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SECURITY INFORMATION

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IAC-M-55

20 December 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 20 December 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

- Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
- Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
- Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
- Major General John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
- Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
- Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
- Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

- Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency
- Dr. H. M. Chadwell, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Meredith Davidson, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Robert E. Long, Central Intelligence Agency
- Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
- Mr. John F. Killea, Department of State
- *Mr. Gordon Tiger, Department of State
- Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
- Colonel Garrison B. Coverdale, Department of the Army
- First Lieutenant Henry Fisher, Department of the Army
- Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
- *Mr. J. H. Alberti, Department of the Navy
- Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
- Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
- Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

James Q. Reber
Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

*For part of

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:
26-Aug-2008

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HR 70-14
(U)

20 December 1951

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*released in
Marshall Shandess
history
released in
Minuteman history
released in
DCI Staff Minutes*

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meetings of 14 December 1951 (IAC-M-53) and 15 December 1951 (IAC-M-54) were approved.

Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia Through 1952. (NIE-29/2)

released in E.O. review (DPC)
NIE 29/2 (1 Jan 52)

2. Action: After discussion, especially of paragraphs 4 and 8, the Conclusions were approved, leaving the IAC representatives to agree on specific word changes and to modify the Discussion section as necessary.

Analysis of Soviet Industrial Vulnerabilities Affecting War Potential.

? unable to identify

3. It was agreed that in view of other projects of a similar character now underway it is not practical to develop the proposed estimate at least until after March 1952.

Consequences of the Loss of the Indian Subcontinent to Communism in the Period 1952-1953. (NIE-61) ?

no record of title
? NIE 61-56 Probable Developments in Burma (10 Apr 56)
Poss - NIE 56 (Completed) Likelihood of the Non-Resources of the Non-
NIE 61-60 The outlook for Burma (12 Apr 60)

4. It was agreed that this estimate should be undertaken on a routine priority.

Present Guatemalan Situation and Its Implications for U. S. Security.

? possibly NIE 62
Present Political Situation in Guatemala - Possible Developments During DEC in E.O. review

5. It was agreed that this proposed estimate should be undertaken.

Anticipated British Position Respecting the Use of Air Bases in U. K.

6. It was observed that while the satisfaction of this request lay beyond the field of national estimates it would be appropriate for the Department of State to query Embassy London on this point for the benefit of A-2.

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released (DEC)
NIE 5 ? (29 Dec 51)

Probable Developments
in Southeast Asia.

7. Action: It was agreed that the members will consider whether a re-examination of the Indochina estimate is now in order, and that the Watch Committee will continue to keep developments in Burma under close examination. It was felt that any new estimate in this area should probably comprehend the whole of Southeast Asia rather than any single portion thereof.

8. Discussion: It was noted that U. S. and British views are generally in accord on the major points in estimates on this area as well as elsewhere. General Smith suggested that all IAC members should read for their personal edification the report which Colonel Betts regularly makes to him. CIA will see that they receive copies for this purpose.

Coordination with the
British on Estimates

9. Discussion: In view of the present generous British attitude which takes U. S. representatives very much into their confidence, it was considered inadvisable to diminish in any degree the coordination which now takes place with the British in the preparation of U. S. estimates. It was noted on the other hand that, even though the British might exert more pressure for the U. S. to match their generosity, we would be unable materially to extend the degree of cooperation.

Continuance of U. S. Intelligence
Activities Prior and Subsequent
to the Ratification of the Japanese
Peace Treaty. (IAC-D-34/1)

10. Action: The recommendations contained in IAC-D-34/1 were approved.

Soviet Defense Capabilities.
(NIE-60)

released in E.O. review (SPIC)
NIE 60 (30 Apr 52) Civil Defense in the USSR

11. Action: In view of the need to make use of all sources in this estimate it was agreed to change the designation of NIE-60 for the purposes of production, with sanitization to be undertaken later if possible. For the present the number of the estimate will not be changed.

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Status of Soviet Atomic
Energy Program. — ? unidentified

12. Action: It was agreed that if anticipated divergences in the semi-annual report were not bridged when the results of the third Soviet atomic test are available, a panel of acceptable outside authorities would be asked to review the facts and assist the IAC in arriving at its report. It was further agreed that CIA would notify Congress of the expected delay.

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