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IAC-M-40

13 August 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 13 August 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Lieut. General Clarence R. Huebner, USA (Ret.), Central
Intelligence Agency
Vice Admiral Bernhard H. Bieri, USN (Ret.), Central
Intelligence Agency
Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Paul Borel, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Robert E. Long, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Mose L. Harvey, Department of State
Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel James F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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HR 70-14
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Soviet Position at the
San Francisco Conference

1. Discussion: Dr. Langer asked whether a crash estimate would be required on this question. It was reported that State is preparing such an estimate and that it would be shortly submitted for comment by the IAC agencies.

Probability of Communist
Assault on Japan in 1951.
(SE-11)

2. Action: This paper was approved with certain changes and with a phrasing of the conclusions acceptable to the majority. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of Naval Intelligence dissented from the accepted wording. This paper will be issued with a second annex on indications directed to certain individuals only; no reference will be made to this annex in the body of the paper.

3. Discussion: It was observed by Admiral Johnson that since the statement of Soviet capabilities for an invasion of Japan was made without reference to U. S. defensive capabilities, this fact should be mentioned in a footnote. This suggestion, it was noted, highlights an increasingly important problem in making estimates of this character. Admiral Johnson also questioned the stated capability of the Communists to follow up an initial landing, noting that optimum conditions for the offensive would be required. Inasmuch as such conditions would not realistically obtain, a conditional phrasing, indicating that this capability in fact assumed optimum conditions, was substituted.

4. The major discussion was on the ultimate conclusion of the paper: the likelihood of a major Communist assault on Japan. State, Army, Air Force and the Joint Staff felt that a Soviet assault on Japan would be unlikely except in the event of global war. The National Estimates Board and Navy were of the opinion that even if the Kremlin decided to precipitate general war in 1951 it is unlikely that the Kremlin would undertake a major campaign against Japan in 1951. AEC and FBI abstained from expressing a view on this point. General Smith, observing that the ground appeared equally firm in support of both possible answers, accepted the majority view as that which should appear in the text of the estimate, even though on the advice of his own staff he dissented therefrom. He pointed out, however, that his dissent under these circumstances was not to be considered a precedent.