

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information
IAC-D-55/2
13 January 1953INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEETHE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

1. Attached hereto is a revision of IAC-D-55 (Final) as a result of initial proposed changes by the agencies.

2. It would be appreciated if the agencies' representatives would meet in Room 2C-468 in the Pentagon at 2:00 o'clock Monday afternoon to propose changes. It is hoped that the next revision can be submitted to the IAC for approval.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

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I. National Estimates

1. The organization and procedures established since October 1950 for the production of national intelligence estimates have now been proved in practice. These estimates draw upon the totality of resources of the entire intelligence community and can be improved only as we strengthen these resources. These estimates derive authority from the manner of their preparation and from the active participation of all the responsible intelligence agency heads in their final review and adoption. Agency dissents are recorded where estimates would be watered down by further efforts to secure agreement.

2. The production program for national intelligence estimates provides for a re-examination of existing estimates on critical areas or problems as well as the production of new estimates designed to improve the coverage of important topics. Special effort is being made to schedule the completion of basic estimates on the USSR in advance of the review of budget estimates and NATO plans.

3. Close coordination between planners and policy-makers on the one hand, and the intelligence community on the other, is continually being pressed in an effort to make the intelligence produced

both useful and timely. The IAC mechanism is most useful when the NSC is furnished with a coordinated intelligence view in advance of the time when the policy is fixed.

4. "Post-mortems," designed to reveal deficiencies in the preparation of selected estimates and to stimulate corrective action, will continue to be held. The experience of past months in this procedure, particularly as applied in the case of estimates on the Far East, indicates that the results are beneficial. ✓

II. Political, Social and Cultural

1. The status of political, social and cultural intelligence is very good, due allowance being made for the paucity of information on the Soviet Orbit and the difficulties of collecting it. Facilities for the production of such intelligence, however, are adequate only for the most urgent needs of the IAC agencies. Less pressing demands can be met only partially and inadequately.

2. The principal deficiency in this field is in the effort devoted to the research-in-depth on which sound estimates and analysis on current development depend. Only the USSR can be regarded as adequately covered in this respect, with China, the European Satellites and Western Europe nearly so. On medium priority areas, such as Iran, Indochina and India, there is considerable lag between production of immediate interpretation and analysis of longer-

term factors. On low priority areas, such as Africa and Latin-America, such factors receive even less study. World Communism, outside the Soviet Orbit, is satisfactorily covered with respect to party strength, political maneuverings and relationships to the Moscow propaganda lines. Research into matters of organization, financial support and infiltration into political and social organizations is inadequate.

3. The agencies have applied special effort to developing intelligence on China. Surveys of present programs both within the Government and in private research are making possible an integrated and maximal use of resources.

III. Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Operational Intelligence

Intelligence needed in support of current military operations in Korea is generally excellent. Information on installations and on developments in Manchuria such as the movement and activities of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean units north of the Yalu River, is inadequate. Reliable information of the enemy's long-range plans and intentions is practically non-existent. Little improvement in these deficiencies can be expected in the near future despite our efforts.

2. Order of Battle and Equipment

Order of battle and equipment information on the USSR, Communist China, and - to a lesser degree - the European satellites is partial and inadequate, primarily because of the extreme difficulty of collection. Information on the navies of the Soviet Bloc is, however, in general satisfactory and adequate because of the greater accessibility of naval forces to observation. However, intelligence on Communist Bloc units and equipment in most areas with which the United States or nations friendly to the United States are in contact is more nearly complete and reliable. Coverage on order of battle intelligence and equipment is generally adequate in respect of nations outside of the Iron Curtain, except in the case of some neutral nations for reason of circumstances beyond our control.

3. Targeting

The assembly and analysis of encyclopedic target data on economic and industrial vulnerabilities is well along for the Soviet Orbit and is in intermediate research stages for Western Europe and the Far East; increased research emphasis is being placed upon military targets. Current target systems studies are reasonably adequate to support joint operational planning but more vigorous data collection efforts will be required to maintain these studies on a current basis. In particular, target intelligence required to counter the Soviet atomic threat is handicapped by gaps in current information on Soviet weapons, stockpiling arrangements and delivery capabilities. Production of priority combat target materials is almost complete for the USSR but coverage varies considerably for the Satellite and approach areas. Finally, extensive tactical target coverage has been completed on areas adjoining the Korean theater but is still in initial stages elsewhere.

