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IAC-M-22  
5 March 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's  
Conference Room, Administration Building  
Central Intelligence Agency, on 5 March 1951

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. William H. Jackson  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,  
Department of State  
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for the Assistant  
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army  
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy  
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,  
Headquarters, United States Air Force  
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy  
Commission  
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for  
Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal  
Bureau of Investigation.

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency  
Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency  
Dr. H. M. Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. George G. Carey, Central Intelligence Agency  
Major General Willard Wyman, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. M. E. Foster, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Deforest VanSlyck, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Paul A. Borel, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Allen Dines, Central Intelligence Agency  
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State  
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State  
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy  
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force  
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force  
Colonel David Crist, Department of the Air Force  
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff  
Commander M. D. Clausner, USN, The Joint Staff  
Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Secretary

✓ Mr. James Q. Reber  
Central Intelligence Agency

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Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 23 February 1951 (IAC-M-21) were approved.

Exploitation of Captured Sources (IAC-D-14/1)

2. Action: Although no specific objections were raised to the paper, it was decided to postpone discussion until the next meeting in order to allow more time for the members to study the matter.

Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951 (NIE-29)

Released in E.O. review E 81-0225 (DEC)  
NIE 29 (20 Mar 51)

3. Action: The March 2 draft of the conclusions of NIE-29 was approved with certain refinements and changes. Paragraph 9 will be revised to indicate agreement that the intelligence agencies do not know whether or not the USSR has decided on an invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, but that they believe such an attack to be a serious possibility.

4. Discussion: It was pointed out that we have no specific intelligence on which to decide whether the current Satellite build-up is directed primarily against Yugoslavia or reflects a general worsening situation in which a blow against Greece or Germany or a general war would be equally possible.

5. There was a difference of opinion on two basic factors entering into this appraisal. They are:

a. the degree of importance which the Soviets attach to Yugoslavia, and

b. the probable Soviet estimate of United States' reaction to the use of force against Yugoslavia.

6. Reflecting these two differences of opinion, one view of the probability of an invasion of Yugoslavia was that it would probably not occur unless and until the Soviets are ready to go ahead with a general war. On the other extreme was the view that the Kremlin might well decide to attack Yugoslavia this year on the theory that the United States would not launch an all-out war on behalf of communist Tito. General Megee pointed out that this uncertain situation presented the greatest danger of a general war because of the very real possibility of miscalculation by either side.

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