND 1 will be scheduled to get LCFLUTTER before the end of September, 1953.

8. Other Security Factors:

None.

STAY BEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS:

9. GRAUGEND 1's permanent residence and job are in Vienna; however, he has been required to travel to Kaernten in connection with his work and is well known there. It would be quite natural for him to stay in Vienna or travel to any part of Austria where there is lumber. He is politically not active, but is probably OeVP. His age and physical status would make him eligible for military conscription in case of hostilities, but his knowledge of Vienna and Austria would enable him to live black if necessary.



PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT:

10. GRAUGEND 1 has stated that he is not entering into intelligence activities because of any sense of moral obligation to [ ] Rather, GRAUGEND 1 explains that the influence of his father has a lot to do with his desire to participate in any action for the West in case war broke out. The strong influence of his father is also noticeable in the progress of his training. Although his understanding in practical and theoretical work is satisfactory, ~~but~~ GRAUGEND 1 shows a lack of aggressiveness and initiative in dealing with actual day to day problems or people. W/T training progress reports also indicate a lack of self confidence. GRAUGEND 1's need for being mothered or bossed may be detrimental to GRAUGEND's safety if he were left alone in a critical situation. As teammate or subordinate under a P/A, GRAUGEND 1 would prove very reliable and cooperative.

TRAINING:

11. Operational Training: None as yet.

12. W/T Training Timetable:

Training was started on 18 February 1953, with three meetings of two hours each per week. Prior to leaving for Heiligenbluth, Kaernten for the summer, GRAUGEND 1 had attained by the end of April, 1953 a receiving speed of 8 - 9 words per minute, and a sending speed of 5 - 6 words per minute. Until the end of August, GRAUGEND 1 will receive periodic supervision and training from OREGON. Normal training sessions will then be continued in Vienna.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:

13. - 16. Not yet applicable.

OPERATIONAL PLAN (Valid from 1 July - 31 December 1953):

17. Area of Operation: After outbreak of hostilities, GRAUGEND 1 expects to continue living at his present home address, Vienna XIII, Zennogasse 5, until he is forced to leave town. He then will probably be located at Heiligenbluth, Kaernten, c/o Hotel Lacknerhof.

18. Time of Activation: Probably twenty days after outbreak of hostilities.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets: GRAUGEND 1 has no special access to any intelligence targets but knows Vienna and parts of Kaernten very well.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions: GRAUGEND 1 is being trained as a W/T operator. Although he does not appear at the moment capable of P/A functions, his contacts among lumbermen and the native population of Kaernten might enable him to organize an airdrop reception site in that area.

21. W/T Plan: Will be determined upon completion of his training.

22. Contacts:

a. Superiors: Until GRAUGEND 1 proves himself more capable of independent action, plans will be made to place him under control of a P/A.

b. Subordinates: None as yet, pending his ability to organize a group as mentioned in Para. 20 above.

c. Personal Contacts: GRAUGEND 1 will be encouraged to widen his sphere of activities and acquaintances, and will be required to report on his progress periodically.

23. Wartime Contact Plan: Will be worked out with GRAUGEND 1 upon his return from Heiligenbluth, Kaernten.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN:

24. A dead drop with final instructions in case of a sudden outbreak of hostilities will be set up for GRAUGEND 1.

Distribution:

1 - Case file  
3 - Iceberg (2 to EE)

ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: [ ] [ ]

DATE: 6 July 1953

CASE OFFICER: [ ] [ ]

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 12/11  
AUTH: NS 101  
DATE: 9 JUN 1953 REVIEWER: 011022

Biographical Information:

1. [ ] [ ] is a 23 year old draftsman, who resides with his widowed mother and sister in Vienna XIV. [ ] [ ]'s father still is listed as missing from World War II and is presumed to be dead. [ ] [ ] completed nine years of formal schooling and also has attended a number of special courses in conjunction with his present employment.

Control and Security:

2. References: PRQ Part I submitted as MAVA-9024, 10 August 1951; PRQ Part II submitted with MAVA-10797, 11 March 1952; Project Outline submitted with MAVA-10829, 7 March 1952; Project Approval contained in MAVW-4408, 9 April 1952 - valid until 1 January 1953. An ammended Project Outline will be submitted in the near future.

3. Namechecks: G-2, CIC, CID, [ ] [ ], Neighborhood checks made in 1952. Results negative.

4. Recruitment: [ ] [ ], who was a personal friend of [ ] [ ] prior to his employment with KUBARK, was introduced by [ ] [ ] to [ ] [ ] in the summer of 1951. After cultivating [ ] [ ] for some time, [ ] [ ] recruited him.