4. Support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The United States has filled NATO requests with the best available intelligence consistent with the National Disclosure Policy. In addition to providing intelligence to assist in the establishment of basic intelligence files for the NATO echelons, the U. S. continues to furnish releasable current studies and reports pertinent to the area and the mission of the NATO major commands.

IV. Economic Intelligence Research

1. Foreign economic intelligence on the free world presents few serious problems, mainly those that arise from the wealth of material and multiplicity of sources. But for the Soviet Bloc such intelligence is far from satisfactory. Apart from aggregate statistics of dubious reliability published by the Soviet governments, the intelligence community is confined to exploiting a diminishing flow of low-grade data much of which is becoming increasingly out-of-date. Only by taking advantage of every possible item of information in the course of a comprehensive, thoroughly planned, and coordinated study can national-security needs for knowledge of the Bloc's economic capabilities and vulnerabilities be met. This means in turn willingness to subordinate ephemeral requirements to the long-range program and a resolute and imaginative attack on problems of centralized indexing and exploitation of all pertinent materials, whether overt or classified. Within the limits set by accessibility of material, the next twelve months should see the production of individual industry studies of far greater substance than any recently available, and these should form the foundation for undertaking inter-industry studies and other over-all analyses with hope of considerably more definite results than heretofore.

2. In the field of economic warfare and support for collective controls, machinery has been established to speed up the processing and evaluation of spot data into intelligence on which action can be taken by the Economic Defense Advisory Committee and the covert services. It is expected that the newly established coordinating committee will assist in bringing available intelligence more quickly and fully to bear on questions arising under this program.

3. The target analysis and production activities outlined in Section III, Armed Forces Intelligence, involve the large-scale processing of foreign economic and technological data. Because of expanding production commitments, existing target research capabilities remain inadequate,

V. Scientific and Technical

1. Scientific and technical intelligence regarding the USSR and Satellites made important progress during 1952; however, current knowledge is still inadequate in terms of national security needs. In order to obtain sounder scientific estimates in many fields, it is now more apparent than ever that there is a need for serious interagency study and development of new and unconventional technical means of collecting scientific intelligence information. Initial efforts with this type of collection show considerable promise, and the development and expansion of these and other techniques is being explored.

2. With the concurrence of the IAC, the DCI has issued a directive delineating areas of dominant interests in the general field of scientific and technical intelligence, allocating primary production responsibility between CIA and the departments of the Department of Defense, and establishing a Scientific Estimates Committee primarily concerned with integrating scientific intelligence opinion for the purposes of national intelligence. Coordination of technical intelligence among the military intelligence agencies exists with liaison with CIA.

3. There has been continued improvement in our knowledge of Soviet accomplishments in the production of fissionable materials

and their conversion to atomic weapons. Intelligence estimates on the status of USSR plutonium production in mid-1953 are now reasonably sound, and good bases have been established for estimating Soviet capabilities for future expansion of the production of fissionable materials. Nothing is known on Soviet U-235 output, and more important, there is still no evidence of value on which to base an estimate of their thermonuclear program.

4. Scientific and technical intelligence on conventional military weapons and equipment of all types is good so far as standardized items in current use are concerned. Necessarily knowledge of weapons improvements in many cases must await Service use. In regard to development of new aircraft, information is partial and inadequate especially with respect to all-weather interceptors.

5. Knowledge of current Soviet guided missiles programs is poor although certain projects based on German developments are fairly well known.

6. While our knowledge of Soviet biological and chemical warfare programs has been poor, steps among the agencies have been undertaken which may result in improvement during the coming year.

7. Major gaps exist in the intelligence on basic scientific research of the countries behind the Iron Curtain, and present estimates of long-range development are very weak. However,

judgment of the current status of over-all Soviet scientific research and development is believed to be sound. During the next year, further improvements, particularly in long-range predictions, are expected to result from present plans for improving overt collection of pertinent information, a more complete and systematic exploitation of open scientific literature, and a concerted intelligence research effort on basic foreign scientific activities.

8. Several important intelligence "finds" in Soviet electronics and telecommunications were made during 1952; and considerable progress has been made in providing more adequate national intelligence on Soviet air defense capabilities; but we are still not in a satisfactory position in regard to this vital problem. Increased efforts are required, and new arrangements among the agencies may be necessary to insure more concentrated attention.

