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IAC-M-11

21 December 1950

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEMinutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 21 December 1950

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief-
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. James M. Andrews, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell Montagué, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel Archer E. Lackey, Department of the Air Force
Colonel Samuel M. Lansing, The Joint Staff
Mr. C. D. DeLoach, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Acting Secretary

Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency

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Approval of Minutes (TOP SECRET)

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 7 December 1950 (IAC-M-10) were approved.

Watch Committee (Reference: Memorandum of 20 December, G-2 IWW 319.26) (TOP SECRET)

2. Action: Agreed that the Watch Committee (formerly called the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee) terms of reference as submitted by General Weckerling would be studied and discussed at the next meeting. Agreed further that if the Watch Committee is to perform the most useful service to the Government it should, short of estimates, make some evaluations of the indications that it detects. It is understood that General Weckerling plans to expand the Watch Committee's publication to include domestic and Near Eastern Sections.

Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea (NIE-12) (SECRET)

no record of release
NIE 12 (27 Dec 50, Secret)

3. Action: Agreed that this draft as amended by the deletion of paragraph 4 should be issued as a national estimate with the dissent of the Air Force and with the following note attached:

This estimate considers only the consequences of the immediate employment of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea in the present situation and does not deal with the consequences of eventual employment of Chinese Nationalist troops either in Korea, in later and changed circumstances, or on the Chinese mainland as part of a larger undertaking. An Estimate (NIE-10) is in preparation on the more general question.

4. Discussion: There was an extended discussion over the differences between the subject draft estimate and the suggestions for amendment by the Air Force. General Smith emphasized that in the preparation of national estimates timeliness was of great importance. Policy officers in the Government must have the intelligence they need when they are faced with their decisions rather than after the decisions are taken. In the event that any member or members feel that they cannot agree with a proposed estimate or

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if they feel that the scope of the problem being dealt with is not the most useful it would be more appropriate and entirely proper for them to dissent rather than to delay the issuance of the estimates. General Smith did not feel that a watering down of the national estimates for the sake of unanimity was proper. In general the members concurred in these views.

(San)
released in Executive Order Review
NIE 17 Probable Soviet Reactions
to a Remilitarization of
Western Germany
(27 Oct 50)

Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany (NIE-17) (SECRET)

5. Action: This paper was referred back to the staff for informal clearance or a future IAC meeting if necessary.

Progress Report (IAC-PR-4) (SECRET)

6. Action: Noted the Progress Report and agreed that:

(Dec)
released in E.O. review
NIE 5 (29 Dec 50)

a. The National Estimate on Indochina should, if possible, be cleared without a meeting.

b. The proposed National Estimate on Communist China embraces many of the questions which came up in the discussion on NIE-12 above with reference to the effects of the utilization of Chinese Nationalist Forces.

(Dec)
released in E.O.
NIE 6 Iran's Position
in the East -
West Conflict
(5 Apr 51)

7. Action: With respect to NIE-6 on Iran, General Weckerling reported that the Watch Committee saw no international reasons for the alert in Iran and requested State Department to check this view.

Russian Reaction to Japanese Treaty
(No document)

8. Action: General Megee transmitted to the IAC orally a request of the Joint Strategic Survey for informal guidance on the following question:

What would be the reaction of the USSR if the United States negotiated a unilateral peace treaty with Japan at the time that we are considering the rearmament of Germany?

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It was the consensus that General Megee should transmit the view of the IAC that the USSR has probably already taken into account the possibility of our unilateral negotiation, even recognizing that it might be a prelude to the rearmament of Japan, and that basic decisions of the USSR on actions vis-a-vis the U.S. would not thereby be materially affected.

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