5. Intelligence Experience Other Than Iceberg: [ ] [ ] has received an intensive course in operational tradecraft. He has done a number of casing and surveillance jobs for the Diva Section. More recently, he has devoted the majority of his time to carrying out various DCOP special missions.

6. Who Knows Whom:

a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact: [ ] [ ]'s sister knows that he has contact with an unknown AIS representative.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent: None.

7. LCFLUTTER: Test has not been given [ ] [ ] as yet. Will be done the next time an operator is in Vienna.

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8. Other Security Factors: [ ]'s earlier close and overt association with [ ] may be presumed to have blown [ ] to some extent, primarily because [ ] probably is blown on the local scene. However, at the time that [ ] and [ ] had such a close relationship there was no intelligence aspect whatsoever and [ ]'s overt relationship with [ ] has been broken off completely and in a natural and credible manner.

Stay Behind Survival Factors:

9. Because of his age and because of his earlier overt association with [ ], it has always been planned that [ ] would leave Vienna and live black immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. [ ] is extremely well equipped for this, both because of his operational know-how and because of his rather outstanding abilities as a woodsman, skier, mountain climber, etc. If [ ] can leave Vienna safely, he should have little difficulty surviving black at any time of the year.

Personality Assessment:

10. [ ] is quiet and unassuming and leads a limited social life. Although he does not make close friends easily, he is universally well-liked. Most of [ ]'s close friends are members of various sporting groups, such as the Vienna Boat Club to which he belongs. Although he has had a limited amount of formal schooling, [ ] is intelligent, quick-witted, and not at all gullible. He is mature beyond his years and takes a healthy interest in politics and international events. [ ] is a militant agnostic, considers himself to be above most of the intrigues of Austrian politics, and is an independent with OeVP sympathies. All in all, [ ] is very stable and well-adjusted.

Training:

11. Operational Training: In addition to all of the book training that is available, [ ] also has been given a variety of live problems in surveillance, casing, arrangement and carrying out of clandestine meetings, selection and use of live and dead drops, observation and reporting, and simple SW techniques. [ ] has had the opportunity to put most of his operational training to actual operational use.

12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Training commenced March, 1952.
- b. Training not yet completed. One more trip to OREGON will be necessary.
- c. Final communications briefing will be given at con-

clusion of next trip to OREGON.

- d. Last OREGON training in December, 1952.
- e. Next OREGON training due circa September, 1953.
- f. Present sending speed 14 WPM; receiving speed 17 WPM.
- g. Behind schedule because of other operational priorities.

Equipment and Supplies:

- 13. Possessed by Agent: None.
- 14. On Hand, Assigned to Agent: None.
- 15. On Order: Two W/T sets have been promised from Salzburg.
- 16. Not Yet Ordered, but Desired: Nothing.

Operational Plan (1 July - 31 December 1953):

17. Area of Operation: Would be living black, probably in Gesa area.

18. Time of Activation: About three months after the outbreak of hostilities; [ ] would plan to get relatively well set up as far as an operating area were concerned and also to recruit a minimum number of support agents.

19. Specific Intelligence Targets: General OB unless otherwise instructed.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions: [ ] , aside from being the W/T operator, would attempt, with time, to build up an intelligence gathering net. This would entail spotting, recruiting, and training couriers as well as information sources. For such personnel, [ ] would attempt to determine which of his present friends and contacts, of sufficiently high caliber, might still be in Vienna after the original chaos caused by hostilities had subsided. [ ]'s capabilities are such that he should have a fairly good chance of successfully building up such a net securely after the start of hostilities.

21. W/T Plan: Would depend considerably upon the degree of success enjoyed by [ ] in his efforts to build up an information gathering and servicing net. Prior to the time that this had been accomplished, [ ] probably would restrict his transmissions to periodic progress reports.

22. Contacts:

a. Superiors: None.

b. Subordinates: As recruited by [ ]

c. Personal Contacts: BI data on potential [ ] collaborators will be submitted in the near future.

23. Wartime Contact Plan: Because [ ] will be living black from the start and may be frequently on the move, any contact would have to be arranged through W/T channels.

24. Emergency Action Plan: As soon as [ ] has cached his equipment, he should be ready to leave Vienna almost immediately upon being told of the imminence of hostilities. The point at which [ ] would be able to come on the air would depend on a number of factors mentioned above.