VI. Psychological Intelligence

Overt and covert propaganda psychological warfare programs have developed to an unprecedented degree in the past two years. The intelligence needs of these programs fall largely within the framework of political and sociological intelligence. The orientation and organization of the material for the psychological warfare user calls for unaccustomed depth and detail both in the field reporting and in analysis. State is initiating a reorganization designed to increase coordination of governmental and private research in this field. This coordination in conjunction with the integration of operational research programs under the proposed psychological committee of the Research and Development Board should insure optimum use of what sources exist.

VII. Geographic Intelligence

1. Geographic research of IAC agencies on foreign areas, including evaluations of foreign mapping activities, is providing regional reports and staff studies for policy and operational planning. Coordinated geographic and map intelligence studies are also undertaken in support of the NIS program.

2. Current geographic and mapping information on the Soviet Bloc and adjacent areas is grossly inadequate. Geographic intelligence research gives particular attention to the regional analysis of those geographic facts that are required in support of planning and operational intelligence for these areas. Within CIA, emphasis is also placed on the study of current developments in Soviet mapping activities and programs.

VIII. Basic Intelligence

1. The program of National Intelligence Surveys (NIS), which was begun in 1949 as an interdepartmental cooperative venture, was designed to meet the U. S. Government's needs for encyclopedic factual intelligence on a world-wide basis. Since the NIS program was begun 1,490 individual sections have been produced on 59 of the 108 NIS areas, which is the equivalent of approximately 23 complete NIS. Based upon the rate of production established during the last quarter of FY 1952, a production goal of the equivalent of approximately 10 complete NIS has been set for FY 1952, and production to

1 January 1953 indicates that there will be substantial attainment of this goal.

2. NIS production is scheduled in accordance with JCS priorities and intelligence agency capabilities. Limitations of the latter have precluded production of NIS on all JCS high priority areas and made it necessary to undertake partial surveys on some areas. However, NIS production on the group of 24 areas of highest priority is approximately 45% complete, whereas the entire program is about 22% complete. NIS on eight individual areas are over 75% complete, and five of these are in the JCS high priority list. Geographic research support for NIS has been excellent.

3. The quality of the NIS is good and can be expected to improve as the gaps in information are filled and revisions are published under the Maintenance Program which was started in FY 1952. Coordination within and between all IAC and non-IAC agencies engaged in the NIS program is excellent and suitable liaison is maintained with the JCS.

IX. Warning of Attack - Current Intelligence

1. As noted above, factual information on the Soviet orbit is partial and inadequate. Accordingly, conclusions concerning Soviet and Communist intentions to initiate hostilities at any given time must be tentative generalizations drawn from inadequate evidence.

They are often based on estimates of the over-all situation rather than on detailed factual information.

2. The IAC Watch Committee provides a sound foundation for extracting maximum benefit from partial and inadequate information. In supporting the work of the committee, the intelligence agencies make elaborate and careful cross-checks of information from all sources against an exhaustive analysis of possible indicators of Soviet intentions. This method is not relied on exclusively; other approaches are constantly being tried.

3. There is no guarantee that intelligence will be able to give adequate warning of attack prior to actual detection of hostile formations. Certain last-minute defensive and offensive preparations on the Soviet periphery may, however, be detected: opportunity for detection of indications of Soviet or satellite attack varies from fair in the border areas of Germany and Korea to extremely poor in the Transcaucasus and Southeast Asia. Each agency maintains its own 24-hour Watch arrangements to handle any information that is received.

4. In general there has been improvement during the past two years in the ability of current intelligence to provide prompt notice and preliminary evaluations of events and developments in the Soviet as well as in the neutral and friendly areas. This

improvement is attributable to increased skill and knowledge of intelligence analysts and to a deepening sense of common purpose among the IAC agencies.

X. Collection

1. The Foreign Service

In general, the collection activities of the Foreign Service are satisfactory. Intelligence needs are met most adequately in the political field, less so in certain aspects of the economic field, and least satisfactorily in the scientific, technical and psychological fields. These deficiencies are generally attributable to a lack of specialized competence in those fields which are not closely related to the basic diplomatic functions of the Foreign Service. Remedial action has been taken by establishing a comprehensive economic reporting program and a continuing program of providing Foreign Service posts with more complete and effective guidance on intelligence needs. Additional remedial measures in progress concern the greater use of overseas personnel of certain operational programs in collecting basic intelligence information, particularly in the psychological and sociological fields; the recognition of the role of the Foreign Service in the national intelligence effort through the revision of the Foreign Service Manual to include for the first time specific and detailed intelligence instructions.

A study has recently been completed on possible measures to meet needs for basic scientific information.

2. Service Attache System

The Service Attache System furnishes extensive useful military information on countries outside the Iron Curtain. Attaches in the Soviet-bloc countries obtain and transmit a considerable volume of valuable information although, under the restrictions imposed on them by Communist governments, the coverage which they provide cannot be considered adequate. The Service Attache System has been strengthened since the beginning of the Korean conflict through the opening of new offices and the assignment of additional officers to important posts. Constant efforts are being made to improve the collection capabilities of Service Attaches by the development of new collection guides and techniques.

3. Overseas Commands

Armed Forces Commands in Europe are active and moderately successful in collecting information. While intelligence collection on the Soviet Union itself is partial and inadequate, it is good in the Eastern Zones of Germany and Austria. Considerable information is gathered by European Commands from returned PW's, escapees, and refugees.

Collection of intelligence in the Far East is adequate on

friendly and neutral areas but is partial and inadequate on Communist China and Eastern Siberia. Tripartite Agreements for exchange of intelligence on Southeast Asia have considerably enhanced collection capabilities in the area and are expected to improve this situation.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Because of overriding considerations of other than an intelligence nature, the Armed Services have not as yet exploited fully their overflight capabilities in aerial reconnaissance. Photo reconnaissance capabilities have increased, with a resulting improvement in contributions in this field. The contributions of radar reconnaissance are only fair, as compared to photo reconnaissance, but are being improved. Photo interpretation capability is generally deficient in the Armed Services; corrective measures are underway. Research and development effort is being expended on free balloons, piloted and pilotless vehicles ("guided missiles") and satellites to overcome a lack of special reconnaissance vehicles. Research continues in the improvement of various detecting devices. Recently, CIA established a small support and liaison group to meet its requirements in the field of photo intelligence.

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5. Espionage and Counterespionage

As the Council is well aware, the covert intelligence collection activity against the Soviet and Satellite orbit is fraught with difficulties. Intensified efforts to produce strategic intelligence have produced only a modicum of success in relation to our national requirements, which are being levied ever more heavily upon the covert collection mechanism as the overt avenues of approach are closed. The lack of significant progress is chargeable to a number of very real obstacles, which become glaringly apparent on close examination.

The first and most obvious difficulties stem from the brutal efficiency of the Soviet security organizations. This efficiency is gradually and inexorably being superimposed on its Satellites. Tightening controls around and within the whole Soviet orbit have considerably reduced the opportunities for penetration, and seriously threaten existing successful operations. This factor is further complicated by a paucity of indigenous agent personnel of sufficiently strong motivation to undertake the physical dangers involved. To counter these additional roadblocks, the major weight of effort for covert collection is being redirected towards alternative means of approach to strategic targets. A further difficulty is caused by the necessity for assigning certain of our most senior and competent intelligence officers to the support of other types of covert operations.

6. Domestic Collection: NSCID No. 7

Through offices located in key cities throughout the US, CIA performs a service of common concern in actively collecting foreign intelligence information from business, financial, educational, and other non-governmental organizations and private individuals. The cooperation of these organizations and individuals has consistently been, and continues to be, excellent. Particular effort has been recently directed to the collection of data on foreign scientific and technical developments, and to the exploitation of the dwindling sources of economic and political information on Communist China. Because the interests of the intelligence-producing agencies have become more sharply directed toward the Soviet Orbit, the domestic collection effort is increasingly pointed in that direction, with particular emphasis on foreign nationality groups within the United States, defectors, and other recently arrived aliens.

7. Foreign Radio Broadcasts: NSCID No. 6

a. NSCID No. 6 - Monitoring

Immediate and extensive coverage of foreign news, information, and propaganda broadcasts is provided by a world-wide monitoring network, maintained by CIA as a service of common concern. A Moscow broadcast can be received in Washington in translation or summary within one hour. Coverage of the Soviet Orbit is excellent,

except for parts of Asia and the Baltic States. Progress made during 1952 towards closing these gaps included: the activation of a station at Hokkaido, Japan, to monitor northeast Asian broadcasts; negotiations with the British Broadcasting Company for monitoring of Baltic and northwestern USSR transmitters by the BBC under existing reciprocal arrangements; and a monitoring survey in Pakistan to explore the possibilities of covering hitherto un-monitorable Central Asian broadcasts.

b. Propaganda Analysis

In support of psychological warfare activities and overt programs such as the VOA, has been further improved. Quantitative and content analysis of radio propaganda has been supplemented by some analysis of published propaganda and press material. More rapid and specialized support on radio propaganda is now provided to "watch" groups and estimating offices.