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ICEBERG PROJECT SUMMARY

CRYPTONYM: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

1. A brief sketch of agent's background, including age and exact occupation.

CONTROL AND SECURITY:

2. References: for PRO, POC, OC, Project Outline, and the most recent Project Approval, including the dates of its validity.

3. Namechecks: files checked, date and brief summary of pertinent results.

4. Recruitment: summary of facts re individuals involved, cover stories, and impressions given as to the type of work agent would be asked to do.

5. Intelligence Experience other than Iceberg: summary

6. Who Knows Who:

a. Persons with Knowledge of AIS Contact: list of persons who know of agent's AIS contact, extent of this knowledge, circumstances under which it was acquired, and whether or not it is planned to evacuate these persons in the event of hostilities.

b. AIS Contacts Known by Agent:

7. LCFLUTTER dates, pertinent results, degree of reliability.

8. Other Security Factors:

STAY BEHIND SURVIVAL FACTORS:

9. Statement of factors in agent's background and personality which will affect his ability to stay in place, pursue his normal activity, and avoid suspicion in a stay-behind situation.

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT:

10. Analysis of agent's personality, ability, and motivation, and pertinent conclusions regarding agent's ability and intention to work against the Soviets with determination under the most adverse conditions.

TRAINING:

11. Operational Training: How much has been given and what is intended for the next six months.

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS   
CLASSIFIED   
CLASSIFICATION: TS  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 12.2  
DATE: 3 JUL 67  
SERIAL: 011922

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12. W/T Training Timetable:

- a. Date Training Commenced:
- b. Date Training Completed:
- c. Date Final Commo and Operational Briefing:
- d. Date Last OREGON Review:
- e. Date Next OREGON Review Due:
- f. Present Sending and Receiving Speeds:
- g. Other Factors Affecting Current Level of Preparedness:

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES:

13. Possessed by Agent: list of all equipment in possession of agent, including caches to which he has directions. Include radio sets, generators, signal plans, code pads, crystals, medicines, weapons, training materials, etc. Except for cryptographic material, give exact description, including model number and serial number. Give general location (city or town) of cache, reference to memorandum giving specific cache location, and estimate the date by which cached equipment will become inoperative.

14. On Hand, Assigned to Agent:

a. To be turned over only when hostilities are imminent: includes equipment held in Gratlas specifically for agent or in caches not yet known to agent. Where appropriate, give all details requested in previous paragraph. Explain the emergency turnover plan.

b. To be turned over during next six months:

15. On Order: give references.

16. Not Yet Ordered, but Desired:

OPERATIONAL PLAN (Valid from 1 July - 31 December 1953):

17. Area of Operation: address(es) where agent will be located after the outbreak of hostilities.

18. Time of Activation:

19. Specific Intelligence Targets: list of and explanation of any special access to.

20. Specific Operational and/or Support Functions: list of and explanation of agent's ability to perform.



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21. W/T Plan: in case of W/T operators, estimate of how often they will come on the air, length of each transmission, statement of agent's plan for obtaining operational areas for sending, recruitment of lookouts, recruitment of partner to recover caches and to operate hand generator.

22. Contacts:

a. Superiors: list any other Iceberg agents whom it is planned to have contact agent using contact plan explained in paragraph 23.

b. Subordinates: list of other Iceberg agents it is planned to have contacted by agent, explaining the type of contact plan and giving the reference for the detailed writeup of the plan.

c. Personal Contacts: List of agent's personal and business contacts who might be willing and able to help him after the outbreak of hostilities. Name, address, occupation, function he or she could perform. These should be namechecked now. (An agent's final operational briefing should include a dry run of the agent's plans for recruiting and using these contacts, incorporating them together with sub-agents assigned to the agent (paragraph b above) into a small net for support and/or information gathering activities, and for setting up intra-net communications and signal devices.)

23. Wartime Contact Plan:

a. Regular

b. First Alternate: varying from the regular only in time and place.

c. Second Alternate: Recognition signals for contact at home.

d. Emergency: signal to prove bona fides to friend or relative who will always know agent's whereabouts and can inform the contactor if agent has been arrested, fled, killed, etc.

EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN:

24. List, in order of importance, of actions which would have to be taken to put the Iceberg system in functioning order if it were learned that D-Day were scheduled for one week hence. Generally, these actions will be distributing W/T equipment now on hand in the office, making caches known to agent, giving agent contact arrangements by which he can contact his sub-agents, last minute instructions. It may be advisable to have a pre-arranged dead drop in which a letter giving final briefing can be left.

Distribution:

1 - Case File  
2 - Iceberg (1 to BE)

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