8. Foreign Materials and Equipment

The collection and technical analysis of Soviet Orbit products has continued to aid in the assessment of USSR scientific, economic, and technological capabilities, although the procurement during 1952 of significant items has not come up to expectations. Owing to the relative stability of the fighting front in Korea, the amount of captured materiel of intelligence importance has declined. At present

the most productive channels for selective procurement of Soviet manufactured items and raw materials are official US missions and covert CIA components overseas. Items procured reasonably successfully through such channels during the year included power tools, pharmaceuticals, rubber products, and metallurgical samples. Improvement in the coordination, through the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency, of technical analysis requirements and exploitation activities has resulted in a greater yield of information from Soviet objects acquired.

9. Monitoring of Radio Jamming

Under NSC 66/1 the agencies undertook the construction and organization of a monitoring system to obtain information on Soviet jamming and related activities in the radio frequency spectrum. A pilot operation involving a very limited number of stations is being established. Adequate information as to the extent of Soviet jamming, concentration of the jamming stations, and related information must await the implementation of a much-expanded program.

XI. Support and Collation Facilities

1. Availability of Materials

With a few exceptions, all pertinent foreign positive intelligence, both raw and finished, is distributed among all interested IAC agencies. In addition to the distribution of current material, there is a continuing effort to locate and extract pertinent information from the large volume of intelligence material that was collected during and after the war, and from other collections in overseas files. The sheer volume of these materials presents formidable and as yet unsolved problems. No IAC agency, utilizing existing techniques, is in a position to record and store all this material and to make the information contained therein readily available to analysts requiring it. Remedy for this problem is being sought through the refinement of agency responsibilities and the development of machine indexing techniques.

2. Library Facilities

While the libraries of the IAC agencies are not yet self-sufficient, they are equipped to satisfy most of the major needs of their users. Their utility can be increased and their effectiveness can be improved in connection with current plans for improving central reference facilities,

3. Biographic Information

Each IAC agency maintains files of biographic data on foreign personalities for its own particular purposes and makes such data available to the other agencies upon request. Excellent data can be made available on political, military, and scientific personalities outside the Iron Curtain; coverage within the Soviet Orbit is necessarily partial and inadequate. Personalities in the economic and industrial fields are poorly covered at present, although there is considerable information available. Means of improvement are currently being studied. Arrangements have been made between CIA and State for the latter to meet CIA needs for biographic data in the political, cultural, and social fields.

4. Graphics Material

The several Defense agencies and CIA each maintain photographic and related documentary libraries consistent with their requirements and responsibilities. Material in each library is available within the IAC agencies, continuing effort must be exerted to increase the quality and quantity of this highly important source of intelligence.

5. Map Procurement and Reference Services

Procurement of foreign-published maps and information on mapping abroad is coordinated by a staff within CIA serving an

interagency map committee. Results during the past three years have proved the effectiveness of overt collection of maps and related information through the Foreign Service Geographic Attache program. Increased emphasis is being placed on the collection of maps and engineering drawings from domestic sources and Service Attache channels are also being used. The currently published foreign maps required for intelligence activities are received on a continuing basis through exchange arrangements between the Department of State and many foreign official mapping agencies. These exchanges are in addition to those of an operational character maintained by the Military Services. Excellent map reference services in support of intelligence requirements are maintained by close working arrangements between the map libraries serving the intelligence areas.

6. Foreign Language Publications

The exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes is presently undertaken in varying degrees by each agency. CIA, in addition to satisfying its own requirements, conducts an exploitation service for the benefit of the intelligence community. Currently, the IAC agencies are considering an NSCID with reference to the exploitation of foreign language publications which should result in improved coordination in procurement,

exploitation, and indexing for intelligence purposes.

Translation is also done by each agency, though coordination is effected to prevent duplication. Overseas abstracting from foreign language publications is presently performed at a number of diplomatic posts. This work is coordinated with similar CIA and departmental activities in the U. S. to avoid duplication and to make the maximum use of available linguists.

Most publications needed for the intelligence effort are now being obtained, though major gaps exist in regard to Soviet Bloc materials. Through overt and covert channels there is an increasing effort to procure procurement in this latter category.